ORDER : In this second appeal, the concurrent findings of learned two courts below have been called in question. The suit of the plaintiffs for declaration of right, title and interest, confirmation of possession and injunction was decreed by the learned trial court over 2B 5K 2Ch 10G of land covered by dag No. 8736 of second RS patta No. 1288 of Mouza Silchar town, Part-VI along with decree adjudging mutation of defendants over 8 Ch of land in the said dag and patta is illegal and for cancellation thereof, was decreed by the learned trial court in title suit No. 200/1994 of the Court of learned Munsiff No. 1 at Silchar. The learned court by that judgment and decree dismissed the counter claim of the defendants for declaration of their right, title and interest and for recovery of khas possession by evicting the plaintiffs. The aforesaid judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court in the suit and the counter claim was challenged by the defendants before the Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.) No. 1, Cachar at Silchar in title appeal No. 14/1999. The learned first appellate court dismissed the appeal on 06.06.2003. The present second appeal is directed against these two judgments and decrees. 2. One Abdus Samad Barbhuiya, the predecessor of the present respondents, as plaintiff, instituted title suit No. 200/1994 in the court of learned Sadar Munsiff No. 1, Cachar at Silchar stating that he acquired right, title and interest with respect to 1B 3K 7Ch 10G of land on the basis of registered gift deed dated 08.02.1943 executed by Abbas Ali and 1B 1K 11Ch of land vide registered gift deed dated 02.09.1953 executed by Musstt. Sureja Begum, widow of aforesaid Abbas Ali and came into possession of whole plot of land measuring 2B 5K 2Ch 10G of land described in schedule to the plaint. While he had been enjoying the land he was surprised to note that suit land measuring 8 Ch out of the aforesaid land was collusively mutated in favour of defendants No. 1 and 2 although they did not have any right, title and interest or possession in respect of thereof. The plaintiff, therefore, instituted the suit for declaration of his right, title and interest and confirmation of possession in the land described in schedule to the plaint along with injunction and for cancellation of mutation entries. 3. The plaintiff, therefore, instituted the suit for declaration of his right, title and interest and confirmation of possession in the land described in schedule to the plaint along with injunction and for cancellation of mutation entries. 3. The defendants on being summoned, appeared and by filing written statement – cum – counter claim stated that the original owner of the land was one Ala Mia who died leaving behind Abbas Ali, Mubeswar Ali and Asrab Ali. Abbas Ali got separated from other two brothers and was enjoying the entire land measuring 1B 18K 13Ch. On 17.12.1932 by executing a registered mortgage deed, he mortgaged the suit land measuring 1B 18K 13Ch covered by dag No. 3249 of C.S. Patta No. 300. Arjan Ali during his life time became owner of the land and he thereafter sold the same to one Sonahar Ali on 19.01.1971 who on turn transferred the land to the defendants No. 1 and 2. But in 1995, when the defendant asked the plaintiff to vacate the land, he refused and disclosed that he became owner of the land on the basis of gift deed dated 08.02.1943 and 02.09.1953. He also created a forged sale deed dated 23.08.1943 in order to get a gift deed dated 02.09.1953 from Sureja Bibi. Under such circumstances, all these deeds are liable to be declared and adjudged as illegal and for declaration that plaintiff has no right, title and interest with respect to the suit land along with a decree for ejectment of the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed a written statement against the aforesaid counter claim denying the case of the defendants in entirety and prayed that the counter claim be dismissed. 4. In course of trial, the learned trial court framed the following issues:- 1. Is there cause of action for the suit? 2. Whether the plaintiff has title and possession over the land described in the schedule of the plaint? 3. Whether the mutation of the defendants is illegal and improper and liable to be cancelled? 3A. Is the suit barred by Limitation? 3B. Is the plaintiff entitled to a decree, as prayed for? ISSUES ON COUNTER CLAIM: 4. Is there cause of action for counter claim? 5. Whether the counter-claims raised are maintainable? 5A. Is the counter-claim barred by Limitation? 6. Whether the documents by which the plaintiff claims are forged? 7. 3A. Is the suit barred by Limitation? 3B. Is the plaintiff entitled to a decree, as prayed for? ISSUES ON COUNTER CLAIM: 4. Is there cause of action for counter claim? 5. Whether the counter-claims raised are maintainable? 5A. Is the counter-claim barred by Limitation? 6. Whether the documents by which the plaintiff claims are forged? 7. Are the defendants No. 2 to 6 owners of the suit homestead? 8. Are the defendants entitled to a decree by way of counter-claim, as prayed for? In course of trial, plaintiff examined 6 witnesses and adduced 6 documentary evidence as Ext. 1 to 6 while defendant examined 2 witnesses and exhibited 5 documents as Ext. A to E. 5. The learned trial court after consideration of the materials available on record held that Ext. C adduced by the defendant contains mention of sale deed dated 05.02.1946 (Ext. A) and gift deed dated 02.09.1953 (Ext. 4). It contains recital covering the matter that led to relinquishment of 1K 12Ch 10G of land by plaintiff in the suit patta in favour of the defendants. This shows that Sureja Bibi admittedly acquired ownership and possession in respect of 1B 3K 7Ch 10G of land out of which she sold 1K 12Ch in favour of the defendants and this must have been done only through Ext. 3. Recital of Ext. C, therefore, presupposes acquisition of title by Sureja Bibi and her sale in favour of the defendants out of the total land of 1B 3K 7Ch 10G and thus even from perusal of gift deed dated 08.02.1943, gift deed dated 02.09.1953, Exts. A, B and C, the claim of the plaintiff over 2B 5K 2Ch 10G of land also become fortified. The learned trial court considered the objection raised by the defendant that gift deed (Ext. 2) containing cross mark as signature of Abbas Ali Sadiol was duly presented before the registering authority and was duly registered amounts to signature within the meaning of section 3(56) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 which provides that signature includes a mark being a sort of symbolic writing. The provision of section 90 of the Evidence Act in regard to 30 years old document extends to such mark and so the Exts. The provision of section 90 of the Evidence Act in regard to 30 years old document extends to such mark and so the Exts. 2 and 4 gift deeds being 30 years old documents and having been presented from the custody of the plaintiff were liable to be presumed to have been executed under section 90 of the Evidence Act. However, such presumption being rebuttable and the defendants not having led any evidence to rebut such presumption, the presumption became final and so the documents were held to have been duly proved in accordance with law. Thus, relying on Exts. 2 and 4 registered gift deeds, the learned trial court declared the right, title and interest of the plaintiff over the suit land and dismissed the counter claim of the defendants holding that they could not prove their right, title 6. It is to be noted that the contents of the plaint and the written statement were different and so defendants were duty bound to prefer two appeals if they were aggrieved at the dismissal of their counter claim and the decree of the suit. The defendants appear to have preferred only one appeal before the first appellate court. After passing of the judgment by the first appellate court the defendants preferred only one second appeal before this court. Decree of the suit of the plaintiff was on the basis of registered gift deed made by Abbas Ali and his wife Sureja Bibi. The defendants, on the other hand, had raised their title on the basis of registered mortgage deed dated 17.12.1932 and so to establish the same, the defendants were duty bound to prove the right, title and interest acquired by Arjan Ali on the basis of aforesaid document or any other document. That not having been done, the counter claim was dismissed and so it would have been proper in the fitness of things if two different appeals would have been preferred. 7. I have heard Mr. AB Choudhury, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. CKS Baruah (Jr.) and Mrs. R Choudhury, learned counsel for the respondents. I have perused the lower court records including the Exts. A, B and C adduced by the defendants. 8. Mr. 7. I have heard Mr. AB Choudhury, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. CKS Baruah (Jr.) and Mrs. R Choudhury, learned counsel for the respondents. I have perused the lower court records including the Exts. A, B and C adduced by the defendants. 8. Mr. AB Choudhury, learned senior counsel, argues that Arjan Ali having acquired title to the suit land measuring 1B 18K 13L on the basis of registered mortgage deed dated 17.12.1932, neither Abbas Ali nor Sureja Bibi could have gifted the land to the plaintiff in any point of time and so acquisition of title by plaintiff over the suit land on the basis of Exts. 2 and 4 is defective. He further submits that the Ext. C itself is indicative of the fact that plaintiff had relinquished his title over the suit land by executing the aforesaid registered deed and so it does not fit in the mouth of the plaintiff to claim right, title and interest thereafter. The learned courts below did not consider Exts. A, B and C in proper perspective and thus, arrived at the erroneous finding. 9. Per contra, Mrs. R Choudhury, learned counsel for the respondents, argues that the very documents produced by the defendants cut at the root of their defence claim. Ext. A adduced by the defendant goes to show that on 05.02.1946 Sureja Bibi, the widow of Abbas Ali had sold 1K 12Ch 10G of land described in dag No. 4469 of R.S. Patta No. 573 in discharge of the debt of her husband to the tune of Rs. 500/- including Rs. 150/- for which Ext. B mortgage deed was executed on 17.12.1932. Drawing attention of the court to the recital of the Ext. B, Mrs. Choudhury has highlighted that Abbas Ali had taken Rs. 150/- as loan from Arjan Ali, predecessor of the defendants and to secure the said loan, he had executed mortgage deed dated 17.12.1932 with respect to 1B 18K 13Ch of land. It was specifically mentioned in the document that he would be liable to make payment of interest at the rate of Rs. 3 and 2 Anas per annum upon the aforesaid amount till realisation. If he fails to liquidate the loan in that event, Arjan Ali would be entitled to get auction of other movable and immovable properties and that till the same is done, he would not transfer the mortgaged land. 3 and 2 Anas per annum upon the aforesaid amount till realisation. If he fails to liquidate the loan in that event, Arjan Ali would be entitled to get auction of other movable and immovable properties and that till the same is done, he would not transfer the mortgaged land. There is a default clause in the said document to show that if he transfers the land and if the same comes to light in that event, he will be liable to punishment in a competent criminal court. By drawing attention of the court to Ext. A she further submits that liability of Abbas Ali as disclosed in Ext. B stood discharged upon execution of Ext. A whereby Sureja Bibi had transferred 1K 12Ch 10G of land in dag No. 4469 of R.S. Patta No. 573 in favour of Arjan Ali on 05.02.1946. The registered mortgage deed (Ext. B), therefore, stood discharged and the mortgage stood redeemed automatically. Under such circumstances, there was no difficulty on the part of either Arjan Ali or his widow Sureja Bibi to make gift in favour of the plaintiff with respect to the other land. Gift made by Abbas Ali on 08.02.1943 by Ext. 2, therefore, did not have any impediment or clog. The gift made by Sureja Bibi, however, on 02.09.1953 included total land of 1B 3K 7Ch 10G and it did not exclude the amount of land measuring 1K 12Ch 10G sold by her vide Ext. A in favour of Arjan Ali and this is why plaintiff had executed a registered relinquishment deed vide Ext. C on 06.01.1965. Ext. C adduced by the defendants as their document itself contains all the recital including the recital as to gift made by Sureja Bibi in favour of the plaintiff and the acquisition of title by her and so, the learned courts below did not commit any error in dismissing the counter claim of the defendants and decreeing the suit of the plaintiff in entirety. The defendants could not establish their right, title and interest with respect to the 8Ch of land as there is no evidence on record to show that this 8 Ch of land is covered by Ext. A, which is the only document, by which Arjan Ali acquired title from Sureja Bibi. 10. The defendants could not establish their right, title and interest with respect to the 8Ch of land as there is no evidence on record to show that this 8 Ch of land is covered by Ext. A, which is the only document, by which Arjan Ali acquired title from Sureja Bibi. 10. This court while admitting this second appeal on 05.09.2003 framed as many as 4 substantial questions of law which are quoted below:- 1. Whether the presumption of genuineness under Section 90 of the Evidence Act can be drawn in respect of Exhibits 2, 3 and 4 which do not contain the signatures of the Executant? 2. Whether in absence of proof of due execution and attestation as required under Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, Exhibit 2 and 4 can be construed as valid deed of gifts? 3. Whether non-consideration of the effect of the deed of relinquishment (Exhibit – C) executed by the plaintiff in favour of the appellants/defendants has vitiated the judgments and decrees passed by the learned courts below? 4. Whether non-consideration of defendant’s exhibits B and C has vitiated the ultimate findings arrived at by the learned courts below? 11. The learned courts below considered Ext. 2 to have been executed by Abbas Ali in favour of the plaintiff on 08.02.1943. Ext. 2 is available on record. It shows that doner gave only a cross mark in place of his signature and the document on being presented before the registering authority in accordance with law and the doner having been identified by witness, the jurisdictional Sub-Registrar got the deed registered. It is endorsed in the body of the document that execution is admitted by Abbas Ali who was identified by Sonahar Ali, son of Mahmud Ali. The endorsement made in the body of the original document goes to show that Abbas Ali admitted the cross sign to be is signature and he admitted before the registering authority that he had executed the deed. Relying on the provision of section 3(56) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the learned trial court was of the view that any mark by an executor over a document apart from writing his name would also be considered to a signature within the meaning of section 3(56) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Relying on the provision of section 3(56) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the learned trial court was of the view that any mark by an executor over a document apart from writing his name would also be considered to a signature within the meaning of section 3(56) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The provision of section 3(56) provides that “sign”, with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, shall, with reference to a person who is unable to write his name, include “mark”, with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions. Giving of sign in place of signature is a recognised provision in law. Even in section 63 of the Indian Succession Act execution of unprivileged Will by a testator either by signing or by affixing a mark by himself or a sign given by some other persons in his presence has been construed to be execution. While section 3(56) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 executor has signed, section 63 of the Indian Succession Act goes further when such mark is given by somebody else as per consent of the executor. So what is necessary in execution of document is doing overt action on the part of the executor in proof or witness of his intention to execute the document. In the present case, such intention of the executor as a doner has been duly expressed before the registering authority. On the overleaf of the first page of the original document while registering the document, the jurisdictional Sub-Registrar mentioned that Abbas Ali admitted to have executed the document. This was done way back on 08.02.1943 and so after the suit was instituted more than 30 years thereafter such execution could not have been called in question when the document was produced to the court from plaintiff who is supposed to be the person in custody of the document. The learned courts below have not committed any error in taking rebuttable presumption of the section 90 of the Evidence Act in view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances. The defendants did not lead any evidence to show that the document was not so executed by Abbas Ali although there is proof to that effect through the endorsement made by the registering authority. The substantial 12. The second substantial question of law is in regard to validity of gift deed. The defendants did not lead any evidence to show that the document was not so executed by Abbas Ali although there is proof to that effect through the endorsement made by the registering authority. The substantial 12. The second substantial question of law is in regard to validity of gift deed. Both the gift deeds were executed 30 years before the same were presented before the court and it was discussed in the aforesaid substantial question of law that the defendants did not lead any evidence to revert the presumption available under section 90 of the Evidence Act. Moreover, Ext. 1 executed by Sureja Bibi and exhibited by plaintiff is the same document which has been exhibited by defendants as Ext. A in favour of Arjan Ali. Sale in favour of Arjan Ali in 1946 by Sureja Bibi on assertion of her title has been duly recited in Ext. C adduced by none other than the defendants. This document relates back to 06.01.1965. Ext. C executed on 06.01.1965 made the defendants aware that there was a gift deed on 02.09.1953 by Sureja Bibi in favour of the plaintiff but they did not take any action thereafter even if they had any doubt about the legality or otherwise of the document. The defendants, therefore, were not entitled to raise any objection after the suit was instituted in the year 1994. The objection as to proof of the document, namely, Ext. 2 and 4, therefore, cannot arise. The second substantial question of law is also decided in favour of the respondents and not in favour of the appellants. 13. The third substantial question of law perhaps does not arise from the facts and circumstances of the case. This substantial question of law was framed on the presumption that the learned courts below did not consider the Ext. C. Having gone through the judgments of the learned courts below, particularly the judgment of the learned trial court, I do not find there is sufficient discussion about this document in paragraph F under the heading issues No. 2, 6 and 7. Rather, the learned trial court considered this document to find support in favour of the case of the plaintiff. The learned trial court considered the document held thereby that as per recital of Ext. C execution of Exts. 2 and 3 become fortified. Rather, the learned trial court considered this document to find support in favour of the case of the plaintiff. The learned trial court considered the document held thereby that as per recital of Ext. C execution of Exts. 2 and 3 become fortified. The substantial question of law mentioned at serial No. 3 above does not arise from the facts and circumstances of the case and it does not require any adjudication. For the same reason, substantial question of law at serial No. 4 would not arise because both the courts have discussed Ext. B as well as Ext. C. Ext. B is the registered mortgage deed dated 17.12.1932 but for which Ext. A sale deed was executed in favour of the defendants and this Ext. A has been relied on in Ext. C. The learned trial court while considering Ext. C considered Ext. B as well. This is why the substantial question of law at serial No. 4 does not require any adjudication. 14. All the substantial questions of law having been answered against the appellants herein and having been found to be based on materials available on record, the second appeal is liable to be dismissed. It is accordingly dismissed. 15. No order as to costs. 16. Interim order, if any, shall stand automatically vacated. Send down the LCRs after framing of decree.