JUDGMENT : Dama Seshadri Naidu, J. 1. Faced with successive rejections before two for a on the issue of standing, the unsuccessful petitioners have filed this revision petition. 2. The facts in brief are that the petitioners-eight in number-have claimed to be the members of the first respondent Sangam, apart from being interested persons as the beneficiaries of the Wakf maintained by the Sangham. Their grievance is that the Sangam, a registered body, is being maintained contrary to its byelaws. They allege that no elections have been held in the managing committee of the Sangam for a long time and that it has been managed by the third and fourth respondents, the self-proclaimed President and the Secretary of the Sangam, to the detriment of the Sangam. They have also made a specific allegation that vast wakf properties in the control of the Sangam are being mismanaged. In the backdrop of the above allegations, the petitioners have sought the following reliefs before the Wakf Board, Ernakulam, in O.P.No.40 of 2009. “a. a decree directing the 3rd and 4th respondents to convene the general body of the 1st respondent committee after duly serving notice to the all general body members including the petitioners; b. appointing an Advocate Commissioner to supervise the general body election process of the 1st respondent committee and to ensure that the provisions of the bye-law of the 1st respondent committee are complied with while it convenes the general body; and c. a perpetual prohibitory injunction restraining the respondents and their henchmen from cutting and removing the kuzhikoors in the petition schedule properties and from in any way encumbering the petition schedule properties and alienating the petition schedule properties without the sanction of the Wakf Board; 3. Looking at the array of the respondents, we gather that the first and second respondents are one and the same, i.e. the Sangam. In the first instance, it is represented by its president; in the second, by its secretary. The third and fourth respondents are said to be the President, and Secretary arrayed nominee given the plea on the petitioners’ part that they have never been duly elected, but self-proclaimed. 4. The counter affidavit was filed by one Mr. T.P. Mohammed Haji and the 4th respondent, who also represents the second respondent. The third and fourth respondents are said to be the President, and Secretary arrayed nominee given the plea on the petitioners’ part that they have never been duly elected, but self-proclaimed. 4. The counter affidavit was filed by one Mr. T.P. Mohammed Haji and the 4th respondent, who also represents the second respondent. Apart from traversing the allegations made by the petitioners, the respondents have taken a specific plea that the petitioners are not the members of the general body of the Sangam and that they have no locus standi or authority to file the Original Petition. In that context, they have pleaded that maintainability ought to be decided as a preliminary issue. 5. Meeting the petitioners’ contentions on merits, the respondents have specifically averred that the President and Secretary have been duly elected, that the Sangam is being managed strictly under the bye-laws, that the office bearers of the Sangam have been striving for the common good of the community, and that they have made no efforts to misuse or diminish the value of the Wakf properties, including felling of trees as had been alleged by the petitioners. 6. Because of the specific plea taken by the respondents concerning the petitioners’ standing to maintain the Original Petition, the Wakf Board has framed the following issues: i. Whether the Wakf Board has a jurisdiction to entertain the petition? ii. Whether the petitioners filed the proper affidavit as contemplated under Section 70 of the Wakf Act? iii. Whether the petitioners have the locus standi to file the Original Petition? 7. On merits, the Wakf Board has returned its findings in petitioners’ favour on issues 1 and 2. On issue No.3, however, the Board has come to a definite conclusion that the petitioners have produced no material to show they are the members of the Sangam; on the said premise, concluding that the petitioners are strangers, the Board dismissed the O.P. at the threshold as not maintainable. 8. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed O.P.(O.A.)No.5 of 2010 before the learned Wakf Tribunal, Kozhikode. 9. In the counter affidavit filed by the respondents before the learned Tribunal, they have taken a specific plea that after the registration of the respondent Sangam, some new mahalloos have been formed. As a result, the inhabitants of the areas covered by those mahalloos, according to them, have shifted their membership to those various newly formed mahalloos. 9. In the counter affidavit filed by the respondents before the learned Tribunal, they have taken a specific plea that after the registration of the respondent Sangam, some new mahalloos have been formed. As a result, the inhabitants of the areas covered by those mahalloos, according to them, have shifted their membership to those various newly formed mahalloos. The respondents have also made a specific assertion that all the appellants/petitioners are the members of the general body of one of the newly formed mahalloos-Poolakkal Mahallu. The Tribunal, concurring with the conclusions arrived at by the Board, has dismissed the petitioners’ appeal. The petitioners, therefore, are before this Court in the revision petition. 10. Sri G.S. Reghunath, the learned counsel for the petitioners, has made elaborate submissions touching on the merits as well as maintainability. Since the adjudication by the Board and the Tribunal was on a preliminary issue-maintainability-we do not intend to advert to the submissions on either side concerning the merits of the matter; rather, we confine the discussion to the singular issue of maintainability of the Original Petition. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioners has laid much emphasis on the fact that the question of maintainability is a mixed question of fact and law and ipso facto it ought not to have been tried as a preliminary issue. In elaboration, he has submitted that both the Board and the Tribunal have been swayed by the respondents’ assertion that the petitioners are not the members. But they have grossly missed on another important aspect: that they are the beneficiaries of the wakf, i.e. the persons interested. 12. The learned counsel has further contended that the Sangam indisputably possesses vast extent of wakf properties mat for the welfare of the community in general and the inhabitants of the mahalloos in particular. According to him, the Sangam has been suffering in the hands of the third and fourth respondents, who are alleged to be imposters, not duly elected. Drawing our attention to the fact that the wafk properties include rubber plantation and there is an imminent threat of dissipation of property, the learned counsel justifies the injunctive relief sought by the petitioners against the respondents. 13. Drawing our attention to the fact that the wafk properties include rubber plantation and there is an imminent threat of dissipation of property, the learned counsel justifies the injunctive relief sought by the petitioners against the respondents. 13. Eventually to support his contentions, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the decisions in Kesava Panicker v. Damodara Panicker and others (1975 KLT 979 F.B.), Amrithakumari v. Ramanathan (198 (2) KLT 305), Muhammed Kunju v. Biju ( 2008 (2) KLT 833 ) and Board of Wakf v. Anis Fatma Begum (2010 (4) KLT 765 (S.C.). 14. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents, with equal vehemence, has strenuously tried to refute the petitioners’ contentions. To begin with, he has submitted that the Board and the Tribunal have concurrently held that the petitioners lack the standing; this Court, exercising its revisional jurisdiction, should not interfere with those findings by taking a different stand, essentially, on re-appreciation of undisputed facts. First, he has contended that the petitioners have miserably failed to establish that they are the members of the Sangam; second, apart from making a bald statement that they are the beneficiaries, the petitioners have neither pleaded nor placed any material in compliance with the statutory requirement under Section 2(k) of the Act, which deals with the concept of persons interested. 15. Drawing our attention to the relief sought by the petitioners, the learned counsel has submitted that all the reliefs could be sought only by the members. In other words, a person interested can only complain about any deficiency in services, if any, extended to the community at large by the Sangam, but cannot meddle in Sangam’s administration. 16. To hammer home his contention that the demand made by the petitioners fall beyond the scope of any person interested, the learned counsel has taken us through the provisions of the Wakf Act, especially, Section 3(1), Section 40(3) and Section 83 thereof. The learned counsel has further submitted that the decision of this Court in Muhammed Kunju (supra) relied on by the petitioners stands overruled by the judgments of the Apex Court in Ramesh Gobindram v. Sugra Humayun Mirza Wakf (2010 (3) KLT 862 (SC) and in Board of Wakf (supra). Reply: 17. The learned counsel has further submitted that the decision of this Court in Muhammed Kunju (supra) relied on by the petitioners stands overruled by the judgments of the Apex Court in Ramesh Gobindram v. Sugra Humayun Mirza Wakf (2010 (3) KLT 862 (SC) and in Board of Wakf (supra). Reply: 17. In reply, the learned counsel for the petitioners has straight away drawn our attention to Section 70 of the Act to emphasise the expansive scope of the Act vis-à-vis persons interested. As regards the alleged mismanagement of the wakf properties, the learned counsel has taken us to what is said to be a memorandum submitted by 107 members of the mahalloo filed as Schedule No.2 on the record. According to him, with cogent proof on hand, the petitioners have sought the injunctive relief. 18. In the end, the learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that both the Board and the Tribunal have grievously erred in concluding at the threshold that the petitioners have no locus standi. According to him, both the fora ought to have allowed the petitioners to direct the respondents to stand trial, during the course of which the petitioners could have proved all the allegations they have made against the respondents, apart from establishing that they have the necessary locus. 19. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondents apart from perusing the record. Issues: 20. From the rival pleading and submissions, these issues emerge: I. Should standing be tried as a preliminary issue or should it be tried along with other substantive issues during the trial on the premise it is a mixed question of law and fact? II. Have the petitioners got the necessary standing to maintain the Original Petition? III. Have the Board and the Tribunal concurrently misdirected themselves in concluding that the petitioners lack the standing resulting in the perversity of findings? IV. Does the nature of the relief determine the maintainability of any judicial proceeding? Issue No. I: Issues, the Stage of Determination: 21. The petitioners’ lis is resisted by the respondents primarily on the contention that they are strangers, have nothing to do with the Sangam, and have, therefore, no standing to question the respondents. Based on the objections filed by the respondents, both the fora, primary and appellate, have tried the issue of standing or jurisdiction as a preliminary issue. The petitioners’ lis is resisted by the respondents primarily on the contention that they are strangers, have nothing to do with the Sangam, and have, therefore, no standing to question the respondents. Based on the objections filed by the respondents, both the fora, primary and appellate, have tried the issue of standing or jurisdiction as a preliminary issue. And the finding is adverse to the petitioners; they have been non-suited. The question is whether jurisdictional issue-standing, to be precise-can be tried as a preliminary issue. 22. As Rule 1 of Order 14 delineates, issues arise when a material proposition of fact or law is affirmed by the one party and denied by the other; material propositions are those propositions of law or fact which a plaintiff must allege in order to show a right to sue or a defendant must allege in order to constitute his defence; and each material proposition affirmed by one party and denied by the other shall from the subject of a distinct issue. The issues, as well-known, are of two kinds: (a) issues of fact; (b) issues of law. The provision further mandates that at the first hearing of the suit the Court shall ascertain upon what material propositions of fact or of law the parties are at variance, and shall thereupon proceed to frame and record the issues on which the right decision of the case appears to depend. 23. With effect from 01.02.1977, notwithstanding that a case may be disposed of on a preliminary issue, the Court shall, subject to sub-rule (2), as per Rules 1 & 2 of Order 14, pronounce judgment on all issues. Where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the Court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law only, it may try that issue first if that issue relates to – (a) the jurisdiction of the Court, or (b) a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force. And for the said purpose, the Court may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the other issues until after that issue has been determined, and may deal with the suit in accordance with the decision on that issue. 24. While examining Rule 2 of Order 14, the Apex Court in Foreshore Coop. And for the said purpose, the Court may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the other issues until after that issue has been determined, and may deal with the suit in accordance with the decision on that issue. 24. While examining Rule 2 of Order 14, the Apex Court in Foreshore Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. Praveen D. Desai ( 2015 (6) SCC 412 ), has held that a comparative reading of the said provision as it existed earlier to the amendment and the one after amendment would clearly indicate that the consideration of an issue and its disposal as a preliminary issue have now been made permissible only in limited cases. In the unamended Code, the categorization was only between issues of law and of fact, and it was mandatory for the court to try the issues of law in the first instance and to postpone the settlement of issues of fact until after the issues of law had been determined. 25. Foreshore Coop. Housing Society Ltd., however, further holds that there is a mandate to the court in the amended provision that though it can dispose of a case on a preliminary issue, the court has to pronounce judgment on all the issues. The only exception to this is contained in sub-rule (2). This sub-rule relaxes the mandate to a limited extent by conferring discretion upon the court: If the court is of the opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of “on an issue of law only”, it may try that issue first. Exercising this discretion is further limited to the contingency that the issue to be so tried must relate to (1) the jurisdiction of the court or (2) a bar to the suit created by law in force. 26. Usually, the jurisdictional issues are three-fold: (1) Inherent; (2) Territorial; and (3) Pecuniary, the first of the three being insurmountable, while the rest are, under certain circumstances, waivable. In the present instance, none of the three bogs the proceedings. The Tribunal does have inherent jurisdiction; the territorial and pecuniary jurisdictions, too, have not been doubted. We are, therefore, of the view that the present lis involves no jurisdictional issue. Barred by Law: 27. Now we may examine whether the proceedings are barred by any law in force. In the present instance, none of the three bogs the proceedings. The Tribunal does have inherent jurisdiction; the territorial and pecuniary jurisdictions, too, have not been doubted. We are, therefore, of the view that the present lis involves no jurisdictional issue. Barred by Law: 27. Now we may examine whether the proceedings are barred by any law in force. This contingency is taken care of by Order 7, especially Rule 11(d), which says that if a suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law, the plaint has to be returned. First, a law must bar the proceedings; second, it should be apparent from the statement from the plaint, but not, for instance, from the defence set up by the rival part to the proceedings. In the present instance, the proceedings, evidently, are not bared by any provision. As such, we may examine the pleadings whether they disclose any factor that unmistakably non-suits the petitioners. Locus Standi: 28. In V.G. Ramachandran’s Law of Writs (6th Ed.), In Chapter 2, covering locus standi, the learned author opines that locus standi of the applicant or petitioner is a sine qua non or condition precedent for exercising power or jurisdiction by the Court. Because the legal capacity of a party to any litigation whether in private or in public action in relation to a remedy must be decided before granting relief, the issue as to locus standi touches the jurisdiction of the court. 29. We may add that the issue of locus standi touches the jurisdiction of the court only one aspect: whether the court can exercise its jurisdiction, which it undoubtedly possesses, at the behest of a person who has knocked at its door. The issue must be decided ‘before granting the relief’, but not necessarily ‘before entertaining the proceedings or lis’. In Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Foundation (454 U.S. 151 (1981) (p.), the American Supreme Court holds that a person claiming standing should satisfy the requirement that there is a “fairly traceable” causal connection between the injury he claims and the conduct he challenges, so that, if the relief sought is granted, the injury will be redressed. 30. In Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Foundation (454 U.S. 151 (1981) (p.), the American Supreme Court holds that a person claiming standing should satisfy the requirement that there is a “fairly traceable” causal connection between the injury he claims and the conduct he challenges, so that, if the relief sought is granted, the injury will be redressed. 30. In Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers (1978 AC 435), the House of Lords has held that a private citizen, except as relator in an action brought by the Attorney-General, has no locus standi in private law as plaintiff in a civil action to obtain either an injunction to restrain another private citizen (in casu a trade union) from committing a public wrong by breaking the criminal law, or a declaration that his conduct is unlawful, unless the plaintiff can show that some legal or equitable right of his own has been infringed or that he will sustain some special damage over and above that suffered by the general public. 31. In S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981 Supp SCC 87), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has acknowledged the traditional rule as regards the locus standi. Judicial redress is available only t a person who has suffered a legal injury by reason of violation of his legal right or legally protected interest by the impugned action of the State or a public authority or any other person or who is likely to suffer a legal injury by reason of threatened violation of his legal right or legally protected interest by any such action. The basis of entitlement to judicial redress is the personal injury to property, body, mind or reputation arising from the violation, actual or threatened, of the legal right or legally protected interest of the person seeking such redress. This is a rule of ancient vintage, and it arose during an era when private law dominated the legal scene, and the public law had not yet been born. 32. Of course, S.P. Gupta, a watermark in the realm of standing, has gone on further to discuss the concept of locus vis-à-vis public law remedies, which we are not now, concerned with. That said, we may, however, acknowledge that the lis here, too, cannot be said to be entirely a private lis requiring strict proof of standing. 32. Of course, S.P. Gupta, a watermark in the realm of standing, has gone on further to discuss the concept of locus vis-à-vis public law remedies, which we are not now, concerned with. That said, we may, however, acknowledge that the lis here, too, cannot be said to be entirely a private lis requiring strict proof of standing. In any dispute involving, for instance, a trust or society not hermetically insulted from public scrutiny, the adjudication partakes the character of, at least, quasi-public law remedy. Here, we are dealing with a wakf registered under the Societies Act. 33. The conclude, we may hold that a pure question of law can always be tried as a preliminary issue, for it is inadvisable to go into the merits without clearing the threshold hurdle, which, if proven, renders the whole exercise of adjudication-and the conclusions, too-void and non est. a person’s standing depends not only on the pleadings but also the evidence he will lead. First, the subject of lis cannot be said to be entirely a private affair; it is public or quasi-public in character. The petitioners once were, admittedly, members of the same Mahalloo, and they are said to have shifted their membership to some other newly formed Mahalloo. Both are questions of fact requiring adjudication. 34. Courts, we may say, usually begin with the presumption that the person knocking its doors is aggrieved or interested, and has a grievance to be redressed. It cannot begin its adjudication with a parochial propensity, suspecting the cause and commitment of the litigant. It is for his rival to expose the chinks in the petitioner’s armour, of course, with a fair opportunity to the petitioner to refute. 35. In the above facts and circumstances, shutting the petitioners out at the threshold on the premise that they lack the standing is impermissible. We, therefore, the Issue No. I in favour of the petitioners. Issue No. II: Statutory Scheme: 36. 35. In the above facts and circumstances, shutting the petitioners out at the threshold on the premise that they lack the standing is impermissible. We, therefore, the Issue No. I in favour of the petitioners. Issue No. II: Statutory Scheme: 36. Section 3(k) of the Act defines “person interested in a waqf to mean any person who entitled to receive any pecuniary or other benefits from the waqf and includes (i) any person who has a right to offer prayer or to perform any religious rite in a mosque, idgah, imambara, dargah, khanqah, peerkhana and karbala, maqbara, graveyard or any other religious institution connected with the waqf or to participate in any religious or charitable institution under the waqf; (ii) the waqif and any descendant of the waqif and the mutawalli. As seen from Section 70, any person interested in a waqf may apply to the Board supported by an affidavit to institute an inquiry relating to the administration of the waqf and if the Board is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the affairs of the waqf are being mismanaged, it shall take such action thereon as it thinks fit. 37. Section 83 of the Act deals with the constitution of Tribunals, and other related matter. Sub-section (2) thereof mandates that any mutawalli or a person interested in a waqf or any other person aggrieved by an order made under this Act, or rules made thereunder, may make an application within the time specified in this Act or where no such time has been specified, within such time as may be prescribed, to the Tribunal for determining any dispute, question or other matter relating to the waqf. 38. From the above statutory scheme, these propositions emerge: (1) a person interested in a waqf may apply to the Board to institute an inquiry relating to the administration of the waqf; (2) a person interested in a waqf or any other person aggrieved may apply to the Tribunal for determining any dispute, question or other matter relating to the waqf; (3) any person can be said to be a person interested in a waqf provided that he is entitled to receive any pecuniary or other benefits from the waqf; and (4) the receiving benefits may include a right to offer prayer or to perform any religious rite in a mosque, etc. Persons affected & Persons Interested: 39. Persons affected & Persons Interested: 39. We may note the semantic difference between a person affected and a person interested. A person affected has a claim stronger than that of a person interested in seeking redressal in a court of law, for the interest of a person has many shades-from core to penumbral. An affected person ex debito justiae gets the right to redressal; the right to judicial remedy needs no express conferment. On the other hand, a person interested can be, for example, a person who has acquired an interest after the cause of action has arisen or after the commencement of the lis-a case in point being a lis pendence purchaser. For such person, the principle of ex debito justiae does not apply. We can, nevertheless, avoid further polemics on the semantic shades concerning ‘person interested’ if we acknowledge that Section 83 of the Act has put both the person affected and the person interested on the same pedestal. 40. In the facts and circumstances, we hold that the issue of standing or locus standi is a mixed question of law and fact requiring the parties to lead evidence on the issue. Issue Nos. III & IV: 41. In the light of our answer to issues Nos. I & II, we are of the view that the Board and the Tribunal have concurrently misdirected themselves in concluding that the petitioners lack the standing. 42. The nature of relief determining the maintainability of any judicial proceeding can be likened to a tail wagging the dog. As per Rule 7 of Order 7, CPC every plaint shall state specifically the relief which the plaintiff claims either simply or in the alternative, and it shall not be necessary to ask for general or other relief which may always be given as the Court may think just to the same extent as if it had been asked for. And the same rule shall apply to any relief claimed by the defendant in his written statement. Where the plaintiff seeks relief regarding several distinct claims or causes of action founded upon separate and distinct grounds, Rule 8 mandates, they shall be stated as far as may be separately and distinctly. 43. That said, we should acknowledge that the processual law is a step in aid to attain substantive justice. Where the plaintiff seeks relief regarding several distinct claims or causes of action founded upon separate and distinct grounds, Rule 8 mandates, they shall be stated as far as may be separately and distinctly. 43. That said, we should acknowledge that the processual law is a step in aid to attain substantive justice. It cannot be stretched too far so that we cannot see the forest for the trees. A suitor may ask for the moon, but the court can always mould the relief. We, therefore, hold that the relief sought cannot determine the nature of the proceedings, much less the very maintainability. 44. We have, consciously, avoided referring to the pleading or evidence on the issue of standing or whether the pioneers are persons interested, lest it should prejudice the cause of either party before the Tribunal. Nor have we referred to the authorities cited at the bar, for they touch upon the merits of the matter. Conclusion: 45. To conclude, we hold that the impugned judgment cannot be sustained, and accordingly set it aside. Consequently, we remit the matter the Wakf Tribunal for a de novo trial, in which it can determine the issue of standing, too, along with other issues. Before parting, we clarify that the adjudication undertaken by us is only on the preliminary issue of standing. We do not desire, even remotely, to pronounce on the merits of the matter. As such, any observations, if at all, made incidentally touching on the merits, the learned Tribunal shall proceed with the matter uninfluenced by those observations. In the manner stated above, we dispose of the revision. No order on costs.