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2016 DIGILAW 507 (ORI)

Laxman Nath v. Bhagaban Nath

2016-07-12

D.DASH

body2016
JUDGMENT : This second appeal has been filed calling in question the judgment and decree passed by the learned District Judge, Keonjhar in Title Appeal No. 34 of 1988 confirming the judgment and decree passed by the learned Sub-ordinate Judge, Anandapur (as it was then) in Title Suit No. 31 of 1986. The respondent no. 1 as the plaintiff had filed the suit for declaration that the defendant no. 1 in the trial court who is the father of appellant no. 1, 2 and 4 and the husband of the original appellant no. 3 (since dead) was not the adopted son of Kanhu and his wife Bhalu and he was never adopted by Kanhu and his wife Bhalu. The suit having been decreed declaring that the appellant-defendant no. 1 and his father Kartika are not the adopted son of Bhalu and her husband Kanhu and further declaring the plaintiff to have solely succeeded to the property of Bhalu and thereby restraining the appellants from interfering with the possession of plaintiff-respondent no. 1 over the suit property, the defendant no. 1 to 4 and 6 being aggrieved by said judgment and decree had filed the first appeal under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The said appeal stood dismissed refusing to interfere with the finding recorded by the trial court as also the final order and the decree. 2. It may be stated here that the first appeal was initially disposed by the learned District Judge by judgment dated 16.09.1992. So, these appellants being the aggrieved defendants had filed second appeal bearing No. 260 of 1992 before this Court. Considering the submission raised from the side of the appellant-defendants that the lower appellate court despite pendency of a petition under order 41 rule 27 of the Code filed by the appellant-defendants for adduction of additional evidence seeking permission to get some documents such as the record of rights admitted in evidence at that stage ought not to have disposed of the appeal without disposing the said application, this Court had remanded the matter to the first appellate court with necessary direction in that light for disposal of the appeal in accordance with law after disposing the application under order 41 rule 27 of the Code filed by the appellant-defendants. The lower appellate court on remand having heard the appeal, has admitted those two records of right in evidence as Ext. C and D and then on merit, has dismissed the appeal. Thus, now before this Court, those unsuccessful defendant no. 1 to 4 and 6 are the appellants in this second appeal under section 100 of the Code. It may be stated here that appellant no. 3 who was the defendant no. 3 in the trial court and appellant no. 3 in the lower appellate court having died in the meantime, her name has been expunged as dead in view of the presence of the rest of the appellants as her legal representatives. 3. For the sake of convenience, in order to avoid confusion and bring in clarity, the parties hereinafter have been referred to as they have been arraigned in the trial court. 4. Plaintiff’s case:- One Bhima Nath had two sons namely, Gani and Bhagirathi. Dibakar and the Nisakar are the sons of Gani and they survived Gani. Dibakar had no issue and he died leaving behind his wife Dalimba who also died sometime thereafter. Nisakar died leaving behind his only son Kanhu. This Kanhu had two wives namely, Keluni and Bhalu and one son Bhikari who died issue less. Kanhu’s first wife namely, Keluni had met her death long before. The second wife Bhalu died on 09.01.1986. Bhagirathi, the son of Bhima had a son Kampal whose three sons are Dinandhu, Harekrushna and Balakrushna. Kampal’s two sons namely, Dinabandhu had no issue and the plaintiff is the son of Balakrushna. The defendant no. 4 is the wife of Balakrushna. After death of Bhima, his two sons Gani and Bhagirathi were leaving jointly and possessing their ancestral property accordingly. During said jointness, Dibakar, Nisakar, Bhagirathi and Pitambar died. Thereafter, dissension arose between Kanhu, the grandson of Gani and Kampal, the grandson of Bhagirathi. So, ancestral properties were amicably partitioned and accordingly parties began to possess. Therefore, in the records of the current settlement, the lands have also been recorded separately in favour of the members of two branches. Bhalu being the last surviving successor of the branch of Gani was in peaceful possession of the entire half share from out of the total ancestral property. After the death of Bhalu, the property came to the hands of the plaintiffs. Bhalu being the last surviving successor of the branch of Gani was in peaceful possession of the entire half share from out of the total ancestral property. After the death of Bhalu, the property came to the hands of the plaintiffs. It is stated that Bhalu during her lifetime was depending much upon one Kartika Nath who happens to be the father of defendant no. 1, 2, 4 and 6 and husband of defendant no. 3 and for the purpose of looking after the cultivation and other family affairs of Bhalu he was rending all sorts of help to her. For some reason or other she was not in good terms with the plaintiff. Bhalu was a centurion when she died. It is said that she was having no mental balance and was unable to see anything as also hear anybody. This was the state prevailing for 20 years prior to her death and so she was fully dependant on Kartika who was in frequent visiting terms to her house. The plaintiff for all these reasons had entertained grave suspicion in a mind lest Kartika would create some documents in his favour taking advantage of Bhalu’s incapacity in doing anything; as also by abusing the confidence reposed by Bhalu on him. So, there was a publication an Odia daily at the behest of the plaintiff mentioning that he would be the ultimate successor of the property of Bhalu on her death. The plaintiff performed the funeral ceremony and obsequies after Bhalu died and he also possessed the property left by Bhalu. It is alleged that as the defendant no. 1, 2 and 4 disturbed in his possession, a proceeding under section 145 of Cr.P.C. had been initiated and the properties were attached remaining under the custody of a receiver. It is only during the pendency of the said proceeding, the plaintiff came to know that Kartika Nath behind the back of all taking advantage of all those aforesaid had fraudulently managed to get the suit land recorded in his land describing him as the son of Kanhu. In addition to it, he has also created a registered deed purported to have been executed by Bhalu acknowledging the adoption of his natural son Laxman-defendant no. 1 falsely said to have been taken earlier. In addition to it, he has also created a registered deed purported to have been executed by Bhalu acknowledging the adoption of his natural son Laxman-defendant no. 1 falsely said to have been taken earlier. The execution of this was seriously disputed and it is stated that Bhalu had absolutely no knowledge about this and she had never executed any deed knowing its contents and purpose. It is further stated that such deed has been taken by Kartika not only taking advantage of total physical incapacity of Bhalu but also abusing the confidence that she has reposed on him to the greatest extent, being in a position to dominate her will. It is stated that there was never such adoption of Laxman by Bhalu nor Kartik was ever adopted by Bhalu and her husband Kanhu. 5. The defendant no. 1 to 4 contested the suit by filing written statement; they challenged the genealogy given in the plaint. It is stated that the plaintiff is a stranger to the family of Bhima and has no locus standie. It is their case that property belongs to one Nandu Nath with whom the plaintiff has no link and communication. It is further stated that Nandu had a son called Gani. Dibakar, Nishakar are his two sons, Dalimba is wife of Dibakar who had survived him and died later. Nishakar died leaving behind his son Kanhu who died leaving behind his two wives namely, Keluni and Bhalu and a son Bhikari through Bhalu. It is stated that Laxman Nath, the defendant no. 1 was adopted validly by Bhalu and thereafter on 15.10.1979, she executed a registered deed of adoption to that effect. This is said to have been with the full knowledge of the plaintiff. The defendant no. 1 further claims to have performed the Sudhikriya of Bhalu and have been in possession of the property of Bhalu. It is alleged that the plaintiff with a view to grab the suit property, got the proceeding under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure initiated and with the help of police has finally obtained the order of attachment. It is also their case that wife of Nishakara namely, Rukmani Nath after the death of Kanhu has sold away the suit land land measuring Ac. 11.07 decimals on 08.12.1950 and 09.12.1950 and since then the defendants are in possession of the same. It is also their case that wife of Nishakara namely, Rukmani Nath after the death of Kanhu has sold away the suit land land measuring Ac. 11.07 decimals on 08.12.1950 and 09.12.1950 and since then the defendants are in possession of the same. With all these counter pleadings, they pray to non-suit the plaintiff holding him to have no locus and as such not entitled to any reliefs as prayed for. 6. The trial court receiving the rival pleadings as aforesaid framed eleven issues. It has rightly taken up for decision at first, the issue no. 1 as regards the correctness of the genealogy projected by the plaintiff. Upon examination of evidence and discussion, the genealogy given in the plaint has been specifically held to have been duly proved and as such has been accepted for further progress of the suit. Thereafter, the answer has been recorded in respect of issue no. 2 as to whether defendant no. 1 is the adopted son Bhalu, wife of Kanhu or not? Upon analysis of evidence and their assessment, the trial court’s finding has been in the negative and thus, it has gone in favour of plaintiff. Answers to these two issues have practically led the trial court to decree the suit granting the reliefs to the plaintiff. The defendants thus having been unsuccessful although had challenged the same by filing the first appeal, they have failed in getting the judgment and decree of the trial court reversed. 7. The appeal has been admitted on the following substantial questions of law:- (1) Whether the learned court below have committed illegality in holding that the onus lay on the appellant to prove the adoption, as alleged, even though, the deed of acknowledgement of adoption was exhibited as Ext. A and according to section 16 of the Hindu adoption and Maintenance Act, the said document was required to be disproved by the plaintiff? (2) Whether the learned lower appellate court after remand of the case by this Court in second appeal No. 260 of 1994, while accepting the documents marked as Exts. C & D as additional evidence, which are record of right, has committed an illegality in not considering the same which disclosed that the vendors of Bhima and Nandu are two different persons and in holding that Bhima and Nandu are one and the same persons? 8. C & D as additional evidence, which are record of right, has committed an illegality in not considering the same which disclosed that the vendors of Bhima and Nandu are two different persons and in holding that Bhima and Nandu are one and the same persons? 8. At this stage, the application filed by the appellants under order 41 rule 27 of the Code for acceptance of additional evidence as mentioned in the schedule of the petition giving rise to Misc. Case No. 532 of 2009 needs consideration and thus stands for disposal as that has the bearing in the matter of further proceeding to answer the substantial questions of law as also may have the impact in the final outcome of the lis. The documents sought to be adduced as additional evidence most importantly include a registered sale-deed dated 08/09.12.1950 and other documents are the certified copies of the records of right of lands of different mouzas i.e., two of Fakirpur and other two of Chakrakana numbering four and two certified copies of plot index showing the inter se relationship of the khata no. and plot number of two settlements in respect of the lands in mouza Fakirpur. It is stated that inspite of all possible steps, the appellants had not been able to trace out the registered sale-deed and for that reason the same could not be adduced in evidence at any earlier stage of litigation. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the documents are of great importance for a just decision in the present dispute between the parties. The move is vehemently resisted by the defendants. It is stated that the suit is of the year 1986, and althrough there has been tooth and nail contest. The first appeal being filed, these appellants lost. So they carried a second appeal, when the appeal was remanded to the lower appellant court and now this appeal is after the disposal of the first appeal in the second round. This second appeal is of the year 2009 and now in this second appeal, the present application has been filed about six months after the admission of the appeal. The appellants have filed the original sale-deed. Althrough the litigation, the appellants put forth their claims based upon adoption. This second appeal is of the year 2009 and now in this second appeal, the present application has been filed about six months after the admission of the appeal. The appellants have filed the original sale-deed. Althrough the litigation, the appellants put forth their claims based upon adoption. By this sale-deed, they want to project another case that even if their case of adoption fails and is not accepted, the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief in view of this registered sale-deed by which the suit land had already been sold long back. It is also submitted that this documents was never produced before the settlement authority nor on that basis any attempt had ever been taken earlier for all these long years to correct the land records. Thus, objection is that the petition at this highly belated stage merits no consideration and the move is pure and simple to drag on the litigation by the appellants being in enjoyment of the subject matter highly detrimental to the interest of the respondents in order to finally see that the respondents in this way being harassed would no more be able pursue the litigation and at the ultimate the appellants would indirectly succeed in achieving the mischievous goal. It is submitted that the assertion that the document was untraceable is false and it is purposefully produced at this stage only to drag on as otherwise there would be no ground for the same purpose of lingering. The suit having been disposed of towards the mid of the year 1988, further rounds of litigation continued. This petition for adduction of additional evidence is filed in the second journey to this Court in second appeal when in the earlier second appeal, it was not so moved although submission then stood confined only for remand to the lower appellate court for consideration of petition under order 41 rule 27 of the Code for admitting two records of right and then for decision afresh on contentious issues considering their impact. The important document out of all these is the sale-deed purported to have been executed by one Rukmani, wife of Kanhu, the second son of Gani in favour of the predecessor in interest of defendant no. 1 to 4. In the said sale-deed, the father’s name of Kartika has been described as Bichha Nath. The important document out of all these is the sale-deed purported to have been executed by one Rukmani, wife of Kanhu, the second son of Gani in favour of the predecessor in interest of defendant no. 1 to 4. In the said sale-deed, the father’s name of Kartika has been described as Bichha Nath. The explanation in the facts and circumstances of the given case for this belated move appears to be wholly unacceptable. It is not described as to how the original sale-deed now produced remained untraced for such a long period and if so why its certified copy was not tendered as secondary evidence. The sale-deed in question since the year 1950 has never been pressed into service in any manner although the preparation of land records and is thus coming to see the light of the day after about six decades. As against the pleading no step has been taken to lead any evidence at the appropriate time or even thereafter since 1988 upto 2009. The defendant no. 1 examined as D.W. 3 has not whispered a word on that score. Similarly, his natural brother i.e., defendant no. 3 examined as D.W. 7 is totally silent on that aspect. The vendee in the said sale-deed is Kartika Nath son of Bichha Nath who is the natural father of the defendant no. 1 as claimed. Now even his own brother (Kartika’s brother) namely, Pati Nath having come to the witness box as D.W. 7 has not stated anything on that nor even all those witnesses have hinted about the possession to have flowed accordingly. This deed of sale being surrounded with such suspicious circumstances in my considered opinion appears to be a bogus document which had been created with great mischievous vision so as to be produced at last to further drag the litigation on as far as possible to ultimately deprive the adversary being not able to further pursue the same and to serve another purpose that at that time it might come as a total surprise when also the clinching evidence showing it to be bogus and created would not be available. The submissions of the learned counsel for the respondents are thus found to be having great force and accordingly stand accepted. The submissions of the learned counsel for the respondents are thus found to be having great force and accordingly stand accepted. In view of aforesaid, this sale-deed and other documents, in my considered view are not so essential for a just decision in the suit. In my humble opinion, the substantial questions of law as framed can properly be answered without taking those into consideration. Furthermore those are not required to be gone through to pronounce the judgment in a more satisfactory manner particularly when in view of the rival case of the parties and the scope for decision in the suit. The petition under order 41 rule 27 of the Code is accordingly rejected and consequently, the Misc. Case stands dismissed. 9. Learned counsel for the appellants seriously disputed the genealogy in stating that no one was there named as Bhima Nath in the ancestral line of the plaintiffs and that Bhima is the self-same person as Nandu Nath. So, according to him, the said finding of the courts below is without proper examination of the material evidence on record and the conclusion on that score is unsustainable. It is also submitted that when in so far as the deed Ext. A is a deed of adoption, the courts below have erred in law by not going to draw legal presumption as available under section 16 of the HAMA and in that event by not going to place the burden of proof upon the plaintiff to rebut the same by leading satisfactory evidence. It is also submitted that this Ext. A ought not to have been held to have not been proved in accordance with law by holding that the evidence with regard to its execution by the old woman of around 80 years of age as unsatisfactory. 10. Learned counsel for the respondents refutes the above submission contending that the trial court has made meticulous examination of evidence both oral and documentary in coming to the above conclusion which has been concurred by the lower appellate court and therefore there remains hardly any scope for this Court in seisin of second appeal to hold otherwise; when no such perversity is shown to be surfacing in the process of arriving at such conclusion. 11. The dispute had been raised before the trial court that Bhima Nath and Nandu Nath are not one and same person. 11. The dispute had been raised before the trial court that Bhima Nath and Nandu Nath are not one and same person. The conclusion of the trial court has been that they refer to same person who is the common ancestor of the plaintiff as well as late Bhima. This has been deposed by the priest of the family examined as D.W. 1, whose evidence is certainly of great importance and has the vital role to play in the absence of any such material being found either to doubt his testimony or to impeach his credibility. The lower appellate court has also dealt with the same to ascertain whether the finding of the lower trial court is sustainable in the eye of law or not, being the final court of fact. The appellant having banked upon Ext. C and D, the records of right in support of the case that Bhima Nath and Nandu Nath are not one and same person, the lower appellate court as seen has taken those two documents Ext. C and D very much into consideration. It is also seen that lower appellate court has made thorough examination of evidence and ultimately has come to the conclusion negating the case of the defendants and conclusively holding the plaintiff to be belonging to that family representing the branch of Bhagirathi who is the son of Bhima Nath also known as Nandu Nath. This concurrent finding of facts in my considered view is not liable to be interfered with in this second appeal when it is not shown that the courts below have arrived at such conclusion traversing the path of appreciation of evidence in a perverse manner and have thus arrived at a wrong destination when as per the settled position of law even if another view is possible to be taken on the basis of evidence, the same is not a ground to strike down the concurrent finding of fact. 12. Now let’s come to the question of presumption of adoption, first in answering the substantial question no. 1. The defendants in this case have proved the said deed, marked Ext. A and it is contended with vehemence that in view of the proof of the same, the courts below ought to have presumed that the adoption of defendant no. 12. Now let’s come to the question of presumption of adoption, first in answering the substantial question no. 1. The defendants in this case have proved the said deed, marked Ext. A and it is contended with vehemence that in view of the proof of the same, the courts below ought to have presumed that the adoption of defendant no. 1 by Bhalu had been made in compliance with the provision of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act (hereinafter in short called as ‘the Act’). The relevant provision as contained in section 16 of the Act reads as under:-“16. Presumption as to registered documents relating to adoption-Whenever any document registered under any law for the time being in force is produced before any Court purporting to record an adoption made and is signed by the person giving and the person taking the child in adoption, the Court shall presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with the provisions of this Act unless and until it is disproved.” In order to attract the applicability of presumption as enacted above, the pre-condition to be satisfied can be summarized as follows:- (a) the documents produced before the court must purport to record an adoption made; (b) it must be signed by the persons giving and taking the child in adoption; (c) it must be registered under any law for the time being in force. Proof of these conditions are the basic requirements for attraction of the presumption or bringing into play the presumption in consonance with the above provisions. The amplitude of this presumption extend to the compliance with all the relevant provisions of the Act. The presumption as contemplated under the above provisions when stand drawn no doubt it stands as rebuttable presumption. Once the person discharges the above legal requirements, the presumption is drawn in his favour and then the ball is in the coat of the adversary. It is for the person denying the adoption to lead evidence to rebut the presumption and thus to throw away that ball beyond the arena. The true effect of the provision of section 16 of the Act clearly seems to be that it calls upon the court to accept the adoption unless it is disproved. It is for the person denying the adoption to lead evidence to rebut the presumption and thus to throw away that ball beyond the arena. The true effect of the provision of section 16 of the Act clearly seems to be that it calls upon the court to accept the adoption unless it is disproved. The presumption is not a mere statutory presumption which can be rebutted in the ordinary manner of rebuttal, but the presumption has to be dislodged by disproof of the fact. Caution of course is that mere raising doubts about adoption is not rebuttal. 13. Firstly, the use of the word ‘record an adoption’ shows that the document must with reference to the fact of adoption, having necessary narration. It need not be an adoption in presenti contemporaneous with the document; nonetheless it may be a previous adoption as acknowledged by the document. The provision is special one, if the legal requirements as aforesaid stand fulfilled, then other formalities or evidence as required under different provisions of the Act concerning the validity of the adoption etc as stipulated therein are not required to be further proved by the parties proving the said document till the presumption gets rebutted by disproof of those facts. The provision is important one to curtail too much of evidence on the point of giving and taking ceremony, also as regards the fact that such adoption duly abides by all other statutory requirement as provided under the Act. The inclusion of the words “unless and until it is disproved” appearing at the end of the statutory provision has made the situation not that rigid but flexible enough to depend upon the evidence available on record in support of adoption. It is a matter of grave significance by reasons of the factum of adoption and displacement of the person adopted from the natural succession thus onus of proof is rather heavy. Statute has allowed some amount of flexibility lest it turns out to be solely depending on a registered adoption deed. The reason for inclusion of the words “unless and until it is disproved” shall have to be ascertained in its proper prospective and as such, the presumption cannot but be said to be a rebuttable presumption. Statute has allowed some amount of flexibility lest it turns out to be solely depending on a registered adoption deed. The reason for inclusion of the words “unless and until it is disproved” shall have to be ascertained in its proper prospective and as such, the presumption cannot but be said to be a rebuttable presumption. Statutory intent thus stands out to be rather expressive depicting therein that the presumption cannot be irrebuttable presumption by reason of the inclusion of the said words. 14. In the backdrop of the above settled position of law, let’s now examine the facts and circumstances of the instant case. Firstly, as regards the attractability of the presumption as aforestated. Here the deed in question is Ext. A. It has been executed by Bhalu, the so called adoptive mother of defendant no. 1 and the other party is the natural mother of defendant no. 1. The adoption when is said to have taken place in the year 1976, the deed has been executed on 15.10.1979 followed by registration on 16.10.1979. It has been mentioned therein that the adoption had taken place on the ‘Shreepanchami Day’ of the year 1976 when the defendant no. 1 was five years old. It has also been stated therein that Bhalu had taken defendant no. 1 in adoption. The reason for execution of such a deed by the so called adoptive mother is that it was in view of demand and on being insisted by the natural father of defendant no. 1, since there was no written record to that effect. However, very interesting recitals next findings mention therein that the so called adoptive mother alive defendant no. 1 treated this defendant no. 1 as her natural son from that very day onwards and that interest over the property stood so conferred upon defendant no. 1 only from that very day. Thus, given reading to those recitals definitely there arises the doubt in mind as regards prior adoption as so stated. Yet even accepting the recording of adoption as made for the moment, it is next seen that the natural mother and so called adoptive mother have put their LTIs on the document. The fact emerges from the evidence of D.W. 1 as also D.W. 7 that at the time of adoption, Bhalu’s husband Kanhu was dead. Yet even accepting the recording of adoption as made for the moment, it is next seen that the natural mother and so called adoptive mother have put their LTIs on the document. The fact emerges from the evidence of D.W. 1 as also D.W. 7 that at the time of adoption, Bhalu’s husband Kanhu was dead. But it is very much there in the evidence that natural father of defendant no. 1 was then alive. This has been clearly noted by the trial court at para-11 of the judgment at page 12. This being so, the question thus now stands that when the provision says expressively that the deed must be signed by the person giving and the person taking, whether for the want as above in this case as it stands, the deed can be said to be having the legal deficiency to the extent for the reason that the natural father has not lent/subscribed his hand to it. True, it is, that by the time, the deed came into being he was dead but still that in my considered opinion is not enough in making good the legal deficiency and thus ignore the same in holding the establishment of one of the preconditions as aforesaid for the purpose of attractability of the presumption under section 16 of the Act that the adoption has to be presumed to have been made in compliance with the provision of the Act. Keeping in view the objective behind the said provision for drawal of presumption that the adoption would be presumed to have been made in compliance with the provisions of the Act as it records a prior adoption, which is not impermissible, the presumption however cannot arise when the natural father of the boy given in adoption being alive at the time of adoption is not signatory to Ext. A. The said legal deficiency is not met and cannot be bypassed merely saying that he being dead at the time of documentation, it was not so possible. A. The said legal deficiency is not met and cannot be bypassed merely saying that he being dead at the time of documentation, it was not so possible. Section -7 of the Act provides that a male Hindu who is of sound mind and is not a minor has the capacity to take a son or daughter in an adoption and when he has wife receiving such adoption, it has to be only with the consent of his wife unless he has completely and finally renounced the world and or has ceased to be a Hindu or has been declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be of unsound mind, and in case, the person has two wives living, consent of both is necessary. Likewise in case of adoption of a son or daughter by female Hindu of sound mind and not a minor if she has husband living and unless that husband has completely and finally renounced the world or has ceased to be Hindu or has been declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be of unsound mind, the adoption cannot be made without his consent. Similarly, as regards the person capable of giving in adoption, both the father and mother if alive shall have equal right to give a son or daughter in adoption, but such right shall not be exercised by either of them without the consent of the other unless one of them has completely and finally renounced the world or has ceased to be a Hindu or has been declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be of unsound mind which has been provided in section 9 of the Act. The reasons for engrafting these provisions are obvious which need no further elaboration. 15. Since the presumption as available under section 16 of the Act squarely refers to the provision of compliance of the above noted provisions, the legislative intention stands clearly crystallized therein that so as to attract the presumption as available under section 16 of the Act, the deed in question must be signed by the persons giving and taking in adoption. In view of above provisions as discussed in my considered view here in the case, the person giving in adoption and taking in adoption would embrace within their ken the natural parents as also the so called adopted parents respectively. 16. In view of above provisions as discussed in my considered view here in the case, the person giving in adoption and taking in adoption would embrace within their ken the natural parents as also the so called adopted parents respectively. 16. The burden of proof, for the aforesaid, thus, remains with the defendant no. 1, to establish the factum of adoption by leading clear, cogent and acceptable evidence so as to pass through the acid test of appreciation of evidence with that superior standard since its deflects the natural line of succession. Both the courts below have found that the factum of adoption has not been proved. The courts below have discarded the evidence of D.W. 1 from consideration saying it to be based on falsehood as because he has deposed that deed of adoption was placed in the ceremonial place. It certainly goes to show that he is not speaking the truth as otherwise when the document had not even come into being how it would be that it had been produced in the function. Rather, it shows that the factum of adoption is not true and by this document Ext. A, a case of adoption is sought to be projected for the first time. The courts below have also noted the evidence of D.W. 1 particularly, the material discrepancies. His evidence is really interesting to note as he states that on getting the notice of the suit, he came to know the first time about his adoption. Similarly, the evidence of D.W. 7 who is none other than the natural mother of D.W. 1 has been scanned along with other documentary evidence. The courts below having found the evidence to be wholly unsatisfactory have ultimately negated the claim of defendant no. 1 that he is the adopted son of late Kanhu and his wife, Bhalu and has held to the contrary. From the evidence of record, it is seen that D.W. 1 who is the priest of the family has deposed that Bhalu asked to give the boy to her in adoption when the wife of Kartika with Kartika, the natural parents of defendant no. 1 gave the boy to her. Next D.W. 3 who is none other than defendant no. 1 has gone to state by refreshing his memory that his natural father Kartika was alive then. 1 gave the boy to her. Next D.W. 3 who is none other than defendant no. 1 has gone to state by refreshing his memory that his natural father Kartika was alive then. It is also the evidence of the natural mother of D.W. 1 examined as D.W. 7. Furthermore, the courts below have rightly taken all those surrounding circumstances and attending factors noting one by one as those surface from the oral as well as documentary evidence. Both the courts below have also gone for thorough examination of evidence on record in finally saying that the execution of the said document by the illiterate woman i.e., Bhalu who at that time was 80 years old has not been proved through clear, cogent and acceptable evidence particularly on the score that she consciously executed the same by fully knowing the nature of the documents as also the recitals made therein and that the true effect of the said document especially as to her right over the property. The evidence of scribe, D.W. 2 as also the evidence of other witnesses claiming their presence at the relevant time have been found to be highly doubtful and as such have not been accepted being not believable. Other documents proved from the side of the plaintiff, extending to negate the claim of adoption as directed by defendant no. 1 have also been taken into account for the purpose. This Court on going through said discussion of evidence finds the approach as also the appreciation of evidence to be just and proper and no such infirmity is noted therein. In view of all the aforesaid, firstly, no fault is found to have been committed by the courts below for having not drawn the presumption as provided in section 16 of the Act in so far as the present case is concerned. The document Ext. A thus cannot be placed in the pedestal of the deed of adoption. Secondly, no such infirmity is found with the said findings of the courts below in negating the claims of the defendants nor even it is seen that the courts below have traversed the entire path in appreciating the evidence in arriving at such destination, in a manner unknown or contrary to law. Therefore, this Court confirms the said findings standing in favour of the plaintiff. Therefore, this Court confirms the said findings standing in favour of the plaintiff. The aforesaid discussion and reasons, while providing the necessary answers to the substantial questions of law against the appellants, thus leads this Court to dismiss the appeal. 17. Resultantly, the appeal stands dismissed and in the facts and circumstances with cost throughout.