ORDER : Kanwaljit Singh Ahluwalia, J. 1. Instant leave to appeal, application has been preferred by the State of Rajasthan in order to assail the impugned judgment dated 20.11.2015, whereby the accused-respondents, namely Ramsahay and Dinesh Keelka, who were tried for offences punishable under Sections 302 & 120-B I.P.C. and under Section 3 (2) (v) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, have been acquitted. 2. In the present case, complainant - Mangilal (PW-1) on 20.04.2013 had presented a written-report (Exhibit-P/1) before Station House Officer, Police Station, Narena, District Jaipur Rural. 3. In the written-report (Exhibit-P/1), complainant- Mangilal (PW-1) has stated that he is a resident of Village Palwas. He is an agriculturist and is also engaged in grazing of the sheep. Complainant made a grievance that on 19.04.2013 at around 10:00 A.M. his daughter (name withheld to protect her identity) had gone to the jungle to graze sheep and goats. His sheep and goats after grazing returned at 04:00 P.M., but her daughter had not come back to his house. A search was carried for her daughter. Later complainant, along with his wife Rameshwari Devi had gone to search for her daughter in the jungle. Dead-body of their daughter was found near the drain. Complainant found that a chuni (patta) was wrapped around her neck and she had died due to hanging. Complainant made a grievance that somebody having committed bad act with his daughter had committed her murder. 4. Above said written-report was investigated. No direct evidence was available. The prosecution nominated accused-respondents, namely Ramsahay S/o. Banshilal and Dinesh Keelka S/o. Rameshwar as accused on the basis of said circumstantial evidence. The prosecution in order to secure conviction of the accused-respondents, had examined as many as eighteen witnesses. 5. Mrs. Sonia Shandilya, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State of Rajasthan, has submitted that the prosecution case has relied upon two following circumstances to secure conviction of the respondents-accused:-- "1. Exchange of call details between accused and deceased. 2. Evidence of last seen." 6. The ld. trial Court has not relied upon the call details as the prosecution has failed to prove the same as per the mandate of Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act. 7. State's counsel has very fairly submitted that no witness of the service provider i.e. telecom company was examined. 8. We find that ld. The ld. trial Court has not relied upon the call details as the prosecution has failed to prove the same as per the mandate of Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act. 7. State's counsel has very fairly submitted that no witness of the service provider i.e. telecom company was examined. 8. We find that ld. trial Court has rightly excluded the call details as ingredients of Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act were not complied with by the prosecution. 9. The Supreme Court in case of Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer and Others, reported as A.I.R. 2015 S.C. 180, considering the provisions of Indian Evidence Act held as under:-- '15. It is further clarified that the person need only to state in the certificate that the same is to the best of his knowledge and belief. Most importantly, such a certificate must accompany the electronic record like computer printout, Compact Disc (CD), Video Compact Disc (VCD), pen drive, etc., pertaining to which a statement is sought to be given in evidence, when the same is produced in evidence. All these safeguards are taken to ensure the source and authenticity, which are the two hallmarks pertaining to electronic record sought to be used as evidence. Electronic records being more susceptible to tampering, alteration, transposition, excision, etc. without such safeguards, the whole trial based on proof of electronic records can lead to travesty of justice. 16. Only if the electronic record is duly produced in terms of Section 65B of the Evidence Act, the question would arise as to the genuineness thereof and in that situation, resort can be made to Section 45A - opinion of examiner of electronic evidence. 17. The Evidence Act does not contemplate or permit the proof of an electronic record by oral evidence if requirements 14 Page 15 under Section 65B of the Evidence Act are not complied with, as the law now stands in India. 18. It is relevant to note that Section 69 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984 (PACE) dealing with evidence on computer records in the United Kingdom was repealed by Section 60 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act, 1999. Computer evidence hence must follow the common law rule, where a presumption exists that the computer producing the evidential output was recording properly at the material time. Computer evidence hence must follow the common law rule, where a presumption exists that the computer producing the evidential output was recording properly at the material time. The presumption can be rebutted if evidence to the contrary is adduced. In the United States of America, under Federal Rule of Evidence, reliability of records normally go to the weight of evidence and not to admissibility. 19. Proof of electronic record is a special provision introduced by the IT Act amending various provisions under the Evidence Act. The very caption of Section 65A of the Evidence Act, read with Sections 59 and 65B is sufficient to hold that the special provisions on evidence relating to electronic record shall be governed by the procedure prescribed under Section 65B of the Evidence Act. That is a complete code in itself. Being 15 Page 16 a special law, the general law under Sections 63 and 65 has to yield. 20. In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu alias Afsan Guru, a two-Judge Bench of this Court had an occasion to consider an issue on production of electronic record as evidence. While considering the printouts of the computerized records of the calls pertaining to the cellphones, it was held at Paragraph-150 as follows: "150. According to Section 63, secondary evidence means and includes, among other things, "copies made from the original by mechanical processes which in themselves insure the accuracy of the copy, and copies compared with such copies". Section 65 enables secondary evidence of the contents of a document to be adduced if the original is of such a nature as not to be easily movable. It is not in dispute that the information contained in the call records is stored in huge servers which cannot be easily moved and produced in the court. That is what the High Court has also observed at para 276. Hence, printouts taken from the computers/servers by mechanical process and certified by a responsible official of the service-providing company can be led in evidence through a witness who can identify the signatures of the certifying officer or otherwise speak of the facts based on his personal knowledge. That is what the High Court has also observed at para 276. Hence, printouts taken from the computers/servers by mechanical process and certified by a responsible official of the service-providing company can be led in evidence through a witness who can identify the signatures of the certifying officer or otherwise speak of the facts based on his personal knowledge. Irrespective of the compliance with the requirements of Section 65-B, which is a provision dealing with admissibility of electronic records, there is no bar to adducing secondary evidence under the other (2005) 11 SCC 600 16 Page 17 provisions of the Evidence Act, namely, Sections 63 and 65. It may be that the certificate containing the details in sub-section (4) of Section 65-B is not filed in the instant case, but that does not mean that secondary evidence cannot be given even if the law permits such evidence to be given in the circumstances mentioned in the relevant provisions, namely, Sections 63 and 65." 21. It may be seen that it was a case where a responsible official had duly certified the document at the time of production itself. The signatures in the certificate were also identified. That is apparently in compliance with the procedure prescribed under Section 65B of the Evidence Act. However, it was held that irrespective of the compliance with the requirements of Section 65B, which is a special provision dealing with admissibility of the electronic record, there is no bar in adducing secondary evidence, under Sections 63 and 65, of an electronic record. 22. The evidence relating to electronic record, as noted herein before, being a special provision, the general law on secondary evidence under Section 63 read with Section 65 of the Evidence Act shall yield to the same. Generalia specialibus non derogant, special law will always prevail over the general law. It appears, the court omitted to take note of Sections 59, 17 Page 18 and 65A dealing with the admissibility of electronic record. Sections 63 and 65 have no application in the case of secondary evidence by way of electronic record; the same is wholly governed by Sections 65A and 65B. To that extent, the statement of law on admissibility of secondary evidence pertaining to electronic record, as stated by this court in Navjot Sandhu case (supra), does not lay down the correct legal position. It requires to be overruled and we do so. To that extent, the statement of law on admissibility of secondary evidence pertaining to electronic record, as stated by this court in Navjot Sandhu case (supra), does not lay down the correct legal position. It requires to be overruled and we do so. An electronic record by way of secondary evidence shall not be admitted in evidence unless the requirements under Section 65B are satisfied. Thus, in the case of CD, VCD, chip, etc., the same shall be accompanied by the certificate in terms of Section 65B obtained at the time of taking the document, without which, the secondary evidence pertaining to that electronic record, is inadmissible." 10. Hence, we discard the evidence of call detail between accused and deceased. 11. So far as evidence of last seen is concerned, prosecution had examined Sunita (PW-8) and Gyarsi (PW-9) respectively. 12. The ld. Hence, we discard the evidence of call detail between accused and deceased. 11. So far as evidence of last seen is concerned, prosecution had examined Sunita (PW-8) and Gyarsi (PW-9) respectively. 12. The ld. trial Court dealt with the evidence of last seen in Para 70 of the impugned judgment and held as under:-- ^^tgka rd vfHk;qDrx.k dks e`rdk ds lkFk vfUre ckj (Last Seen) ns[ks tkus dk iz'u gS rks vfHk;kstu lk{kh ds :Ik esa bl ekeys esa xokg ih-M-8 lquhrk o ih-M+ 9 X;kjlhnsoh lk{kh ds :i esa izLrqr gqbZ gSA tgka rd ih-M+ 8 lquhrk nsoh dk iz'u rks mlus vius c;kuksa esa vfHk;qDr }kjk Qksu djus dh ckr dgh gSA ftjg esa blus ;g Hkh dFku fd;k gS fd fjiksVZ ntZ djokrs le; bldh lcus ckr dj yh FkhA vFkkZr bl xokg dh lk{; ds vuqlkj fjiksVZ ntZ djkus ls iwoZ budh vkil esa ckr gks xbZ Fkh rks bl xokg us e`rdk ds firk o ekrk dks D;ksa ugha crk;k fd mldh jklgk; ls ckr gqbZ FkhA bl xokg dks vfHk;kstu i{k }kjk i{knzksgh ?kksf"kr fd;k x;k gSA ftlesa blus iqfyl c;ku izn'kZ ih-18 dk Hkkx D;wa ls vkj iqfyl dks ugha nsus dk crk;k gSA ftlesa mlus jkelgk; o ,d yM+dk dks x;kjlh nsoh ds ikl ns[kdj vkuk iqfyl dks vius c;ku /kkjk 161 n-iz-la- esa crk;k gS tcfd mDr Hkkx dks U;k;ky; esa gq, c;kuksa esa iqfyl dks ugh fy[kuk crk;k x;k gSA bl xokg us ;g Hkh dFku fd;k gS fd X;kjlhnsoh dh gR;k gqbZ ml fnu eSusa nksuks eqyfteku dks ukys dh rjQ tkrs ns[kk FkkA bl izdkj bl lk{kh dh lk{; esa tc ;g rF;k vk;k gS rks fQj izFke lwpuk fjiksVZ o rgjhjh fjiksVZ izn'kZ ih-1 esa vKkr O;fDr;ksa ds fo:) fjiksVZ D;ksa vafdr dh xbZ gSA ;g lUnsgkLin gSA blh izdkj vU; lk{kh ih-M-9 X;kjlhnsoh us viuh eq[; ijh{k.k esa ukys ds ikl nks O;fDr;ksa dks ns[kuk crk;k gS rFkk nksuks gkftj vnkyr crk;s gSA ogha ftjg esa bl xokg us dFku fd;k gS fd e`rdk esjh nksfgrh yxrh Fkh RkFkk izn'kZ Mh-1 iqfyl c;ku esa ;g rF; vafdr ugha gS fd mlus fdlh O;fDr dks eksVjlkbfdy ij vkrs ns[kk gks] eSus dksbZ ?kVuk ?kfVr gksrs ugha ns[kh rFkk lc yksxks us vkil esa ckrphr dj iqfyl esa fjiksVZ ntZ djkus dk dFku fd;k gSA xokg us vt[kqn vkxs dgrh gS fd eq>s rks iqfyl us ;g dgk Fkk fd tkdj dg nsuk fd nks vkneh vk;s FksaA blfy, eSus vkt ;g c;ku fn;kA iqfyl us esjs ls dksbZ f'kuk[rxh ijsM ugha djkbZ] eqyfteku dks igyh ckj dksVZ esa ns[kk gSA vuqla/kku ds nkSjku iqfyl us bl xokg ds c;ku ?kVuk ds ckn fnukad 24-04-2013 dks ikWp fnu ckn fy;s gSA blls Hkh ;g lUnsg mRiUu gksrk gS fd tc bl xokg us eqyfteku dks ?kVuk ds fnu ?kVukLFky ij ns[kk Fkk rks fjiksVZ esa mudk uke vafdr D;ksa ugha fd;k gS blh ifjis{; esa U;kf;d n`"Vkar 2012 Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 383 Hem Lata Vs State of Rajasthan es blh izdkj ds rF;ksa gksus ij ekuuh; jktLFkku mPp U;k;ky; us bu xokgks dh lk{; dks fo'oluh; ugha ekuk gS] gLrxr izdj.k esa Hkh ;gh fLFkfr gSA ih-M+ 8 lquhrk us vius eq[; ijh{kk esa vfHk;kstu }kjk i{knzksgh gksus ij iqfyl c;ku izn'kZ ih-18 dk Hkkx D;w ls vkj ugha fy[kuk crk;k gSA blh izdkj ih-M+9 X;kjlhnsoh us ;gh dFku fd;k gS fd eq>s rks iqfyl us dgk Fkk fd nks vknfe;ksa dk uke crk nsukA blfy, eSua ;g uke crk;s gSa bl izdkj esjs fouez erkuqlkj vfHk;qDrx.k dks e`rdk dh e`R;q ls iwoZ vfUre ckj (Last Seen) ns[kk x;k gks bl lEcU/k esa tks vfHk;kstu i{k dh lk{; gS og dkQh detksj rFkk fo'oluh; ugha dgh tk ldrh gSA^^ 13. Having heard learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State, we find that the evidence of last seen in itself is not sufficient to record conviction of the accused-respondents. 14. Taking totality of circumstances, we are of the view that the prosecution has utterly failed to prove the complicity of the accused-respondents with the alleged crime. The only evidence which remain for consideration against the accused-respondents is evidence of last seen, which as pointed out earlier is a shaky one. Apart from it, evidence of last seen alone is not sufficient to record conviction of the accused. 15. Reliance can be placed on the judgment of Supreme Court in State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran and Anr. reported in (2007) 3 SCC 755 , wherein the Supreme Court in paras 31, 32, 33 & 34 of the said judgment has held, as under:-- "31..... It is a settled rule of criminal jurisprudence that suspicion, however grave, cannot be substituted for a proof and the courts shall take utmost precaution in finding an accused guilty only on the basis of circumstantial evidence. This Court has applied the above-mentioned general principle with reference to the principle of last seen together in Bodhraj v. State of J & K as under : (SCC p.63, para 31) "31. The last-seen theory comes into play where the time-gap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were seen last alive and when the deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any person other than the accused being the author of the crime becomes impossible. It would be difficult in some cases to positively establish that the deceased was last seen with the accused when there is a long gap and possibility of other persons coming in between exists. In the absence of any other positive evidence to conclude that the accused and the deceased were last seen together, it would be hazardous to come to a conclusion of guilt in those cases..." [See also : State of U.P. v. Satish (SCC para 22) and Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna Reddy v. State of A.P. (SCC para 27)]. 32. In the absence of any other positive evidence to conclude that the accused and the deceased were last seen together, it would be hazardous to come to a conclusion of guilt in those cases..." [See also : State of U.P. v. Satish (SCC para 22) and Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna Reddy v. State of A.P. (SCC para 27)]. 32. In Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna Reddy, this Court further opined that even in the cases where time gap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were last seen alive and when the deceased was found dead is too small that possibility of any person other than the accused being the author of the crime becomes impossible, the courts should look for some corroboration. 33. In Jaswant Gir v. State of Punjab, it was observed that (SCC p.441, para 5) "5...... In the absence of any other links in the chain of circumstantial evidence, it is not possible to convict the appellant solely on the basis of the 'last seen' evidence, even if the version of PW 14 in this regard is believed..." 34. From the principle laid down by this Court, the circumstance of last-seen together would normally be taken into consideration for finding the accused guilty of the offence charged with when it is established by the prosecution that the time gap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were found together alive and when the deceased was found dead is so small that possibility of any other person being with the deceased could completely be ruled out. The time gap between the accused persons seen in the company of the deceased and the detection of the crime would be a material consideration for appreciation of the evidence and placing reliance on it as a circumstance against the accused. But, in all cases, it cannot be said that the evidence of last seen together is to be rejected merely because the time gap between the accused persons and the deceased last seen together and the crime coming to light is after a considerable long duration. But, in all cases, it cannot be said that the evidence of last seen together is to be rejected merely because the time gap between the accused persons and the deceased last seen together and the crime coming to light is after a considerable long duration. There can be no fixed or straight jacket formula for the duration of time gap in this regard and it would depend upon the evidence led by the prosecution to remove the possibility of any other person meeting the deceased in the intervening period, that is to say, if the prosecution is able to lead such an evidence that likelihood of any person other than the accused, being the author the crime, becomes impossible, then the evidence of circumstance of last seen together, although there is long duration of time, can be considered as one of the circumstances in the chain of circumstances to prove the guilt against such accused persons. Hence, if the prosecution proves that in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case, there was no possibility of any other person meeting or approaching the deceased at the place of incident or before the commission of the crime, in the intervening period, the proof of last seen together would be relevant evidence. For instance, if it can be demonstrated by showing that the accused persons were in exclusive possession of the place where the incident occurred or where they were last seen together with the deceased, and there was no possibility of any intrusion to that place by any third party, then a relatively wider time gap would not affect the prosecution case". 16. In the light of the above, we are of the considered opinion that the prosecution could not prove the offence against the accused-respondents beyond reasonable doubt and the accused-respondents were rightly extended benefit of doubt by the trial Court. 17. The finding given by the learned trial Court that the chain of circumstances is not complete to arrive at the conclusion that the respondents have committed the offence, is justified on the facts of the case. 18. 17. The finding given by the learned trial Court that the chain of circumstances is not complete to arrive at the conclusion that the respondents have committed the offence, is justified on the facts of the case. 18. Having gone through the impugned judgment and the material available on record, we are of the opinion that the view formulated by the trial Court is a view, which is possible on the facts of the case and, hence, no interference is warranted to entertain the present leave to appeal preferred by the State of Rajasthan. Furthermore, it cannot be said that the judgment rendered by the trial Court is perverse or suffers from any patent illegality or infirmity. 19. Consequently, present leave to appeal is, hereby, dismissed.