JUDGMENT : RAMESH RANGANATHAN, J. 1. These two applications, seeking review of the order passed by the Division Bench in WP No. 31371 of 2015 and WA No. 1101 of 2015 dated 20.4.2016, are filed both by the writ petitioners i.e., the College and the Society which established it, and the students who were admitted in the college pursuant to the interim order passed earlier by a learned Single Judge of this Court. Before examining the contentions, urged in support of the submission that the aforesaid orders necessitate review, it is necessary to note, albeit in brief, the facts leading upto the filing of these review petitions. The Medical Council of India ("M.C.I." for short) carried out physical assessment of the petitioner-medical college on 26/27.2.2015 and, in its compliance verification assessment report dated 6.5.2015, pointed out various deficiencies. The petitioner-College submitted a compliance report on 4.6.2015 on the deficiencies pointed out by the M.C.I, which again carried out verification of the petitioner-College on 9.7.2015, and submitted a compliance verification assessment report. Both these reports were considered by the Executive Committee of the M.C.I, in the Council meeting held on 5.8.2015 and, on being satisfied that the petitioner-College had not complied with the deficiencies pointed out therein, the Council resolved to recommend to the Central Government not to accord recognition/approval to the petitioner-College. The M.C.I. communicated its decision to the Central Government by its letter dated 17.8.2015. The petitioner-College submitted a further report on 27.8.2015 claiming to have complied with the deficiencies pointed out by the M.C.I. The Central Government thereafter, by proceedings dated 1.9.2015, requested the M.C.I, to reconsider the matter duly taking note of the compliance report. The M.C.I, carried out a compliance verification assessment of the petitioner-College on 12.9.2015, and was not satisfied with the compliance of deficiencies. In its meeting held on 21.9.2015, the Executive Committee of the M.C.I, considered the compliance verification assessment report based on the inspection conducted on 12.9.2015, and the previous compliance verification assessment reports, and resolved not to recommend accord of recognition/approval to the petitioner-College to admit students to prosecute MBBS course for the academic year 2015-16. The resolution of the M.C.I, was forwarded to the Central Government vide their letter dated 5.10.2015. 2. The resolution of the M.C.I, was forwarded to the Central Government vide their letter dated 5.10.2015. 2. Even before the second decision was communicated, the petitioners filed WP (C) No. 9215 of 2015 before the Delhi High Court on 22.9.2015 challenging the recommendation of the M.C.I, to the Central Government, in its letter dated 17.8.2015, advising the latter to reject grant recognition/approval for the academic year 2015-16. Even before this writ petition came up for admission before the Delhi High Court, they filed WP No. 31371 of 2015 before this Court on 23.9.2015. The deponent of the affidavits, filed in support of WP (C) No. 9215 before the Delhi High Court and WP No. 31371 of 2015 filed before this Court, was the very same person. Though WP (C) No. 9215 of 2015 was filed before the Delhi High Court on 22.9.2015, the deponent of the writ affidavit in WP No. 31371 of 2015, filed before this Court on 23.9.2015, had declared that they had not filed any other writ petition, suit or other proceedings for the relief or reliefs sought for. 3. An interim order was passed, in WP MP No. 40556 of 2015 in WP No. 31371 of 2015 dated 29.9.2015, similar to the interim order passed by the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in WA No. 1879 of 2015 dated 15.9.2015 whereby the Government of India and the M.C.I, were directed to grant provisional permission to the petitioner-College to conduct the course for the academic year 2015-16. By the interim order dated 29.9.2015 passed by the learned Single Judge, the petitioners were permitted to admit students for the first year MBBS course in the academic year 2015-16, subject to further orders of the Court. It was made clear that any allotment and admissions made by the petitioner-College should be notified to each of the admitted student that their admission was based on the provisional permission, was subject to further orders of the Court, and no equities could be claimed by any student. On the very same day i.e., 29.9.2015 the petitioners withdrew WP (C) No. 9215 of 2015 filed before the Delhi High Court. Aggrieved by the interim order passed in WP No. 31371 of 2015 dated 29.9.2015, the M.C.I filed SLP (Civil) No. 29246 of 2015 before the Supreme Court. On the very same day i.e., 29.9.2015 the petitioners withdrew WP (C) No. 9215 of 2015 filed before the Delhi High Court. Aggrieved by the interim order passed in WP No. 31371 of 2015 dated 29.9.2015, the M.C.I filed SLP (Civil) No. 29246 of 2015 before the Supreme Court. The said S.L.P. was withdrawn by M.C.I with liberty to challenge the interim order before the Division Bench of this Court. Consequently, M.C.I filed Writ Appeal No. 1101 of 2015, under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, against the interlocutory order passed on 29.9.2015 in WP MP No. 40556 of 2015 in WP No. 31371 of 2015. 4. WA No. 1101 of 2015 was allowed, and WP No. 31371 of 2015 was dismissed, by the Division Bench by its order dated 20.4.2016. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioners filed SLP (C) No. 14355 of 2016, and some of the students filed SLP (C) No. 15166 of 2016 before the Supreme Court. By a common order dated 23.5.2016, the Supreme Court dismissed SLP (C) No. 14355 of 2016 and granted liberty to the students, who filed SLP (C) No. 15166 of 2016, to withdraw the S.L.P. It is necessary to note that neither was liberty sought by the students to file a review petition before this Court nor was liberty granted by the Supreme Court. Thereafter these review petitions have been filed by the petitioners, and some of the students who have sought leave of this Court to do so. 5. Thereafter these review petitions have been filed by the petitioners, and some of the students who have sought leave of this Court to do so. 5. In its order dated 20.4.2016, against which these review petitions have been filed, the Division Bench observed that the relief sought for in both the writ petitions were substantially the same except that, in addition to the prayers sought in the present writ petition, the petitioners had challenged the vires of Clause 8(3)(1) of the Establishment of Medical College Regulations, 1999; when WP (C) No. 9215 came up before the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court on 24.9.2015, the petitioners had sought permission not to press the relief to declare Clause 8(3)(1) ultra vires; the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court had granted leave as sought for, and had relegated the writ petition to be heard by a Single Judge of the Delhi High Court; on 29.9.2015 both the writ petitions, for the very same relief, were listed both before the Delhi High Court and this Court; this Court was not informed about the pending writ petition before the Delhi High Court; by misleading this Court, an interim order was obtained; thereafter the writ petition filed before the Delhi High Court was withdrawn on 29.9.2015; the memo dated 28.9.2015 stated that the cause of action, and the prayer in the writ petition pending before the Delhi High Court, was different from the cause of action and the prayer sought for in the instant with petition; even this memo was not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge when the matter was heard; the Court was kept in the dark of the true facts, and was misled to believe that this was the sole writ petition pending consideration; under the protection of the interim order, the petitioner-College admitted students for the academic session 2015-16; and WP No. 31381 of 2015 was instituted before this Court a day after the institution of WP (C) No. 9215 of 2015 before the Delhi High Court. 6. 6. After extracting the prayer in both the writ petitions, and the averments in the respective writ affidavits, the Division Bench observed that the averments in Paragraphs XII to XXIV of the writ petition filed before the Delhi High Court, and the averments in Paragraphs IX to XXVIII of the writ petition filed before this Court, were in pari materia; almost all averments/statements, made in both the writ petitions, were identical line to line and page to page; deponent of the writ affidavit filed before this Court, and the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition filed before the Delhi High Court, was Mr. Javvad Ahmed Qureshi and he signed the verification statement before this Court; the extracted portions of the prayers, the declarations, and the averments made in support of the writ petitions, left no doubt that the petitioners, with their eyes wide open, simultaneously intended to prosecute two writ petitions before two different High Courts on the same cause of action; neither the Delhi High Court nor this Court was informed of the prosecution of the other writ petition; the learned Single Judge, who passed the interim order, was not informed about the writ petition that was filed before the Delhi High Court; the prayers, sought before the Delhi High Court in paragraphs (b), (c) and (d), were similar to the prayers sought in the instant writ petition; there was deliberate and willful suppression of relevant facts by the petitioners; they knowingly prosecuted two writ petitions simultaneously, and they withdrew the writ petition in the Delhi High Court, probably after the interim order was granted in the instant writ petition. 7. 7. The Division Bench was of the view that this Court would not have entertained the writ petition, and granted the interim order, if it was appraised of the filing of another writ petition before the Delhi High Court on the same cause of action; though a memo was filed on 28.9.2015, the same was not brought to the notice of this Court when the writ petition was considered; the reason assigned before the Delhi High Court, for withdrawing the writ petition, was 'to approach the appropriate forum'; at that stage also, the petitioners did not inform the Delhi High Court about the writ petition pending before this Court; if there were any bona fides in their claim, that they did not intend to prosecute two writ petitions simultaneously, a request ought to have been made to withdraw the writ petition on 24.9.2015 when it was listed for the first time before the Delhi High Court; the order of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court dated 28.9.2015 disclosed that there was no intention to withdraw the writ petition; no material was brought on record to show that the Counsel on record in the Delhi High Court was instructed to withdraw the writ petition itself, when it was listed before the Delhi High Court on 28.9.2015; this was also clear from a reading of the memo filed in the present writ petition on 28.9.2015; the averment in both the petitions, that they had not availed any other remedy, was a deliberate misstatement/suppression of material fact; institution of another writ petition, on the same cause of action, was a 'material fact' having a direct bearing on the maintainability of another writ petition; the petitioners had prosecuted both the writ petitions till they obtained an interim order from this Court; they had suppressed material facts which were germane to the maintainability of the writ petition; no person can simultaneously prosecute two writ petitions before the same High Court, or before two different High Courts, on the same cause of action and for the same relief; once the writ petition was instituted before the Delhi High Court seeking a comprehensive relief including the prayer sought in the writ petition before this Court, the writ petition filed before this Court was not maintainable; after the petitioners had sought leave not to prosecute prayer (a), which was granted by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in its order dated 28.9.2015, the prayer in the writ petition before the Delhi High Court, as it stood after leave was granted on 28.9.2015, was the same as sought for in the present writ petition; the remedy, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is extraordinary; while exercising the extraordinary remedy under Article 226, the writ Court expects the person, coming before it, to be fair and frank in stating the facts which constitute the cause of action to ventilate his grievance, leaving it to the Court to decide whether relief should be granted and, if so, what relief; Courts would be disinclined to lean in favour of a petitioner, to grant him equitable relief, who does not disclose true facts, tries to mislead the Court, or suppresses true facts deliberately in order to gain undue advantage; if the petitioner had disclosed the fact of their having filed a writ petition in the Delhi High Court, the learned Single Judge would have first considered the maintainability of a second writ petition in this Court on the same cause of action; and, in their anxiety to obtain some order to admit students for the academic session 2015-16, the petitioners had lost sight of the fact that what was impugned was only the recommendation by the MCI, and it was ultimately the prerogative of the Union of India to grant or refuse permission. 8. The Division Bench then held that there was clear suppression of crucial facts which had a bearing on the maintainability of the writ petition itself; subsequent withdrawal of one writ petition, did not absolve the tainted acts of the petitioners when the writ petitions were filed; the petitioner had not only invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction, under Article 226 of the constitution of India, by filing two writ petitions before two High Courts, but had also suppressed the filing and pendency of the other writ petition when the instant writ petition was filed in this Court; they had also made a false and misleading statement, in the body of the writ petition, that they had not filed any other petition for the relief sought in the instant petition; the sequence of events clearly revealed that the petitioners had, one after another, made false and misleading statements on affidavit including in the Memo dated 28.9.2015; it was clear that the petitioners endeavour was to somehow snatch/obtain an interim order from either of the High Courts; there was considerable force in the submission that the petitioners had tried to obtain an interim order from the Delhi High Court and, having realized that they were not getting any order, they had withdrawn that writ petition, and had prosecuted the present writ petition; and it was a classic case of "forum hunting" which the petitioners had indulged in. 9. While holding that the petitioners had admitted students, for the academic year 2015-16, on its own pursuant to the interim order, the admitted students were not allotted to the petitioner-College by the respondents, and their order would cause tremendous inconvenience to the students who were admitted in the petitioner-College, though their admissions were conditional and they were notified that their admissions would be subject to further orders of this Court and no equities could be claimed by them, the Division Bench observed that, in order to curb such practices and to discourage institutions from resorting to such tactics, it was necessary to pass a strong/harsh order; and it was also necessary to pass such an order so that the students would be able to appear for the Common Entrance Tests for the next academic year or take an appropriate decision, in respect of their career, before commencement of the next academic year. While directing the petitioners to, forthwith, refund the entire amount collected from the students towards fee and other expenses, the Division Bench made it clear that their order did not come in the way of students working out their remedies as available in law, against the petitioners, if so advised. 10. Review, literally and judicially, means re-examination or reconsideration. The basic philosophy inherent in it is the universal acceptance of human fallibility. Yet, in the realm of law, Courts lean strongly in favour of the finality of a decision legally and properly made. Exceptions have been carved out to correct accidental mistakes or to prevent miscarriage of justice or to avoid abuse of process. It is exercised to remove the error and not to disturb the finality. (Baskaran v. The Commissioner of College Education, 1995 (II) CTC 513 ). There is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution which precludes a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave palpable errors committed by it. (Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1909 ; State of Rajas than v. Surendra Mohnot, 2014 (6) ALD 17 (SC) : (2014) 14 SCC 77 ). If the Court finds that the order was passed under a mistake, and it would not have exercised the jurisdiction but for the erroneous assumption, which in fact did not exist and its perpetration would result in miscarriage of justice, it is not precluded from rectifying the error as the root from which the power flows is the anxiety to avoid injustice. Technicalities apart, if the Court is satisfied of the injustice then it is its constitutional and legal obligation to set it right by recalling its order. (S. Nagaraj's case (supra); Baskaran's case (supra)). 11. There are, however, definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of a new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made. It may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found. It may also be exercised on any analogous ground. It may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found. It may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a Court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with the appellate power which may enable an Appellate Court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate Court. (A.T. Sharma v. A.P. Sharma, AIR 1979 SC 1047 ; Shivdeo Singh's case (supra); Baskaran's case (supra)). A review of a judgment is a serious step, and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or a patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. The present stage is not a virgin ground, but review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of finality. (Sow Chandra Rente v. Sk. Habib, (1975) 1 SCC 674 ; Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawathi, (2013) 8 SCC 320 ). The scope of interference, in review proceedings, is extremely limited. A review proceeding cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case, and the finality of the judgment delivered by the Court will not be reconsidered except "where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility". (Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, (1980) 2 SCC 167 ; Sow Chandra Xante's case (supra)). A mere repetition of old and overruled arguments, a second trip over ineffectually covered ground or minor mistakes of inconsequential import are obviously insufficient. (Sow Chandra Kante's case (supra)). A party is not entitled to seek review of a judgment merely for the purpose of a rehearing and a fresh decision of the case. The normal principle is that a judgment pronounced by the Court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances, of a substantial and compelling character, make it necessary to do so. (Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd.'s case (supra); Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1965 SC 845 ). 12. Review is not a rehearing of an original matter. The power of review cannot be confused with the appellate power which enables a superior Court to correct all errors committed by a subordinate Court. (Kamlesh Verma's case (supra)). (Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd.'s case (supra); Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1965 SC 845 ). 12. Review is not a rehearing of an original matter. The power of review cannot be confused with the appellate power which enables a superior Court to correct all errors committed by a subordinate Court. (Kamlesh Verma's case (supra)). The power of review must be exercised with extreme care, caution and circumspection and only in exceptional cases. (Jain Studios Ltd. v. Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd., 2006 (5) ALD 71 (SC) : (2006) 5 SCC 501 ; Kamlesh Verma's case (supra)). An error which is not self-evident, and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying exercise of the power of review. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected. (Kamlesh Verma's case (supra)). A review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise". (Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi, (1997) 8 SCC 715 ; Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury, (1995) 1 SCC 170 ; Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma, AIR 1979 SC 1047 : (1979) 4 SCC 389 ). 13. There is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision and an error apparent on the face of the record. While the first can be corrected by the higher forum; the latter only can be corrected by exercise of the review jurisdiction. (Parsion Devi's case (supra)). The earlier order cannot be reviewed unless the Court is satisfied that material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. (Kamlesh Verma's case (supra); Col. Avtar Singh Sekhon v. Union of India (1980) Supp SCC 562). Unless there is a mistake apparent on the face of the record, the order/judgment does not call for review. (N. Anantha Reddy v. Anshu Kathuria, 2014 (5) ALD 141 (SC) : (2013) 15 SCC 534) and the finality attached to the judgment/order cannot be disturbed. (Rajender Kumar v. Rambhai, (2007) 15 SCC 513 ). 14. Unless there is a mistake apparent on the face of the record, the order/judgment does not call for review. (N. Anantha Reddy v. Anshu Kathuria, 2014 (5) ALD 141 (SC) : (2013) 15 SCC 534) and the finality attached to the judgment/order cannot be disturbed. (Rajender Kumar v. Rambhai, (2007) 15 SCC 513 ). 14. If the judgment is vitiated by an error apparent on the face of the record, in the sense that it is evident on a mere look at the record without a long drawn process of reasoning, a review application is maintainable. If there is a serious irregularity in the proceeding, such as violation of the principles of natural justice, a review application can be entertained. (Baskaran's case (supra)). Error apparent on the face of the proceedings is an error which is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law and not mere wrong decision. (T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, AIR 1954 SC 440 ; Kamlesh Verma's case (supra)). It is essential that it should be something more than a mere error. It must be one which must be manifest on the face of the record. (Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, AIR 1955 SC 233 ; Kamlesh Verma's case (supra)). A review lies only for a patent error, (Parsion Devi's case (supra); Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Government of A.P., AIR 1964 SC 1372 ), a mistake that is self-evident, needs no search and stares at its face. (N. Anantha Reddy's case (supra)). 15. Bearing these principles in mind, let us now take note of the rival submissions made by learned Senior Counsel and Counsel on either side. (N. Anantha Reddy's case (supra)). 15. Bearing these principles in mind, let us now take note of the rival submissions made by learned Senior Counsel and Counsel on either side. Sri P. Venugopal, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner-College, would submit that WP No. 9215 of 2015 was filed before the Delhi High Court on 22.9.2015, and the present writ petition was filed before this Court on the next day i.e. 23.9.2015; when the writ petition came up for admission on 24.9.2015, the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court directed that the matter be listed before another Division Bench; both 25.9.2015 and 26.9.2016 were public holidays; the petitioner had instructed their Counsel before the Delhi High Court to withdraw the writ petition in its entirely; by mistake the learned Counsel only withdrew a part of the prayer on 28.9.2015; the petitioner had filed a memo on 28.9.2015 before this Court disclosing that they had filed a writ petition before the Delhi High Court; the writ petition, listed before this Court on 28.9.2015, was adjourned to 29.9.2015; in the forenoon of 29.9.2015 the petitioner withdrew the writ petition before the Delhi High Court, and at 4.00 p.m. on 29.9.2015 an interim order was passed by this Court; by the time the interim order was passed by this Court, the writ petition filed before the Delhi High Court had already been withdrawn; they had, thereby, corrected their mistake; the dirt, if any, had been cleansed/removed; their earlier failure to state that they had invoked the jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court was unintentional; as the petitioner had not resorted to trickery, this Court should take a lenient view and condone the lapse on their part; a bona fide mistake on their part should not result in their students being made to suffer for no fault of theirs; and the students should be permitted to prosecute their studies. Learned Senior Counsel would rely on Royal Medical Trust (Registered) v. Union of India, (2015) 10 SCC 19 . 16. Learned Senior Counsel would rely on Royal Medical Trust (Registered) v. Union of India, (2015) 10 SCC 19 . 16. Sri B. Vijaysen Reddy, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the students admitted in the petitioner-College pursuant to the interim order dated 29.9.2015, would contend that failure of the petitioner-College to specifically assert that they had already invoked the jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court did not amount to suppression of a material fact; it did not have any bearing on the interim order passed by the learned Single Judge as he had merely followed the order passed by the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court; the Division Bench of this Court failed to notice that the students would lose two years as, by the time the writ petition was disposed of, the process of conducting the medical entrance examination for the subsequent year had already commenced; this Court should take note of the subsequent events to review the earlier order; Courts can always review its earlier order in order to render substantial justice; students, who had already prosecuted their first year medical course in the petitioner-College, should not suffer for the mistake of either the petitioner-society or its college; no prejudice would be caused to larger public interest if the students, admitted to the petitioner-College, were permitted to continue their education therein while, at the same time, penalizing the petitioner College for their failure to state that they had invoked the jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court; innocent students should not suffer for the mistake of the college; even assuming that the petitioner had suppressed facts, it is only the Court which passed the interim order which should have exercised discretion either to refuse grant of relief or to condone the lapse; and, in such circumstances, the order passed by the Division Bench necessitated review. Learned Counsel would rely on Al-Karim Educational Trust v. State of Bihar, (1996) 8 SCC 330 ; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Suresh Narayan Vijayavargiya, 2014 (2) ALD 142 (SC) : (2014) 11 SCC 694 ; M.C.I v. Kalinga Institute of Medical Sciences (KIMS), AIR 2016 SC 2294 : 2016 (4) Scale 649 ; Priyadarshini Dental College and Hospital v. Union of India, (2011) 4 SCC 623 ; Hind Charitable Trust Shekhar Hospital (P) Ltd. Union of India, (2015) 2 SCC 336 ; Baskaran's case (supra); Dwarka Prasad Agarwal (D) by LRs. v. B.D. Agarwal, 2003 (5) ALD 14 (SC) : (2003) 6 SCC 230 ; Rajesh D. Darbar v. Narasingrao Krishnaji Kulkarni, (2003) 7 SCC 219 and Bhagubhai Dhanabhai Khalasi v. State of Gujarat, (2007) 4 SCC 241 . 17. Sri Tadi Nageswara Rao, learned Standing Counsel for N.T.R. University of Health Science, would submit that, in compliance with the interim order passed by the learned Single Judge, the N.T.R. University of Health Sciences had approved the merit list submitted by the petitioner-College on 30.9.2015. 18. 17. Sri Tadi Nageswara Rao, learned Standing Counsel for N.T.R. University of Health Science, would submit that, in compliance with the interim order passed by the learned Single Judge, the N.T.R. University of Health Sciences had approved the merit list submitted by the petitioner-College on 30.9.2015. 18. On the other hand Sri S. Vivek Chandra Sekhar, learner Standing Counsel for the respondent-MCI, would submit that both the ex parte interim order passed by the learned Single Judge, and the provisional admission order issued pursuant thereto, stipulated that admission of the students, in the petitioner-College, was subject to result of the writ petition and they were not entitled to claim equities; all these students were aware of their admission being subject to the result of the writ petition; the writ petitioners had deliberately suppressed facts; they had earlier invoked the jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court for the very same relief; the petitioner had an opportunity of withdrawing the writ petition before the Delhi High Court at least on two different occasions; they could have withdrawn the writ petition either on 24.9.2015 or 28.9.2015; neither of these two opportunities were availed; on 28.9.2016, when the writ petitioners claim to have filed a memo before this Court, the prayer in both the writ petitions were identical, yet the petitioners had stated in the memo that it was not; the Division Bench has passed an elaborate and well considered order holding that material facts had been deliberately suppressed by the petitioner; the writ petitioners cannot now take advantage of having admitted students in their college under the protection of an interim order obtained by mis-representation and suppression of facts; the petitioners were not only refused approval for the academic year 2015-16, they have also not been granted permission for the academic year 2016-2017; no interim order could have been passed in a writ petition filed before this Court wherein the petitioner had deliberately suppressed the fact of their having invoked the jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court for the very same relief; the direction to the petitioner, to refund the amount collected from the students, was consequential to the dismissal of the writ petition; the Division Bench had taken a sympathetic view and, keeping the interest of the students in mind, had directed the petitioner-College to return the amount paid by them; that would not confer any right on the students to claim that they should be permitted to continue to prosecute their studies; no equities can be claimed by the students, as both the interim order and the provisional admission order precluded them from doing so; the students, who were aware of the risk they were taking and the consequence of their admission being cancelled, cannot now claim equities; the Division Bench had rightly held that it was better for the students to forego their admission, and appear for the next year EAMCET examination; Section 10-B of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 prohibits conferment of degrees to students who prosecute their medical education in a college which has not been granted permission under Section 10-A; if the students are permitted to write the examination, and the Central Government were to refuse to permission later, their degrees would not be recognized; the EAMCET examination was conducted, for the academic year 2016-17, only after the writ petition was disposed of by the Division Bench; instead of having lost out one or two academic years as at present, the students would have run the risk of their degrees not being recognized after undergoing the 514 years medical course in the petitioner-College; under the guise of seeking review, the petitioners are seeking a rehearing of the entire matter; a review petition is not an appeal in disguise; even if two views are possible, and the view expressed by the Division Bench is one such, the order would not necessitate review; the petitioners had consented to the writ petition being heard by the Division Bench, and did not seek remand to the learned Single Judge; the Division Bench had considered the judgment of the Supreme Court in S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar, 2004 (5) ALD 84 (SC) : (2004) 7 SCC 166 and had refused to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition on the ground that the petitioner had suppressed material facts; the contentions raised in the present review proceedings could only have been raised in an appeal preferred against the order of the Division Bench before the Supreme Court; the special leave petitions, filed before the Supreme Court by both the petitioner-College and its students, against the order of the Division Bench, were dismissed; neither the petitioner-College nor the students sought leave of the Supreme Court to file a review petition before this Court; as the writ petition was dismissed in limine for suppression of material facts, interference in the present review proceedings would effect the majesty of the Court, and send a wrong signal to those who indulge in such acts; as review of the order of the Division Bench is sought only on equities, and as it is evident that there are no equities in favour of either the petitioner-College or the students, the review petitions are liable to be dismissed; and there is, therefore, no justification in the order of the Division Bench now being subjected to review. Learned Standing Counsel would rely on N. Anantha Reddy's case (supra); Rajender Kumar's case (supra); Parsion Devi's case (supra); Sow Chandra Kante's case (supra); Medical Council of India v. JSS Medical College, (2012) 5 SCC 628 ; Medical Council of India v. Rajiv Gandhi University of Health Sciences, 2004 (4) ALD 15 (SC) : (2004) 6 SCC 76 and Union of India v. Era Educational Trust, (2000) 5 SCC 57 . 19. As noted hereinabove, the writ petitioners filed WP (C) No. 9215 of 2015 before the Delhi High Court on 22.9.2015, and WP No. 31371 of 2015 before this Court on the next day i.e., 23.9.2015. When the matter came up before it on 24.9.2015, a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court recused, and the matter was posted before another Bench. When the matter was listed on 28.9.2015, the petitioner sought leave not to press for relief (a) which was to declare Regulation 8(3)(i) of the M.C.I. Regulations ultra vires and the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court granted leave as sought for, and the wrist petition was posted before the Single Judge of the Delhi High Court. Consequently the prayers in both writ petitions, filed before the Delhi High Court and this Court, were more or less identical. The deponent of the affidavits in both these writ petitions was the very same person. Yet, the fact that the petitioner had filed a writ petition before the Delhi High Court on 22.9.2015 was suppressed in the writ affidavit filed before this Court on 23.9.2015. 20. The simultaneous filing of writ petitions in different High Courts on the same issue is a practice which should be discouraged. Litigants must fight their battles fairly and squarely, and not stoop low to gain what can only be temporary victories by keeping material facts away from the Court. The conduct of making dishonest and deliberate mis-statements must be strongly and emphatically disapproved. {All India State Bank Officers Federation v. Union of India, 1990 Supp SCC 336). As no person is entitled to invoke two parallel and independent remedies simultaneously for the very same relief, the writ petitioner could not have invoked the jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court and this Court at the same time. {All India State Bank Officers Federation v. Union of India, 1990 Supp SCC 336). As no person is entitled to invoke two parallel and independent remedies simultaneously for the very same relief, the writ petitioner could not have invoked the jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court and this Court at the same time. What is even more disconcerting is the writ petitioner's failure to state, in the writ affidavit filed before this Court, that they had already invoked the jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court for, more or less, identical reliefs. "Suppressio veri Suggestio falsi" means that suppression of the truth is equivalent to the suggestion of what is false. (Black's Law Dictionary with pronunciations-Sixth Edition). "Suppressio veri", i.e., the suppression of relevant and material facts is as bad as Suggestio falsi i.e., a false representation deliberately made. Both are intended to dilute-one by inaction and the other by action. Like a false statement willfully and deliberately made, suppression of a relevant and material fact also interferes with and obstructs the administration of justice. (Sri V. Satyanarayana Rao v. State of A.P., 2007 (6) ALT 294 ). If a wrong or misleading statement is deliberately and wilfully made by a party to a litigation with a view to obtain a favourable order, it would prejudice or interfere with the due course of the judicial proceeding. (Naraindas v. The Government of Madhya Pradesh, (1975) 3 SCC 31 ; Afzal v. State of Haryana, 1996 (1) ALD (Crl.) 183 (S.C.) : (1996) 7 SCC 397 ; V. Satyanarayana Rao's case (supra); S.R. Ramaraj v. Special Court, Bombay, 2003 (2) ALD (Crl.) 780 (SC) : (2003) 7 SCC 175 ). 21. A person who makes an ex parte application to the Court that is to say, in the absence of the person who will be affected by that which the Court is asked to do - is under an obligation to the Court to make the fullest possible disclosure of all material facts within his knowledge. (The King v. The General Commissioners for the Purposes of the Income Tax Acts for the District of Kensington. Ex parte Princess Edmond de Polignac, (1917) 1 K.B. 486). (The King v. The General Commissioners for the Purposes of the Income Tax Acts for the District of Kensington. Ex parte Princess Edmond de Polignac, (1917) 1 K.B. 486). If, on the argument showing cause against a rule nisi, the Court comes to the conclusion that the rule was granted upon an affidavit which was not candid, and the facts were stated in such a way as to mislead and deceive the Court, there is power inherent in the Court, in order to protect itself and prevent an abuse of its process, to discharge the rule nisi and refuse to proceed further with the examination of the merits. (The King's case (supra); K.D. Sharma v. SAIL, (2008) 12 SCC 481). Where an applicant has obtained relief by an affidavit which suppresses material facts, the Court will not, on that, call upon the respondents to answer. (The King's case (supra)). If the party applying for relief abstains from stating facts which the Court thinks are material to enable it to form its judgment, he disentitles himself to that relief which he asks the Court to grant. (Dalglish v. Jarvie, (1850) 2 Mac. & G. 231; The King's case (supra)). 22. The Court takes statements of fact, contained in the petitions, at their face value and it would be unfair to betray the confidence of the Court by making statements which are untrue and misleading. (Dalip Singh v. State of U.P., (2010) 2 SCC 114 : (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 324; Hari Narain v. Badri Das, AIR 1963 SC 1558 ). A careful examination will be made by the Court of the facts as they are, and as they have been stated in the applicant's affidavit, and everything will be heard that can be urged to influence the view of the Court when it reads the affidavit and knows the true facts. But if the result of this examination and the hearing is to leave no doubt that the Court has been deceived, it will then refuse to hear anything further from the applicant in a proceeding which has only been set in motion by means of a misleading affidavit. (K.D. Sharma's case (supra); R. v. Kensington Income Tax Commrs, (1917) 1 KB 486). Suppression or concealment of material facts is a jugglery, manipulation, manoeuvring or misrepresentation which has no place in equitable and prerogative jurisdictions. (K.D. Sharma's case (supra); R. v. Kensington Income Tax Commrs, (1917) 1 KB 486). Suppression or concealment of material facts is a jugglery, manipulation, manoeuvring or misrepresentation which has no place in equitable and prerogative jurisdictions. If it does not reject the petition on that ground, the Court would be failing in its duty. (K.D. Sharma's case (supra)). 23. What is material for the Court to consider is whether the facts, which the applicant did not tell the Court, was material to be considered, (The King's case (supra)), on whether the writ petition should be entertained on merits. A fact relevant to the lis is a material fact. As filing of the writ petition before the Delhi High Court, for substantially the same relief, was relevant to the question whether another writ petition for the very same relief should be simultaneously entertained by this Court, failure of the petitioner to state this fact in the writ affidavit filed before this Court, is suppression of a material fact. If this fact had been brought to its notice, this Court may well have refused to entertain the writ petition itself, let alone pass an interim order. 24. The memo filed by the petitioners, allegedly on 28.9.2015, extracts the prayer sought in the writ petition, and then records that the petitioner had approached the Delhi High Court on 22.9.2015 by filing WP (C) No. 9215 of 2015, seeking some reliefs not sought for in the present writ petition; the said matter was listed on 24.9.2015, and the Counsel for the petitioner was informed that steps were being taken to withdraw the same and pursue the present writ petition; and this memo was being filed since reference to the pendency of the earlier writ was omitted in the writ affidavit due to miscommunication. 25. All that is stated in the memo dated 28.9.2015 is that the petitioner-College had invoked the jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court. What is, however, misrepresented therein is that the relief sought for before the Delhi High Court was distinct from the relief sought for in the writ petition filed before this Court. 25. All that is stated in the memo dated 28.9.2015 is that the petitioner-College had invoked the jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court. What is, however, misrepresented therein is that the relief sought for before the Delhi High Court was distinct from the relief sought for in the writ petition filed before this Court. As has been noted by the Division Bench, in the order under review, the relief sought for in WP (C) No. 9215 of 2015, after the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court granted leave to the petitioners not to press their challenge to the vires of Clause 8(3)(1) of the Regulations, is substantially the same as in WP No. 31371 of 2015 filed before this Court. The assertion in Para 2 of the Memo dated 28.9.2015, that the petitioner had filed WP (C) No. 9215 of 2015 seeking a relief which was not sought in WP No. 31371 of 2015, is evidently false. This false assertion, in the memo dated 28.9.2015, amounts to misrepresentation of facts. 26. There is no material on record to show that the writ petitioner had instructed their Counsel before the Delhi High Court to withdraw the writ petition in its entirety, and that the Counsel had mistakenly withdrawn only a part of the prayer. While a part of the prayer was withdrawn before the Delhi High Court on 28.9.2015, the memo allegedly filed before this Court on the very same day makes no reference thereto, and only states that the relief sought before the Delhi High Court was different from that sought before this Court. As has been noted by the Division Bench, in the order under review, there is no material on record to show that this memo dated 28.9.2015 was brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge when he passed the interim order on 29.9.2015. Neither the docket proceedings of, nor the interim order passed by, the learned Single Judge reflect any such memo having been filed, or that the learned Judge was made aware that the petitioner had even filed a writ petition before the Deli High Court. It cannot, therefore, be said that, by the time the interim order had been passed, the petitioner-College had cleansed themselves of the dirt of suppression/misrepresentation of facts or that they did not resort to trickery or even that their mistake was bona fide. It cannot, therefore, be said that, by the time the interim order had been passed, the petitioner-College had cleansed themselves of the dirt of suppression/misrepresentation of facts or that they did not resort to trickery or even that their mistake was bona fide. The Division Bench was justified in not taking a lenient view, and in refusing to condone suppression and misrepresentation of facts by the petitioners. 27. As has been rightly contended before us by Sri S. Vivek Chandra Sekhar, learned Standing Counsel for MCI, the writ petitioner had two opportunities before the Delhi High Court to withdraw the writ petition both of which they failed to avail, firstly on 24.9.2015 when the writ petition was listed before the Division Bench, and thereafter on 28.9.2015 when the writ petition came up before another Division Bench. It is only on 29.9.2015, the very same day on which the writ petition was listed before the learned Single Judge of this Court, was the writ petition filed before the Delhi High Court withdrawn. In these circumstances, can it be said that the Division Bench of this Court was not justified in exercising its discretion not to entertain the writ petition on the ground that the writ petitioners had misrepresented and suppressed material facts? 28. The jurisdiction of the High Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is extraordinary, equitable and discretionary. Prerogative writs mentioned therein are issued to provide substantial justice. (K.D. Sharma's case (supra)). In exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the High Court is not just a Court of law, but is also a Court of equity. A person who invokes the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is duty bound to place all the facts before the Court without any reservation. If there is suppression of material facts, or if twisted facts have been placed before it, the High Court would be fully justified in refusing to entertain the petition. (Dalip Singh's case (supra); Prestige Lights Ltd. v. SBI, (2007) 8 SCC 449 ; Kensington Income Tax Commissioners's case (supra)). As grant of relief under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary, a petitioner, who approaches the Court for such relief, must make a full and frank disclosure of facts. (Dalip Singh's case (supra); Prestige Lights Ltd. v. SBI, (2007) 8 SCC 449 ; Kensington Income Tax Commissioners's case (supra)). As grant of relief under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary, a petitioner, who approaches the Court for such relief, must make a full and frank disclosure of facts. If he fails to do so, and suppresses material facts, his application is liable to be dismissed, {Dalip Singh's case (supra); G. Narayanaswamy Reddy v. Government of Karnataka, (1991) 3 SCC 261 ). 29. The prerogative remedy, under Article 226, is not a matter of course, and a writ Court would bear in mind the conduct of the party who invokes its jurisdiction. If the applicant makes a false statement or suppresses material facts or attempts to mislead it, the Court may dismiss the action on that ground alone and may refuse to enter into the merits of the claim. This rule has been evolved in larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of Court by deceiving it. It is, therefore, of utmost necessity that the person approaching the writ Court must come with clean hands, put forward all the facts before the Court without concealing or suppressing anything, and seek an appropriate relief. (K.D. Sharma's case (supra)). As a general rule, suppression of a material fact by a litigant disqualifies him from obtaining any relief (S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd.'s case (supra)), since the very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in the disclosure of true, complete and correct facts. If material facts are not candidly stated or are suppressed or are distorted, the very functioning of the writ Courts would become impossible. (Dalip Singh's case (supra); Prestige Lights Ltd.'s case (supra)). 30. When an applicant comes to the Court to obtain relief on an ex-parte statement he should make a full and fair disclosure of all material facts i.e., facts, not law. He must not misstate the law if he can help it as the Court is supposed to know the law. But it knows nothing about the facts, and the applicant must state fully and fairly the facts. The penalty by which the Court enforces that obligation is that, if it finds that the facts have not been fully and fairly stated, it would then set aside any action which it has taken on the faith of the imperfect statement. But it knows nothing about the facts, and the applicant must state fully and fairly the facts. The penalty by which the Court enforces that obligation is that, if it finds that the facts have not been fully and fairly stated, it would then set aside any action which it has taken on the faith of the imperfect statement. (Kensington Income Tax Commissioners's case (supra); K.D. Sharma's case (supra)). 31. A person invoking the discretionary jurisdiction of the Court cannot be allowed to approach it with a pair of dirty hands. (Arunima Baruah v. Union of India, (2007) 6 SCC 120 ). A litigant, who attempts to pollute the stream of justice or who touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands, is not entitled to any relief, interim or final. (Dalip Singh's case (supra)). A party which has misled the Court into passing an order in its favour is not entitled to be heard on the merits of the case. (Dalip Singh's case (supra); Welcome Hotel v. State of A.P, AIR 1983 SC 1015 ). In order to sustain and maintain the sanctity and solemnity of proceedings in law Courts, it is necessary that parties should not make false or knowingly inaccurate statements or misrepresentation and/or should not conceal material facts with a design to gain some advantage or benefit from the Court, a place where truth and justice are the solemn pursuits. Any party does so at its risk and cost, and must be ready to take the consequences that follow. Lenient or liberal or generous treatment by Courts, in dealing with such matters, is either mistaken or lightly taken. There is hence a compelling need to take a serious view in such matters to ensure the expected purity in the administration of justice. (K.D. Sharma's case (supra); Vijay Syal v. State of Punjab, (2003) 9 SCC 401 ). 32. In the event a party misrepresents, on a point having a bearing on the exercise of judicial discretion, and thereby tries to overreach the Court, the party forfeits the claim to the discretionary relief. The same is the case when the misrepresentation is discovered by the Court. But the misrepresentation must be deliberate and on a point having relevance to the question before the Court. (Rosy Jacob v. Jacob A. Chakramakkal, (1973) 1 SCC 840 ). The same is the case when the misrepresentation is discovered by the Court. But the misrepresentation must be deliberate and on a point having relevance to the question before the Court. (Rosy Jacob v. Jacob A. Chakramakkal, (1973) 1 SCC 840 ). A Court of equity refuses relief to the petitioner whose conduct, in regard to the subject-matter of the litigation, has been improper. This was formerly expressed by the maxim 'he who has committed iniquity shall not have equity', and relief was refused where a transaction was based on the petitioner's fraud or misrepresentation. Later it was said that the plaintiff in equity must come with perfect propriety of conduct, or with clean hands. The maxim does not, however, mean that equity strikes at depravity in a general way; the cleanliness required is to be judged in relation to the relief sought, and the conduct complained of must have an immediate and necessary relation to the equity sued for; and it must be depravity in a legal as well as in a moral sense. (Halsbusy's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol.16, PP.874-76; Arunima Baruah's case (supra)). Equity will not apply the principle about clean hands unless the depravity, the dirt in question on the hand, has an immediate and necessary relation to the equity sued for. (Moody v. Cox, (1917) 2 Ch 71 : (1916-17) All ER Rep. 548 (CA); Arunima Baruah's case (supra)). 33. Exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is discretionary, and a writ is not issued as of right or as a matter of course. (C.R. Reddy Law College Employees' Association, Eluru, W.G. District v. Bar Council of India, New Delhi, 2004 (5) ALD 180 (DB)). The Court may, in appropriate cases, refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction for good and valid reasons. (C.R. Reddy Law College Employees' Association, Eluru, W.G. District v. Bar Council of India, New Delhi, 2004 (5) ALD 180 (DB)). The Court may, in appropriate cases, refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction for good and valid reasons. (Krishnadevi Malchand Kamathia v. Bombay Environmental Action Group and others, (2011) 3 SCC 363 ; Board of Trustees of Port of Kandla Port v. Hargovind Jasraj, (2013) 3 SCC 182 ; Pune Municipal Corporation v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 5 SCC 211 ; State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh, (1992) I LLJ 283 (SC); R. Thiruvirkolam v. Presiding Officer, (1997) 1 SCC 9 : 1997 (2) ALD (S.C.S.N.) 5-1; State of Kerala v. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth, Naduvil (dead), (1996) 1 SCC 435 and Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla v. Hind Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd. etc., (1997) 3 SCC 443 : 1997 (2) ALD (S.C.S.N.) 47). As the petitioner had obtained an ex parte interim order from the learned Single Judge, suppressing and misrepresenting material facts, the Division Bench, rightly and for just and valid reasons, refused to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. 34. Reliance placed on behalf of the petitioners, on Bhagubhai Dhanabhai Khalasi's case (supra), is misplaced. In Bhagubhai Dhanabhai Khalasi's case (supra), the Supreme Court held that the appellate Court should have confined the exercise of its jurisdiction only to the question whether the writ petition should have been determined on merits by the learned Single Judge. As has been noted, in the order under review, when WA No. 1101 of 2015 was listed before it on 20.1.2016, the Division Bench recorded the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant (MCI) that, in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, WP No. 31371 of 2015 should be clubbed with the writ appeal. In the very same proceedings dated 20.1.2016, the Division Bench had also noted the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondents (writ petitioners) that he had no objection for clubbing the writ petition with the writ appeal, and its being heard by the Division Bench. In the very same proceedings dated 20.1.2016, the Division Bench had also noted the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondents (writ petitioners) that he had no objection for clubbing the writ petition with the writ appeal, and its being heard by the Division Bench. Having consented to WP No. 31371 of 2015 being clubbed with WA No. 1101 of 2015, and for the matters to be heard by the Division Bench, it is not open, to either the writ petitioners or the students admitted in the writ petitioner-College, to now contend that the Division Bench ought to have remanded the matter to the learned Single Judge, and ought not to have taken upon itself the task of adjudicating the maintainability of the writ petition. 35. In Baskaran's case (supra), the Division Bench of the Madras High Court held that failure on the part of the Court to give an opportunity to the applicant, to appear in the proceedings and to be heard, was in violation of principles of natural justice; there was no merit in the contention that the applicant could not put forward any defence independent of the management; the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is equitable and discretionary; and the applicant could have put forward some contentions which might not have been available to the management, and could have requested the Court to consider the same. 36. The judgment, in Baskaran's case (supra), has no application to the facts of the present case as it is only pursuant to the interim order passed by the learned Single Judge that the students, who have also sought review of the order of the Division Bench, were admitted into the writ petitioner-College. As M.C.I., had preferred WA No. 1101 of 2015, against the interim order passed by the learned Single Judge in WPMP No. 40556 of 2015 in WP No. 31371 of 2015 dated 29.9.2015, the Division Bench cannot be faulted for deciding the matte after hearing the M.C.I. and the writ petitioners. The question, whether the learned Single Judge was justified in passing an interim order, permitting the writ petitioner-College to admit students, was in issue before the Division Bench. The question, whether the learned Single Judge was justified in passing an interim order, permitting the writ petitioner-College to admit students, was in issue before the Division Bench. As it is only by the provisional admission order, issued to each of the students on 30.9.2015, were they admitted into the writ petitioner-College, and they were informed that their admission would be subject to the result of WP No. 31371 of 2015 pending before the High Court, nothing prevented the students, who now seek review of the order of the Division Bench, to implead themselves in the writ petition and the writ appeal, and contest the matter before the Division Bench. Even otherwise, some of these students had filed SLP (C) No. 15166 of 2016 before the Supreme Court, against the order under review, which was dismissed as withdrawn without either leave being sought or granted to file the present review petition. It is, therefore, not open to these students to now contend that the order passed by the Division Bench, without hearing them, is in violation of principles of natural justice. 37. It is no doubt true that Courts can take notice of subsequent events, and can mould the relief accordingly, in exceptional circumstances. (Ramji Lal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1996 Punj. 374 (FB)). In Rajesh D. Darbar's case (supra), the Supreme Court held that subsequent events, in the course of the case, may influence the equitable jurisdiction to mould the relief; Courts of justice may, when the compelling equities of a case oblige them, shape reliefs to make them justly relevant in the updated circumstances; where the relief is discretionary, Courts may exercise this jurisdiction to avoid injustice; all these are done only in exceptional situations and not if the statute, on which the legal proceeding is based, inhibits such change in the cause of action or relief; and the rights vested by virtue of a statute cannot be divested by this equitable doctrine. 38. The interim order, passed by this Court on 29.9.2015, stipulated that allotment and admissions made by the petitioners, pursuant to the interim order, should be notified to each of the admitted students. 38. The interim order, passed by this Court on 29.9.2015, stipulated that allotment and admissions made by the petitioners, pursuant to the interim order, should be notified to each of the admitted students. In compliance therewith, the NTR University of Health Sciences issued proceedings dated 30.9.2015 to the writ petitioner-College that the merit list was approved under A, B and C category seats for admission in MBBS course for the academic year 2015-2016 subject to the terms and conditions mentioned therein, and the final orders of the High Court. The permission was to be valid for one year, and for admission of only one batch of 100 MBBS course seats during the academic year 2015-16. The writ petitioner-College was informed that admission for next batch of students, for the academic year 2016-17, would be made after recognition or renewal permission was granted by the Central Government. The writ petitioner was directed to notify each of the admitted students that the admission was based on provisional permission, subject to further orders of the High Court, and no equities could be claimed by any of them. The provisional admission order, issued to the students, on 30.9.2015 clearly specified that their admission was subject to the outcome of WP No. 31371 of 2015 filed by the petitioners before this Court; the students were being admitted on the basis of the interim order passed in WP No. 31371 of 2015; and, in any event, they shall abide by the final orders to be passed in the writ petition, and not claim any equities. 39. While, in exceptional cases, it may not be impermissible for the Court to take note of subsequent events to review the earlier order and render substantial justice thereby, it is evident that the present case is not one such, for the students of the writ petitioner-College, who have also sought review of the order, were made aware that their admission was pursuant to the interim order passed by this Court, was subject to the result of the writ petition, and the Court had made it clear that they were not entitled to claim any equities. As admission of these students in the petitioner-College was pursuant to the interim order passed by this Court, and as each of them were informed thereof, their admission in the writ petitioner-College is not an exceptional circumstance justifying review of the order of the Division Bench. 40. Let us now take note of the judgments relied on behalf of the petitioners. In Al-Karim Educational Trust's case (supra), the Supreme Court held that, if it is found that the affiliation is being withheld unreasonably or the decision is being prolonged for one reason or the other, the Court would, though reluctantly, be constrained to exercise jurisdiction. In Priyadarshini Dental College & Hospital's case (supra), the Supreme Court held that it was necessary to emphasise the distinction between applications for fresh permissions and applications for renewal of permissions; and the process of decision-making under the Regulations, for grant of fresh or initial permission for establishment of new dental colleges was exhaustive and elaborate, when compared to the process of decision-making in regard to the grant of renewal of permission for the four subsequent years. 41. In Suresh Narayan Vijayvargiya's case (supra), the Supreme Court held that the contemnors had sought to defeat the interim orders passed by the Court which were binding on the parties; the purpose of flouting the orders had been achieved as the contemnors wanted to fill up the entire seats by themselves; and to maintain the sanctity of the orders of Court, and to give a message that parties cannot get away by merely tendering an unconditional and unqualified apology after enjoying the fruits of their illegality, a fine of Rs. 50 lakhs should be imposed. In Hind Charitable Trust Shekhar Hospital (P) Ltd's case (supra), looking at the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, and as several seats for medical admission were likely to remain vacant for the academic year, the Supreme Court was of the view that these matters required urgent consideration; and interim directions were issued in exercise of its power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. In Kalinga Institute of Medical Sciences (KIMS)'s case (supra), the Supreme Court held that the High Court ought to have been more circumspect in directing admission of students; granting admission to students in an educational institution, when there was serious doubt whether admission should at all be granted, was not a matter to be taken lightly; the career of a student was involved; and it was better to err on the side of caution and deny admission to a student rather than to have the sword of Damocles hanging over him. While imposing costs of Rs. 5 crores on the Institution, for playing with the future of its students and the mess that it had created for them, the Supreme Court directed that this amount not to be recovered from any student or adjusted against the fees of students of the present or subsequent batches. 42. The aforesaid judgments, on which reliance is placed by the petitioners herein, were passed by the Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. The Constitution has, by Article 142, empowered the Supreme Court to make such orders as may be necessary "for doing complete justice in any case or matter pending before if, which authority the High Court does not enjoy. The jurisdiction of the High Court, in writ proceedings, is circumscribed by limitations which cannot be transgressed on the whim or subjective sense of justice varying from Judge to Judge. {State of Punjab v. Surinder Kumar, (1992) 1 SCC 489 ). The power which is available to the Supreme Court under Article 142 is not available to the High Courts. (Chairman, Grid Corpn. of Orissa Ltd. (Gridco) v. Sukamani Das, (1999) 7 SCC 298 ). The power conferred on the High Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is not on par with the constitutional jurisdiction conferred upon the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. (State of U.P. v. Johri Mal, (2004) 4 SCC 714 ; State of H.P. v. A. Parent of a Student of Medical College, (1985) 3 SCC 169 and Asif Hameed v. State of J&K, 1989 Supp (2) SCC 364). Although the High Court may pass an order for doing complete justice to the parties, they do not have the power akin to Article 142 of the Constitution of India. Although the High Court may pass an order for doing complete justice to the parties, they do not have the power akin to Article 142 of the Constitution of India. (Johri Mal's case (supra); Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee v. C.K. Rajan, (2003) 7 SCC 546 ; B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 ). Exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction, constitutionally conferred on the Supreme Court under Article 142(1) of the Constitution, can be of no guidance on the scope of Article 226, (State of Haryana v. Naresh Kumar Bali, (1994) 4 SCC 448 ; State of H.P. v. Mahendra Pal, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 731), and this Court would not be justified in passing similar orders, that too in review proceedings. 43. Even otherwise, but for their having suppressed the material fact of their having invoked the jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court for a similar relief, the petitioner may not have been granted interim relief by the learned Single Judge and, if interim relief had not been granted, the students, who have now sought review of the order of the Division Bench, could not have been admitted into the petitioner-College. As their admission is pursuant to the interim order, which was obtained by suppression and misrepresentation of facts, the question of the petitioner-college being penalized with fine, while permitting the students to continue prosecuting their studies therein, would result in the petitioner-College not only being let off scot-free but also being rewarded with admissions for the academic year 2015-16, despite their having abused the process of Court. 44. The students admitted to the writ petitioner-College, pursuant to the interim order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 29.9.2015, now claim equities contending that they cannot be made to suffer for the act of the Court i.e., the order of the Division Bench. There is a well-recognised maxim of equity, namely, actus curiae neminem gravabit which means an act of the Court shall prejudice no man. This maxim is founded upon justice and good sense which serves a safe and certain guide for the administration of law. (Raj Kumar Dey v. Tarapada Dey, (1987) 4 SCC 398 ; Gursharan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee, (1996) 2 SCC 459 and Mohd. Gazi v. State of M.P., 2000 (5) ALD 14 (SC) : (2000) 4 SCC 342 ; Ramji Lal's case (supra)). (Raj Kumar Dey v. Tarapada Dey, (1987) 4 SCC 398 ; Gursharan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee, (1996) 2 SCC 459 and Mohd. Gazi v. State of M.P., 2000 (5) ALD 14 (SC) : (2000) 4 SCC 342 ; Ramji Lal's case (supra)). A party cannot be made to suffer adversely by reason of an order passed by a Court of law which is not binding on him (Dwarka Prasad Agarwal's case (supra)). 45. While these students claim that the order of the Division Bench was passed behind their back, without their being given an opportunity of being heard, such an order is not binding on them, and they cannot be made to suffer the loss of one academic year for no fault of theirs, Sri S. Vivek Chandrasekhar, learned Counsel for M.C.I., would submit that the learned Single Judge could not have directed the M.C.I., to disobey the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956, or the regulations made thereunder, to which it owes its existence. As held by the Supreme Court, in A.P. Christians Medical Educational Society v. Government of A.P., (1986) 2 SCC 667 , students are not entitled to appear in any examination until they complete the prescribed minimum period of studies after permission is granted under Section 10-A of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956; and there is nothing more destructive of the rule of law than a direction by the Court to disobey the laws. 46. From the submission of Sri S. Vivek Chandra Sekhar, learned Standing Counsel for the M.C.I., it does appear that the writ petitioners were not only refused approval for the academic year 2015-16, but they have also not been granted renewal for the academic year 2016-17. Section 10-A of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956, relates to permission for establishment of a new medical college, new course of study etc. Section 10-A of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956, relates to permission for establishment of a new medical college, new course of study etc. Under sub-section (1) thereof, notwithstanding anything contained in the Act or any other law for the time being in force (a) no person shall establish a medical college or (b) no medical college shall (i) open a new or higher course of study or training which would enable a student of such course or training to qualify himself for the award of any recognized medical qualification or (ii) increase its admission capacity in any course of study or training except with the previous permission of the Central Government obtained in accordance with the provisions of this section. Section 10-B relates to non-recognition of medical qualifications in certain cases and, under sub-sections (1) to (3), where any medical college is established or where any medical college opens a new or higher course of study or training or where any medical college increases its admission capacity in any course of study or training except with the previous permission of the Central Government in accordance with the provisions of Section 10-A, no medical qualification, granted to any student of such medical college, shall be a recognized medical qualification for the purposes of the Act. 47. In Rajiv Gandhi University of Health Sciences's case (supra), the Supreme Court held that, in cases where the Council has not granted permission in terms of Section 10-A of the Medical Council Act, if interim orders are granted to those institutions, which have been established without fulfilling the prescribed conditions, to admit students, it will lead to serious jeopardy to the students admitted in these institutions. In JSS Medical College's case (supra), the Supreme Court held that, in normal circumstances, the High Court should not issue interim orders granting permission as it has a cascading effect; by virtue of such orders students are admitted, and though many of them would have taken the risk knowingly, a few may be ignorant; in most of such cases, when finally the issue is decided against the college, the welfare and plight of the students are ultimately projected to arouse sympathy of the Court; if, ultimately, it is found that the college's claim is untenable, the admission of students would be illegal; and there is nothing more destructive of the rule of law than a direction by the Court to allow continuance of such students, whose admissions are found illegal in the ultimate analysis. 48. The order under review was passed by the Division Bench on 20.4.2016. As is evident from the A.P. EAMCET-2016 Notification, issued by the Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University, Kakinada dated 29.1.2016, (a copy of which has been placed for our perusal by Sri B. Vijaysen Reddy, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the students in the writ petitioner-College, the last date for submission of non-line applications with fine, for EAMCET-2016, was 29.4.2016 i.e., nine days after the order was passed by the Division Bench on 20.4.2016. Nothing prevented these students from applying for, and appearing in, the EAMCET-2016 examination, and to seek admission in recognized and approved medical colleges for the academic year 2016-17. The submission that the Division Bench was unaware of the possibility of these students losing a second academic year, and not merely one year, does not therefore merit acceptance. 49. It is only if admissions to the medical course, for the academic year 2015-16, is made with the previous permission of the Central Government, and that too in accordance with the provisions of Section 10-A of the Act, is a student, who completes his education therefrom, entitled to have his qualifications treated as a recognized medical qualification for the purposes of the Act. Even if these students were to complete the 5 1/2 years medical course in the petitioner-College, without prior permission of the Central Government, their medical qualification, after undergoing the 5 1/2 years medical course, would run the risk of not being recognized and, consequently, they would have lost the entire 5 1/2 years spent in undergoing the course in the petitioner-College, as against the loss of one year as at present. We find considerable force in the submission of Sri Vivek Chandra Sekhar, learned Standing Counsel for M.C.I., that the order under review, in fact, helped students admitted in the writ petitioner-College pursuant to the interim order passed by the learned Single Judge, atleast to get refund of their money for, if they had been permitted to prosecute their studies in the petitioner-College, they would not only have lost the money paid to the petitioner-College, but would also have been deprived of their degrees later, even after having completed 5 1/2 years study in such an unrecognized institution. 50. The discretionary power, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is exercised with great caution, only in furtherance of the interest of justice and in larger public interest, and not merely on a legal point being made out. The interest of justice and the public interest coalesce. They are very often one and the same. (Ramniklal N. Bhutta v. State of Maharashtra, (1997) 1 SCC 134 : 1997 (2) ALD (S.C.S.N.) 18; Manohar Lal v. Vinesh Anand, 2001 (1) ALD (Crl.) 908 (SC) : (2001) 5 SCC 407 ). Only when it comes to the conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference, would the Court intervene in a matter. (Master Marine Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Metcalfe and Hodgkinson Pvt. Ltd., (2005) 6 SCC 138 ; Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd., (2000) 2 SCC 617 ). WP No. 31371 of 2015 was filed by the petitioner-Society and college, and as they were found to have misrepresented and suppressed material facts before this Court, the writ petition was dismissed in limine. The Division Bench was justified in not undertaking a detailed examination on merits as the discretionary jurisdiction of this Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, would not be exercised to entertain a writ petition when its very institution is an abuse of the process of Court. 51. The Division Bench was justified in not undertaking a detailed examination on merits as the discretionary jurisdiction of this Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, would not be exercised to entertain a writ petition when its very institution is an abuse of the process of Court. 51. While any order obtained from the Court, by misrepresentation or suppression of facts, must necessarily be set aside, the Division Bench had, with a view to protect the interests of students, admitted into the writ petitioner-College, directed the writ petitioner-College to refund the amounts paid to them by the students. Though the very admission of the students, into the writ petitioner-College, was only after each of them was informed that they could not claim equities, the Division Bench directed the writ petitioner-College to refund the amount paid by them. Permitting the students to still prosecute their course in the writ petitioner's medical college would, in effect, result in permitting the writ petitioner-Society and college to admit students for the academic year 2015-16, and in rewarding them despite their misrepresentation or suppression of facts before this Court, and that too without having been granted permission by the M.C.I. 52. In any event, it cannot be said that the opinion expressed by the Division Bench, that the petitioner-College had suppressed and misrepresented facts before this Court, is not a possible view which can be taken on the facts on record and, consequently, the said order would not necessitate review. An error which has to be established by a long-drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. Where an alleged error is far from self-evident, and has to be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ. (Meera Bhanja's case (supra); Satyanarayan Laminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumala, AIR 1960 SC 137 ). It is only where there can reasonably be no two opinions entertained about it, is a clear case of an error apparent on the face of the record made out. {Thungabhadra Industries Ltd's case (supra); Surendra Mohnot's case (supra)). If the view adopted by the Court in the original judgment is a possible view it is difficult to hold that there is an error apparent. {Northern Indian Caterers (India) Ltd's case (supra)). {Thungabhadra Industries Ltd's case (supra); Surendra Mohnot's case (supra)). If the view adopted by the Court in the original judgment is a possible view it is difficult to hold that there is an error apparent. {Northern Indian Caterers (India) Ltd's case (supra)). The possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. (Kamlesh Verma's case (supra); Lily Thomas v. Union of India, 2000 (2) ALD (Crl.) 686 (SC) : 2000 (6) ALD 6 (SC) : (2000) 6 SCC 224 ). Mere disagreement with the view expressed in the judgment is not a ground for invoking the review jurisdiction. {Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. (2013) 8 SCC 337 ). The Division Bench refrained from exercising its discretionary jurisdiction, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to interfere on the ground that the petitioner had suppressed/misrepresented facts in the writ affidavit. Even if the view expressed by Sri P. Venugopal, learned Senior Counsel, and Sri B. Vijaysen Reddy, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the review petitioners, is presumed to be a possible view, no interference is called for as the reasons for which the Division Bench dismissed the writ petition in limine is undoubtedly a possible view. The order of the Division Bench cannot, therefore, be said to suffer from an error apparent on the face of the record necessitating its review. Both the review petitions fail, and are accordingly dismissed. However, in the circumstances, without costs. Miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall also stand dismissed.