BINOD BIHARI SINGH (DEAD) v. DISTRICT TRANSPORT MANAGER (ADMN. )
2016-07-13
K.R.MOHAPATRA, S.PANDA
body2016
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : S. Panda, J. - The petitioners in this writ petition assail the award dated 20.11.1991 passed by opposite party No.2- Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bhubaneswar in I.D. Case No.57 of 1989. 2. The petitioners were employees of Odisha State of Road Transport Corporation (for short, 'OSRTC'). They were made to retire prematurely on 20.09.1986 on attaining the age of 50 years. Such decision of premature retirement of the petitioners was taken by the OSRTC in the public interest. The schedule of reference for adjudication before the learned Labour Court was as follows: "Whether the pre-mature retirement of (i) Sri Binod Bihari Singh, Asst. Station Master, (2) Sri Banchanidhi Jena, Conductor (3) Sri Rama Chandra Singh, Conductor of O.S.R.T.C., Bhadrak with effect from 20.09.1986 in legal and/or justified? If not, to what relief are they entitled?" 3. Both the parties (the petitioners as well as the opposite party Nos.1 and 3) filed written statements in support of their stand. Learned Labour Court by its award dated 20.11.1991 (Annexure-11) held the compulsory retirement of the petitioners to be legal and justified. He further held that the petitioners are not entitled to the benefits claimed by them. Assailing the same, the petitioners have filed the present writ petition. During pendency of the writ petition, petitioner Nos.1 and 3 died and were substituted by their legal heirs. 4. Though several grounds were taken in the writ petition assailing the correctness of the award passed under Annexure-11, learned counsel for the petitioners assailed the finding of the learned Labour Court with regard to premature retirement of the petitioners on "public interest". He strenuously contended that neither the order of retirement as passed under Annexure-1 series reflects that the compulsory retirement of the petitioners was on 'public interest' nor the impugned award spells out the nature of 'public interest' for which petitioners were made to retire prematurely. He further submitted that retirement of the petitioners was arbitrary and the finding to that effect arrived at by the learned Labour Court is perverse. He also relied upon three unreported decisions of this Court in OJC No.2803 of 1984 disposed of on 17.07.1990, OJC No.1176 of 1988 disposed of on 27.06.1991 and OJC No.3970 of 1989 disposed of on 23.11.1997 and submitted that the petitioners in the said writ petitions were also made to retire prematurely on 'public interest'.
He also relied upon three unreported decisions of this Court in OJC No.2803 of 1984 disposed of on 17.07.1990, OJC No.1176 of 1988 disposed of on 27.06.1991 and OJC No.3970 of 1989 disposed of on 23.11.1997 and submitted that the petitioners in the said writ petitions were also made to retire prematurely on 'public interest'. This Court considering the provisions under Regulation-118 of the OSRTC Employees (Classification, Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Regulations, 1978 (for short, 'Regulations 1978'), came to a conclusion that it was incumbent upon the Corporation to satisfy the Court as to what 'public interest' was sought to be achieved by superannuating the petitioners prematurely. In the case at hand, neither the OSRTC has spelt out the 'public interest' achieved on such premature retirement of the petitioners in the order passed under Annexure-1 series nor the learned Labour Court has given any finding to that effect. Hence, he prayed to quash the impugned order under Annexure-11 and to grant consequential benefits to the legal heirs of the petitioners. 5. Mr.Sahoo, learned counsel for opposite parties 1 and 3-OSRTC refuted such submissions and strenuously urged that the ground of premature retirement need not be spelt out in the order of superannuation. Thus, no fault can be found with the OSRTC for non-mentioning of the ground of premature retirement under Annexure-1 series. Further, learned Labour Court while answering issue No.1 has discussed the materials available on record in threadbare and came to a categorical finding that the premature retirement of the petitioners was on 'public interest'. The said finding being supported by materials available on record, this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article-227 of the Constitution of India should not sit over the impugned award as an appellate Court. He also relied upon the unreported decision of this Court in OJC No.1213 of 1987 disposed of on 08.08.1990. Further, relying upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shri Baikuntha Nath Das and another v. Chief District Medical Officer, Baripada and another, reported in 73 (1992) CLT 665 (SC), he contended that when the termination is on public interest and the learned Labour Court satisfies the grounds enumerated at paragraph-32 of the said decision (supra), this Court should not interfere with the order of termination. Hence, he prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 6.
Hence, he prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the case record, it reveals that the OSRTC in exercise of power conferred under Regulation-118 of the Regulations, 1978 can superannuate an employee prematurely in public interest. In Shri Baikuntha Nath Das' case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the assessment of compulsory retirement held as follows: "32. The following principles emerge from the above discussion: (i) An order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment. It implies no stigma nor any suggestion of misbehaviour. (ii) The order has to be passed by the government on forming the opinion that it is in the public interest to retire a government servant compulsorily. The order is passed on the subjective satisfaction of the government. (iii) Principles of natural justice have no place in the context of an order of compulsory retirement. This does not mean that judicial scrutiny is excluded altogether. While the High Court or this Court would not examine the matter as an appellate court, they may interfere if they are satisfied that the order is passed (a) mala fide or (b) that it is based on no evidence or (c) that it is arbitrary-in the sense that no reasonable person would form the requisite opinion on the given material; in short, if it is found to be perverse order. (iv) The government (or the Review Committee, as the case may be) shall have to consider the entire record of service before taking a decision in the matter - of course attaching more importance to record of and performance during the later years.The record to be so considered would naturally include the entries in the confidential records/character rolls, both favourable and adverse. If a government servant is promoted to a higher post notwithstanding the adverse remarks, such remarks lose their sting, more so, if the promotion is based upon merit (selection) and not upon seniority. (v) An order of compulsory retirement is not liable to be quashed by a Court merely on the showing that while passing it uncommunicated adverse remarks were also taken into consideration. That circumstance by itself cannot be a basis for interfere. Interference is permissible only on the grounds mentioned in (iii) above.
(v) An order of compulsory retirement is not liable to be quashed by a Court merely on the showing that while passing it uncommunicated adverse remarks were also taken into consideration. That circumstance by itself cannot be a basis for interfere. Interference is permissible only on the grounds mentioned in (iii) above. This aspect has been discussed in paras 29 to 31 above." Judicial interference can only be made when an order of compulsory retirement suffers from non-application of mind, mala fide, arbitrary, perverse and is based on no evidence. The order of compulsory retirement passed in respect of petitioners has to be scrutinized keeping in view the aforesaid principles. 7. Learned Labour Court while answering the reference framed two issues, which are as follows:- (1) Whether the premature retirement of (1) Sri Binod Bihari Singh, Asst. Station Master (2) Sri Banchanidhi Jena, Conductor, (3) Sri Rama Chandra Singh, Conductor of Orissa State Road Transport Corporation, Bhadrak with effect from 20.9.86 is legal/and/or justified ? (2) To what relief the workmen are entitled? 8. After going through the discussions as made above and on perusal of the finding on issue No.1, it is apparent that the grounds on which the petitioners suffered the order of compulsory retirement are conspicuously absent therein. No material is either produced before the learned Labour Court or before this Court to come to a conclusion that the order of premature retirement of the petitioners was on 'public interest'. On the other hand, it is the admitted case of the parties that the petitioners have crossed the efficiency bar and have received increments. Learned Labour Court, while discussing issue No.(1) has rightly held that the employees, who are turned dead wood or no way useful to be retained in service, can be made to retire prematurely on public interest and for that crossing efficiency bar cannot immune them from compulsory retirement. However, there is no finding to the effect that continuance of the petitioners in service is not in public interest, as they are turned dead wood and no way useful for the OSRTC.
However, there is no finding to the effect that continuance of the petitioners in service is not in public interest, as they are turned dead wood and no way useful for the OSRTC. Learned counsel for the OSRTC relying upon the decision of this Court in OJC No.1213 of 1987 disposed of on 08.08.1990 contended that change of condition of service of a workman by dispensing with his services prematurely on completion of 50 years of age cannot be said to be withdrawal of customary concession or privilege or change in usage. Thus, he contended that application of Regulation-118 of Regulations, 1978 in the present case cannot be said to be in contravention of provisions under Section 9-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The said decision has no application to the case at hand for the reason that learned counsel for the petitioners has not raised any grievance with regard to change of service conditions of the petitioners by effecting compulsory retirement. Further, review committee had taken into consideration that the petitioners therein were placed under suspension for adopting dishonest tactics. But, in the instant case, ground of premature retirement of the petitioners is conspicuously absent in the order of superannuation as well as in the impugned award. Though learned Labour Court had an occasion to assess the service books of the petitioners, no material was brought out which would justify the compulsory retirement of the petitioners was for the public interest. On the other hand, the two unreported decisions relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioners (supra) are squarely applicable to the case at hand, wherein it has been categorically held that power of compulsory retirement being available to be exercised in the event of public interest only and the same having not been challenged, it was incumbent upon the Corporation to satisfy the Court below as to what 'public interest' was achieved by superannuating the petitioners prematurely. Apparently, no material was produced before the learned Labour Court to come to a conclusion that premature superannuation of petitioners were in public interest.
Apparently, no material was produced before the learned Labour Court to come to a conclusion that premature superannuation of petitioners were in public interest. Moreover, learned Labour Court being swayed away by the principles that adverse remarks need not be communicated to the petitioners for superannuating them prematurely on public interest, that review committee has taken a decision for compulsory retirement of the petitioners, and that the petitioners were given three months' notice as a pre-condition to pass the order of compulsory retirement, came to a conclusion that order of compulsory retirement of the petitioners was justified. 9. Having heard learned counsel for the parties as well as on perusal of the case record, it is apparent that neither the authorities under OSRTC have applied their mind while passing the order of compulsory retirement nor the learned Labour Court has assigned any reason for holding it to be legal and justified. 10. In that view of the matter, the impugned award dated 20.11.1991 passed by opposite party No.2- Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bhubaneswar in I.D. Case No.57 of 1989 under Annexure-11 is not sustainable in law. Accordingly, the same is set aside, but in the circumstances, without any order of costs. Final Result : Allowed