JUDGMENT S.K. MISHRA, J. - This is the second journey of the petitioner to this Court. On earlier occasion, he has filed W.P. (C) No.2012 of 2013, which was disposed of in his favour. After remand by this Court in W.P. (C) No.2012 of 2013, the question of condonation of delay in filing of Election Petition No.12 of 2012 in the Court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Gunupur was taken up and as per the order dated 08.10.2013, learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) refused to condone the delay and rejected the application of the petitioner. Against such order, this writ petition has been filed. 2. The factual backdrop leading to filing of this writ petition may be succinctly described as follows : The petitioner, hereinafter referred as the “election petitioner”, was a candidate for the post of Samiti Sabhya of Thuapadi Samiti of Bisam-Cuttack Block. The result of which election was declared finally on 24.02.2014 and in such election, opposite party No.1-Nilamadhab Hikaka, hereinafter referred as the ‘returned candidate”, was declared elected for the aforesaid office. Being aggrieved by such election, the election petitioner filed an election petition on 16.03.2012. it is alleged that the election petition was presented after the delay of seven days. Accompanied with the election petition, he filed a petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Gunupur admitted the election petition and issued notice to the opposite party No.1 i.e. the returned candidate with the observation that the prayer relating to condonation of delay being a mixed question of fact and law will be dealt with at the time of final hearing of the election petition. Being aggrieved with the order, opposite party No.1 i.e. the returned candidate challenged the order before this Court in W.P. (C) No.7367 of 2012. This Court while disposing of the said writ petition on 25.04.2012 set aside the order of the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) passed on 03.04.2012 and remitted the matter to the trial court to consider the issue of limitation after giving opportunity of hearing to both the parties. Thereafter, both the parties led evidence and on behalf of the election petitioner, four witnesses were examined and three witnesses were examined on behalf of opposite party No.1, the returned candidate. Thereafter, both the parties led evidence and on behalf of the election petitioner, four witnesses were examined and three witnesses were examined on behalf of opposite party No.1, the returned candidate. After considering the materials on record, the learned Election Tribunal-cum-Civil Judge (Senior Division), Gunupur rejected the prayer of condonation of delay, as consequence thereof it was held that the Election Petition No.12 of 2012 was not entertainable. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated 17.01.2013, the present petitioner filed a writ petition before this Court in W.P.(C) No.2012 of 2013, which was disposed of on 12.07.2013. This Court on hearing both the parties and taking into consideration that the Election Tribunal had not considered the relevant evidence on record allowed the writ petition with a direction to the Election Tribunal to consider the relevant evidence afresh and pass an order within a period of 15 days. However, the returned candidate preferred a Special Leave Petition (Civil) before the Hon’ble Apex Court, which was registered as S.L.P. (Civil) No.24812 of 2013 against the order passed by this Court. Said S.L.P. was dismissed on 16.08.2013. After disposal of the S.L.P. and rehearing of the parties, the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) rejected the petitioner’s prayer for condonation of delay, which is assailed in this writ petition. 3. Before looking into the materials on record to decide whether an application for condonation of delay should have been allowed by the Election Tribunal, it is appropriate to take note of the leading decisions of this Court in this issue. In Maharagu Naik and others v.Civil Judge, Senior Division-cum-Election Commissioner, Boudh and others, 102 (2006) CLT 710, a Division Bench of this Court held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is also applicable to the election case under the Panchayat Samiti Act and has held as follows : “Sufficient cause” should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bonafide is imputable to the applicant. In the present case except advancing the plea that the plea of illness is false. Opp. Party No.1 did not tender any evidence from her side. In her deposition or in the deposition of any other witnesses examined from her side, she did not whisper if the petitioner was not ill or that she was well and the plea of illness is false. Opp. Party No.1 did not tender any evidence from her side. In her deposition or in the deposition of any other witnesses examined from her side, she did not whisper if the petitioner was not ill or that she was well and the plea of illness is false. Under such circumstances, approach of leaned Civil Judge in assessment of evidence is found to be correct as against the hair-splitting interpretation of the evidence in the context of illness adopted by the learned Addl. District Judge. Therefore, the reasoning assigned and the conclusion arrived at by the learned Addl. District Judge in not condoning the delay (in M.J.C. No.14 of 2002) is illegal and accordingly set side. (emphasis supplied) In the off-quoted decision of the Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others, AIR 1987 SC 1353 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down the principles which guide applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is appropriate to quote the exact words used by the Hon’ble Supreme Court: “3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by deposing of matters on ‘merits’. The expression “sufficient cause” employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that – Xxx xxx xxx 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious mater being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. “Every day’s delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour’s delay, every second’s delay ? As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. “Every day’s delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour’s delay, every second’s delay ? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalizes injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Xxx xxx xxx Same judgment has been relied upon by the Supreme Court again in the case of State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO and others, AIR 2005 SC 2191 , wherein the Supreme Court after taking into consideration a number of cases has held that the proof by sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of the extraordinary restriction vested in the Court. What counts is not the length of the delay but the sufficiency of the cause and shortness of the delay is one of the circumstances to be taken into account in using the discretion. 4. In this case learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that there is six days delay, but the learned Counsel for the opposite party No.1 says that there is seven days delay. Before going into those questions, it is appropriate to take into the facts and circumstances of the case i.e. the contention made in the application for condonation of delay. In the petition filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the election petitioner took the plea that the delay was caused due to low backache and he was under treatment from 05.03.2012 to 12.03.2012 as an outdoor patient in Bissam Cuttack Medical and he went to Vaishnavi Hospital, Visakhapatnam for better treatment on 12.03.2012. In the petition filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the election petitioner took the plea that the delay was caused due to low backache and he was under treatment from 05.03.2012 to 12.03.2012 as an outdoor patient in Bissam Cuttack Medical and he went to Vaishnavi Hospital, Visakhapatnam for better treatment on 12.03.2012. He states that after four days he returned to his home and filed the election petition. The returned candidate on the other hand took a very short plea. According to him, the ground of ailment is a false plea taken by the petitioner. It is further pleaded that the O.P.D. ticket of C.H.C., Bissam Cuttack is a fraudulent document and the petitioner has never visited Vaishnavi Hospital, Visakhapatnam for treatment. It is further pleaded that the prescription obtained by him from Vaishnavi Hospital, Visakhapatnam is a fraudulent document. So the petition for condonation of delay filed by the petitioner is liable to be dismissed. Opposite Party No.2 has not filed any written objection. 5. In substantiating his plea, the election petitioner examined four witnesses. P.W. 1 is the election petitioner himself, who has specifically deposed that due to severe backache he went to Bissam Cuttack Medical where he contacted the doctor and expressed his health problem to him on 05.03.2012 and he prescribed him some medicines and accordingly he took those medicines regularly. He has further stated that as he was not recovered from illness, as advised by the Doctor he went to Visakhapatnam on 12.03.2012. for better treatment and he was treated at Vaishnavi Hospital and stayed there till 15.03.2012. After his return, the petitioner filed the election petition on 16.03.2012. in support of his treatment the petitioner filed prescription, which is marked as Ext.1. Similarly, in support of treatment in the Vaishnavi Hospital, Visakhapatnam, he has filed prescription, which is marked as Ext.2. 6. Though no such plea has been taken, the returned candidate while cross-examining these witnesses has put forth a new case beyond his plea that the petitioner was a employee of the Nabin Vikash Charitable Trust which runs under the Vedant Foundation and he tried to introduce a story that during the period the election petitioner was allegedly ill, he has attended his official duty. How far such a suggestion beyond plea is permissible ? How far such a suggestion beyond plea is permissible ? This Court is of the opinion that in a Civil Case, the party should not be allowed to travel beyond his pleadings and the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) has erred in law in allowing the suggestion of the returned candidate’s Advocate and pleading a new case for the opposite party No.1. 7. On a sincere analysis of the evidence, it is seen that the P.W. 2 is an N.G.O. Chief, where the election petitioner was serving and his name is Bala Muklunda Palo. In his deposition, he states that the present petitioner is one of the Coordinator and is working under his supervision and that the petitioner did not attend his duty on 05.02.2012 till 16.02.2012 and for that absence he has obtained leave and he resumed his duty on 17.02.2012. He had also filed a leave application which is marked as Ext. 7. P.W. 3 is a Medical Officer of C.H.C., Bissam-Cuttack. He states that while he was on duty he prescribed medicine for the petitioner Kameya Wadaka under Ext. 1 and his signature therein is Ext.1/1. It is also deposed by P.W. 3 that he had prescribed certain medicines on 09.03.2012 and on 12.03.2012 he advised the petitioner for better treatment. The O.P.D. register of the C.H.C. Bissam Cuttack was admitted in evidence in support of his treatment given by the petitioner from 05.03.2012 to 12.03.2012. P.W. 3 is a public servant being the Medical Officer of a Community Health Centre. He has no reason to tell lie on oath. Moreover, his statement is fortified by the entries made in the O.P.D. register, which is contemporaneous to the treatment given to the election petitioner. P.W. 4 is a Public Relation Officer of Vaishnavi Hospital of Visakhapatnam. His name is B.Sridhar. He has stated on oath that the petitioner was under treatment of Dr. G.N. Srinivas and he has issued prescription, which was marked as Ext.2 He has given his statement before the Court on oath. This witness is an outsider and there is no reason to disbelieve his version. 8. In order to summarise the materials led before the Election Tribunal by the election petitioner, this Court finds that the petitioner himself has examined himself to prove all the documents. The doctor of the C.H.C., Bissam Cuttack has supported his statement and prescription. The P.R.O. Dr. 8. In order to summarise the materials led before the Election Tribunal by the election petitioner, this Court finds that the petitioner himself has examined himself to prove all the documents. The doctor of the C.H.C., Bissam Cuttack has supported his statement and prescription. The P.R.O. Dr. B.Sridhar of Vaishnavi Hospital, Visakhapatnam has supported the plea of treatment imparted by Dr. G.N.Srinivas of Vaishnavi Hospital, Visakhapatnam. The Supervisor of the N.G.O. has also stated that the petitioner was on leave from 05.03.2012 till 16.03.2012. Opposite party No.1 is the returned candidate. He has not examined himself as a witness. If a party is not examined himself as a witness, adverse inference has to be drawn against him. O.P.W. No.1 was said to be the Chief Coordinator of the N.G.O. where the petitioner was serving as a Coordinator. O.P.W. 2 was an employee of the N.G.O., but he is at present not working in the N.G.O. and doing business. O.P.W. No.3 was the Branch Manager of S.B.I. Bissam Cuttack Branch. In his evidence he has stated on oath that he has received summons from the court to depose in the Court with the documents in the matter of litigation between the parties. Further he has filed certain documents to prove that the election petitioner was serving at the relevant time and he was not unwell. Such documents have been marked as Ext. L by the O.P.W. No.3 in those documents, he has admitted that the documents at Exts.D to H cannot be operational or without permission of the authorities. Although he has denied the documents to be admitted in an election dispute, he has submitted that the documents marked as Exts.D to H does not contain a single seal or signature of the authority, who was in charge of the N.G.O. The O.P.W. No.2-Gopaldas Bhatra, who was an employee of the N.G.O., has stated that if any employee has any inconvenience, then he shall submit leave application to Bal Mukunda Pal, who is the Unit Head of Naveen Vikash Charitable Trust. But he has stated that he cannot say how many days Kamaya Wadakka has worked in which month of the year. O.P.W. No.3 is the Bank Manager, who has deposed at the petitioner has received his salary for the month of March, 2012. 9. But he has stated that he cannot say how many days Kamaya Wadakka has worked in which month of the year. O.P.W. No.3 is the Bank Manager, who has deposed at the petitioner has received his salary for the month of March, 2012. 9. In this background and in view of the materials available before the Court, learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) has adopted a perverse approach by allowing the third case to be introduced by the opposite party No.1 and in a hairsplitting appreciation of evidence, which is generally adopted in criminal cases, has come to the conclusion that the petitioner has not been able to prove that he was prevented, by sufficient cause from preferring the election petition in the Court within the prescribed period of limitation. 10. Learned Counsel for opposite party No.1 i.e. the returned candidate has relied upon the case of P.K.Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and another, AIR 1998 SC 2276 , wherein the Supreme Court has depreciated the High Court order as it has not examined to the reply filed by the appellant. The Supreme Court further held that Law of Limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribe and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The Court does not intend to extend the benefit on equitable grounds and the plea taken by the opposite party has been taken into consideration and after considering the case in a wholistic manner, the conclusions mentioned below has been arrived at. So the decision cited by the learned Counsel for the returned candidate, i.e. P.K.Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and another (supra) is not applicable in this case. 11. In that view of the matter, this Court is of the opinion that the order dated 08.10.2013 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Gunupur in Election Petition No.12 of 2012 should be set aside and the writ petition should be allowed. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed but without any cost. The order dated 08.10.2013 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Gunupur in Election Petition No.12 of 2012 is set aside. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed but without any cost. The order dated 08.10.2013 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Gunupur in Election Petition No.12 of 2012 is set aside. The petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act read with Section 44-B (1) of the Panchayat Samiti Act filed by the petitioner on 16.03.2012 before the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Gunupur is hereby allowed and the delay is condoned. The Civil Judge (Senior Division), Gunupur is directed to take up the matter of the Election Petition and try the same on day-to-day basis and dispose of the same within a period of three months from the date of receipt of this order. The Registry is directed to send the L.C.R. without any further delay. Petition allowed.