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2016 DIGILAW 486 (GUJ)

State of Gujarat v. Dalwadi Jashmat Ranchhod

2016-02-29

G.B.SHAH, K.S.JHAVERI

body2016
JUDGMENT : K.S. Jhaveri, J. 1. Both these appeals are preferred by the State against the judgment and order dated 30.6.2004/1.7.2004 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Surendranagar in Sessions Case No. 65 of 2003, whereby the respondent-original accused was convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 354 and 452 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, "IPC") and sentence of till rising of the Court was imposed. The accused was also directed to pay Rs. 7,000/- towards compensation to the victim. The accused was acquitted from the charges of offence punishable under Section 376 and 506(2) of IPC. Being aggrieved by imposition of sentence, the State has preferred Criminal Appeal No. 1367 of 2004 under Section 377 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for enhancement of sentence, while Criminal Appeal No. 1369 of 2004 is preferred against acquittal of the accused from the charges of offence under Sections 376 and 506(2) of IPC. 2. The facts in brief giving rise to the filing of present appeal are as under:- 2.1 As per the case of the prosecution, on 9.1.1998, the accused entered the house of the complainant when his wife was alone. It is alleged that at about 19.15 hours, when the victim was in the open space of the house, the accused shown a note of Rs. 100/- to her, threatened her with knife. It is also alleged that when the accused threatened the wife of the complainant, he also caught hold of her hand and made an indecent demand. It is alleged that the accused misbehaved with her and tried to outrage her modesty. Since wife of the complainant declined to surrender to such demand, the accused threatened to kill her and committed rape on her. With these allegations, the complaint was filed against the accused. 2.2 On complaint being filed, investigation was carried out and the accused was arrested in connection with the said offence. After completion of investigation, the charge sheet was filed against the accused in the Court of learned Magistrate. However, as the case was exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the same committed to Sessions Court. Thereafter, charge was framed against the accused. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 2.3 During the trial, the prosecution had examined following witnesses:- Sr. No. Name Exh. 1 Complainant-Gangaram Chaturbhai Jambukiya. 11 2 Victim. However, as the case was exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the same committed to Sessions Court. Thereafter, charge was framed against the accused. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 2.3 During the trial, the prosecution had examined following witnesses:- Sr. No. Name Exh. 1 Complainant-Gangaram Chaturbhai Jambukiya. 11 2 Victim. 13 3 Lavjibhai Chaturbhai Dalvadi. 14 4 Ganpatbhai Naranbhai Dalvadi. 15 5 ASI, Narottam Jayantibhai Trivedi. 17 6 ASI, Mansukhbhai Govindbhai Solanki, IO. 19 2.4 The prosecution had also produced and relied upon following documentary evidence:- Sr. No. Name Exhibit 1 Panchnama of the place of offence 10 2 Original Complaint 12 3 Panchnama of arrest of the accused along with knife 16 4 Extract of Station Dairy entry no. 2/98 of Chuda Police Station 18 2.5 At the end of trial, the Court below recorded further statement of accused under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. and thereafter, passed the impugned judgment and order of conviction, which has led to the filing of present appeals. 3. Learned APP, Ms. C.M. Shah appearing for the appellant-State has taken us through the oral as well as documentary evidence and contended that though the trial Court found that accused guilty for the offences punishable under Sections 452 and 354 of IPC, the trial Court has committed an error in imposing lesser sentence upon the accused inspite of voluminous evidence against him. She submitted that the prosecution has examined six witnesses in support of its case. The prosecution has also produced four documentary evidences on the record of the case. However, without appreciating those documentary as well as oral evidence available on the record of the case in their proper perspective, learned Judge has erred in imposing lesser punishment. She also submitted that though the accused is convicted by the trial Court for an offence punishable under Section 452 and 354 of IPC, the trial Court has committed an error in imposing lesser punishment. She also submitted that the offence is serious in nature and no leniency should have been showed towards the accused. She submitted that as per Section 452 of IPC maximum sentence of seven years is provided, however, the trial Court has imposed punishment only till rising of the Court. She also submitted that the offence is serious in nature and no leniency should have been showed towards the accused. She submitted that as per Section 452 of IPC maximum sentence of seven years is provided, however, the trial Court has imposed punishment only till rising of the Court. She also submitted that the accused is also found guilty for the offence punishable under Section 354 of IPC and the punishment for this offence is imprisonment for two years. She, therefore, submitted that the learned trial Judge has rightly convicted the accused, however, lesser sentence is imposed upon the accused. She further submitted that the learned Judge has also erred in not properly appreciating the gravity of the offence committed by the accused while imposing the sentence and thereby committed grave error by imposing lesser punishment. She also submitted that the learned Judge ought to have imposed maximum sentence on the present accused as provided under Sections 354 and 452 of IPC. Hence, impugned judgment and order passed by learned Judge in imposing the lesser sentence deserves to be modified by this Hon'ble Court and the sentence imposed to the accused deserves to be enhanced to maximum sentence as provided under the aforesaid sections. She also submitted that the learned Judge has failed to appreciate the seriousness of the offence committed by the accused while imposing the sentence. The learned Judge also failed to appreciate that there is no sufficient and reasonable cause for the learned Judge to impose lesser punishment. She also submitted that the learned Judge failed to appreciate that there is no any mitigating circumstance to impose less punishment and it is very clear from the facts and circumstances of the case and the material available on record of the case that there are aggravating circumstances in which Hon'ble Judge ought to have imposed the maximum sentence as provided under the law. She, therefore, prays that Criminal Appeal No. 1367 of 2004 may be allowed by enhancing the sentence imposed upon the accused. 4. On the other hand, Mr. Ashish Dagli, learned counsel for the respondent-accused has contended that the accused has been properly punished by the trial Court. She, therefore, prays that Criminal Appeal No. 1367 of 2004 may be allowed by enhancing the sentence imposed upon the accused. 4. On the other hand, Mr. Ashish Dagli, learned counsel for the respondent-accused has contended that the accused has been properly punished by the trial Court. He also submitted that looking to the family condition of the accused and the fact that there were no injuries caused to the victim nor her clothes were torn, the trial Court has rightly imposed the sentence upon the accused. He submitted that considering all these aspects the trial Court has not committed any error in awarding lessor punishment to the accused. He, therefore, submitted that the sentence imposed upon the accused by the impugned order may not be enhanced and prayed that this appeal may be dismissed. In the alternative, he submitted that if this Court finds substance in the appeal of the State, the accused may be directed to pay compensation in lieu of sentence. In this regard, he has relied upon decision of the Apex Court in Tekan Alias Tekram v. State of Madhya Pradesh (Now Chhatisgarh), reported in 2016 (2) SCALE 274. In this decision, the Honourable Apex Court has referred to Victim Compensation Schemes notified by the State Governments and Union Territories under Section 357A of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 and awarded compensation to the victim of rape. He submitted that even if the accused is found guilty and if this Court is inclined to enhance the sentence, it may not be enhanced in lieu of compensation as provided in the Victim Compensation Schemed referred to in the judgment of the Honourable Apex Court. 5. So far as Criminal Appeal No. 1369 of 2004 is concerned, which is preferred against acquittal of the accused from the charges of offences punishable under Section 376 and 506(4) of IPC, Ms. C.M. Shah, learned APP appearing for the State has taken us through the evidence and contended that the trial Court has committed an error in acquitting the accused inspite of voluminous evidence against him and contended that the trial Court ought not to have acquitted the accused. She submitted that the prosecution has successfully proved its case. C.M. Shah, learned APP appearing for the State has taken us through the evidence and contended that the trial Court has committed an error in acquitting the accused inspite of voluminous evidence against him and contended that the trial Court ought not to have acquitted the accused. She submitted that the prosecution has successfully proved its case. She submitted that the complainant has stated in his evidence that when he returned from another village, the victim narrated the incident and told him that the accused committed rape on her by showing knife. She further submitted that even the victim has stated in her evidence that the accused committed rape on her without her consent and her evidence was enough to convict the accused for this offence. She also submitted that there was no reason to dis-believe the version of these witnesses as there was no previous enmity between the accused and the complainant. She, therefore, prays that this appeal may be allowed by setting aside the impugned judgment. 6. On the other hand, Mr. Manraj Barot, learned counsel for the respondent-accused has contended that the trial Court has rightly appreciated the evidence on record and acquitted the accused of some of the charges levelled against him. It is also submitted that so far as acquittal appeals are concerned, the law is well settled and by taking us through the impugned judgment, he submitted that this Court may not interfere with the impugned judgment and the appeal may be dismissed. 7. We have heard Ms. C.M. Shah, learned APP appearing for the appellant-State, Mr. Ashish Dagli and Mr. Manraj Barot, learned advocates for the respondent-accused. We have also gone through the oral as well as documentary evidence on record. So far as Criminal Appeal No. 1367 of 2004 is concerned, which is preferred for enhancement of sentence, we find that from the evidence of Lavjibhai, it is clear that the accused had entered the house of the victim with an intention to outrage her modesty. It is also proved that the accused had trespassed in the house of the victim, therefore, the accused is rightly held guilty for the offences punishable under Sections 354 and 452 of IPC. The maximum sentence provided for this offence is seven years' imprisonment, therefore, the sentence imposed by the trial Court seems to be on lower side and it is required to be enhanced. 8. The maximum sentence provided for this offence is seven years' imprisonment, therefore, the sentence imposed by the trial Court seems to be on lower side and it is required to be enhanced. 8. Moreover, recently, it has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the decision in the case of Raj Bala Vs. State of Haryana and Others etc. etc. in Criminal Appeal Nos. 1049 to 1050 of 2015, decided on 18/08/2015, in para 1 and 2 as under:- "1. In Gopal Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, while focusing on the gravity of the crime and the concept of proportionality as regards the punishment, the Court had observed:- "Just punishment is the collective cry of the society. While the collective cry has to be kept uppermost in the mind, simultaneously the principle of proportionality between the crime and punishment cannot be totally brushed aside. The principle of just punishment is the bedrock of sentencing in respect of a criminal offence. A punishment should not be disproportionately excessive. The concept of proportionality allows a significant discretion to the Judge but the same has to be guided by certain principles. In certain cases, the nature of culpability, the antecedents of the accused, the factum of age, the potentiality of the convict to become a criminal in future, capability of his reformation and to lead an acceptable life in the prevalent milieu, the effect - propensity to become a social threat or nuisance, and sometimes lapse of time in the commission of the crime and his conduct in the interregnum bearing in mind the nature of the offence, the relationship between the parties and attractability of the doctrine of bringing the convict to the value-based social mainstream may be the guiding factors. Needless to emphasise, these are certain illustrative aspects put forth in a condensed manner. We may hasten to add that there can neither be a straitjacket formula nor a solvable theory in mathematical exactitude. It would be dependent on the facts of the case and rationalized judicial discretion. Neither the personal perception of a Judge nor self-adhered moralistic vision nor hypothetical apprehensions should be allowed to have any play. For every offence, a drastic measure cannot be thought of. Similarly, an offender cannot be allowed to be treated with leniency solely on the ground of discretion vested in a court. Neither the personal perception of a Judge nor self-adhered moralistic vision nor hypothetical apprehensions should be allowed to have any play. For every offence, a drastic measure cannot be thought of. Similarly, an offender cannot be allowed to be treated with leniency solely on the ground of discretion vested in a court. The real requisite is to weigh the circumstances in which the crime has been committed and other concomitant factors which we have indicated hereinbefore and also have been stated in a number of pronouncements by this Court. On such touchstone, the sentences are to be imposed. The discretion should not be in the realm of fancy. It should be embedded in the conceptual essence of just punishment." [Emphasis added] 2. Seven years prior to that, in Shailesh Jasvantbhai v. State of Gujarat, it has been held that:- "7. The law regulates social interests, arbitrates conflicting claims and demands. Security of persons and property of the people is an essential function of the State. It could be achieved through instrumentality of criminal law. Undoubtedly, there is a cross-cultural conflict where living law must find answer to the new challenges and the courts are required to mould the sentencing system to meet the challenges. The contagion of lawlessness would undermine social order and lay it in ruins. Protection of society and stamping out criminal proclivity must be the object of law which must be achieved by imposing appropriate sentence. Therefore, law as a cornerstone of the edifice of "order" should meet the challenges confronting the society. Friedman in his Law in Changing Society stated that: "State of criminal law continues to be--as it should be--a decisive reflection of social consciousness of society." Therefore, in operating the sentencing system, law should adopt the corrective machinery or deterrence based on factual matrix. By deft modulation, sentencing process be stern where it should be, and tempered with mercy where it warrants to be. The facts and given circumstances in each case, the nature of the crime, the manner in which it was planned and committed, the motive for commission of the crime, the conduct of the accused, the nature of weapons used and all other attending circumstances are relevant facts which would enter into the area of consideration. 8. The facts and given circumstances in each case, the nature of the crime, the manner in which it was planned and committed, the motive for commission of the crime, the conduct of the accused, the nature of weapons used and all other attending circumstances are relevant facts which would enter into the area of consideration. 8. Therefore, undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice system to undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law, and society could not long endure under such serious threats. It is, therefore, the duty of every court to award proper sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed or committed, etc. This position was illuminatingly stated by this Court in Sevaka Perumal v. State of T.N." [Emphasis supplied] And again:- "The court will be failing in its duty if appropriate punishment is not awarded for a crime which has been committed not only against the individual victim but also against the society to which the criminal and the victim belong. The punishment to be awarded for a crime must not be irrelevant but it should conform to and be consistent with the atrocity and brutality with which the crime has been perpetrated, the enormity of the crime warranting public abhorrence and it should "respond to the society's cry for justice against the criminal"." 8.1 Thus, in our opinion, the ends of justice would meet if the sentence imposed upon the accused is enhanced and if the accused is ordered to undergo imprisonment for one year and nine months. At this stage, we may look into the decision of Honourable Apex Court in the case of TEKAN ALIAS TEKRAM V. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH (NOW CHHATITISGARH), 2016 (2) SCALE 274. In this decision, the Honourable Apex Court has referred to Victim Compensation Schemes notified by the State Governments and Union Territories under Section 357A of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 and awarded compensation to the victim of rape. Considering the family condition of the accused, the passage of time after commission of offence and aforesaid decision of the Honourable Apex Court, we direct the accused to deposit an amount of Rs. Considering the family condition of the accused, the passage of time after commission of offence and aforesaid decision of the Honourable Apex Court, we direct the accused to deposit an amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only) with the Sessions Court towards compensation to be paid to the victim/complainant within a period of six months from today i.e. on or before 31.8.2016. If the accused deposits such amount of compensation, he is not required to undergo the period of sentence imposed upon him by this Court. Upon deposit of Rs. 1,00,000/- by the accused towards compensation, as aforesaid, the same shall be paid to the victim or the complainant, after due verification. Accordingly, Criminal Appeal No. 1367 of 2004 preferred for enhancement of punishment is required to be partly allowed. 9. So far as Criminal Appeal No. 850 of 2005 is concerned, it has come on record that when the alleged incident took place daughter of the victim aged seven years was present in the house along with her. Therefore, if the accused would have committed rape on her forcefully, daughter of the victim would have seen the incident. It has also come in evidence that the victim had not handed over her clothes to the police and she was also not sent for medical examination. It has also come in evidence that the victim did not receive any injuries at the time of commission of offence. In his evidence, Lavjibhai Dalvadi, PW-3, Exh.14, has stated that when he reached to the place of the incident, he did not notice any injuries on the person of the victim. It is also stated that he did not see that clothes of the victim were torn or there were any stains of blood or semen on the clothes of the victim. Therefore, the accused is rightly acquitted from the charges of offences under Sections 376 and 506(2) of IPC. In view of this and considering various decisions of Honourable Apex Court, when two views are possible, this Court should not interfere with the order of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. It is also required to be noted that the principles which would govern and regulate the hearing of appeal by this Court, against an order of acquittal passed by the trial Court, have been very succinctly explained by the Apex Court in a catena of decisions. It is also required to be noted that the principles which would govern and regulate the hearing of appeal by this Court, against an order of acquittal passed by the trial Court, have been very succinctly explained by the Apex Court in a catena of decisions. In the case of M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani Vs. State of Kerala & Anr., (2006) 6 S.C.C. 39 , the Apex Court has narrated the powers of High Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. In para 54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under: "54. In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Even while exercising an appellate power against a judgment of acquittal, the High Court should have borne in mind the well-settled principles of law that where two view are possible, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the Court below." 9.1 Further, in the case of Chandrappa Vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 S.C.C. 415 , the Apex Court laid down the following principles; 42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: [1] An appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. [2] The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. [3] Various expressions, such as, substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes, etc. are not intended to curtain extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of flourishes of language to emphasis the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. [4] An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. [4] An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. [5] If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. 9.2 Thus, it is a settled principle that while exercising appellate power, even if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. 9.3 Even in the case of State of Goa V. Sanjay Thakran & Another, (2007) 3 S.C.C. 75, the Apex Court has reiterated the powers of the High Court in such cases. In para 16 of the said decision, the Court has observed as under; "16. From the aforesaid decisions, it is apparent that while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the appellate Court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. However, the appellate Court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the appellate Court, in such circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether any of the accused is connected with the commission of the crime he is charged with." 9.4 Similar principle has been laid down by the Apex Court in the cases of State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Ram Veer Singh & Ors, 2007 A.I.R. S.C.W. 5553 and in Girja Prasad (Dead) by LRs Vs. State of M.P., reported in 2007 A.I.R. S.C.W. 5589. Thus, the powers, which this Court may exercise against an order of acquittal are well settled. 9.5 In the case of Luna Ram Vs. Bhupat Singh and Ors, (2009) SCC 749, the Apex Court in paras-10 and 11 has held as under: "10. The High Court has noted that the prosecution version was not clearly believable. Some of the so called eye witnesses stated that the deceased died because his ankle was twisted by an accused. Others said that he was strangulated. It was the case of the prosecution that the injured witnesses were thrown out of the bus. The doctor who conducted the postmortem and examined the witnesses had categorically stated that it was not possible that somebody would throw a person out of the bus when it was in running condition. 11. Considering the parameters of appeal against the judgment of acquittal, we are not inclined to interfere in this appeal. The view of the High Court cannot be termed to be perverse and is a possible view on the evidence." 9.6 Even in a recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mookkiah and Anr. Vs. State, rep. by the Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu, AIR 2013 SC 321 , the Apex Court in para 4 has held as under: "4. It is not in dispute that the trial Court, on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence led in by the prosecution and defence, acquitted the accused in respect of the charges leveled against them. Vs. State, rep. by the Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu, AIR 2013 SC 321 , the Apex Court in para 4 has held as under: "4. It is not in dispute that the trial Court, on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence led in by the prosecution and defence, acquitted the accused in respect of the charges leveled against them. On appeal by the State, the High Court, by impugned order, reversed the said decision and convicted the accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC and awarded RI for life. Since counsel for the appellants very much emphasized that the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in upsetting the order of acquittal into conviction, let us analyze the scope and power of the High Court in an appeal filed against the order of acquittal. This Court in a series of decisions has repeatedly laid down that as the first appellate court the High Court, even while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, was also entitled, and obliged as well, to scan through and if need be re-appreciate the entire evidence, though while choosing to interfere only the court should find an absolute assurance of the guilt on the basis of the evidence on record and not merely because the High Court could take one more possible or a different view only. Except the above, where the matter of the extent and depth of consideration of the appeal is concerned, no distinctions or differences in approach are envisaged in dealing with an appeal as such merely because one was against conviction or the other against an acquittal. [Vide State of Rajasthan vs. Sohan Lal and Others, (2004) 5 SCC 573 ]" 9.7 It is also a settled legal position that in acquittal appeal, the appellate Court is not required to rewrite the judgment or to give fresh reasonings, when the reasons assigned by the Court below are found to be just and proper. Such principle is laid down by the Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka Vs. Such principle is laid down by the Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka Vs. Hemareddy, AIR 1981, SC 1417, wherein it is held as under: "...This Court has observed in Girija Nandini Devi V. Bigendra Nandini Choudhary ( (1967) 1 SCR 93 : AIR 1967 SC 1124 ) that it is not the duty of the Appellate Court on the evidence to repeat the narration of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the trial Court expression of general agreement with the reasons given by the Court the decision of which is under appeal, will ordinarily suffice." 10. Thus, in case the appellate Court agrees with the reasons and the opinion given by the lower Court, then the discussion of evidence is not necessary. Moreover, learned APP is not in a position to show any evidence on record so as to take a contrary view in the matter or to conclude that the approach of the Court below is vitiated by some manifest illegality or that the decision is perverse or that the Court below has ignored material evidence while acquitting the accused. Hence, we are of the considered opinion that the Court below has not committed any error in acquitting the respondent from some of the charges levelled against him. We are in complete agreement with the reasonings given by and the findings arrived at by the Court below in the impugned judgment and, therefore, find no reasons to entertain Criminal Appeal No. 850 of 2005. 11. For the foregoing reasons, Criminal Appeal No. 1367 of 2004 is partly allowed. The impugned judgment and order dated 1.7.2004 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Surendranagar in Sessions Case No. 65 of 2003 convicting the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 452 and 354 of IPC is confirmed, however, the sentence imposed for the said offences is enhanced to one year and nine months' imprisonment. Considering the decision of Honourable Apex Court in the case of TEKAN ALIAS TEKRAM V. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH (NOW CHHATITISGARH), 2016 (2) SCALE 274, we direct the accused to deposit an amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only) with the Sessions Court towards compensation to be paid to the victim/complainant within a period of six months from today i.e. on or before 31.8.2016. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only) with the Sessions Court towards compensation to be paid to the victim/complainant within a period of six months from today i.e. on or before 31.8.2016. If the accused deposits such amount of compensation, he is not required to undergo the period of sentence imposed upon him by this Court. Upon deposit of Rs. 1,00,000/- by the accused towards compensation, as aforesaid, the same shall be paid to the victim or the complainant, after due verification. If the accused fails to deposit the amount of compensation within the period, as aforesaid, he shall surrender before the jail authorities on 1.9.2016 to undergo the sentence as awarded by this Court. 12. Criminal Appeal No. 1369 of 2004 is dismissed. The impugned judgment and order dated 30.6.2004 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Surendranagar in Sessions Case No. 65 of 2003 acquitting the accused from the charges of offence punishable under Sections 376and 506(2) of IPC is hereby confirmed. 13. Bail bond, if any, stands cancelled. Record and Proceedings be sent back to the concerned trial Court forthwith.