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2016 DIGILAW 50 (GUJ)

Irfan Ismailbhai Kalva v. State of Gujarat

2016-01-08

S.G.SHAH

body2016
JUDGMENT S.G. Shah, J. 1. Learned advocate for the petitioner disclosed on record that petitioner has been transferred to Jamnagar Jail and, therefore, he wants to amend the petition by adding The Jail Superintendent, Jamnagar District Jail, Jamnagar as party respondent No. 4. Amendment is allowed as prayed for, which shall be carried out forthwith. 2. By way of this petition, the detenue has challenged the order of detention dated 21.11.2015 passed by respondent No. 2, under the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti Social Activities Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as "PASA Act"). 3. Learned advocate, Mr. Soeb R. Boharia, appearing for the petitioner - detenue has invited my attention to the order of detention dated 21.11.2015, by which, the detenue was arrested and sent first to Patan Sub Jail and then transferred to Jamnagar District Jail, Jamnagar. The ground of detaining the accused is that two offence was registered against the petitioner under the provisions of Sections 5, 6(B), 8 and 10 of the Bombay Animal Preservation Act, 1954, Section 11(L) of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 and Section 295(A), 429 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code. He is, therefore, a "cruel person" as defined under Section 2(bbb) of the PASA Act. Learned advocate appearing for the petitioner has submitted that, except these two offences, there is no material with the detaining authority to detain the petitioner under the provisions of the PASA Act. It is submitted that the order is vitiated because only on the basis of two offences registered against the petitioner, and in absence of any other material to show involvement of the petitioner in similar activities, the detaining authority has recorded a subjective satisfaction that the petitioner is a cruel person. The definition of cruel person requires habitual involvement and, therefore, the subjective satisfaction and the consequential order are vitiated. 4. Learned AGP appearing for the respondent - State has opposed this petition. 5. The definition of cruel person requires habitual involvement and, therefore, the subjective satisfaction and the consequential order are vitiated. 4. Learned AGP appearing for the respondent - State has opposed this petition. 5. Having regard to the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner, it would be necessary to refer to the definition of "cruel person" as given in Section 2(bbb) of the Gujarat Prevention of Antisocial Activities Act, 1985, which runs as under: "2(bbb) "cruel person" means a person who either by himself or as member or leader of a gang habitually commits or attempts to commit abets the commission of an offence punishable under Section 8 of the Bombay Animal Preservation Act, 1954 (Bom. LXXII of 1954)". 6. It is clear from reading of the definition that the person to be branded as a cruel person has to be either a member or leader of a gang habitually committing or attempting to commit or abetting the commission of offence punishable under Section 8 of the Bombay Animal Preservation Act, 1954. The term "habitually" examined from any angle, literal or legal, would require presence of an element of repetitiveness. In the instant case, barring one offence registered against the petitioner, there was no material before the detaining authority to record a satisfaction that the petitioner is habitual or repetitively involved in the offence. 7. Under the circumstances, the subjective satisfaction that the petitioner is a cruel person on the basis of which he has been detained is vitiated. 8. It is generally seen that though some of the accused are repeatedly detained on different occasions for different offences, only because of nondisclosure of proper information and in all such detention orders, such orders are generally quashed and set aside by the Court. It is also seen that because of quashing of previous detention order, competent authority could not consider the grounds of detention under such order which is already quashed as a ground for detention for subsequent offences by the same detenue. However, when competent authorities are not abiding all other cited cases while passing the order of detention based upon two offences, it is surprising to note that at no point of time they challenged the observation of any Court that when previous order of detention has been quashed, it cannot be considered in subsequent detention. However, when competent authorities are not abiding all other cited cases while passing the order of detention based upon two offences, it is surprising to note that at no point of time they challenged the observation of any Court that when previous order of detention has been quashed, it cannot be considered in subsequent detention. It goes without saying that if a particular detenue continuous to commit the similar offence repeatedly, and if he is required to be detained repeatedly then atleast at some point of time, the competent authority shall compile all the information and shall consider it for fresh detention order as and when necessary and shall produce all such information before the Court so as to avoid the quashing of such detention order. If competent authority fails to take care of such exercise and when in impugned order of detention all such facts were not disclosed or considered for passing such order, the detention order is required to be dealt with as it is without considering the additional disclosure in affidavit-in-reply by the respondents. 8.1 In the present case, it seems that petitioner has been detained several times but at present, the detention order under challenge does not disclose all such facts so as to enable the petitioner to properly represent his case. Hence, there is no option but to consider that present order of detention is solely based upon a two offences. Therefore, considering the settled legal position that no person can be detained for two offences. 8.2 In view of above facts and circumstances, it would be necessary to observe that the competent authority is not precluded to disclose all material facts while detaining the petitioner if so require for any offence that he might commit hereinafter. In other words, though impugned order is quashed and set aside at present, it would not come in way of the competent authority for quoting such FIR and order of detention, thereby to treat petitioner as a habitual offender in case of commission of offence repeatedly. 8.3 No doubt, neither the possibility of launching of a criminal proceedings nor pendency of any criminal proceedings is an absolute bar to an order of preventive detention. 8.3 No doubt, neither the possibility of launching of a criminal proceedings nor pendency of any criminal proceedings is an absolute bar to an order of preventive detention. But, failure of the detaining authority to consider the possibility of either launching or pendency of criminal proceedings may, in the circumstances of a case, lead to the conclusions that the detaining authority has not applied its mind to the vital question whether it was necessary to make an order of preventive detention. Since there is an allegation that the order of detention is issued in a mechanical manner without keeping in mind whether it was necessary to make such an order when an ordinary criminal proceedings could well serve the purpose. The detaining authority must satisfy the court that the question too was borne in mind before the order of detention was made. In the case on hand, the detaining authority failed to satisfy the court that the detaining authority so bore the question in mind and, therefore, the court is justified in drawing the inference that there was no application of mind by detaining authority to the vital question whether it was necessary to preventively detain the detenue. It is also fruitful to refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu through Secretary to Government and another reported in (2011)5 SCC 244 wherein, it is observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court that if a person is liable to be tried, or is actually being tried for a criminal offence but the ordinary criminal law will not be able to deal with the situation, then and only then, preventive detention be taken recourse to. 9. The petitioner has argues on merits of FIRs, referring certain judgments. However, discussion of such facts, prima facie at this stage, is not warranted since it may otherwise prejudice to the trial. 10. However, since all such orders are quashed on technical ground, the same shall not come in the way of the Detaining Authority to pass an appropriate order in future. 11. In view of the above facts and circumstances of the case, the petition is allowed. The impugned order of detention dated 21.11.2015 passed by respondent No. 2 is hereby quashed and set aside. 11. In view of the above facts and circumstances of the case, the petition is allowed. The impugned order of detention dated 21.11.2015 passed by respondent No. 2 is hereby quashed and set aside. The detenue is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith, if he is not required to be detained in connection with any other case. Rule is made absolute accordingly. Direct Service is permitted.