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2016 DIGILAW 496 (MAD)

Thulasirengan v. R. Arjunan

2016-02-09

C.S.KARNAN

body2016
JUDGMENT : These two Second Appeals have been filed by the plaintiffs in O.S.No.3491 of 2004 and the defendants in O.S.No.836 of 2009 on the file of the 1st Additional District Munsif Court, Tiruchirappalli against the decrees and judgments dated 05.09.2014 made in A.S.No.28 of 2012 and A.S.No.111 of 2012 respectively, on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Tiruchirappalli. 2. The plaint averments in O.S.No.3491 of 2004 and averments in the written statement in O.S.No.836 of 2009 filed by the appellants in the above second appeals are as follows:- The properties comprised in S.F.No.42/1 measuring to an extent of Ac.2.78 cents and an extent of Ac.0.25 cents in S.F.No.44 situate at Varanganeri Village, Tiruchirappalli Taluk were originally owned by Krishnasamy Iyengar and others. They had executed two registered sale deeds in favour of one Mr. Somasundaram Reddiar in the year 1969. The appellants purchased the said properties under four registered sale deeds in the year 1980. The said properties are lying in one block with a compound wall. The appellants are in possession and enjoyment of the said properties by paying kist and they have also been granted patta by the Government. One S.M. Khan filed a suit in O.S.No.88 of 1963 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Tiruchirappalli against SRSKS Iyengar Family Trust and the said suit was dismissed. The defendants are utter strangers and attempting to interfere with the plaintiffs' peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit properties. In addition to the above allegations the appellants who are defendants in O.S.No.836 of 2009 filed written statement stating that they have also acquired title to the properties by adverse possession. 3. The plaint averments in O.S.No.836 of 2009 and averments in the written statement in O.S.No.3491 of 2004 filed by the respondents in the above second appeals are as follows:- The total extent of the properties comprised in S.F.No.42 is Ac.8.64 cents. An extent of Ac.1.50 cents out of the Ac.8.64 cents was purchased by Rengasamy Konar/the father of the plaintiffs 1 to 4 in O.S.No.836 of 2009 vide a registered sale deed No.1433 of 1963 dated 11.04.1963. After the demise of the said Rengasamy Konar, the plaintiffs in O.S.No.836 of 2009 being his legal heirs are in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the said property. After the demise of the said Rengasamy Konar, the plaintiffs in O.S.No.836 of 2009 being his legal heirs are in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the said property. The said property and other properties were originally covered in Title Deed No.1167 granted by Rani Mangammal to her commander Raja Mirsari Khan and his brother Khanmian. The said grant was a personal inam and it has been confirmed by the Inam Commissioner under the Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 M/s. SRSKS Iyengar Family Trust had claimed imaginary and unfounded right over the said property and filed Trust O.P.No.48 of 1962 before the Principal District Court, Tiruchirappalli, seeking permission to sell the suit property in O.S.No.836 of 2009 and other properties. At the intervention of S.M. Khan, who is none other than the lineal descendants of Raja Mirsari Khan, the said Trust O.P. was dismissed on 11.02.1963. The trustees of M/s. SRSKS Iyengar Family Trust suppressing the dismissal of the above Trust O.P. and without getting permission to sell from the District Court sold the suit property and other properties to Somasundara Reddiar in the year 1969. No Ryotwari Patta was issued in favour of M/s. SRSKS Iyengar Family Trust. This Court by an order dated 17.07.1991 in CRP.No.601 of 1991 held that the Trustees of M/s. SRSKS Iyengar Family Trust cannot sell the Trust properties by filing Trust O.P. before the District Court since the said Trust is a private religious and charitable Trust is outside the scope of the Trust Act. The competent authority to grant permission to sell the Trust properties is the Commissioner of H.R.&C.E. Madras. The same has also been reported in 1992 I MLJ page 47. As the suit property is an Inam land the regular Tahsildar has no power to issue patta in favour of the defendants in O.S.No.836 of 2009. The plaintiffs in O.S.No.836 of 2009 have already filed an application to grant patta in their favour outside the scope of the Tamilnadu Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 as per G.O.Ms.No.1300 dated 30.04.1991 and the same is pending. The plaintiffs in O.S.No.836 of 2009 alone are in possession and enjoyment of the suit property. The plaintiffs in O.S.No.836 of 2009 have already filed an application to grant patta in their favour outside the scope of the Tamilnadu Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 as per G.O.Ms.No.1300 dated 30.04.1991 and the same is pending. The plaintiffs in O.S.No.836 of 2009 alone are in possession and enjoyment of the suit property. The defendants in O.S.No.836 of 2009 has also claiming title to the suit property and hence the suit in O.S.No.836 of 2009 has been filed for declaration of title and for permanent injunction. 4. Both the suits in O.S.No.3491 of 2004 and O.S.No.836 of 2009 were tried together and evidences were recorded commonly in O.S.No.836 of 2009. On the side of the respondents in the above second appeals, Exhibits A1 to A18 were marked. PW1 to PW3 were examined as witnesses. On the side of the appellants in the above second appeals Exhibits B1 to B55 were marked and DW1 was examined as witness. CW1 was examined as Court witness and through him Exhibits C1 to C5 were marked through PW3. Exhibits X1 to X7 were marked as third party documents. The trial Court has framed the following issues:- (i) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for declaration as prayed for? (ii) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for permanent injunction as prayed for? (iii) Whether the defendants are entitled for permanent injunction as prayed for? (iv) To what relief, if any? 5. The trial Court by its common judgment dated 02.11.2011 decreed the suit in O.S.No.3491 of 2004 filed by the appellants and dismissed the suit in O.S.No.836 of 2009 filed by the respondents with costs. 6. Aggrieved by the said decision of trial Court, the respondents in the second appeal had preferred appeals in A.S. No. 28 of 2012 and A.S. No. 111 of 2012 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Tiruchirappalli. Both the appellants and the respondents filed documents to be received in evidence at the appellate stage. The first appellate Court has framed the following issues: (i) Whether Krishnasamy Iyengar and others have got right to convey the property comprised in S.F.No.42/1 in favour of Somasundaram Reddiar? (ii) Whether S.M. Khan has got right to convey the property comprised in S.F.No.42/1 in favour of Rengasamy Konar as per Title Deed No.1167? The first appellate Court has framed the following issues: (i) Whether Krishnasamy Iyengar and others have got right to convey the property comprised in S.F.No.42/1 in favour of Somasundaram Reddiar? (ii) Whether S.M. Khan has got right to convey the property comprised in S.F.No.42/1 in favour of Rengasamy Konar as per Title Deed No.1167? (iii) Whether the trial Court is right in deciding the title to the property under dispute in the absence of production of the original sale deed No.610 of 1969 and Title Deed No.1167? (iv) Whether Krishnasamy Iyengar and others have got any right to sell the trust properties comprised in S.F.No.42, 43 and 44 without obtaining permission from the competent Court? (v) Whether the trial Court is correct in granting a decree for permanent injunction based on the registered sale deed No. 610 of 1969? (vi) Whether the trial Court is correct in granting a decree for permanent injunction in the absence of relief of declaration of title when there is a rival claim? (vii) Whether I.A.No.244 of 2014 is liable to be allowed? (viii) Whether I.A.No.680 of 2012 is liable to be allowed? (ix) Whether I.A.No.566 of 2014 is liable to be allowed? (x) Whether the appeals are liable to be allowed? 7. The first appellate Court allowed both the appeals on 05.09.2014 filed by the respondents in the above second appeals A.S.No.28 of 2012 and A.S.No.111 of 2012 filed against the decrees dated 02.11.2011 in O.S.No.836 of 2009 and O.S.No.3491 of 2004 respectively and marked Exs.A19 to A35 as additional evidences. Aggrieved by the decision of the first appellate Court the appellants preferred the present two second appeals in S.A(MD)Nos. 946 and 947 of 2014. At the time of admission of the above second appeals, the following substantial questions of law were framed: (a) Whether the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court below is vitiated having failed to consider the entire evidence on record and to apply the correct principles of law. (b) Whether the judgment and decree of lower appellate Court is vitiated for having failed to follow Order 41 Rule 28 of the Code of Civil Procedure, when it had decided to allow the appellants before it to adduce additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (b) Whether the judgment and decree of lower appellate Court is vitiated for having failed to follow Order 41 Rule 28 of the Code of Civil Procedure, when it had decided to allow the appellants before it to adduce additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (c) Whether the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court is vitiated for decreeing the suit of the appellants before it based on the additional evidence produced by the appellants before it in the first appeals, which are all facts relating to long after the rendering of the judgment by the trial Court and the authenticity of which additional documents have been vehemently questioned on the side of the respondents in the two appeals. (d) Is not the respondent estopped from claiming the suit property be that of S.M. Khan, when already the suit filed by S.M. Khan in O.S.No.88/63 against the family of Krishnasami Iyengar and had been dismissed and therefore that matter had become final and the claim now made by the appellants in the two appeals cannot be countenanced at all as they claim title to the property only under S.M. Khan, the party in O.S.No.88/63 and the present suit property being the subject matter in these suits. Therefore the decision of the Lower Appellate Court is totally wrong? (e) Is not the adoption of a procedure contrary to the provisions of the C.P.C. renders the judgment void and illegal and therefore the allowing of the two I.A.'s filed under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. by the appellants and that without giving an opportunity to the respondents to counter them factually, procedurally and legally is wrong and the judgment of the Lower Appellate Court stand vitiated and is no judgment in the eye of law? (f) Is not the common judgment and decree of the first appellate court are vitiated for shifting the onus of proof on the appellants, when it is the duty of the respondents who sought the declaratory decree of title to prove their case? (g) Is not the common judgment and decree of the first appellate Court are vitiated for non suiting the appellants on the ground that the appellants had not sought for the declaratory decree, when question of title had been mainly canvassed and considered by it? 8. Mr. (g) Is not the common judgment and decree of the first appellate Court are vitiated for non suiting the appellants on the ground that the appellants had not sought for the declaratory decree, when question of title had been mainly canvassed and considered by it? 8. Mr. K.K. Senthil, learned counsel appearing for the appellants and Mr. K.S. Shankar Murali, learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted their respective oral arguments and written arguments. 9. I have carefully considered the arguments of the counsel on either side and perused the exhibits, decrees and judgments of both the trial and the first appellate Court and all the material records. For the sake of convenience the plaintiffs in O.S.No.3491 of 2004 and the defendants in O.S.No.836 of 2009 shall be referred to as appellants and the plaintiffs in O.S.No.836 of 2009 and the defendants in O.S.No.3491 of 2004 shall be referred to as respondents. 10. Both the parties have marked number of exhibits and also let in oral evidences. When this Court asked the learned counsel appearing for the appellants to trace the appellants' title to the property he has submitted that Title Deed No.610 was issued in favour of Krishnasamy Iyengar and argued that the same has been marked as Ex.C5. In order to ascertain whether Krishnasamy Iyengar has been granted Title Deed No.610, I have perused the Exs.B32 and B55 the registered sale deeds executed by Krishnasamy Iyengar and others in favour of Somasundaram Reddiar/the vendor of the appellants. No where in the recitals in Exs.B32 and B55 the vendors have stated they have acquired title to the property be conveyed under Title Deed No.610. Ex.C5 is not a Title Deed as argued by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants. It is a copy of settlement 'A' Register. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents argued that in Ex.A35 which is the detailed list of joint pattadars in the Village of Varanganeri, Tiruchirappalli the name of Somasundaram Reddiar was not included in S.F.No.42/1. He has also pointed out that the DW1 has deposed evidence that he has not seen the Title Deed No.610 and the same has not been produced by him. On perusal of the Exs.C5, A35 and the testimony of DW1, there is a force in the arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 11. He has also pointed out that the DW1 has deposed evidence that he has not seen the Title Deed No.610 and the same has not been produced by him. On perusal of the Exs.C5, A35 and the testimony of DW1, there is a force in the arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 11. In the absence of production of Title Deed No.610 the arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants deserves no consideration. In Exs.B32 and B55 the trustees of M/s. SRSKS Iyengar Family Trust, this Court categorically held that the Trust being a private religious and charitable trust is outside the purview of the Trust Act and no permission can be granted by the District Court under Section 34 of the Trust Act. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents had also pointed out the order passed by this Court, as he then was from the decision reported in 1992 I MLJ Page 47. When this Court asked the learned counsel appearing for the appellants whether the trustees of M/s. SRSKS Iyengar Family Trust obtained either permission from the District Court or from the Commissioner of H.R.&C.E. to sell the properties. He has fairly conceded that no such permission was obtained from the District Court and Commissioner of H.R.&C.E. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents would contend that as title to the property of the appellants is under dispute the appellants ought to have filed the suit for declaration of title to the suit properties, but they have chosen to file only a suit for injunction simplicitor. He has also relied upon a decision reported in 2009 2 Law Weekly Page 546 and would contend that the appellants had filed a suit for injunction in O.S.No.3491 of 2004. The respondents in the written statement filed in O.S.No.3491 of 2004 denied title of the appellants, pleaded their title and possession. Once title of the appellants are denied, they ought to have launched a suit for declaration or ought to have amended the prayer for declaration within time in the suit for injunction. In the aforesaid case it has been held that when there is a serious dispute or cloud over the title there is a need to amend the suit and convert the suit into one for declaration. In the aforesaid case it has been held that when there is a serious dispute or cloud over the title there is a need to amend the suit and convert the suit into one for declaration. When this Court asked the learned counsel appearing for the appellants whether amendment was made either before the trial Court or before the first appellate Court to convert the suit in O.S.No.3491 of 2004 which is filed for permanent injunction into a suit for declaration of title, he has admitted that no such amendment was made both before the Court of first instance and the first appellate Court. Therefore, in the absence of prayer for declaration of title the suit for injunction for simplicitor in O.S. No. 3491 of 2004 is legally unsustainable and not maintainable. 12. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents would contend that the appellants have also pleaded adverse possession against the respondents, but without admitting the title of the respondents. He has also relied upon 2011 (5) Law Weekly page 725 wherein it has been held that a person pleading adverse possession has no equitites in his favour as he is trying to defeat the right of the true owner. He has also placed his reliance on the decision reported in 2011 (3) Law Weekly page 789 and would contend that the appellants in their written statement filed in O.S.No.836 of 2009 in paragraph 34 pleaded that they have acquired title to the suit property by adverse possession. But the appellants have not admitted the title of the respondents. In the above decision it has been held that if the defendant has enjoyed the suit property as owner of the suit property, he cannot claim adverse possession. Similarly, if the defendant enjoying the suit property for more than a statutory period but did not enjoy the property to the knowledge of true owner. In that case also he cannot claim adverse possession. The appellants have claimed title to the suit property independently without admitting the title of the respondents. Therefore, this Court hold that the plea of adverse possession taken by the appellants cannot be accepted. 13. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant would contend that the order in O.S.No.88 of 1963 will operate as resjudicata under Section 11 of C.P.C. and relied upon the decision reported in 2010 2 CTC at Page 631. Therefore, this Court hold that the plea of adverse possession taken by the appellants cannot be accepted. 13. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant would contend that the order in O.S.No.88 of 1963 will operate as resjudicata under Section 11 of C.P.C. and relied upon the decision reported in 2010 2 CTC at Page 631. In the said decision it is held that the previous suit being dismissed under Order 9 Rule 8 and the present suit on the same cause of action is not maintainable. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent would contend that the suit in O.S.No.88 of 1963 was rejected for default for non payment of Court fee vide document No.B47. No issue was framed and answered with respect to the title under dispute in O.S.No.88 of 1963. He would further contend that once a suit is rejected for non payment of Court fee the same shall not preclude the plaintiff from presenting a fresh claim on the very same cause of action as per Order VII Rule 13. It is evident from the Ex.B47 that the suit in O.S.No.88 of 1963 was rejected for non payment of Court fee and he further relied on the decision reported in 2000 I MLJ Page 86 and contend that the said suit was dismissed for default, since the plaintiff failed to pay deficit Court fees. In order to apply the rule of resjudicata the issue must be heard and finally disposed off as per Section 11 of C.P.C. In the abovesaid decision it has been held that suit dismissed for default will not operate as resjudicata in the subsequent suit. No materials to show that the issue were directly and substantially in issue in previous suit when previous suit was not heard or decided subsequent suit is not barred by resjudicata. 14. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants argued that an order was passed in I.A.No.98 of 1963 in O.S.No.88 of 1963 (vide Ex.B31) and it will operate as resjudicata. 14. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants argued that an order was passed in I.A.No.98 of 1963 in O.S.No.88 of 1963 (vide Ex.B31) and it will operate as resjudicata. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents vehemently contended that an order passed in interlocutory application cannot take away the substantial right of the parties and the same will not operate as resjudicata at a later stage and he cited the authority reported in 2007 (I) MLJ Page 266 and would contend that the appellants have contended that S.M. Khan has already filed a suit in O.S.No.88 of 1963 and filed I.A.No.98 of 1963 for injunction. The said I.A. was dismissed. Therefore, the said order operates as resjudicata. But in the above decision it has been held that interlocutory orders cannot take away the substantial right of the parties. An I.A. which leaves the matter for open consideration at a later stage will not operate as resjudicata. He further relied on the decision reported in 2012 (4) SCC page 307. In the above decision it has been held that interim order always merges in the final order after decree is passed and where case is dismissed, interim order stands automatically nullified. 15. I have carefully heard the arguments of both the counsel. Under Ex.B47 the plaint in O.S.No.88 of 1963 was rejected for non payment of Court fee. Therefore, under Order VII Rule 13 a fresh suit on the same cause of action is not barred. Section 11 of C.P.C. will not apply as there is no substantial issue was framed and answered in O.S.No.88 of 1963. Therefore, this Court hold that the suit in O.S.No.836 of 2009 will not operated as resjudicata in O.S.No.836 of 2009. 16. The appellants filed documents in C.M.P.(MD)No.169 of 2016 in SA(MD)No.947 of 2014 to receive the same as additional evidence at second appeal stage namely the proceedings of the Settlement Tahsildar and the order passed by the Inam Abolition Tribunal. The respondents have also filed documents in their additional typed set which were obtained under R.T.I. Act. The appellants have not pleaded about the passing of the order by the settlement Tahsildar in their plaint in O.S.No.3491 of 2004. The appellants have not at all pleaded that why the documents now sought to be marked were not filed either before the trial Court or before the first appellate Court. The appellants have not pleaded about the passing of the order by the settlement Tahsildar in their plaint in O.S.No.3491 of 2004. The appellants have not at all pleaded that why the documents now sought to be marked were not filed either before the trial Court or before the first appellate Court. At this juncture the learned counsel appearing for the respondents has argued that despite the order passed by the Settlement Tahsildar, the competent Civil Court alone can dwell upon the dispute as to the title to the property and relied on 1998 2 CTC page 196. It is also the well settled principles of law patta or order for transfer of patta is not a conclusive proof of title. The appellants have miserably failed to satisfy the ingredients of Order 41 Rule 27 to receive the documents as additional evidence at the second appeal stage. Therefore, the M.P.No.169 of 2016 is liable to be dismissed and accordingly the same is dismissed without costs. 17. It is a settled principles of law that only on substantial question of law alone second appeal can be entertained. A mere question of fact, question of law and mixed question of law and facts are not the grounds to entertain a second appeal. The substantial question of law in A, B, C and E are all pertaining to the applicability of Order 41 Rule 27 and 28. the learned counsel appearing for the respondent would contend that the case of the appellants before this second appeal is pertaining to marking of the documents Exs.A19 to A35 before the first appellate Court. As the said documents sought to be marked are public documents and obtained under R.T.I. Act, the first appellate Court marked the same. The appellants have not at all raised that oral evidence has to be let in before marking the said documents. Once the documents are allowed to be produced and marked by the appellate Court under Order 41 Rule 28 the appellate Court may take evidence or direct the Court from where decree the appeal is preferred to take evidence. When the oral evidence is dispensed with to mark the said documents there is no flaw committed by the first appellate Court. Apart from that this is only a procedure to be followed by the Court and curable by this Court. When the oral evidence is dispensed with to mark the said documents there is no flaw committed by the first appellate Court. Apart from that this is only a procedure to be followed by the Court and curable by this Court. Therefore, the same cannot be a substantial questions of law. He has also pointed that the appellants have not challenged the order dated 05.09.2014 in I.A.No.244 of 2014 in A.S. No. 28 of 2012 and the order dated 05.09.2014 in I.A.No.680 of 2012 in A.S.No.28 of 2012 by way of filing civil revision petition. Therefore, he cannot challenge the said order in the second appeal. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants would contend that as per Section 103 of C.P.C. this Court has got powers to determine the issue of facts which was wrongly decided by the lower Court. Section 103 of C.P.C. contemplates are hereunder: "103. Power of High Court to determine issue of fact. In any second appeal, the High Court may if the evidence on the record is sufficient, determine any issue necessary for the disposal of the appeal, (a) Which has not been determined by the lower appellate Court or both by the Court of first instance and the lower appellate Court, or (b) Which has been wrongly determined by such Court or Courts by reason of a decision on such question of law as is referred to in Section 100." 18. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants has not at all pointed out any reason that first appellate Court wrongly decided the question of fact. As per Section 103(b) an issue which has been wrongly determined by lower Court by reason of the decision on such question of law as if referred to in Section 100 of C.P.C. The first appellate Court has allowed the said I.A. as the documents sought to be marked are all obtained from the Government under the Right to Information Act. As the appellants failed to challenge the said order they are estopped from challenging the said order in the second appeals. The appellants have not at all pointed out that on account of the decision of the first appellate Court in the said I.A.s, substantial question of law is emerged in the second appeals. As the appellants failed to challenge the said order they are estopped from challenging the said order in the second appeals. The appellants have not at all pointed out that on account of the decision of the first appellate Court in the said I.A.s, substantial question of law is emerged in the second appeals. The procedural aspect of receiving and marking documents by the lower Court is only in accordance with the Civil Procedure Code and the same cannot be a substantial question of law. Therefore, the substantial questions of law framed in A, B, C and E are not substantial questions of law and the present second appeals merit no consideration. The another substantial question of law in D is the decree in O.S. No. 88 of 1963 shall operate as resjudicata. The principles of resjudicata is only a mixed question of law and facts and it is not a substantial question of law as contended. 19. The remaining substantial questions of law formulated in F and G are relating to shifting of onus of proof. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents would contend that the appellants have filed the suit first in O.S.No.3491 of 2004 for permanent injunction. The respondents denied the appellants' title in their written statement filed in O.S.No.3491 of 2004. But the appellants have not chosen to amend the said suit for declaration. The appellants also contended in their written statement in O.S.No.836 of 2009 that they have prescribed title by adverse possession, but without admitting the title of the respondents. The lower appellate Court was satisfied that the respondents have discharged their initial burden of proof by appreciating the sale deed in favour of Rengasamy Konar and vacant site tax issued to the respondents, Adangal chitta issued to Rengasamy Konar, survey field extract and from the information gathered by the respondents under R.T.I. Act and only thereafter the onus of proof is shifted on the appellants but they have miserably failed to discharge their onus. Therefore, there is no mistake committed by the lower appellate Court and there is no substantial question of law in the second appeal. There is a considerable force in the argument advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents. Therefore, there is no mistake committed by the lower appellate Court and there is no substantial question of law in the second appeal. There is a considerable force in the argument advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents. The appellants have failed to challenge the orders passed in I.A.No.244 of 2014 in A.S. No. 28 of 2012 and I.A. No. 680 of 2012 in A.S. No. 28 of 2012 and as such they are not entitled to plead that the first appellate Court has wrongly shifted the onus of proof on them. 20. The other decisions relied on by both the learned counsels are not germane to decide the substantial questions of law alleged to be involved in the above second appeals. 21. On going through the common judgment rendered in A.S.No.28 of 2012 and A.S.No.111 of 2012 by the first appellate Court, this Court is of the view that the first appellate Court has considered the entire evidence on record and arrived at a just conclusion. Nothing warranted to interfere with the findings of the first appellate Court. There is no substantial question of law involved in the second appeals. 22. In the result, the decrees and judgments dated 05.09.2014 of the first appellate Court in A.S. No. 28 of 2012 and A.S. No. 111 of 2012 are hereby confirmed. The second appeals in S.A.(MD) Nos. 946 and 947 of 2014 are hereby dismissed as devoid of merits without costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petitions are also dismissed.