ORDER Singh, J. -- 1. This is an application filed under section 378(3) of CrPC, seeking leave to present an appeal against the impugned judgement of acquittal dated 27.8.2015, passed by the 4th Additional Sessions Judge, District Raisen (M.P.), in Special S.T. No.02/2014, titled as State of M.P. v. Salman Khan, acquitting the respondent-Salman Khan for offences punishable under sections 363, 366, 376 of IPC and section 3/4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act of 2012’ for short). 2. According to the prosecution, accused-respondent is the neighbour of prosecutrix (PW6), and they are known to each other. On the night of 8.12.2013, prosecutrix (PW6) and her family members, after taking evening meals went to sleep. During the night, prosecutrix (PW6) went outside to attend a call of nature, and met respondent. He induced her to accompany him on the promise of marriage. Agreeable to the idea, prosecutrix eloped with him after taking some money and cloths. First, they stayed with his uncle and next day they went and stayed with his Aunt (Fufi). In the night, respondent ravished prosecutrix. 3. In the meanwhile, when in the morning of 9.12.2013, prosecutrix was found missing from the house and was not traceable in the nearby area and accused-respondent Salman was also found missing, Idrish (PW4) father of prosecutrix, lodged report against accused-respondent on the basis of suspicion that accused had kidnapped the prosecutrix. On the basis of the report, Crime No.131/2013 was registered by Police Bamhori vide Ex.P-7, against the accused Salman for offences punishable under sections 363 and 366 of the Indian Penal Code. 4. Further story of the prosecution is that on 11.12.2013, respondent took prosecutrix to Bus Stand Silwani and on some pretext, he went away leaving her behind. During the course of the investigation, prosecutrix was recovered by police from Bus Stand Silwani and memo of Panchnama was prepared. Prosecutrix was medically examined by Dr. Preetiwala (PW10), who gave no definite opinion about the sexual intercourse. Thereafter, she was handed over to her father. After arrest on 16.12.2013, the accused was also medically examined and found sexually active. Prosecutrix was radiologically examined for assessment of her age by Dr. Prosecutrix was medically examined by Dr. Preetiwala (PW10), who gave no definite opinion about the sexual intercourse. Thereafter, she was handed over to her father. After arrest on 16.12.2013, the accused was also medically examined and found sexually active. Prosecutrix was radiologically examined for assessment of her age by Dr. Surendra Singh Kushwaha (PW2) and on the basis of his examination; he opined that on the date of examination, the age of the prosecutrix was between 15 to 18 years. Statements of prosecutrix and witnesses were recorded by the police. After investigation, the respondent was charge-sheeted under sections 363, 366 and 376 of IPC and section 3/4 of the Act of 2012. 5. On the basis of the charge sheet, trial Court framed charges against the accused-respondent for offences punishable under sections 363, 366 and 376 Indian Penal Code and section 3/4 of the Act of 2012. Respondent abjured his guilt. 6. The trial Court after considering the plea of the accused-respondent, disbelieved the testimony of various prosecution witnesses and acquitted the accused-respondent. 7. Panel advocate for State submitted that impugned judgement passed by the learned trial Court is wholly erroneous in law as well as on facts. Learned trial Court committed grave error in holding that the prosecution had failed to prove the allegations without proper appreciation of the material available on record in its true perspective. 8. Now the question that arises for consideration before this Court is, whether the evaluation of the evidence by the trial Court suffers from illegality, manifest error or perversity? 9. It is settled law that in an appeal against acquittal, the appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence. There is no limitation, restriction or condition for the exercise of such powers and the appellate Court may draw its own conclusion on all questions of fact and law. However, the reversal of acquittal can be made only if the conclusions recorded by the trial Court did not reflect a possible view, that is to say a view which can reasonably be arrived at. In the case of acquittal, the judgement of the trial Court may be interfered with only where there is absolute assurance of guilt of the accused-respondent on the basis of evidence on record and not merely because the High Court can take another possible or a different view. 10. In the case of acquittal, the judgement of the trial Court may be interfered with only where there is absolute assurance of guilt of the accused-respondent on the basis of evidence on record and not merely because the High Court can take another possible or a different view. 10. In this regard, first question which is required to be considered, is whether the prosecutrix was below 18 years of age on the date of the incident? 11. On the basis of the statements of the prosecutrix (PW6), her parents and on the basis of entry in her mark-sheet and medical evidence, learned trial Court inferred that it has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt that on the date of the incident, the prosecutrix had not completed the age of 18 years. Perusal of mark-sheet of the prosecutrix, reflects that the date of birth of the prosecutrix is 4.7.1999. Accordingly, on the date of the incident, i.e., 9.12.2015, the age of the prosecutrix was 16 years, 5 months and 5 days. On the other hand, as per Dr. Surendra Singh Kushwaha (PW2) on radiological examination, he found that the age of prosecutrix on the date of her examination was 15 to 18 years. In his cross-examination, he has admitted the possibility that on date of incident, her age could be more than 18 years. No doubt, parents of the prosecutrix are best persons to prove her age but in their evidence they did not prove this fact. Their evidence does not inspire confidence. So far as the date of birth recorded as 4.7.1999, in the mark-sheet is concerned, the author of that entry was not examined. Mahendra Sharma (PW3) in charge Headmaster, Government Primary School, Pratapgarh, Block Silwani, District Raisen, in his evidence stated that he had not given admission to the prosecurtrix in Class I and he was unable to say on what basis or material, date of birth was recorded in the scholar register. His evidence further shows that he was not sure whether recorded date of birth is true or not. The date of birth recorded in the school register, in the absence of definite and cogent evidence is of not much evidentiary value. His evidence further shows that he was not sure whether recorded date of birth is true or not. The date of birth recorded in the school register, in the absence of definite and cogent evidence is of not much evidentiary value. In these circumstances, learned trial Court has committed no error in refusing to place reliance upon the mark sheet and learned trial Court concluded rightly, that the age of the prosecutrix could not be held to be less than 18 years on the date of the incident. 12. From perusal of the record, it is clear that trial Court has recorded detailed and cogent reasons for its finding, supported by statements of witnesses. In these circumstances, the finding regarding the age cannot be lightly interfered with. 13. So far as statements of prosecutrix regarding abduction is concerned, trial Court has observed that version of the prosecutrix as given by her in her statement recorded under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure differs substantially from the evidence given by her in the Court. That apart, from her evidence it clear that she was taken to different places by the respondent and she went along without any protest. Moreover, she met a number of persons, but did not tell or narrate to anyone about the abduction or rape. Had she been forcibly abducted by the respondent, there were numerous occasions on which she could have easily raised an alarm and invite intervention of others. However, she singularly failed to do so, which, as per the trial Court leads to the inescapable conclusion that she was a consenting party and had accompanied the respondent Salman Khan on her own free will and accord. As stated above, prosecution has failed to prove that at the time of the incident, the prosecutrix was less than 18 years of age and thus, the charges levelled against the respondent under sections 363, 366 and 376 of Indian Penal Code and section 3/4 of the Act of 2012, have not been proved and rightly held so by the trial Court. 14. In the aforesaid circumstances, in the considered opinion of this Court, trial Court has considered the entire material evidence on record against respondent in its entirety and on a proper appreciation of evidence and after assigning detailed and cogent reasons, has acquitted the respondent. 14. In the aforesaid circumstances, in the considered opinion of this Court, trial Court has considered the entire material evidence on record against respondent in its entirety and on a proper appreciation of evidence and after assigning detailed and cogent reasons, has acquitted the respondent. Unless the judgement of acquittal is palpably wrong and grossly unreasonable, interference in a case against acquittal is not called for in view of the law settled by the Supreme Court in the catena of decisions. Hon’ble the Supreme Court held that if the evaluation of the evidence by the trial Court does not suffer from illegality, manifest error or perversity and the main grounds on which it has based its order are reasonable and plausible, the High Court should not disturb the order of acquittal even if another view is possible. Therefore, no interference by this Court with impugned judgement is warranted, in view of the law laid down by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the matters Bhagwati and others v. State of U.P. [1976 SCC (Cr.) 338], Chandrappa and others v. State of Karnataka [ (2007)4 SCC 415 ], Ashok Rai v. State of U.P. and others [2014 AIR SCW 3406], and Sadhu Saran Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others [(2006)4 SCC 357]. 15. The application for leave to appeal against acquittal of the accused-respondent has no merit and substance and accordingly is hereby dismissed in limine at the stage of admission itself. 16. Accordingly, this miscellaneous criminal case stands finally disposed of. 17. Let record of the trial Court be sent back with a copy of this order without delay.