JUDGMENT : (1) Is there any subtle difference between the question of locus standi in the case of initiating criminal proceedings and in the claim of outsiders to come on record in pending criminal proceedings? (2) Can outsiders be permitted to file criminal revisions challenging an order of discharge under Section 239 Cr.P.C., especially when the prosecuting agency has preferred a criminal revision, challenging the very same order, that too within time? (3) Whether the principles of res judicata or constructive res judicata are applicable to criminal proceedings? 2. This Court has come to a strange situation, wherein a number of Criminal Revisions are being filed by different persons styling themselves as third parties, who are interested in the outcome of the proceedings before the court below in CC No.44/2011. All these Criminal Revisions are directed against common order dated 05.11.2013 in Crl.M.P. Nos.83/2012, 106/2013, 24/2012, 102/2013 and 84/2012 in CC No.44/2011 of the court below. The learned Special Judge (SPE/CBI), Thiruvananthapuram has discharged A1 to A5, A7 and A8 in CC No.44/2011 through the said common order under Section 239 Cr.P.C. It is a case wherein the CBI, being the premier investigating agency of the country, conducted an investigation and filed a final report before the court below, alleging offences punishable under Section 120B read with Section 420 IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, against the accused. 3. The aforesaid accused preferred various Crl.M.Ps. before the court below seeking discharge under Section 239 Cr.P.C. The CBI has preferred Crl.R.P. No.206/2014 before this Court challenging the said order of discharge passed by the court below under Section 397 read with Section 401 Cr.P.C. Sri. T.P. Nandakumar, who is witness No.108 in the final report, has sought for leave to file Crl.R.P. No.2306/2013. True that it is numbered. Sri. K.M. Shajahan has sought for leave to file a Crl.R.P. and leave has been granted, whereby he has preferred Crl.R.P. No.73/2015. One Sri. K.R. Unnithan has also filed a Crl.R.P. and has sought for leave. The said Crl.R.P. has not been numbered. 4. Apart from all the above, two other persons have approached this Court for getting themselves impleaded in Crl.R.P. No.206/2014. It seems that the matter involved has assumed much public importance, and attracted by the public interest in the matter, several others may also attempt to come on record. The said Crl.R.P. has not been numbered. 4. Apart from all the above, two other persons have approached this Court for getting themselves impleaded in Crl.R.P. No.206/2014. It seems that the matter involved has assumed much public importance, and attracted by the public interest in the matter, several others may also attempt to come on record. Therefore, this Court is constrained to consider the legality and maintainability of the Crl.R.Ps. preferred by witness No.108 as well as the other outsiders, who have approached this Court as third parties. 5. Heard the maintainability of these revisions, except Crl.R.P. No.206/2014, in extenso. Heard Sri. Chandrasekharan Pillai, learned Standing counsel for the petitioner in Crl.R.P. No. 206/2014, learned Senior Counsel Sri. Nagendra Rai J, for the petitioner in Crl.R.P. No. 2306/2013, Sri. K.M. Shajahan, the petitioner in Crl.R.P. No.73/2015 as party in person, Adv. Sri. D. Anil Kumar for the petitioner in the unnumbered Crl.R.P. Heard learned Senior Counsel Sri. M.K. Damodaran and Sri. B. Raman Pillai and Adv. Sri. K.V. Sohan for the party respondents. 6. It has been argued at the instance of the third party revision petitioners that the said petitioners have locus standi in the matter, since the matter is one relating to the Prevention of Corruption Act in which a huge amount of the public money is involved. Per contra, learned counsel for the party respondents as well as the learned Standing Counsel for the CBI have argued that the said petitioners and other third parties have no locus standi to come on record or to file separate criminal revisions. 7. The impugned order was passed under Section 239 Cr.P.C. According to the learned counsel for the respondents, any outsiders have no locus standi to interfere in a matter wherein the accused were discharged under Section 239 Cr.P.C. or 227 Cr.P.C. It has also been pointed out that this is not a case wherein the accused were acquitted after trial. It has also been pointed out that in the case of an acquittal, if the prosecuting agency is not preferring an appeal challenging the acquittal, a private person aggrieved can prefer a criminal revision challenging such judgment of acquittal. The impugned order is an order passed under Section 239 Cr.P.C. as an order of discharge, and not as a judgment of acquittal. 8. The impugned order is an order passed under Section 239 Cr.P.C. as an order of discharge, and not as a judgment of acquittal. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner in Crl.R.P. No.2306/2013 has relied on the decision in State of Kerala v. Narayani Amma Kamala Devi and Others [ AIR 1962 SC 1530 ] and argued that the revisional power of the High Court as it then stood under Section 439 Cr.P.C., could be exercised at the instance of any person. Citing the observations made by the Apex Court in paragraph 6 of the decision in State of Kerala (supra), the learned counsel has pointed out that in the case of any proceedings, the record of which has been called for by itself or which has been reported for orders or which otherwise comes to its knowledge, the High Court can exercise the revisional jurisdiction and, therefore, the High Court can entertain a criminal revision being moved either by the convicted person himself or by any other person or suo motu on the basis of its own knowledge derived from any source whatsoever without being moved by any person at all. Therefore, according to the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner in Crl.R.P. Nos.2306 of 2013, the said revision petitioner is entitled to move this Court to bring to its knowledge the grounds of revision available in the matter. 9. Reliance has also been placed by the learned Senior Counsel to the decision in Rameshchandra J. Thakkar v. Assandas Parmanand Jhaveri, State of Maharashtra [ (1973) 3 SCC 884 ], wherein it was held that revisional jurisdiction can be exercised by the High Court, being moved either by the convicted person himself or by any other person or suo motu on the basis of its own knowledge derived from any source whatsoever without being moved by any person at all. It has also been pointed out that all that is necessary to invite the High Court's powers of revision into operation is such information as to make the High Court think that an order made by a subordinate court is fit for the exercise of its powers of revision. It has also been pointed out that all that is necessary to invite the High Court's powers of revision into operation is such information as to make the High Court think that an order made by a subordinate court is fit for the exercise of its powers of revision. Reliance has also been placed on Pratap v. State of U.P. and Others [ (1973) 3 SCC 690 ], wherein it was held by the majority that - “Under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the High Court has got ample powers to issue notice to show cause why his sentence should not be enhanced on the basis of a revision petition filed by a private party and the power of the High Court under this section is one which the High Court can impose suo motu and all that a person filing a revision petition under that section does is to draw the court's attention to an illegal, improper or incorrect finding, sentence or order of a subordinate court. The fact that the Government did not do so does not affect the powers of the High Court under that Section. “ 10. It assumes paramount importance in the finding entered by the Apex Court in Pratap (supra) that “The fact that the government did not do so does not affect the powers of the High Court under that Section”. The aforesaid decisions relate to cases in which the State or the prosecuting agency had not chosen to challenge the orders or judgments involved therein. Here is a case wherein the CBI has preferred the Crl.R.P. validly within the time prescribed. Admittedly, the Crl.R.P. preferred by the CBI in the matter is not barred by limitation. The same has been admitted by this Court and records have been called for. 11. The question to be decided is, in such a context, when the investigating agency and the prosecuting agency has filed a Crl.R.P. challenging the impugned order, whether any of the outsiders can be permitted to poke their nose in the matter by preferring separate criminal revisions? It is true that Crl.R.P. No.2306/2013 was the first one filed in the matter. At the same time, even the petitioner in Crl.R.P. No.2306/2013 has no case that the CBI has not filed a Crl.R.P. within the prescribed period. It is true that Crl.R.P. No.2306/2013 was the first one filed in the matter. At the same time, even the petitioner in Crl.R.P. No.2306/2013 has no case that the CBI has not filed a Crl.R.P. within the prescribed period. The question whether a revision filed by a third party even if it is the first in any point of time can be considered or can be maintained, has also to be considered. 12. Both the learned Senior Counsel Sri. M.K. Damodaran and Sri. B. Raman Pillai have pointed out that what is under challenge in these Criminal Revisions is the order of discharge. The learned Senior Counsel have pointed out that the matters which arise for consideration at the time of passing an order under Section 239 Cr.P.C. As per Section 239 Cr.P.C., if upon considering the police report and the documents sent with it under Section 173 and making such examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate considers and charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the accused, and record his reasons for doing so. From the wordings of Section 239 Cr.P.C. as well as Section 227 Cr.P.C. it is evident that the concerned Magistrate's Court or the Sessions Court, as the case may be, at the stage of passing of an order of discharge or for framing charges, shall consider the police report and the documents sent along with it under Section 173 Cr.P.C. Of course, Section 239 Cr.P.C. stipulates examination, if any, of the accused by the Magistrate, as he thinks necessary, and also for giving an opportunity to the prosecution and the accused of being heard. Thereafter, if the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the accused. 13. It is a trite law that what can be looked into by the concerned court at the time of exercising the powers under Section 239 Cr.P.C. or Section 227 Cr.P.C., are the contents of the final report and the documents sent along with it under Section 173 Cr.P.C. The court shall also hear the prosecution and the accused. Such an opportunity to the accused will not extend to have an opportunity to produce documents on his side. Such an opportunity to the accused will not extend to have an opportunity to produce documents on his side. The accused or any person other than the prosecution have no power to produce any other documents for the verification of the court at the time of exercising the powers under Section 239 or Section 227 Cr.P.C. The examination of the accused, and hearing of the prosecution and the accused, also shall be confined to the matters placed before court by the prosecution by way of the final report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. and the documents presented along with it. Therefore, any extraneous matters cannot be considered at that stage. The concerned court cannot entertain any other extraneous matters either at the time of passing an order of discharge or passing an order for the framing of charges. 14. The learned Standing Counsel for the CBI has vehemently canvassed an argument that it is for the CBI and CBI alone who can prefer a Criminal Revision in the matter as the CBI alone was the investigating agency, and the prosecuting agency before the court below. The CBI has filed a Criminal Revision within time. An argument has also been canvassed to the effect that if any private person is permitted to intervene in the matter at this stage, it would be detrimental to the interest of the prosecution in the matter. 15. The learned Senior Counsel Sri. M.K. Damodaran has invited the attention of this Court to the decision in Panchhi and others v. State of U.P.[ (1998) 7 SCC 177 ] rendered by a three Judges Bench of the Apex Court. In paragraph 7 of the above decision it was held: “We heard Shri R.K. Jain, learned Senior Advocate who appeared for the appellant and Shri R.B. Malhotra, learned Senior Advocate for the State of U.P., Smt. Indira Jaising, Senior Advocate prayed for allowing the National Commission for Women to intervene presumably to bolster up the cause that Ramshree must be saved from the gallows. We could not permit the move for intervention in this appeal for the obvious reason that under the Code of Criminal Procedure, the National Commission for Women or any other organization cannot have locus standi in this murder case.” 16. Reliance has also been placed on Simranjith Singh Mann v. Union of India and another [ (1992) 4 SCC 653 ]. Reliance has also been placed on Simranjith Singh Mann v. Union of India and another [ (1992) 4 SCC 653 ]. It was held therein that if the aggrieved party invokes the jurisdiction of the Apex Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, that may stand on a different footing as in the case of A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak. It was however held therein that it should not mean that in all such cases the aggrieved party has a remedy under Section 32 of the Constitution. 17. In S.P. Gupta v. Union of India [1981 Supp SCC 87] it was held: “But we must be careful to see that the member of the public, who approaches the court in cases of this kind, is acting bona fide and not for personal gain or private profit or political motivation or other oblique consideration. The court must not allow its process to be abused by politicians and others....” The said observations were made while discussing the question of locus standi in public interest litigation. The said words of caution were uttered while expanding the scope of locus standi rule. 18. Reliance has also been placed on Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary and others [ (1992) 4 SCC 305 ] wherein it was held: “The Special Judge disposed of the petition holding, "Shri H.S. Chowdhary has no locus standi to claim the reliefs sought for in the petition." In the revision petition, Mr. H.S. Chowdhary took certain additional grounds stating that the First Information Report has not disclosed the commission of any cognizable offence and the CBI has gone wrong in registering the FIR in the absence of any additional evidence which were not available before the JPC and that the Letter Rogatory ought not have been issued without recording evidence. The High Court dismissed the revision petition as being not maintainable on the sole ground of locus standi and did not go to other questions of law raised by Mr. Chowdhary. Only for the first time before this Court, the parties are litigating on the above stated propositions of law which except for one or two have neither been raised before the Courts below nor agitated. Chowdhary. Only for the first time before this Court, the parties are litigating on the above stated propositions of law which except for one or two have neither been raised before the Courts below nor agitated. Strictly speaking, as the present appeals are preferred challenging only the judgment of the High Court dated 19.12.90, this Court is called upon to examine the tenability of the reasons given by the High Court as regards the locus standi of Mr. H.S. Chowdhary and in addition, the invocation of the suo motu action of the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. This Court while disposing of Criminal Appeal No. 306/91 filed by Mr. H.S. Chowdhary challenging the first part of the order of the High Court dismissing his revision petition on the ground that he has no locus standi, has confined its consideration only on that point. However, with regard to the various questions of law, we expressed our view in our earlier Order as follows; Even if there are million questions of law to be deeply gone into and examined in a criminal case of this nature registered against specified accused persons, it is for them and them alone to raise all such questions and challenge the proceedings initiated against them at the appropriate time before the proper forum and not for third parties under the garb of public interest litigants.” 19. It was held in paragraph 46 of Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary (supra): “We have also given the reasons for not dealing with specific propositions raised by the respective counsel in our earlier Order observing thus: Therefore, under these circumstances one should not lose sight of the significant fact that in case this Court pronounces its final opinion or conclusions on the issues other than the general issues raised by the appellants as public interest litigants, without hearing the really affected person/persons, such opinion or conclusions may, in future, in case the investigation culminates in filing a final report become detrimental and prejudicial to the indicated accused persons who would be totally deprived of challenging such opinion or conclusions of this apex Court, even if they happen to come in possession of some valuable material to canvass the correctness of such opinion or conclusions and consequently their vested legal right to defend their case in their own way would be completely nullified by the verdict now sought to be obtained by these public interest litigants. 20. In paragraph 122 of Janata Dal's case (supra), it was held” “The High Court rejected the applications of the interveners as having no right to be impleaded as a consequence of the dismissal of the petition of H.S. Chowdhary on the ground that he has noocus standi. We too in our earlier Order having held that H.S. Chowdhary has no locus standi to file the petition or to invoke the revisional or extraordinary inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Sections 397 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure respectively and that the petition under Article 51-A of the Constitution cannot come within the true meaning and scope of public interest litigation, dismissed the applications of the interveners holding thus: Consequent upon the above conclusions (1) and (2), the appellants namely, Janata Dal, Communist Party of India (Marxist) and Indian Congress (Socialist) who are before this Court equally have no right of seeking their impalement/intervention. For the same reasons, Or. P. Nalla Thampy Thera also has no right to file the Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 114 of 1991 as a public interest litigant. 21. For the same reasons, Or. P. Nalla Thampy Thera also has no right to file the Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 114 of 1991 as a public interest litigant. 21. Reliance has also been placed on the decision in Subramanian Swamy and others v. Raju through Member, Juvenile Justice Board and another [ (2013) 10 SCC 465 ] wherein it was held: “Coming to the second stage of the system of administration of criminal justice in India, this Court in Thakur Ram v. State of Bihar, while examining the right of a third party to invoke the revisional jurisdiction under the 1898 Code, had observed as under: (AIR 912) “.... The criminal law is not, however, to be used as an instrument of wrecking private vengeance by an aggrieved party against the person who, according to that party, had caused injury to it. Barring a few exceptions, in criminal matters the party who is treated as the aggrieved party is the State which is the custodian of the social interests of the community at large and so it is for the State to take all the steps necessary for bringing the person who has acted against the social interests of the community to book.” In Subramanian Swamy's case (supra) the Apex Court has placed reliance on the decision in Panchhi and others v. State of U.P.[ (1998) 7 SCC 177 ]. 22. Learned counsel Sri. K.V. Sohan has invited the attention of this Court to paragraph 8 of the decision in Subramanian Swamy’s case(supra). “The administration of criminal justice in India can be divided into two broad stages at which the machinery operates. The first is the investigation of an alleged offence leading to prosecution and the second is the actual prosecution of the offender in a court of law. The jurisprudence that has evolved over the decades has assigned the primary role and responsibility at both stages to the State through we must hasten to add that in certain exceptional situations there is a recognition of a limited right in a victim or his family members to take part in the process, particularly, at the stage of the trial. The jurisprudence that has evolved over the decades has assigned the primary role and responsibility at both stages to the State through we must hasten to add that in certain exceptional situations there is a recognition of a limited right in a victim or his family members to take part in the process, particularly, at the stage of the trial. The law, however, frowns upon the prohibits any abdication by the State of its role in the matter at each of the stages and, in fact, does not recognise the right of a third party/stranger to participate or even to come to the aid of the State at any of the stages.” 23. The learned Senior Counsel Sri. M.K. Damodaran has invited the attention of this Court to the decision in Nandakumar T.P. v. Renjitha Markose and Others [2013 (4) KHC 315]. That was a case wherein an intervention was sought for by way of getting the petitioner therein impleaded in a Crl.R.P. This Court held in paragraphs 16and 17 that: “16. As rightly pointed out by the learned DGP if it is found that the petitioner has no locus standi to agitate the matter, then it may not be necessary for this Court to go into the merits of the order passed by the Court below. As rightly noticed by the learned DGP if the complainant is aggrieved by the order of the Courts below rejecting her complaint, it is for her to agitate the matter and this Court need not take upon itself the onerous duty of scrutinising the legality, regularity, or propriety of the order passed when the complainant has no grievance regarding the same. The matter may be different if the revision had been filed by the complainant. 17. It is rather unknown in criminal law that a person can claim himself to get impleaded in the proceedings at the revisional stage. While it is usually said that the locus standi concept as such may not be strictly applicable in criminal proceedings since it is accepted principle that criminal law can be set into motion by any person, still the concept may not be altogether be irrelevant in certain circumstances.” 24. When considering the question of locus standi, there is a lot of difference in initiating criminal proceedings and in permitting an outsider to come on record in pending criminal proceedings. When considering the question of locus standi, there is a lot of difference in initiating criminal proceedings and in permitting an outsider to come on record in pending criminal proceedings. Question of locus standi has no relevance for initiating criminal proceedings; whereas, it has relevance in the claim of an outsider to come on record in pending criminal proceedings. The power of the High Court is not to be exercised in a petition which is misconceived, ill-advised and is a typical example of gross abuse of the process of Court. The petition intended for personal gains, though styled as one in public interest, deserves to be dismissed. 25. On going through the scheme of the Code, especially Section 401 Cr.P.C., it is true that the High Court, in the case of any proceeding, the record of which has been called for by itself or which otherwise come to its knowledge, can exercise the powers of a Court of Appeal under Sections 386, 389, 390 and 391, or powers of revision. The stand taken by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that when the High Court can exercise the powers of revision from matters, which otherwise comes to its knowledge, the petitioners cannot be found fault with in their intervention. At the same time, it is a matter of concern that a criminal revision which has already been filed by the prosecuting agency in the same matter, is still pending before this Court. In such case, this court cannot entertain other criminal revisions in the same matter again and again. 26. Based on the decision in Bhagat Ram and another v. The State of Rajasthan and another [ (1972) 2 SCC 466 ], which was followed by H.R. Khanna, J., in State of Rajasthan v. Tarachand Jain [ AIR 1973 SC 2131 ], 'principles of res judicata as well as constructive res judicata' are applicable to criminal proceedings also. The decision in Bhagat Ram (supra) was approved by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak and another [ AIR 1988 SC 1531 ]. When the revision filed by the prosecuting agency is disposed of, that will be the end of all the other revisions. The decision in Bhagat Ram (supra) was approved by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak and another [ AIR 1988 SC 1531 ]. When the revision filed by the prosecuting agency is disposed of, that will be the end of all the other revisions. If as a matter of fact, no revision was filed by the prosecuting agency in the matter, one could have understood the anxiety of the petitioners in coming forward with the revisions. In such a case, especially when public interest is involved in the matter, this Court could have entertained the revisions filed by outsiders through their intervention as third parties. 27. The anxiety forwarded by the petitioners that the CBI may not be expected to prosecute the revision filed by the CBI properly, and therefore, there is possibility of public interest to become frustrated, is also baseless. The CBI is not expected to abandon the Criminal Revision filed by them, when considering the enormous public interest involved in the matter. Over and above it, when the CBI has preferred the revision challenging the impugned common order, it has become the duty of this Court to go into the correctness, legality, regularity or propriety of the impugned common order, irrespective of the fact as to whether the CBI prosecutes the revision properly or not. 28. This is a case wherein none of these petitioners have ever challenged the actions of the CBI in investigating the matter or, in not properly investigating the matter. These petitioners have no case that proper documents were not furnished before the court below. Apart from considering the report under Section 173 Cr.P.C and the records appended with it, no other persons are entitled to produce any documents for the perusal of the court at the stage of Section 239 Cr.P.C. 29. Two other petitioners, who want to get themselves impleaded, have forwarded a case that they have collected some documents and they are in possession of some documents and therefore, they should be permitted to get impleaded in the revision filed by the CBI and in another revision. The same also cannot be permitted. Two other petitioners, who want to get themselves impleaded, have forwarded a case that they have collected some documents and they are in possession of some documents and therefore, they should be permitted to get impleaded in the revision filed by the CBI and in another revision. The same also cannot be permitted. Apart from considering the final report filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C. and the documents appended with it, the court cannot entertain any other evidence at the stage of Section 239 Cr.P.C. In such a case, even if any other persons are in possession of some other documents, even when the same have relevance in the matter, the same is of no use at all. They ought to have challenged the investigation conducted by the CBI or the manner in which it was investigated or the Final Report, through appropriate proceedings, in case, they were entitled to. In the absence of any challenge with regard to the Final Report of the CBI under Section 173 Cr.P.C. or the documents produced along with it, third parties cannot come forward with such documents at this stage and claim that the matter has to be remitted back, so that their documents can be considered. 30. Even if these criminal revisions are allowed and the matter is remitted to the court below, these third parties will not get an opportunity to produce their documents for having considered once again under Section 239 Cr.P.C. Matters being so, the impleading petitions filed by the two persons are liable to be dismissed. 31. Even though the learned counsel for the petitioner in Crl.R.P.No.2306/13 has argued that the petitioner therein is witness No.108 in the Final Report and therefore, he can well maintain a revision, as I observed above, when the CBI has preferred a criminal revision in the matter challenging all aspects, Crl.R.P.No.2306/13 is also not maintainable. Had there been no revision by the prosecuting agency, the said revision could have been entertained. In the light of the criminal revision filed by the prosecuting agency, no other parties can be permitted to prefer criminal revisions in the matter, especially when the challenge is with regard to the discharge under Section 239 Cr.P.C. 32. Had there been no revision by the prosecuting agency, the said revision could have been entertained. In the light of the criminal revision filed by the prosecuting agency, no other parties can be permitted to prefer criminal revisions in the matter, especially when the challenge is with regard to the discharge under Section 239 Cr.P.C. 32. If what is impugned is a judgment of acquittal passed by the court below and the prosecuting agency has not preferred an appeal against acquittal, revision by third parties would have been perfectly maintainable in a matter challenging the judgment of acquittal. When the impugned order here is not a judgment of acquittal, the scope of intervention by third parties is very limited. Their intervention can be entertained only when the prosecuting agency is not challenging the order of discharge. 33. As rightly pointed out by the learned Standing Counsel for the CBI, the continuance of the revisions filed by the third parties may cause hindrance and obstructions to the claims forwarded by the CBI in their revision and the same may even be detrimental to the revision filed by the CBI. Therefore, all such revisions filed by the private persons are liable to be weeded out in the light of the pendency of the Crl.R.P filed by the CBI in the matter. 34. The petitioner, who is appearing as party in person in Crl.R.P.No.73/15 has pointed out that leave has been granted to him and therefore, this Court cannot presently recall the leave granted to the petitioner. This is not a question of recalling the leave granted. Now this Court is considering the maintainability of the criminal revision as such. It is true that leave has been granted to the petitioner to prefer a criminal revision. That is not the end of the road. This Court can consider the maintainability of the criminal revision. This Court is satisfied that the revisions preferred by the third parties cannot be entertained in view of the pendency of the revision filed by the investigating agency and the prosecuting agency. 35. The learned standing counsel for the CBI has sought for a period of two months' time to consider Crl.R.P.No.206/2014 on the ground that the Additional Solicitor General of India has to appear in the matter for the CBI, and the learned Additional Solicitor General requires two months' time to go through and study the matter. 35. The learned standing counsel for the CBI has sought for a period of two months' time to consider Crl.R.P.No.206/2014 on the ground that the Additional Solicitor General of India has to appear in the matter for the CBI, and the learned Additional Solicitor General requires two months' time to go through and study the matter. The said request can only be granted. Two months time is granted to the CBI to engage the learned Additional Solicitor General of India to appear before this Court for CBI in Crl.R.P.No.206/14. It is made clear that this Court has not entered any findings or observations with regard to the merits of the case. In the result, Crl. R.P. Nos. 2306/2013, 73/2015 and unnumbered Crl. R.P. of 2015, and Crl. M.A. No. 423/2015 in Crl. R.P. 73 of 2015 and Crl. M.A No. 2877 of 2016 in Crl. R.P. No.206 of 2014 stand dismissed. Post Crl. R.P. No. 206/2014 for hearing after two months.