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2016 DIGILAW 519 (ORI)

State of Orissa v. Balaram Bagh

2016-07-13

I.MAHANTY, S.K.SAHOO

body2016
JUDGMENT : S.K. Sahoo, J. This is an appeal under section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure preferred by the State of Orissa challenging the impugned judgment and order dated 05.05.1994 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Sambalpur in S.T. Case No. 283 of 1993 in acquitting the respondent Balaram Bagh of the charges under sections 302 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code for committing murder of Ghasiram Karta (hereafter ‘the deceased’) and attempting to commit murder of Kasiram Karta (P.W.2) on 18.07.1993 at about 6 p.m. at Harijanpara, Kuchinda in the district of Sambalpur. 2. On 18.7.1993 P.W.1 Kamala Karta, wife of Kasiram Karta (P.W.2) appeared before the Officer in charge of Kuchinda Police Station namely Sri Askhya Kumar Behera (P.W.9) and orally reported about the incident. P.W.9 reduced the oral information to writing and drew up the First Information Report (Ext.6) and accordingly, Kuchinda P.S. Case No. 57 of 1993 was registered for the offence under section 307 of the Indian Penal Code. As per the First Information Report, it is the prosecution case that P.W.2 and the deceased, who was his elder brother were staying at Harijanpara since last thirty years after constructing two houses. On the eastern side of their houses, the respondent was staying constructing one house and there was a passage in between their houses and that of the respondent which was used by the villagers to approach the embankment. On 18.07.1993 which was a Sunday, the respondent put a fence on the passage without asking anybody as a result of which villagers faced inconvenience. It is the further prosecution case as per the First Information Report that after returning from her work, P.W.1 asked the respondent to remove the fence for easy access of the villagers on that road but the respondent got enraged and challenged the informant. At about 6 O’clock in the evening, the deceased returned from the bus stand and tried to remove the fence put by the respondent for which the respondent got angry and brought a folded iron rod from inside the house and dealt a blow on the head of the deceased. The deceased shouted sustaining bleeding injury on the head and thereafter, the respondent dealt two to three further blows to the deceased. The deceased shouted sustaining bleeding injury on the head and thereafter, the respondent dealt two to three further blows to the deceased. Looking at the assault on the deceased, when P.W.2 came to save him, he was also assaulted by the respondent by the iron rod as a result of which he also sustained injuries on the knee and head. The incident was witnessed by a number of persons including the family members of the informant. The deceased as well as injured were brought to the Police Station and FIR was lodged. 3. P.W.9 took up investigation of the case, examined the witnesses and sent the deceased Ghasiram Karta and the injured Kasiram Karta (P.W.2) for medical examination to Kuchinda Hospital on police requisitions. The I.O. also made a prayer for recording the dying declaration of the deceased as his condition was quite alarming. The I.O. visited the place of occurrence and collected blood stained earth, sample earth and Amari stick stained with blood from the spot and prepared seizure list Ext.8 in presence of the witnesses. He also arrested the respondent and basing on his disclosure statement, he seized one iron rod (M.O.I) stained with blood on being led by the respondent under seizure list Ext.5/2. On 19.07.1993 the investigating officer received information that the deceased succumbed to the injuries at about 8.20 p.m. on that day and accordingly the case turned to one under sections 302 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code. He was informed by Burla Police that adequate steps have been taken at their level for conducting inquest and autopsy examination. P.W.10 Bibhuti Bhusan Sahoo who was working as S.I. of Police attached to Burla Police Station conducted inquest over the dead body of the deceased at V.S.S. Medical College and Hospital, Burla in presence of the witnesses and prepared inquest report Ext.16 and sent the dead body to the F.M.T. Department for post mortem examination under dead body challan Ext.17. P.W.11 Dr. Punyansu Mohanty conducted autopsy over the dead body of the deceased on 20.07.1993 and opined the cause of death was due to Coma as a result of injury to the head. The I.O. again proceeded to the spot on 20.07.1993 and prepared a sketch map of the spot and sent requisition to the doctor at Kuchinda to collect nail clippings and scrapings of the respondent. The respondent was then forwarded to Court. The I.O. again proceeded to the spot on 20.07.1993 and prepared a sketch map of the spot and sent requisition to the doctor at Kuchinda to collect nail clippings and scrapings of the respondent. The respondent was then forwarded to Court. On 21.07.1993 the I.O. seized blood stained wearing apparels belonging to the deceased under seizure list Ext.11. He received the injury reports of the deceased and P.W.2 from the doctor of Kuchinda Hospital. He produced the seized iron rod (M.O.I) before the doctor to ascertain regarding possibility of the injuries by the said weapon. On 11.09.1993 the I.O. received supplementary case diary, inquest report, dead body challan and post mortem examination report from Burla Police Station. On 28.09.1993 he sent all the seized incriminating materials to the R.F.S.L., Ainthapalli for chemical examination through S.D.J.M., Kuchinda and received the chemical examination report Ext.14. On 13.10.1993 on completion of investigation, he submitted charge sheet under sections 302 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code. 4. After submission of charge sheet, the case was committed to the Court of Session for trial after observing due committal procedure where the learned Trial Court charged the respondent under sections 302 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code and since the respondent refuted the charge, pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried, the Sessions Trial procedure was resorted to prosecute him and establish his guilt. 5. During Course of trial, in order to prove its case, the prosecution examined eleven witnesses. P.W.1 Kamala Karta is the informant of the case and she is an eye witness to the occurrence. P.W.2 Kasiram Karta is the younger brother of the deceased and an injured in the case and he is also an eye witness to the occurrence. P.W.3 Droupadi Chhatriya is also an eye witness to the occurrence. P.W.4 Dr. Ramesh Chandra Nanda was the Medical Officer in charge of Kuchinda Sub-Jail who on police requisition drew the blood sample of the respondent who was then detained at Kuchinda Sub-Jail and submitted his report Ext.1. P.W.5 Dr. Surendra Kumar Panda was the doctor attached to Kuchinda Hospital who examined the deceased in an injured condition as well as P.W.2 Kasiram Karta on 18.07.1993 and proved his reports Ext.2/1 and Ext.3/1. P.W.6 Nimain Charan Panda was the R.I., Kuchinda who on police requisition prepared the spot map Ext.4. P.W.5 Dr. Surendra Kumar Panda was the doctor attached to Kuchinda Hospital who examined the deceased in an injured condition as well as P.W.2 Kasiram Karta on 18.07.1993 and proved his reports Ext.2/1 and Ext.3/1. P.W.6 Nimain Charan Panda was the R.I., Kuchinda who on police requisition prepared the spot map Ext.4. P.W.7 Sarat Kumar Kusum and P.W.8 Babulal Sunari did not support the prosecution case for which they were declared hostile by the prosecution and cross-examined. P.W.9 Akshya Kumar Behera was the Officer in charge of Kuchinda Police Station who is the Investigating Officer of the case. P.W.10 Bibhuti Bhusan Sahu was the S.I. of Police attached to Burla Police Station who conducted inquest over the dead body of the deceased and sent the dead body for post mortem examination. P.W.11 Dr. Punyansu Mohanty conducted autopsy over the dead body of the deceased and prepared post mortem report Ext.18. The prosecution exhibited eighteen documents. Ext.1 is the report of P.W.4, Exts.2/1 and 3/1 are the medical examination reports of the deceased and P.W.2 respectively, Ext.4 is the spot map, Ext.5/2 is the seizure list, Ext.6 is the F.I.R., Ext.7 is the requisition, Ext.8 is the seizure list, Ext.9 is the statement of the respondent, Exts.10 and 11 are the seizure lists, Ext.12 is the police requisition, Ext.13 is the forwarding letter, Ext.14 is the chemical examination report, Ext.15 is the report of the doctor, Ext.16 is the inquest report, Ext.17 is the dead body challan and Ext.18 is the post mortem report. The prosecution also proved three material objects. M.O.I is the iron rod, M.O.II is the Dhoti of P.W.2 and M.O.III is the Dhoti of deceased. 6. The defence plea of the respondent was one of denial and it was pleaded that on 18.07.1993 while he was putting fence on his own land, P.W.1 and her husband (P.W.2) raised objection. The respondent replied them that the land in which the fence had been put belonged to his own land. It was further pleaded that on the same day in the evening hours, P.W.2 and the deceased after consuming liquor came to the spot being armed with lathi and assaulted the respondent. The respondent was also holding a lathi and tried to defend himself. One witness namely Murali Sunar was examined as D.W.1. 7. It was further pleaded that on the same day in the evening hours, P.W.2 and the deceased after consuming liquor came to the spot being armed with lathi and assaulted the respondent. The respondent was also holding a lathi and tried to defend himself. One witness namely Murali Sunar was examined as D.W.1. 7. The learned Trial Court in the impugned judgment observed that it can be safely concluded that the deceased met with a homicidal death and P.W.2 sustained injuries on his person which according to the opinion of the doctor endangered his life. It was further held that there has been inordinate delay in the examination of a material witness like P.W.3 and no explanation whatsoever has been given either by P.W.3 or by the investigating officer and therefore, the evidence of P.W.3 can be discarded altogether from consideration. It was further held that the respondent had lodged Station Diary Entry at the Police Station concerning the occurrence but no explanation is coming from the side of the prosecution as to what happened to that Station Diary Entry. It was further held that though the F.I.R. was shown to have been recorded on 18.07.1993 at 7.00 p.m. but it directly contradicts the version of the informant. It was further held that the F.I.R. was found to have been received on 20.07.1993 by the learned S.D.J.M. and no reason has been assigned by the I.O. as to why he could not promptly comply with the statutory requirement as prescribed under section 157 Cr.P.C. and this conduct of the Investigating Agency creates a strong suspicion regarding its fairness. It was further held that the iron rod (M.O.I) which was seized in consequence of the information supplied by the respondent had no direct nexus with the case in view of the statements of P.Ws.1 and 2 during trial. It was further held that the ocular testimonies of P.Ws.1, 2 and 3 created suspicion in the mind of the Court as if the genesis of the prosecution case has been materially suppressed and a camouflaged version subsequently cooked up has been presented for the appreciation of the Court. It was further held that the ocular testimonies of P.Ws.1, 2 and 3 created suspicion in the mind of the Court as if the genesis of the prosecution case has been materially suppressed and a camouflaged version subsequently cooked up has been presented for the appreciation of the Court. It was further held that the incriminating fact sounded by the investigating officer that he searched for the respondent but could not find him becomes somewhat unacceptable in view of the evidence of P.W.1 that prior to her arrival at the police station, the respondent was present there and had lodged a Station Diary Entry against both the injured persons including the deceased. It was further held that even if the accused did not fully establish his plea yet there is ample evidence to justify the finding that the prosecution has not established its case beyond all reasonable doubt against the respondent. It was further held that it is not a case where the plea of right of private defence taken by the respondent can be completely ruled out of consideration in the face of reasonable doubts created in the mind of the Court and such reasonable doubts according to the doctrine of law propounded by the Hon’ble Supreme Court are enough to entitle the respondent to get its benefit. Ultimately the learned Trial Court held that the prosecution has failed to bring home the charges under sections 302 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code against the respondent beyond all reasonable doubt and accordingly acquitted the respondent of all the charges. 8. Mr. Janmejaya Katikia, learned Additional Government Advocate contended that the learned Trial Court was wrong in disbelieving the version of the injured (P.W.2) and the informant (P.W.1) whose presence at the time of occurrence cannot be doubted. It was further urged that the evidence of P.W.3 has been illegally thrown out of consideration by the learned Trial Court. It was further urged that relying upon the statement of an illiterate and rustic witness like P.W.1 who had no knowledge about the procedure regarding making of station diary entry, the learned Trial Court should not have drawn adverse inference against the prosecution for non-production of the station diary entry. It was further urged that when the evidence of P.Ws. It was further urged that relying upon the statement of an illiterate and rustic witness like P.W.1 who had no knowledge about the procedure regarding making of station diary entry, the learned Trial Court should not have drawn adverse inference against the prosecution for non-production of the station diary entry. It was further urged that when the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 has remained unchallenged and the same is corroborated by the medical evidence and when the learned Trial Judge has observed that the respondent had assaulted both the injured persons when he was confronted with a situation of aggression and out of the injured persons, one subsequently succumbed, it was not proper on the part of the learned Trial Judge to acquit the respondent. It was further urged that when the evidence of the defence witness has been disbelieved, it was not proper on the part of the learned Trial Court to accept the plea of right of private defence as advanced by the respondent. The learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand supported the impugned judgment and contended that the learned Trial Court has discussed the evidence on record in its proper perspective and arrived at a finding which cannot be said to be manifestly wrong or perverse and therefore, it would not be proper to disturb the order of acquittal after twenty two years. 9. Adverting over the nature and cause of death of the deceased, we find that apart from the inquest report Ext.16, the prosecution has relied upon the evidence of P.W.11 Dr. Punyansu Mohanty who had conducted post mortem examination over the cadaver of the deceased on 20.07.1993 on police requisition at V.S.S. Medical College and Hospital, Burla. During post mortem examination, he noticed one abrasion on right shoulder, stitch wounds over this scalp and another abrasion over right elbow. On dissection, he found rupture of the spleen, depressed fracture on the skull on the left parietal region and extradural clot on the left parietal region. He opined the cause of death due to coma as a result of injury to the head and all the injuries were found to be ante mortem in nature. He proved the post mortem report Ext.18. The learned Trial Court has observed that it can be safely concluded that the deceased met with homicidal death. He opined the cause of death due to coma as a result of injury to the head and all the injuries were found to be ante mortem in nature. He proved the post mortem report Ext.18. The learned Trial Court has observed that it can be safely concluded that the deceased met with homicidal death. There was no challenge to the evidence of the doctor either during trial or before us. In view of the testimony of the autopsy doctor, the post mortem report Ext.18 and the inquest report Ext.16, we are of the view that the deceased met with a homicidal death. 10. The informant (P.W.1) has stated that after the occurrence, they first went to the Police Station and the officer in charge directed them to take the injured persons to the hospital first for treatment and her oral information was not then reduced to writing and on the following day of the occurrence at 11 a.m., the officer in charge reduced her information to writing at the Police Station and she and her daughter-in-law gave their L.T.I. thereon. Keeping this statement of P.W.1 in view, we verified the First Information Report wherein it is mentioned that the matter was reported on 18.07.1993 at 7 p.m. The statement of the investigating officer (P.W.9) also indicates that P.W.1 orally reported about the incident on 18.07.1993 at 7 p.m., on the basis of which the First Information Report was drawn up. To cross check this discrepancies, we perused the medical requisitions in respect of the deceased as well as P.W.2 which have been marked as Ext.2 and Ext.3 respectively which indicate the preparation of those documents on 18.07.1993 and the P.S. Case number has also been reflected therein. The gist of the information given has also been noted in the medical requisitions. The doctor (P.W.5) has also stated that on 18.07.1993 at about 8 p.m. he examined the deceased as well as P.W.2 on police requisitions. Therefore, in view of the oral evidence of the investigating officer (P.W.9) as well as the doctor (P.W.5) and the medical requisitions, it is clear that the FIR was registered on 18.07.1993 and not on 19.07.1993 as stated by the informant which may be due to confusion. Therefore, in view of the oral evidence of the investigating officer (P.W.9) as well as the doctor (P.W.5) and the medical requisitions, it is clear that the FIR was registered on 18.07.1993 and not on 19.07.1993 as stated by the informant which may be due to confusion. It is pertinent to note that in the chief examination, P.W.1 has stated that when she came to the Police Station and orally reported the matter, the same was reduced to writing but in the cross-examination, she has stated that her oral information was not then reduced to writing but it was done on the next day at 11 a.m. We cannot lost sight of the fact that P.W.1 was a rustic lady and therefore, chance of committing mistake regarding the date and time of reducing her oral information to writing by police relating to the incident cannot be ruled out. It seems that the learned Trial Court has given undue importance to the date of receipt of the FIR by the learned S.D.J.M., Kuchinda on 20.07.1993 and held that when the Court is closely situated to the Police Station campus, the non-compliance of statutory requirement under section 157 Cr.P.C. suggests that the FIR has been ante dated and it was not recorded on the date and time mentioned therein. At the outset, on the perusal of the First Information Report, it is seen that after the matter was reported on 18.07.1993 at 7 p.m., the FIR was dispatched from the Police Station on 19.07.1993. Merely because such FIR was placed before the learned S.D.J.M. on 20.07.1993, it cannot be said that the FIR was received by the learned S.D.J.M. on 20.07.1993. There may be many a factors on the part of the staff receiving the FIR not placing the same before the learned S.D.J.M. on 19.07.1993 and one of such causes may be that the learned S.D.J.M. was either absent on that day or held up in some other important assignment. When the FIR was lodged on 18.07.1993 at 7 p.m. and it was dispatched to the Court on 19.07.1993, it cannot be said as observed by the learned Trial Court that the statutory requirement under section 157 Cr.P.C. has not been complied with. Section 157 Cr.P.C. states that an “occurrence report” is to be sent forthwith to the Magistrate having jurisdiction to take cognizance on such report. Section 157 Cr.P.C. states that an “occurrence report” is to be sent forthwith to the Magistrate having jurisdiction to take cognizance on such report. The object of sending a report under section 157(1) of the Code is to enable the Magistrate to have early information of every serious crime and also to avoid possibility of improvement in the prosecution story and introduction of any distorted version by deliberations and consultations. “Forthwith” means promptly and without undue delay which suggests that the F.I.R. has to be sent within reasonable time in the circumstances prevailing. It is not the duty of the prosecution to explain every hour’s delay in sending the F.I.R. to the Magistrate. Therefore, we are of the view that the observation of the learned Trial Court that the FIR has been ante dated is not correct. 11. P.W.1 Kamala Karta has stated that she saw the assault on the deceased by the appellant by means of an iron rod as a result of which the deceased fell down on the ground sustaining bleeding injuries and then her husband (P.W.2) came to the rescue of the deceased. In the cross-examination, she has stated that she was cooking food at the time of occurrence and came out of the house when her husband came to the rescue of the deceased. P.W.2 has stated that when he came out of the house, the deceased was lying with bleeding injury. Though P.W.1 has stated that when the respondent tried to inflict further blows on her husband, she physically restrained the respondent but it has been confronted to her and proved through the investigating officer that she has not made any such statement. Therefore, it cannot be accepted that P.W.1 is a witness to the assault on the deceased. Similarly when the Public Prosecutor showed the iron rod produced from Malkhana to P.W.1, she stated that the respondent had not assaulted with that iron rod. P.W.2 Kasiram Karta stated that when his son Mahendra raised hue and cry on the road, he came out of the house and found bleeding injury on the head of the deceased who was lying by the side of the Amari fence erected by the respondent and when he rushed to the place of occurrence, the respondent dealt a blow on the right side of his head by means of an iron rod. This statement of P.W.2 indicates that he had not seen the actual assault on the deceased. Mahendra, son of P.W.2 has not been examined in the case. Therefore, it cannot be accepted that P.W.2 is a witness to the assault on the deceased. P.W.2 has also denied the iron rod shown to him by the Public Prosecutor as the weapon of offence. So far as the assault on P.W.2 is concerned, though P.W.2 has stated that the respondent dealt a blow on the right side of his head by an iron rod but the doctor (P.W.5) has noticed three injuries on the person of P.W.2 out of which two lacerated wounds were on the head and one contusion was on the right knee. The doctor has stated that three independent blows must have been inflicted to P.W.2 to sustain three injuries. Thus in view of the discrepancies in the ocular testimony vis-a-vis medical evidence, we are not inclined to place any reliance on the evidence that the respondent also assaulted P.W.2. P.W.3 Droupadi Chhatriya stated that on the date of occurrence at 6 p.m. while she was returning from the hospital, she found the respondent first assaulted the deceased on his head by means of an iron rod and when the deceased fell down on the ground with bleeding injury, P.W.2 came to the spot and he was also assaulted by the respondent on his head by the same iron rod for which P.W.2 also sustained bleeding injury. P.W.3 has stated that her statement was recorded by the investigating officer two days after the occurrence. The investigating officer on the other hand has stated that he recorded the statement of P.W.3 on 05.10.1993 and on that day he felt the necessity of recording the statement of P.W.3. We verified the case record and found that in fact the statement of P.W.3 has been recorded on 05.10.1993. It was suggested to the investigating officer that he had planted P.W.3 as an eye witness to the occurrence at a belated stage. Thus in view of the statement of the investigating officer, it is clear that even though the occurrence in question took place on 18.07.1993 but the statement of P.W.3 who claims to be an eye witness was recorded only on 05.10.1993 i.e. more than two and half months after the occurrence. Thus in view of the statement of the investigating officer, it is clear that even though the occurrence in question took place on 18.07.1993 but the statement of P.W.3 who claims to be an eye witness was recorded only on 05.10.1993 i.e. more than two and half months after the occurrence. Law is well settled that the testimony of a witness cannot become unreliable merely because there is delay in examination of such witness. Question of delay in examining a witness during investigation is material only when there are concomitant circumstances to indicate and suggest that some unfair practice has been adopted by the investigating agency for the purpose of introducing a witness to falsely support the prosecution case or the investigator was deliberately marking time with a view to decide about the shape to be given to the case. Delay in examination of witnesses is a variable factor which would depend upon a number of circumstances. For example, non-availability of witnesses, the investigating officer being preoccupied in some serious matters, the investigating officer spending his time in arresting the accused who were absconding, being occupied in other spheres of investigation of the same case which may require his attention urgently and importantly etc. However, in a case where the commission of crime is alleged to have been seen by witnesses who are easily available, a prudent investigator would give to the examination of such witnesses’ precedence over the evidence of other witnesses. (Ref:- (2005) 9 Supreme Court Cases 283, Sunil Kumar Vs. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 7 Supreme Court Cases 646, Shyamal Ghosh Vs. State of W.B. and (2015) 9 Supreme Court Cases 588, V.K. Mishra Vs. State of Uttarakhand, AIR 1979 SC 135 , Ganesh Bhavan Patel Vs. State of Maharashtra). In the present case when specific questions relating to delayed examination of P.W.3 have been put to the investigating officer and he has stated that he felt the necessity of recording the statement of P.W.3 for the first time only on 05.10.1993, we are of the view that the prosecution has tried to introduce an eye witness at a belated stage and therefore, the learned Trial Court was justified in not placing any reliance on the evidence of P.W.3. 12. 12. Even though it is the prosecution case that one iron rod (M.O.I) was seized at the instance of the respondent under seizure list Ext.5 and the doctor conducting post mortem examination has opined that the injuries sustained by the deceased can be inflicted by M.O.I but since the witnesses P.Ws. 1 and 2 have denied M.O.I as the weapon of offence, the seizure of such iron rod is in no way relevant for the purpose of this case. The chemical examination report indicates that though faint smears of blood was noticed on the iron rod but no opinion regarding its origin or grouping was given. Therefore, we are of the view that seizure of the iron rod cannot be said to be an incriminating material against the respondent. 13. P.W.1 has stated that before her arrival at the Police Station, the respondent was present there who also lodged station diary entry at the Police Station concerning the occurrence. In view of such statement of P.W.1, the evidence of investigating officer that on the next day of occurrence at 7 p.m., he could locate the appellant moving on the road at Harijanpada, Kuchinda and detained him, interrogated him and then arrested him appears to be a suspicious feature. 14. The respondent has taken a plea of right of private defence in his statement recorded under section 313 Cr.P.C. No such suggestion regarding plea of right of private defence has been given to P.Ws. 1 and 2. D.W. 1 Murali Sunar has been examined in support of such plea. Though D.W.1 stated that the respondent sustained injuries on his head and back during the occurrence due to the assault by the deceased as well as by P.W.2 but no injury report has been proved on behalf of the defence. D.W.1 has stated that on the date of occurrence after he came back to his house at 5 p.m., while he was cleaning his hands and legs to take his food, he heard noise coming from the place of occurrence. He further stated that when he first gave a look to the place of occurrence, he saw the deceased lying injured in the bari of the respondent and he immediately lifted the deceased and carried him to his house. He further stated that when he first gave a look to the place of occurrence, he saw the deceased lying injured in the bari of the respondent and he immediately lifted the deceased and carried him to his house. He further admits that he had never disclosed about the occurrence before anybody and disclosing about the occurrence for the first time before the Court. In view of such statement of D.W.1, it is very difficult to accept his evidence. P.W.6 who was the R.I., Kuchinda has stated that the spot was situated in between the houses of the respondent and P.W.2 and on measurement, he found that the spot was jointly recorded in favour of the deceased and P.W.2. The investigating officer also stated that during his spot visit, he noticed a green fence erected in front of the house of the informant. Thus the defence plea that on the date of occurrence the respondent was putting fence on his own land cannot be accepted. Law is well settled that the question of self defence is one of both law and fact. The right of self defence is not a right to take revenge but it is purely preventive. A plea of right of private defence cannot be based on surmises and speculation. The accused is not required to prove the plea of right of private defence beyond all reasonable doubt but he has to raise a doubt in the mind of the Court to satisfy that his defence is probable one. Even if specific plea of self defence is not taken but it is not enough to denude the accused the right if the same is otherwise made out. Thus when the plea regarding self defence has been taken for the first time in the statement recorded under section 313 Cr.P.C. and no suggestion regarding such plea was put in the cross-examination of any of the prosecution witnesses particularly P.Ws. 1 and 2 and when the evidence of the defence witness is not acceptable and no injury report of the respondent has been proved, it is very difficult to rely upon the plea of self defence taken by the respondent even by preponderance of probabilities. 15. 1 and 2 and when the evidence of the defence witness is not acceptable and no injury report of the respondent has been proved, it is very difficult to rely upon the plea of self defence taken by the respondent even by preponderance of probabilities. 15. In view of the discussions of the evidence on record, we are of the view that P.W.1 and P.W.2 are not the witnesses to the actual assault on the deceased and the evidence of P.W.3 cannot be acted upon in view of the inordinate delay in recording of her statement by the investigating officer. We are also of the view that M.O.I was not the weapon of offence in view of the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2. We are also of the view that the statement of the investigating officer that the respondent was arrested on the next day of occurrence in the evening hours at a place called Harijanapada is suspicious in view of the statement of P.W.1 that the respondent was present in the Police Station in the evening hours on the date of occurrence. 16. Assessing the materials available on record as well as the findings of the learned Trial Court, it cannot be said that the order of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court is palpably wrong or manifestly erroneous. Law is well settled that in a case of appeal against acquittal, although the powers of the High Court to reassess the evidence and reach its own conclusions are as extensive as in an appeal against an order of conviction, yet, as a rule of prudence, proper weight should be given to the views of the Trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at the trial, the right of an accused to the benefit of any doubt and the slowness of an appellate Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Trial Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses. Where two reasonable views are possible or two reasonable conclusions can be drawn on the evidence on record, the appellate Court, as a matter of judicial caution should not interfere with the conclusion arrived at by the learned Trial Court unless the conclusions are not possible. Where two reasonable views are possible or two reasonable conclusions can be drawn on the evidence on record, the appellate Court, as a matter of judicial caution should not interfere with the conclusion arrived at by the learned Trial Court unless the conclusions are not possible. Even if the appellate Court can review the Trial Court’s conclusion both on facts as well as law, but if the grounds of acquittal cannot be entirely and effectively dislodged or demolished and unless there has been flagrant miscarriage of justice by pronouncing the order of acquittal substantially and compelling reasons are there to interfere with the conclusions arrived at by the Trial Court, the findings of acquittal should not be disturbed. On careful analysis, even though we have not accepted some of the reasonings of the learned Trial Court but in view of our independent assessment of evidence on record, we find no infirmity or perversity in the impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court and therefore, we are not inclined to interfere with the same and accordingly, the impugned judgment and order of acquittal is upheld and the Government Appeal stands dismissed. The respondent has been released on bail by the learned Trial Court in view of the order of this Court dated 11.04.1996. He is discharged from the liability of his bail bonds. His personal bonds and surety bonds stand cancelled. In the result, the Government Appeal stands dismissed. I. Mahanty, J. : I agree.