JUDGMENT : VIRENDER SINGH, J. 1. Seeking reinstatement in service with all consequential benefits including, payment of back-wages, the petitioner who was compulsorily retired from service, has knocked the door of this Court seeking quashing of order of compulsory retirement contained in Memo dated 19.01.2012. 2. The factual matrix of the case are noticed hereunder:- The petitioner, who was appointed as temporary Munsif on 15.05.1989, was confirmed in service on 11.02.1994. While posted as Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Ranchi, he was issued a charge-memo dated 25.04.2008, on the allegation that he demanded Rs. 5,000,00/- through his peon namely, Bibhuti Kumar for granting bail to one Janab Salim Ali who was an accused in Complaint Case No. 717 of 2003, and since the said amount was not paid to his peon he dismissed the bail application on 12.09.2007. In the complaint petition which was registered as C. Case No. 717 of 2003, Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance of the offence on 06.11.2003, against which the accused persons preferred Cr. M.P. No. 1413 of 2003 under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. The Quash petition was finally dismissed by the High Court on 02.05.2007 and the accused Janab Salim Ali was arrested on 11.09.2007. The bail application preferred by the said accused, after the petitioner rejected his prayer for bail, was subsequently dismissed by A.J.C. also vide, order dated 19.09.2007. In the meantime, the petitioner was put under suspension on 13.09.2007 and as noticed above, a charge-memo was served upon him on 25.04.2008, to which the petitioner responded by filing his reply on 17.06.2008. During the departmental enquiry, five witnesses including, the learned Judicial Commissioner and son of the accused namely, Haider Ali were examined in support of the charges framed against the petitioner. The petitioner did not examine any witness however, he produced documentary evidence in his defence. The petitioner submitted his final defence on 08.01.2010 and, the enquiry officer submitted the report on 22.02.2010. The second show-cause notice dated 24.09.2010 was replied by the petitioner on 13.10.2010 and the order of compulsory retirement was passed on 20.10.2011 which was forwarded to the Government. The Government however, called for the complete record of the case. It appears that the High Court sent a second recommendation for compulsory retirement on 28.11.2011 and finally, the impugned order contained in Memo dated 19.01.2012 was issued by the order of the Governor of Jharkhand. The Government however, called for the complete record of the case. It appears that the High Court sent a second recommendation for compulsory retirement on 28.11.2011 and finally, the impugned order contained in Memo dated 19.01.2012 was issued by the order of the Governor of Jharkhand. It is stated that two criminal cases were instituted separately, against Haider Ali and Bibhuti Kumar however, Haider Ali was acquitted from the criminal charges in Special Case No. 16(A) of 2007 vide, order dated 23.02.2015 and, Bibhuti Kumar who was accused in Special Case No. 16 of 2007 was acquitted vide, order dated 27.02.2015. 3. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents on record. CONTENTIONS : 4. Mr. Manoj Tandon, the learned counsel for the petitioner challenging the impugned order dated 19.01.2012 inter-alia contended that:- (i) the charge against the petitioner must be held disproved on the ground that there is neither direct nor indirect evidence against the petitioner for demanding bribe through his peon from the accused for enlarging the accused on bail. (ii) the case set-up against the petitioner is based on “no evidence” and while so, this Court can examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the enquiry officer. (iii) the order of compulsory retirement issued on 19.01.2012 which records that the said order has been issued in “public interest”, is an order passed under Rule 74(b) (ii) of the Jharkhand Service Code, 2001 however, without assessing the entire service record of the petitioner and thus, unsustainable. (iv) the order of compulsory retirement issued under Rule 2(iv-a) of Bihar and Orissa Subordinate Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1935 being not attracted in the case of the petitioner, renders the said order invalid. (v) an order of compulsory retirement cannot be passed as a measure of punishment for passing an erroneous judicial order. (vi) the jurisdiction of the Inquiry Officer does not extend to record a finding of guilty. Thus enquiry report is liable to be rejected. 5. As against the above, Mr. Anoop Kr. Mehta, the learned counsel appearing for the High Court raising question of jurisdiction of the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence led in the departmental enquiry submitted that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court not being the Court of Appeal cannot re-appreciate the evidence led in the domestic enquiry. Anoop Kr. Mehta, the learned counsel appearing for the High Court raising question of jurisdiction of the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence led in the departmental enquiry submitted that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court not being the Court of Appeal cannot re-appreciate the evidence led in the domestic enquiry. Reiterating the stand taken in the counter-affidavit, the learned counsel submitted that the order of compulsory retirement dated 19.01.2012 has been passed as a measure of punishment and, the expression “public interest” used in the said order has been misconstrued by the petitioner as if, the said order has been passed under Rule 74(b)(ii) of the Jharkhand Service Code, 2001. It is stated that in the domestic enquiry the delinquent officer produced evidence and cross-examined the witnesses at length, which is reflected in the enquiry report dated 22.02.2010 running into more than 30 pages and that the delinquent was afforded sufficient opportunity to defend himself. CONSIDERATION : 6. The main plea of the petitioner is that the charge against him was that Bibhuti Kumar, the peon had demanded bribe at his instance, however the said Bibhuti Kumar was not examined during the departmental enquiry and thus, there is no legal evidence against the petitioner to prove the charge of demanding bribe of Rs. 5,000,00/- through his peon for enlarging the accused on bail. 7. Before examining this aspect, the difference in departmental enquiry and criminal trial has to be kept in mind. In a criminal proceeding the approach of the Court, the standard of proof and admissibility of evidence are tested by entirely different yardsticks which are not applied in a disciplinary proceeding. In a criminal trial, incriminating statement of the accused in certain circumstances or before certain officers is inadmissible in evidence whereas, strict rules of evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental proceeding. The degree of proof which is necessary to record an order of conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record a finding that the misconduct alleged has been proved. Similarly, appreciation of evidence in both proceedings is also not similar. In fact, the purpose of departmental enquiry and prosecution of an accused are two different and distinct aspects. In Union of India Vs. Similarly, appreciation of evidence in both proceedings is also not similar. In fact, the purpose of departmental enquiry and prosecution of an accused are two different and distinct aspects. In Union of India Vs. Sardar Bahadur reported in (1972) 4 SCC 618 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal trial and thus, the standard of proof required is that of preponderance of probabilities and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. In Nirmala J. Jhala Vs. State of Gujarat & Anr. reported in (2013) 4 SCC 301 , the decision on which heavy reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:- 17. “In view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that the disciplinary proceedings are not a criminal trial, and in spite of the fact that the same are quasi-judicial and quasi-criminal, doctrine of proof beyond reasonable doubt, does not apply in such cases, but the principle of preponderance of probabilities would apply. The Court has to see whether there is evidence on record to reach the conclusion that the delinquent had committed a misconduct. However, the said conclusion should be reached on the basis of test of what a prudent person would have done..............” 8. In the present case, the Enquiry Officer thus, was required to apply the test of “preponderance of probability” and not the test applied in criminal trial as contended on behalf of the petitioner. However, there is another issue which is interlinked with the plea that the charge as framed against the petitioner cannot be held proved. The issue which falls for our consideration is whether the High Court can delve deep into the evidences led during the departmental enquiry or it is absolutely precluded from doing so. The answer appears to be plain and simple. If in a case, without any elaborate argument on the evidences led during the departmental enquiry, it can be demonstrated that the case against the delinquent is of “no evidence”, the Court cannot stay its hands away, and say “sorry”, we cannot re-appreciate the evidence. In our considered opinion such a course is not available in law, even though the petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In our considered opinion such a course is not available in law, even though the petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. For example, if the only evidence led against the delinquent is his confessional statement or if the department merely produces copy of a First Information Report lodged against the delinquent and no other evidence is led during the departmental enquiry, in our opinion, High Court would be within its jurisdiction, to examine the nature of evidence led, to test the sustainability of the penalty order. However, the situation would be entirely different if some evidence led against the delinquent, on preponderance of probability, can reasonably prove the charge against the delinquent. 9. Now, in the light of the aforesaid legal position, the petitioner's plea would be examined while adverting to the facts of the case again. 10. The gist of the charge against the petitioner was that on 11.09.2007 before the accused namely, Janab Salim Ali was produced in the Court, the petitioner demanded Rs. 5,000,00/- through his peon namely, Bibhuti Kumar for his release on bail. At that time the accused was sitting in police jeep. Further, he deferred hearing of the bail petition for 12.09.2007 and finally dismissed the same because the demand was not fulfilled. During the domestic enquiry, the petitioner produced order taking cognizance dated 06.11.2003 in Complaint Case No. 717 of 2003, order dated 02.05.2007 dismissing the Quash petition of the accused persons filed in the High Court, order dated 11.09.2007 remanding the accused in judicial custody, copy of Vakalatnama dated 11.09.2007 on which the signature of the accused was attested by the Karapal, certification of the Jail Superintendent indicating entry of the accused in jail at 2.35 p.m. on 11.09.2007 and deposition of Md. Afroz in Complaint Case No. 647 of 2007 as well as reply filed by Bibhuti Kumar in the Departmental Proceeding No. 02 of 2007. The Enquiry Officer noticed the statement of Md. Afroz, Advocate who deposed that on 11.09.2007 before the remand, the accused was sitting with his son Hydar Ali in the police jeep. The son of the accused deposed that when his father was sitting in the police zeep, Bibhuti Kumar came near his father and whispered that if he can arrange Rs. 5,000,00/- Sir, would grant him bail to which his father showed his helplessness to arrange the said amount. The son of the accused deposed that when his father was sitting in the police zeep, Bibhuti Kumar came near his father and whispered that if he can arrange Rs. 5,000,00/- Sir, would grant him bail to which his father showed his helplessness to arrange the said amount. On 12.09.2007 again the said Bibhuti Kumar informed him that Sir would hear the bail petition only when he brings money and thereafter, he arranged Rs. 14,000/- and gave it to Bibhuti Kumar. It is not in dispute that a complaint was lodged to the then Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi by the advocates of the accused and the learned Judicial Commissioner called Bibhuti Kumar and made enquiry from him. A search was conducted upon him and Rs. 13,390/- was recovered from the possession of Bibhuti Kumar and thereafter, the police was called and he was handed over to the police. In support of the charges framed against the petitioner, Registrar, Civil Court, Ranchi was also examined. The said witness has also confirmed recovery of Rs. 13,390/- from Bibhuti Kumar in the chamber of Judicial Commissioner. 11. At no stage during the departmental enquiry, the petitioner alleged mala-fide against the Judicial Commissioner or the Registrar, Civil Court, Ranchi. From the enquiry report, it is manifest that the documents produced by the petitioner have been considered by the enquiry officer. The petitioner has cross-examined the witnesses at length however, the material witnesses reiterating the episode supported the charge against the petitioner. The enquiry officer recorded a finding that the charges framed against the petitioner were substantiated by the administration. The non-examination of Bibhuti Kumar is of no consequence, as he was made an accused in a criminal case registered for the said occurrence. The present is not a case based on “no evidence”. The evidence led against the petitioner connect him with the charges framed against him. It is not a case of “mere probability” of the petitioner involved in an act amounting to misconduct. 12. In Narinder Mohan Arya Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in (2006) 4 SCC 713 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that the Writ Court will bear in mind the distinction between some evidence and no evidence and the question required to be posed is whether some evidence adduced would lead to the conclusion as regards the guilt of the delinquent officer or not. Ltd. reported in (2006) 4 SCC 713 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that the Writ Court will bear in mind the distinction between some evidence and no evidence and the question required to be posed is whether some evidence adduced would lead to the conclusion as regards the guilt of the delinquent officer or not. It is equally true that sufficiency of evidence is not an issue which can be agitated in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 13. In State of A.P. Vs. Chitra Venkata Rao reported in (1975) 2 SCC 557 , it has been held that, “the adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal”. It is also well settled that, “it is not every error either of law or fact which can be corrected by a superior Court” [Nagendra Nath Bora & Anr. Vs. The Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam & Ors. AIR 1958 SC 398 ]. 14. In Sree Meenakshi Mills Ltd V. CIT reported in AIR 1957 SC 49 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has discussed the distinction between “question of fact” and “question of law” and, by an illustration; if in a suit a defence of the denial of execution of a promissory note is taken and the Court finds that the disputed signature is unlike the admitted signatures of the defendant and, on a consideration of other facts, comes to a conclusion that the promissory note is not genuine, observed that it cannot be contended that the finding thus recorded is not genuine and it is a question of law. 15. No doubt, there is no evidence on the point that the petitioner asked his peon Bibhuti Kumar to demand Rupees Five lacs for granting bail to the accused and, equally true is the fact that the petitioner could not have produced evidence to establish that he never demanded Rupees Five lacs through his peon from the accused however, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the possible evidence on this point that is, the evidence of Bibhuti Kumar who was arrested on the same day had become tainted. He, in any event could not have admitted that he demanded Rupees Five lacs at the instance of the petitioner. He, in any event could not have admitted that he demanded Rupees Five lacs at the instance of the petitioner. Even if, it is assumed that Bibhuti Kumar had confessed his guilt implicating the petitioner, his confession could not have been made the basis for recording a finding that the charge against the petitioner stood proved. In view of the evidences led during the departmental enquiry against the petitioner, even in both the hypothetical situations, evidence of Bibhuti Kumar was inconsequential and it could not have materially affected the outcome of the enquiry. Whether the bail application was filed on 11.09.2007 or on 12.09.2007, cannot be ascertained. During the course of hearing the counsel appearing for the parties agreed that the bail applications, at that point in time, used to be presented directly to the Court and no number was given to the bail applications (at the first stage). Thus, nothing much turns on this fact. Whether the bail application allegedly filed on 11.09.2007 was accompanying the vakalatnama of the accused or not, also cannot be ascertained and it has to be remembered that the bail application of the accused bears both the dates. 16. Having bestowed our anxious consideration to the plea raised by the petitioner, we find ourselves unable to differ from the inference drawn by the enquiry officer, on the basis of the evidence led during the departmental enquiry to conclude that the charges framed against the petitioner were proved. 17. In the counter-affidavit, the High Court has taken a stand that the petitioner has been inflicted penalty of “compulsory retirement”. The said penalty may be imposed upon the employee under Rule 49(iv-a) of Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 as well as, under Rule 2(iv-a) of Bihar and Orissa Subordinate Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1935. Rule 49 of Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 reads as under:- 49. “The following penalties may, for good and sufficient reason and as hereinafter provided, be imposed upon members of the services comprised in any of the classes (1) to (5) specified in rule 14, namely:- (i) Censure. (ii) Withholding of increments or promotion including stopage at an efficiency bar. (iii) Reduction to a lower post or time-scale, or to a lower stage in a time-scale. (ii) Withholding of increments or promotion including stopage at an efficiency bar. (iii) Reduction to a lower post or time-scale, or to a lower stage in a time-scale. (iv) Recovery from pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to Government by negligence or breach of orders. (iv-a) Compulsory retirement. (v) Suspension. (vi) Removal from the civil service of the Crown, which does not disqualify from future employment. (vii) Dismissal from the civil service of the Crown, which ordinarily disqualifies from future employment; Explanation 1.- The discharge- (a) of a person appointed on probation, during or at the end of the period of probation, on ground arising out of the specific conditions laid down by the appointing authority, e.g., want of a vacancy, failure to acquire prescribed special qualifications or to pass prescribed test, (b) of a person appointed otherwise than under contract to hold a temporary appointment, on the expiration of the period of the appointment, (c) of a person engaged under contract, in accordance with the terms of his contract does not amount to removal or dismissal within the meaning of this rule. Explanation II.-The discharge of a probationer, whether during or at the end of the period of probation for some specific fault or on account of his unsuitability for the services, amounts to removal or dismissal within the meaning of this rule. Explanation III.-Compulsory retirement of a Government servant in accordance with the provisions relating to his superannuation or retirement does not amount to penalty within the meaning of this rule.” 18. Rule 2 of Bihar and Orissa Subordinate Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1935 reads as under: 2. “The following penalties may, for good and sufficient reasons be imposed upon any member of a Subordinate Service, viz. Rule 2 of Bihar and Orissa Subordinate Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1935 reads as under: 2. “The following penalties may, for good and sufficient reasons be imposed upon any member of a Subordinate Service, viz. (i) Censure; (ii) Withholding of increments or promotion including stoppage at an efficiency bar; (iii) Reduction to a lower post or time-scale, or to a lower stage in a time-scale; (iv) Recovery from pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to Government by the negligence or breach of order; (iv-a) Compulsory retirement; (v) Fine; (vi) Suspension (vii) Removal from the civil service of the Crown, which does not disqualify from future employment; (viii) Dismissal from the Civil Services of the Crown, which ordinarily disqualifies from future employment; Provided that the penalty of fine shall be imposed only on menials and inferior servant; Explanation 1.- The discharge- (a) of a person appointed on probation, during or at the end of the period of probation, on grounds arising or at the specific conditions laid down by the appointing authority, e.g., want of vacancy, failure to acquire prescribed special qualification or to pass prescribed test; (b) of a person appointed otherwise than under contract to hold a temporary appointment, on the expiration of the period of the appointment, (c) of a person engaged under contract, in accordance with the term of his contract does not amount to removal or dismissal within the meaning of this rule. Explanation II.-The discharge of a probationer, whether during or at the end of the period of probation for some specific fault or on account of his unsuitability for the service amounts to removal or dismissal within the meaning of the rule. Explanation III.-Compulsory retirement of a Government servant in accordance with the provisions relating to his superannuation or retirement does not amount to a penalty within the meaning of this rule”. Note 1.-For the procedure to be followed before an order of dismissal, removal, compulsory retirement or reduction can be passed, see Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. In drawing up proceedings and conducting departmental enquiries, the instructions contained in rules 160 to 170 of the Bihar and Orissa Board's Miscellaneous Rules, 1939 are to be followed, except where more detailed instructions have been framed by the department concerned. Note 2. In drawing up proceedings and conducting departmental enquiries, the instructions contained in rules 160 to 170 of the Bihar and Orissa Board's Miscellaneous Rules, 1939 are to be followed, except where more detailed instructions have been framed by the department concerned. Note 2. For the procedure to be followed before an order imposing the following penalties can be passed, see Rule 55-A of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, published with notification no. 5172-A dated the 3rd June, 1950):- (i) Censure. (ii) Withholding of increment or promotion, including stoppage at an efficiency bar. (iii) Recovery from pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to Government by negligence or breach of order.” 19. The Bihar and Orissa Subordinate Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1935 were framed by the Government in exercise of power conferred under Rule 54 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930. Rule 49 of 1930 Rules and Rule 2 of 1935 Rules are pari materia insofar as, penalty which may be imposed upon an employee is concerned. Both the Rules provide “good and sufficient reasons” as grounds for imposing one of the penalties mentioned therein. The High Court has taken a stand that mere mentioning of wrong provision of law in order dated 19.01.2012 would not render the penalty of compulsory retirement imposed upon the petitioner, illegal. It is asserted that the employer has power to impose the penalty of compulsory retirement under Rule 49(iv-a) of Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930. It is further stated that in view of Article 235 of the Constitution of India though, the Appointing Authority of a judicial officer is the Governor of the State, administrative as well as the disciplinary control over the judicial officers vest in the High Court. The stand taken by the High Court merits acceptance. In N. Mani Vs. Sangeetha Theatre reported in (2004) 12 SCC 278 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that; 9. “It is well settled that if an authority has a power under the law merely because while exercising that power the source of power is not specifically referred to or a reference is made to a wrong provision of law, that by itself does not vitiate the exercise of power so long as the power does exist and can be traced to a source available in law”. 20. 20. Noticing a similar contention, in Mohd. Shahabuddin Vs. State of Bihar reported in (2010) 4 SCC 653 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed; this Court will always rely upon Section 114 illustration (e) of the Evidence Act to draw a statutory presumption that the official acts are regularly performed and if satisfied that the action in question is traceable to a statutory power, the Courts will uphold such State action. 21. The original records of the case disclose that the decision to inflict punishment of “compulsory retirement” was taken by the Full Court, and the recommendation of the High Court has been accepted by the Government. It is well settled that the control of the High Court under Article 235 of the Constitution of India includes the disciplinary control over the members of subordinate judiciary and, the disciplinary control of the High Court includes power to impose punishment. One of the punishments which can be inflicted upon a member of the subordinate judiciary is compulsory retirement. In State of West Bengal Vs. Nripendra Nath Bagchi reported in AIR 1966 SC 447 , it has been held that the control vested in the High Court under Article 235 of the Constitution includes disciplinary jurisdiction and it is complete control subject only to the power of the Government. In the said case, the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, “it shows that the High Court is made the sole custodian of the control over the judiciary.” In Registrar, High Court of Madras Vs. R. Rajiah reported in (1988) 3 SCC 211 , the High Court's control over the subordinate judiciary would comprehend taking a decision on punishment including, punishment of compulsory retirement, has been affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. We thus, find no force in the contention that wrong mentioning of the provision under which the petitioner was compulsorily retired, would render the impugned order dated 19.01.2012 invalid. 22. Finding fault with the enquiry report wherein the enquiry officer observed that the delinquent is found “guilty”, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the jurisdiction of the enquiry officer does not extend to record a finding of guilty and the enquiry report is liable to be discarded on that count alone. This contention is without substance. 22. Finding fault with the enquiry report wherein the enquiry officer observed that the delinquent is found “guilty”, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the jurisdiction of the enquiry officer does not extend to record a finding of guilty and the enquiry report is liable to be discarded on that count alone. This contention is without substance. As noticed above, the enquiry officer has recorded a finding that in view of the evidences led during the enquiry, the charges framed against the petitioner have been substantiated. 23. The other contention that before the impugned order dated 19.01.2012 compulsorily retiring the petitioner from service was passed his entire service record should have been considered, is devoid of merits. In the service jurisprudence, the expression “compulsory retirement” has two different connotations; one is when it is used as a measure of punishment and the other is when in public interest, to weed out dead-wood from the service, an order is passed. The order of compulsory retirement dated 19.01.2012 has been passed as a punishment, after a duly constituted and properly conducted departmental enquiry against the petitioner. The mere use of the word “public interest” in the impugned order dated 19.01.2012 would not render the same, invalid. The use of expression “public interest” in order dated 19.01.2012 can be viewed from a different angle inasmuch as, it is not in public interest to keep a judicial officer in service against whom a charge of demanding bribe has been found proved. 24. Referring to decision in Ramesh Chander Singh Vs. High Court of Allahabad and another reported in (2007) 4 SCC 247 , a contention has been raised by learned counsel for the petitioner that initiation of departmental proceeding against the petitioner was illegal. On this issue, all that is required to be indicated is that the initiation of departmental proceeding against the petitioner was not on the ground that he passed an “erroneous order in law” rather, specific charge against the petitioner was of demanding bribe through his peon from the accused for enlarging him on bail. On this issue, all that is required to be indicated is that the initiation of departmental proceeding against the petitioner was not on the ground that he passed an “erroneous order in law” rather, specific charge against the petitioner was of demanding bribe through his peon from the accused for enlarging him on bail. Moreover, in “Ramesh Chander Singh” the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, “if the High Court were to initiate disciplinary proceedings based on a judicial order, there should have been strong grounds to suspect officer's bona fides and the order itself should have been actuated by malice, bias or illegality.” The facts in Ishwar Chand Jain Vs. High Court of Punjab and Haryana and another reported in (1988) 3 SCC 370 , on which the counsel for the petitioner placed reliance are different from the facts of the present case. That was a case of a probationary officer in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:- 13. Every judicial officer is likely to commit mistake of some kind or the other in passing orders in the initial stage of his service which a mature judicial officer would not do. However, if the orders are passed without there being any corrupt motive, the same should be overlooked by the High Court and proper guidance should be provided to him. If after warning and guidance the officer on probation is not able to improve, his services should be terminated.” 25. Reliance placed by the petitioner's counsel on the decision in Nirmala J. Jhala Vs. State of Gujarat reported in (2013) 4 SCC 301 is also misplaced. In the said case, the advocate for the complainant admitted that he had no talk with the delinquent regarding money nor did the delinquent ever made such demand. The advocate who was examined to support the charge also did not support the case set-up against the delinquent. The High Court disbelieved the statement of the complainant that he could hear conversation between the delinquent and one advocate. In fact, the said evidence was discarded by the enquiry officer also. Still, the High Court shifting the burden of proof of negative circumstances on the delinquent, reached the conclusion that the charge framed against the delinquent has rightly been found proved. In the aforesaid facts, the Hon'ble Supreme Court interfered with the order of compulsory retirement. In fact, the said evidence was discarded by the enquiry officer also. Still, the High Court shifting the burden of proof of negative circumstances on the delinquent, reached the conclusion that the charge framed against the delinquent has rightly been found proved. In the aforesaid facts, the Hon'ble Supreme Court interfered with the order of compulsory retirement. The factual aspect in the case on hand is precisely different. 26. Viewed in the context of the aforesaid discussion, we find that no inference is warranted with the penalty order dated 19.01.2012 whereby, the petitioner was compulsorily retired from service. 27. In the result, the writ petition fails and resultantly, it is dismissed.