ORDER : Smt. Savithramma, the learned High Court Government Pleader takes notice for the respondent No.1. Notice to the respondent Nos.2 to 5 is dispensed with. 2. The petitioner is seeking the writ of certiorari for quashing the entire proceedings in case No.1/2016-17 on the file of the first respondent Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies (‘ARCS’ for short). 3. The facts of the case in brief are that the second respondent Co-operative Society represented by its President and one of the Directors (respondent Nos.3 and 4 herein) executed the lease deed in favour of the petitioner on 9.12.2011. The lease was in respect of the vacant land measuring 60 cents and was for a period of 45 years. Subsequently, there was a change in the management of the second respondent Co-operative Society. Contending that the lease is illegal and collusive, the respondent No.2 raised the dispute before the respondent No.1 invoking Section 70 of the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959 (‘the said Act’ for short). 4. Sri S.K. Acharya, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the decision to lease the property in question in favour of the petitioner was taken by the annual general meeting of the second respondent Co-operative Society held on 19.9.2011. He submits that nobody objected to the leasing of the property either at the time of leasing the property or thereafter also. 5. He submits that as the lease deed contains the arbitration clause, the initiation of the proceedings before the respondent No.1 is without the authority of law and without jurisdiction. He submits that under Section 70 of the said Act, the respondent No.1 is not clothed with the power to adjudicate the disputes between the Society and the lease-holder. He submits that totally the petitioner has paid the lease deposit of Rs. 3,00,000/-. He submits that every year she has been paying Rs. 50,000/-. He submits that the petitioner is developing the property by taking the clearances and certificates from the Municipality. 6. He submits that the petitioner has filed the impleading application in the proceedings before the respondent No.1. The respondent No.1 is not even prepared to take the petitioner’s impleading application on record. He has only been orally saying that the petitioner’s presence is not necessary. He submits that this is how the principles of natural justice are being disrespected. 7. He submits that the petitioner has filed the impleading application in the proceedings before the respondent No.1. The respondent No.1 is not even prepared to take the petitioner’s impleading application on record. He has only been orally saying that the petitioner’s presence is not necessary. He submits that this is how the principles of natural justice are being disrespected. 7. Smt. Savithramma, the learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for the respondent No.1 submits that the whole lease transaction is collusive. She submits that the petitioner is the wife of the respondent No.5, who was Director of the second respondent Society at the time of entering into the lease arrangement. She submits that the execution of the lease deed is not brought to the notice of the Board of the second respondent Cooperative Society or to its General Body. She submits that the amounts, which the petitioner claims to have paid to the second respondent Society, do not figure in the accounts book of the Society. She submits that under Section 70(c) of the said Act, the ARCS is clothed with the power to invalidate any action taken by the former Management, if its action is not in the interest of the Co-operative Society or if it violates any provision of law. 8. The submissions of the learned counsel have received my thoughtful consideration. I notice with concern that both in the lease deed and in the memorandum of this petition, the petitioner is shown as the daughter of M.P. Tukaram. It is not known why the petitioner’s status of being the wife of the respondent No.5 is not shown. It is also not known how the former Management of the respondent No.2 zeroed in on the petitioner. Admittedly, no advertisement, no publicity, no notifications were issued calling for the applications for taking the lease of the property. 9. It may not be out of context to refer to what the Apex Court has said in the case of CENTRE FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS reported in (2012) 3 SCC 1 in paragraph No. 96 of its decision: “96. 9. It may not be out of context to refer to what the Apex Court has said in the case of CENTRE FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION AND OTHERS v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS reported in (2012) 3 SCC 1 in paragraph No. 96 of its decision: “96. In our view, a duly publicised auction conducted fairly and impartially is perhaps the best method for discharging this burden and the methods like first-come-first-served when used for alienation of natural resources/public property are likely to be misused by unscrupulous people who are only interested in garnering maximum financial benefit and have no respect for the constitutional ethos and values. In other words, while transferring or alienating the natural resources, the State is duty-bound to adopt the method of auction by giving wide publicity so that all eligible persons can participate in the process.” 10. Be it as it may, as the ARCS is seized of the matter, I do not propose to deliver any finding on whether the leasing of the property in question to the petitioner is illegal or not. Whether the proper procedure was followed is for the ARCS to decide. Whether the lease amounts were credited to the Society’s account, if not so, what would be the consequence is also for the ARCS to decide. 11. In the case on hand, the question that I am required to consider is whether the ARCS has the competence to examine the validity or invalidity of the lease transaction. Section 70(c) of the said Act reads as follows: “70. Disputes which may be referred to Registrar for decision. – (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, if any dispute touching the constitution, management, or the business of a cooperative society arises. – (a) xxxxxxxxx (b) xxxxxxxxx (c) between the society or its committee and any past committee, any officer, agent or employee, or any past officer, past agent or past employee or the nominee, heirs, or legal representatives of any deceased officer, deceased agent, or deceased employee of the society, or (d) xxxxxxxxxxxxx such dispute shall be referred to the Registrar for decision and no Civil or Labour or Revenue Court or Industrial Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or other proceedings in respect of such dispute.” 12. The plain reading of the afore-extracted provisions reveals that the dispute between the second respondent Society and its former Management can always be adjudicated by the ARCS. The issue of whether the Management is justified in entering into such a lease transaction itself cannot be settled by taking the matter to the arbitrators. Clause No.8 of the lease deed is applicable where there is difference of opinion between the Society and the petitioner. In the instant case, what is brought before the ARCS is not the difference of opinion between the respondent No.2 and the petitioner but the very validity of creating the lease by the former Management of the respondent No.2 in favour of the petitioner. Such a dispute is beyond the scope of arbitration. 13. The next question that I have to examine is whether the petitioner is entitled to be impleaded in the proceedings before the ARCS. My unmistakable answer to the said question is in the affirmative. If the ARCS invalidates the lease transaction, it is bound to affect the interest of the petitioner adversely. She is therefore a proper and necessary party for the adjudication of the issues falling for consideration in the proceedings before the ARCS. 14. At this juncture, Sri Acharya submits that the case is set down for the pronouncement of orders on 12.7.2016. 15. It is necessary that the petitioner be heard by the ARCS before the ARCS proceeds to pass the final order. I therefore deem it necessary and just to reserve the liberty to the petitioner to make an application for the pre-ponement of the case after serving the copies on the parties or their learned advocates. As there is some confusion as to whether the petitioner has already made the impleading application or not, I also deem it necessary to reserve the liberty to the petitioner to make fresh application for impleadment. The ARCS shall consider the two anticipated applications, one for advancement and the other for impleadment and dispose them after hearing all the parties and in the letter and spirit of this order. 16. Needless to observe that all the contentions are left open to be urged before the ARCS. It is clarified that the reasons given and the observations made hereinabove are only for the purpose of disposing of this petition. 16. Needless to observe that all the contentions are left open to be urged before the ARCS. It is clarified that the reasons given and the observations made hereinabove are only for the purpose of disposing of this petition. The ARCS shall adjudicate the matter independently of and uninfluenced by the reasons given and the observations made hereinabove.