JUDGMENT : 1. The defendants-APSEB authorities who have been aggrieved by the common judgment in O.S.Nos.696 and 1381 of 1993 on the file of V Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad whereby and whereunder compensation of Rs.80,000/- in O.S.No.696 of 1993 and Rs.1,24,000/- in O.S.No.1381 of 1993 was granted for the death of one J.Ramesh due to electrocution by a live electric wire, filed the instant appeal. 2. The deceased was aged 27 years and working as a Class IV employee in Postal Department at Narayanaguda. On 11.05.1992 at about 5 PM while the deceased and some others were waiting at bus stand Nampally near Telugu University, suddenly one electrical wire was snapped from electric pole and fell on the iron railing of Telugu University. The deceased and four other persons came in contact with the iron railing and were thus electrocuted and died instantaneously. (a) The plaintiffs in O.S.No.696 of 1993 who are parents and plaintiff in O.S.No.1381 of 1993 who is the wife of deceased filed separate suits claiming damages of Rs.1 lakh and 3 lakhs respectively attributing negligence to electricity authorities which resulted in death of deceased. The fact of death of deceased due to electrocution was not denied by defendants but their prime line of defence was that the death was due to vis major (act of God). They contended that on 11.05.1992 due to sudden and heavy gale the LT conductor of the line snapped and fell on the iron grill of the compound of Telugu University at Nampally bus stand and the iron grill got energized and at that time the deceased came in contact with iron grill compound and met with instantaneous death and in the entire process there was no negligence on the part of defendant-Board. They pleaded that since the place at which the fatal accident took place was a VIP area where Telugu University and Lalitha Kala Toranam were located, the officials of the defendant-Board were inspecting the transformer and line frequently in order to maintain uninterrupted power supply and thus the question of their negligence did not arise. The defendants thus attributed the death to vis major and claimed it as beyond their control. They further pleaded that defendant-Board passed a resolution to pay ex gratia of Rs.5,000/- to the legal heirs of the deceased persons involved in the accident. The defendants thus attributed the death to vis major and claimed it as beyond their control. They further pleaded that defendant-Board passed a resolution to pay ex gratia of Rs.5,000/- to the legal heirs of the deceased persons involved in the accident. (b) Having regard to the admitted fact that the deceased met with untimely death due to the snapping of live electric wire, the trial Court relying on the principle res ipso loquitur, observed that prima facie the negligence was on the part of the department and hence the onus was on the defendants to establish that they were vigilant and diligent and the act was purely vis major and out of their control. (c) Then, the trial Court embarked upon to find out whether the defendants could successfully discharge their burden. It may be noted, the defendants examined DW1 Additional Divisional Engineer, APSEB and produced Exs.B1 to B3. Ex.B1 and B2 are newspaper information about the accident and Ex.B3 is the inspection report submitted by the departmental personnel regarding the accident. Having observed that DW1 was not an eye-witness to the incident and not a part of the inspection team, the trial Court found fault with the defendants for not examining one of the staff members who allegedly inspected the spot and held that the contents of Ex.B3 were not proved. DW1 is concerned, he claimed that it being a VIP locality, they would conduct checkups to the wires every month and during such periodical checkups, they had never come across any defect in the wires. He however admitted in the cross examination that they have no record showing that they have conducted periodical checkups. In view of his admission, the trial Court observed that the defendants for the reasons best known to them did not produce any record to establish their contention that they used to conduct periodical checkups and hence an adverse inference could be drawn against them to the effect that there were no periodical checkups or proper maintenance of electricity supply at the place of incident. The trial Court ultimately held that defendants failed to establish that accident was occurred due to some cause other than their negligence. The trial Court ultimately held that defendants failed to establish that accident was occurred due to some cause other than their negligence. It further held that if it were the case of the defendants that due to heavy gale the live electrical wire got snapped and fell down, it was its primary duty to stop power supply immediately but as per Exs.A1 and A2 it was the police who got stopped the power supply immediately after the accident. The trial Court thus fixed liability on the defendants and decreed the suits as stated supra. Hence the appeal by the defendants. 3. The parties in the appeal are referred as they arrayed in the trial Court. 4. Heard arguments of Sri R.Vinod Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for APSEB and Sri Namavarapu Rajeswara Rao, learned counsel for R3 to R5. 5. Learned standing counsel would argue that the fatal accident was occurred due to sudden snapping of live electrical wire from the poll because of heavy gale at the place of accident and in view of the said fact, the trial Court ought to have accepted the defence of the defendants that it was purely an act of God but nothing else and exempted it from liability. He would argue that the trial Court ought to have believed the version of defendants that the locality being a VIP area, the defendant officials were regularly conducting line checkups for ensuring uninterrupted power supply as deposed by DW1. He thus prayed to allow the appeal. 6. Per contra, learned counsel for respondents 3 to 5 in support of the judgment would argue that the appeal is not maintainable for the reason that defendants have preferred appeal against only one out of two decrees and therefore, technically speaking judgment and decree in O.S.No.1381 of 1993 remained unchallenged and findings therein, which are similar to the present one, attained finality and hence the present appeal is barred. Regarding merits of the appeal, he would argue that the defendants cannot repudiate their liability on the ground of vis major for the reason they failed to convince the Court that they have taken all the precautionary measures and hence the trial Court rightly negatived their plea and decreed the suit. He thus prayed to dismiss the appeal. 7. Regarding merits of the appeal, he would argue that the defendants cannot repudiate their liability on the ground of vis major for the reason they failed to convince the Court that they have taken all the precautionary measures and hence the trial Court rightly negatived their plea and decreed the suit. He thus prayed to dismiss the appeal. 7. In the light of above rival submissions, the point for determination in this appeal is: Whether there are merits in the appeal to allow? 8. POINT: The uncontroverted facts in this case are to the effect that the deceased-J.Ramesh and four others got electrocuted on 11.05.1992 at about 5 PM at the bus stand Nampally, near Telugu University when one electric live wire got snapped from a nearby electric pole and fell down on iron railing of Telugu University and when the said Ramesh and four others came in touch with the iron railing. The defence plea is that of vis major. (a) The above facts would inevitably remind us the principle of strict liability or absolute liability propounded in the case of Rylands vs. Fletcher (1868) LR 3 H.L. 330 (House of Lords). The facts in that case were that a mill owner employed contractors to construct a reservoir on his land to provide water to his mill. In the course of the work the contractors noticed some old shafts and passages on the land which communicated with the mines of a neighbouring owner. The contractors without blocking the shafts and passages constructed reservoir and filled it with water. In due course the water burst through the old shafts and flooded in As mines and resulted in loss to him and his bringing the action for damages against the mill owner. In that context, fixing liability on the defendant Blackburn J., observed thus: We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. He further observed: He can excuse himself by showing that the escape was owing to the plaintiffs default or perhaps that the escape was the consequence of vis major, or the act of God but as nothing of this sort exists here, it is unnecessary to inquire what excuse would be sufficient. The general rule, as above stated, seems on principle just. The person whose grass or corn is eaten down by the escaping cattle of his neighbour, or whose mine is flooded by the water from his neighbours reservoir, or whose cellar is invaded by the filth of neighbours privy, or whose habitation is made unhealthy by the fumes and noisome vapours of his neighbours alkali works, is damnified without any fault of his own and it seems but reasonable and just that the neighbour, who has brought something on his own property which was not naturally there, harmless to others so long as it is confined to his own property, but which he knows to be mischievous if it gets on his neighbours, should be obliged to make good the damage which ensues if he does not succeed in confining it to his own property. But for his act in bringing it there no mischief could have accrued, and it seems but just that he should at his peril keep it there so that no mischief may accrue, or answer for the natural and anticipated consequences. And upon authority, this we think is established to be the law whether the things so brought be beasts, or water, or filth, or stenches. (b) It is needless to emphasize that the rule of strict liability or absolute liability expounded in the above decision was widely acclaimed. The pith and substance of the above decision is that if a person, for his own purpose brings on and keeps in his property, anything, which is likely to result in causing mischief if it escapes, then such person shall bear in mind he keeps it in his property at his peril and he will be prima facie liable for the damages which is the natural consequence of its escape. Of course, the defence available to him in an action for damages is two fold: firstly, that the escape which resulted in mischief was due to the default of the plaintiff himself and secondly, that the escape was the consequence of vis major i.e. act of God. (c) In the instant case, the electrical wires, electric pole and other relative devices such as transformers etc. are admittedly the properties of the defendants. The defendants have been allowing passage of electric current through those cables for their purpose i.e. to distribute electricity. It is needless to expatiate that the defendants have full knowledge that if the electricity escapes due to snapping of electric wires or runs down through electric poles for lack of proper insulation, the electric current is likely to cause any amount of mischief and result in damage to lives and limbs of general public who, while passing on the public roads, might accidentally come in contact with the snapped electric wires. Yet, obviously for the public purpose, the defendants allowed the electric current to pass through its property i.e. electric wires. Hence, if the mischief is caused due to escape of the electricity as is done in the instant case, the defendant department will be liable for damages under the strict liability principle enunciated in Rylands vs. Fletcher (1 supra). As already stated supra, the defendants can repudiate its liability on two main defences and in the instant case the defendants chose the defence of vis major. The defence was that due to heavy gale the live wire was snapped accidentally and there was no wanting of any diligence on their part. This plea, it appears, was not found favour with the trial Court as in para-19 of its judgment the trial Court having regard to admission of DW1 has observed thus: The admission of DW1 that the incident that occurred at the place now in question is the only incident on that day falsifies the contention of the defendants that due to heavy gale and wind live wires were got snapped and fell down and it is therefore the act of God or vis major. The trial Court, thus, did not believe the plea of vis major and held that defendants failed to establish that accident was occurred due to some cause other than negligence of the Electricity Board. The trial Court, thus, did not believe the plea of vis major and held that defendants failed to establish that accident was occurred due to some cause other than negligence of the Electricity Board. The trial Court held that it was due to the negligence of the Electricity Board in not properly maintaining the supply line the incident was occurred. 9. Though in this appeal it is vehemently argued that the trial Court did not properly appreciate the defence theory of vis major, I find no much force in the said argument for the reason that the appellants/defendants failed to adduce cogent evidence that the escape i.e. snapping of live electric wire was due to vis major. As stated supra, on behalf of defendants DW1 was examined and Exs.B1 to B3 were marked. As noted by the trial Court DW1 was not an eyewitness to the incident and he was not even a part of inspection team which submitted its report under Ex.B3. Therefore, DW1 was not a correct person to speak on alleged vis major. Then, we are left with Exs.B1 to B3. Exs.B1 and B2 are the news paper items speaking about the incident. No implicit reliance can be placed on Exs.B1 and B2 without examination of the persons who reported. The same is the case with Ex.B3. None of the inspection team members who submitted Ex.B3 was examined in proof of Ex.B3. Thus, the defendants could not prove that the electric wire was snapped because of the heavy gale at the place of incident. Therefore, the trial Court rightly rejected their contention and held that it was only due to lack of supervision that the live wire was snapped. Since the defendants failed to produce any record showing that they have conducted periodical checkups prior to the date of incident, though they claimed to maintain record, the trial Court was right in drawing adverse inference in that regard. Therefore, the finding of the trial court can not be found fault. 10. Even assuming for a moment that the electric wire was snapped because of the heavy gale, still that itself will not automatically exonerate the defendants from liability unless they establish that they took all precautions and safety measures and in spite of it, due to the act of natural forces beyond their control the accident was occurred. 11. 10. Even assuming for a moment that the electric wire was snapped because of the heavy gale, still that itself will not automatically exonerate the defendants from liability unless they establish that they took all precautions and safety measures and in spite of it, due to the act of natural forces beyond their control the accident was occurred. 11. In Vohra Sadikbhai Rajakbhai vs. State of Gujarat (MANU/SC/0591/2016) the Supreme Court held such a responsibility lies on the defendant. The facts in that case were that the respondent/Sate of Gujarat constructed and maintained a dam and during one monsoon season the respondent released the water from the dam which flooded the land of the plaintiffs and destroyed the plantation therein. In the resultant suit for damages the respondent contended that the water had to be released from the dam as it reached alarming level because of heavy rains and non-release would have breached the dam. The action was thus taken in public interest and it was occasioned because of the rains which was an act of God (vis major). The contention of the appellants on the other hand, was that it was sheer negligence on the part of respondents in not maintaining low level of water keeping in mind ensuing monsoon season and therefore, the damage caused to the appellants had direct nexus with the act of negligence of the respondents which could not be attributed to the act of God. The Apex Court accepted the contention of the appellant and held thus: Para-28 xx xx Merely by saying that the level of water in the dam increased because of monsoon rains and that the water was released in public interest cannot be treated as discharging the burden on the part of the Respondents in warding off the allegation of negligence. It is a matter of common knowledge that with advanced technology available with the Meteorological Department in the form of satellite signals etc, there is a possibility of precise prediction of the extent of rainfall in the monsoon season. In view of the principle laid down in Rylands v. Fletcher, onus was on the Respondents to discharge such a burden, and it has miserably failed to discharge the same. On that basis, we are constrained to hold that there is a negligence on the part of the Respondents which caused damage to the fields of the Appellants. 12. In view of the principle laid down in Rylands v. Fletcher, onus was on the Respondents to discharge such a burden, and it has miserably failed to discharge the same. On that basis, we are constrained to hold that there is a negligence on the part of the Respondents which caused damage to the fields of the Appellants. 12. Coming to the instant case, the defendants before taking the plea of vis major should satisfy the Court that they have taken all the necessary precautions and safety measures by conducting periodical checkups to the live wires and ensured that they were properly maintained and despite the incident was occurred due to the act of natural elements. However, as observed by the trial Court they have not produced any record to show that they used to conduct periodical checkups to the electric wires and transformers at the place of incident. In that view of the matter, mere defence plea of vis major is of no avail to the defendants. 13. The appeal is not maintainable for another reason also as the appellants failed to show that they filed a corresponding appeal against the common judgment in OS.No.1381 of 993. 14. In the result, this appeal filed by the defendants is dismissed by confirming the judgment of the trial Court. No costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.