JUDGMENT : Nishita Mhatre, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 6th January, 2016 in W.P. No.4928 (W) of 2015. It has been preferred by the Kolkata Municipal Corporation and its Commissioner (hereinafter referred to as “KMC”). The Respondent Nos.1 and 2 are Fabworth Promoters Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Fabworth”) and its director, respectively. Respondent No.3 is the Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as “KMDA”). Respondent No.4 is the Hearing Officer whose order was challenged before the learned Single Judge by Fabworth. 2. A plot of land measuring about 5.61 acres at the junction of Dhapa Road and Eastern Metropolitan Bypass is owned by the KMDA. A notice was published on 20th February, 2006 by the KMDA inviting tenders for leasing this land for constructing a 5/7 Star Hotel thereon. Fabworth being interested, offered a lease premium of Rs.189,67,41,000/-, which was the highest bid received by the KMDA. The bid was accepted and a Lease Deed was executed between the KMDA and Fabworth on 20th September, 2007. The lease was for a period of 99 years and was renewable for a further period of 99 years. Several restrictions were placed on the lessee in the Lease Deed with the right of reversion being maintained by the lessor. As mentioned earlier the lease premium was Rs.189,67,41,000/- and the annual rent was Rs.1/- per cottah. 3. Fabworth applied for mutation its name as a lessee of the premises on 4th October, 2007. KMC informed it that the annual valuation in respect of the said premises with effect from 3rd quarter of 2008 was determined at Rs.13,27,71,870/-. While applying for the mutation, the form filled in by Fabworth indicated that the existing recorded owner was “unassessed”. The mutation in the name of Fabworth as lessee was effected on 11th October, 2007 and a building permit was granted by the KMC in favour of the Fabworth subsequently. This building permit refers to KMDA as the lessor while Fabworth has been recorded as the lessee. On receipt of the calculation for the annual valuation of the premises, Fabworth objected to the same. However, its objections were overruled by an order dated 30th December 2008. That order was challenged by Fabworth by preferring WP 9372(W) of 2012. On 25th July, 2013 the learned Single Judge of this Court disposed of the said writ petition. On receipt of the calculation for the annual valuation of the premises, Fabworth objected to the same. However, its objections were overruled by an order dated 30th December 2008. That order was challenged by Fabworth by preferring WP 9372(W) of 2012. On 25th July, 2013 the learned Single Judge of this Court disposed of the said writ petition. The KMC was directed to consider all documents produced by Fabworth and to make an assessment in accordance with law. The KMC was expected to pass a reasoned order within three months, after affording an opportunity of hearing to all the interested parties. 4. Thereafter, a committee was constituted for conducting the hearing, although the hearing was expected to be conducted by a Hearing Officer under the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act (hereinafter referred to as “KMC Act”). The committee upheld the annual valuation calculated by the KMC and observed that Section 176 of the KMC Act was not applicable since the lease granted in favour of Fabworth must be deemed to be a perpetual lease and therefore it would be liable to pay property tax on that basis in respect of the aforesaid premises. A second writ petition was filed by Fabworth being W.P. No. 30732(W) of 2014. On 12th December, 2014 the learned Single Judge (Kar Gupta, J.) quashed the order dated 13th August, 2014. 5. The learned Judge discussed various judgments and observed as follows: “In view of the above, the respondent No.11 was under obligation to pay the property tax of the premises under reference at the first instance. No material is available on record to show that the provisions of sub section (3A) of Section 193 and/or Section 230 could be invoked in this case. Therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside on that ground alone”. 6. After setting out the provisions of Section 171(8)(a)(ii) and Section 176 of the KMC Act, the learned Judge observed as follows: “The liability of the respondent No.11 is evident in Clause (a) (ii) of sub section (8) of Section 171 of the said Act, 1980. Both the aforesaid provisions contained “Non obstante” clause. The objection had been raised by the petitioners in their written objection on the above ground and it was ignored. In view of the discussions and observations made hereinabove, the impugned order is quashed and set aside. Both the aforesaid provisions contained “Non obstante” clause. The objection had been raised by the petitioners in their written objection on the above ground and it was ignored. In view of the discussions and observations made hereinabove, the impugned order is quashed and set aside. I direct the Kolkata Municipal Corporation to pass an order afresh on the basis of the order dated July 25, 2013 passed in W.P. No.9372 (W) of 2012 taking into consideration the discussions and observations made hereinabove within January 15, 2015 after giving opportunity of hearing to the persons concerned including the petitioners. The above competent authority is further directed to communicate the above decision to the parties concerned within a week thereafter. Let it further be recorded that the payment of property taxes paid by the petitioners on the basis of the claim of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation made by a communicated dated July 22, 2013 (Annexure P 7 at page 111 of this writ application) shall be adjusted against the amount which may be due and payable on the basis of the aforesaid decision of the competent authority of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation. I make it clear that I have not entered into the merits of this case with regard to correctness of annual valuation or property taxes of the above premises while examining the propriety of the decision making process and all points are kept open”. 7. On remand, a fresh notice of hearing was issued by the Hearing Officer to Fabworth. The Hearing Officer passed an order on 13th January, 2015 reiterating the earlier order passed by the KMC calculating the annual valuation at Rs.13,27,71,870/-. Aggrieved by this order Fabworth filed their third writ petition being W.P. No.4928(W) of 2015. This writ petition was decided by the learned Single Judge (Arijit Banerjee, J.) on 6th January, 2016. Quashing the order passed by the Hearing Officer, the learned judge directed him to assess the annual value of the property tax afresh, on the basis that the land was “owned by” and “belongs to” KMDA in accordance with the provisions of Section 176 read with Section 171(8)(a)(ii) of the KMC Act, after affording a hearing to Fabworth. Quashing the order passed by the Hearing Officer, the learned judge directed him to assess the annual value of the property tax afresh, on the basis that the land was “owned by” and “belongs to” KMDA in accordance with the provisions of Section 176 read with Section 171(8)(a)(ii) of the KMC Act, after affording a hearing to Fabworth. The learned Judge has concluded that the Hearing Officer had disobeyed the observations of Kar Gupta, J. made in the order passed in the earlier writ petition where the learned Judge has expressed his view that the provisions of Section 176 read with Section 171(8)(a)(ii) of the KMC Act would be applicable for calculating the annual value of the property. Banerjee, J. concurred with the observations of Kar Gupta, J. that the primary liability to pay property tax on the premises was that of KMDA and that the land in question should be valued on the basis that it is owned by and belongs to KMDA. The learned Judge did not accept the distinction sought to be drawn in respect of the phrases “owned by” and “belonging to” by the KMC. The learned Judge held that these phrases are synonymous in the context of the KMC Act. The mutation made in the name of Fabworth did not make it the owner of the land as its name was recorded as a lessee, according to the learned Judge. After discussing several judgments cited at the bar, the learned Judge found that the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Calcutta Swimming Club and Anr. vs. Kolkata Municipal Corporation reported in (2010) 3 CLT 410 was squarely applicable to the facts in the present case. A similar question arose in that appeal and the Division Bench held that the primary liability to pay tax was on the Government since it was the owner of the land; the club was the undisputed owner of the building and structures thereon and the property tax in respect of the structures would be assessed in the hands of the lessee. The learned Judge therefore set aside the order passed by the Hearing Officer and held that while Fabworth was liable to pay property tax on the buildings and structures constructed on the land, the land would have to be assessed in the hands of the KMDA as it was the owner. The learned Judge therefore set aside the order passed by the Hearing Officer and held that while Fabworth was liable to pay property tax on the buildings and structures constructed on the land, the land would have to be assessed in the hands of the KMDA as it was the owner. The contention raised on behalf of the KMC that a writ petition was not maintainable as there was an alternative and efficacious remedy provided in the KMC Act itself, was negated by the learned Judge. He held that the writ petition had been admitted and therefore the issue regarding its maintainability could not be considered at the stage of final hearing. Furthermore the learned Judge was of the view that the self-imposed restriction of entertaining a writ petition when there is an alternative remedy was not applicable in this case as the Hearing Officer had flouted the order of Kar Gupta, J. and acted in excess of his jurisdiction while passing the impugned order. 8. The issue before us is whether the land which has been leased by the KMDA, a body constituted under the Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority Act, 1972, should be taxed in its hands or in the hands of the lessee. Could it be said that the land in question was “owned by” KMDA but did not “belong to” it but Fabworth, as suggested on behalf of the KMC? 9. The learned Advocate General appearing for the KMC submitted – (i) The writ petition was not maintainable as there was an alternative and efficacious remedy provided under the KMC Act being an appeal under Section 189 of the aforesaid Act; (ii) Though the KMDA was the lessor and therefore responsible for paying property tax, by the lease agreement, Fabworth had accepted this liability; (iii) The judgment of Kar Gupta, J. dated 12th December, 2014 was an open remand to the Hearing Officer. Therefore, the Hearing Officer had exercised his jurisdiction in the manner that he felt the KMC Act should be interpreted for reckoning the liability for payment of property tax; (iv) The lease agreement which was valid for a period of 99 years with the option for renewal was in fact a perpetual lease. There was a transfer of the rights of enjoyment to the lessee. Therefore the property no longer belonged to the owner as illustrated in Raja Mohd. There was a transfer of the rights of enjoyment to the lessee. Therefore the property no longer belonged to the owner as illustrated in Raja Mohd. Amir Ahmad Khan vs. Municipal Board of Sitapur reported in AIR 1965 SC 1923 ; (v) The KMDA would be liable only if it would have been assessed as an owner earlier. Admittedly, the assessment form filled in by Fabworth indicated that the property was unassessed; (vi) The phrases “owned by” or “belonging to” in Section 171(8)(a) of the KMC Act are not synonymous. The Legislature does not use words which are redundant while legislating. The same word may be used in different contexts in that very Act, as in this case. The judgments in State of Orissa & Ors. vs. Joginder Patjoshi & Anr., reported in (2004) 9 SCC 278 , Ramnarayan Mor vs. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1964 SC 949 , Gramophone Company of India Ltd., vs. Birendra Bahadur Pandey & Ors., reported in (1984) 2 SCC 534 are relied on in support of this contention; 10. Per contra Mr. P. Chidambaram appearing for Fabworth submitted – (i) The writ petition was maintainable because the hearing authority had passed the assessment order without jurisdiction and in defiance of the order of Kar Gupta J, by concluding that neither Section 171(8) nor Section 176 were applicable in this case as KMDA did not have any interest in the land in question; (ii) The period or tenure of the lease does not affect the ownership of the property and therefore, even though the lease was for 99 years with an option to renew the same, it continues to be a lease in view of the judgments in The Collector of Bombay vs. Khatizabai Dharsi Somji Dossa reported in 1961(64) BLR 311, Union of India vs. Hotel Excelsior Ltd. reported in 2012 SCC Online Del 4758; (iii) The particulars mentioned in the Lease Deed may not reflect the market value of the property and therefore it does not have a direct nexus with the determinations of the annual value of any land in view of the judgment in Shree Mahamaya Mining & Industries (P) Ltd. & Ors. vs. The Calcutta Municipal Corporation & Ors., reported in 1995 (2) CHN 125 ; (iv) Kar Gupta, J. in the order dated 12th December, 2014 had discussed the manner in which the annual valuation of the property was to be calculated and the matter was remanded only for actually calculating the annual value and the property tax using that method. This order which was binding on all the parties to the appeal and the learned judge unambiguously had held that Section 176 read with Section 171(8)(a)(ii) were applicable for the purpose of calculating the annual value and the property tax payable and that the primary liability to pay tax on the land was on KMDA under Section 193(1)(a) of the KMC Act; (v) The judgment in Calcutta Swimming Club & Anr. vs. Kolkata Municipal Corporation reported in (2010) 3 CLT 410 passed by the Division Bench of this Court covers the issue involved in the appeal. The Division Bench has held that the liability to pay tax on the land is on the lessor while the tax on the buildings must be borne by the Calcutta Swimming Club. The distinction sought to be drawn by the KMC that the land was not unassessed was immaterial as the primary liability in law to pay the property tax on the land was that of the KMDA; (vi) The distinction sought to be drawn by the KMC between the phrases “owned by” and “belonging to” has not been pleaded by the KMC as it has never raised the issue that although the property was owned by KMDA, it belonged to Fabworth; (vii) The use of the phrase “belonging to” instead of “owned by” in Section 176 of the KMC Act does not make a difference to the assessment of the land in the hands of the KMDA. Acquisition of the property by a statutory body makes it an owner of that property and the lessee of such a property can never become the owner of the property under a Lease Deed. Acquisition of the property by a statutory body makes it an owner of that property and the lessee of such a property can never become the owner of the property under a Lease Deed. The decisions in Commissioner Wealth Tax, W. Bengal vs. M/s. Bishwanath Chatterjee & Ors., reported in (1976) 3 SCC 385 and Late Nawab Sir Mir Osman Ali Khan vs. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Hyderabad reported in 1986 (Supp) SCC 700 have been cited in support of the submission that only when the legal title vests in an assessee, the property must be treated as belonging to the assesse; (viii)The Hearing Officer ought not to have interpreted the provisions of law of the KMC Act when that had already been done by Kar Gupta, J. and the interpretation of an act is always a matter of law for the Court to decide and the authorities are bound to abide by that construction. In view of the judgments in Padfield and Ors. vs. Minister of Agriculture Fisheries and Food & Ors., reported in (1968) 1 All ER 997, Babaji Kondaji Garad vs. Nasik Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd., Nasik & Ors., reported in (1984) 2 SCC 50 , V. Jaya Prakash vs. Commissioner of Municipality, Khapra Municipality, Kapra, R.R. District & Anr., reported in (2003) SCC Online AP 1080. 11. The first submission of the learned Advocate General, that the writ petition was not maintainable need not concern us at this stage. The learned Single Judge had admitted the petition. The parties were directed to file their affidavits after which the matter was finally heard. It does not appear from the decision impugned that although the petition had been admitted, the issue regarding its maintainability was to be decided at the final hearing of the petition. In any event it is well-settled that the power of the High Court exercised in its writ jurisdiction under Section 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be whittled down by legislation. It is a self-imposed restraint which the High Court exercises while deciding matters under Article 226 of the Constitution. Normally the High Court would not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution when an alternative and efficacious remedy is available to the petitioner. However, there are certain exceptions to this Rule. It is a self-imposed restraint which the High Court exercises while deciding matters under Article 226 of the Constitution. Normally the High Court would not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution when an alternative and efficacious remedy is available to the petitioner. However, there are certain exceptions to this Rule. The extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution can always be exercised when an authority passes an order without jurisdiction or in violation of the principles of natural justice or when the fundamental rights of the petitioner are adversely affected. The submission of the learned Advocate General in the present case regarding the maintainability of the writ petition is, in our view, untenable because the Hearing Officer in this case has passed an order after the remand without adhering to the judgment dated 12th December, 2014 passed by Kar Gupta, J. and therefore had passed an order in excess of his jurisdiction by interpreting the provisions of the KMC Act when that exercise had already been carried out by Kar Gupta, J. The Hearing Officer was obviously bound by the observations made by Kar Gupta, J. in the judgment dated 12th December, 2014. The views of the learned Single Judge could not be brushed aside by the Hearing Officer merely because they were not palatable. 12. As mentioned earlier the main issue before us is whether the land in question should be taxed in the hands of the owner-KMDA or in the hands of the lessee-Fabworth. There is no dispute that the parties entered into a lease agreement for the property in question which was a plot of land measuring 5.61 acres on the Eastern Metropolitan Bypass. The consideration for the lease was Rs.189,67,41,000/- and the lease was for a period of 99 years for the construction of 5/7 Star Hotel. Clause 2 of the Lease Deed reads as follows: “2. The consideration for the lease was Rs.189,67,41,000/- and the lease was for a period of 99 years for the construction of 5/7 Star Hotel. Clause 2 of the Lease Deed reads as follows: “2. The Lessee hereby agrees and covenants with the Lessor as follows: (a) … … … (b) The Lessee shall during the said term pay all present and future rate, taxes, charges and other impositions of every description in respect of the demised land and the buildings erected or to be erected thereon, which are or may be assessed to be payable by the owner or the occupier presently or in future and all increases thereof in respect of the demised land and all structures thereon or to be made thereon from the date of commencement of lease. (c) The Lessee shall at its own cost and expenses – (i) apply for mutation of its name in the records of Kolkata Municipal Corporation within 30 days from the date of signing of Deed of Lease. (ii) within the 30 days from the date of receipt of written intimation/order of Kolkata Municipal Corporation effecting mutation of name of the Lessee in the records of Kolkata Municipal Corporation as Lessee of the demised land, the Lessee shall submit plan for sanction of building plan/s for 5/7 Star Hotel Complex in respect of the demised land. (iii) start construction of hotel complex building or buildings and structures within three months from the date of final sanction of the building plan by Kolkata Municipal Corporation for the purpose of setting up 5/7 Star Hotel along with boundary walls, sewers and drains in accordance with plans, sections, specifications as may be approved by the appropriate authority and according to the Rules and Regulations of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation and according to the requirements of any statute of any Land Use and Development Control Plan and/or Development Control Regulations of any Authority or Pollution Control Board.” 13. The argument of the learned Advocate General is that in view of the aforesaid clause in the Lease Deed which clearly mentions that the lessee would be liable to pay all the present and future rents, taxes and charges on the demised land and the buildings erected or to be erected thereon, Fabworth would be liable to pay the tax on the land demised. He submitted that the very fact that under the Lease Deed, Fabworth had agreed to pay the property taxes indicated that it had taken on the liability for the same, even though it was not the owner of the land. He urged that in view of this clause of the Lease Deed the land demised must be taxed in the hands of Fabworth as it belongs to Fabworth after the execution of the Lease Deed. He also submitted that the tenure of the lease deed indicated that it was a perpetual lease and therefore the land belonged to Fabworth for all practical purposes. 14. This submission in our opinion is untenable. The word “lease” is defined under Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. It is a transfer of a right to enjoy immovable property made for a certain time which may be expressed or implied, or in perpetuity, in consideration of a price to be paid to the transferor by the transferee. The transferor being the lessor retains the ownership of the land while the lessee, i.e., the transferee can enjoy the land on payment of some consideration. A lease may be in perpetuity as well. However, that does not change the nature of the land holding inasmuch as the lessor continues to be the owner of the land as it belongs to him while the lessee enjoys the land during the tenure of the lease. The Bombay High Court in The Collector of Bombay vs. Khatizabai Dharsi Somji Dossa reported in 1961(64) BLR 311, and the Delhi High Court in Union of India vs. Hotel Excelsior Ltd. reported in 2012 SCC Online Del 4758; have reiterated that the ownership of the land does not cease to be that of the lessor only because of the long tenure of the lease. With respect, we agree with this view. 15. It would be necessary to consider certain relevant provisions of the KMC Act. Section 171 of the KMC Act speaks of property tax being chargeable on lands and buildings. It prescribes the manner in which the property tax has to be assessed as the percentage of the annual value of the land or building in question. Section 171(2) provides the manner in which the property tax is to be calculated, being a percentage of the annual value of covered space of the building as determined under Section 174. It prescribes the manner in which the property tax has to be assessed as the percentage of the annual value of the land or building in question. Section 171(2) provides the manner in which the property tax is to be calculated, being a percentage of the annual value of covered space of the building as determined under Section 174. The calculation of the property tax on vacant land and land with constructions thereon has also been prescribed under this provision. Sub-Section (3) of this Section further prescribes the property tax which may be imposed on lands and buildings including huts thereon, taking into account the tax under the Howrah Bridge Act, 1926. Sub-Section (5) of Section 171 provides for rebate on the property tax payable in the first three years after the Occupancy Certificate is issued under the KMC Act in the case of newly constructed buildings used for residential purposes. Section 171(6) starts with a non-obstante clause and provides that “lands and buildings which are the properties of the Union are exempt from property tax.” Sub-Section (7) again begins with a non-obstante clause and provides that lands and buildings which vest in the Board of Trustees for the Port of Kolkata shall be assessed in accordance with the provisions contained in the Kolkata Port Act, 1890 and the agreement if any between the Board of Trustees for the Port of Kolkata and the Corporation. Sub-Section (8) reads as follows: “(8) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2), the property tax on the – (a) land owned by or belonging to – (i) the board of trustees for the Improvement of Kolkata, constituted under the Kolkata Improvement Act, 1911, or (ii) the Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority, constituted under the Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority Act, 1972, or (iii) the West Bengal Housing Board, constituted under the West Bengal Housing Board Act, 1972, or (iv) the West Bengal Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation, established under the West Bengal Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation Act, 1974, or (v) such other statutory body as may be notified by the State Government in this behalf from time to time, for the purposes of development schemes in accordance with the published or approved plans but not put to such use, Shall be ten per cent of the annual value of such land as determined under this Chapter; (b) land or building acquired, constructed, purchased or owned by the Government or any of the statutory bodies mentioned in clause (a) for any Government approved scheme for the purpose of subsidised housing for persons belonging to low income group or industrial workers and comprising of tenements let out to such persons on a monthly rent shall be ten per cent of the annual value of such land or building determined under this Chapter; (c) land or building acquired, constructed, purchased or owned by Government or any of the statutory bodies mentioned in clause (a) for any other purpose shall be at the rate determined under sub-section (2) of this section.” 16. Under Section 172 of the KMC Act, certain lands and buildings are exempt from property tax. Similarly, under Section 173, an exemption is available for properties owned by the diplomatic or consular mission of a foreign State from payment of any rate, tax or fee. Section 173A exempts ex-servicemen from payment of tax on lands and buildings if he is residing in that land or building. The annual valuation in respect of privately owned properties is determined under Section 174. However, an exception is carved out under Section 176 of the Act for determining the annual valuation of lands or buildings owned by various statutory bodies. It reads as follows: “176. The annual valuation in respect of privately owned properties is determined under Section 174. However, an exception is carved out under Section 176 of the Act for determining the annual valuation of lands or buildings owned by various statutory bodies. It reads as follows: “176. Annual valuation of lands or buildings belonging to various statutory bodies.-The annual value of any land or building belonging to the State Government or any of the statutory bodies mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (8) of section 171 shall be deemed to be five per cent of the cost of acquisition thereof, subject to any revision made in this behalf by the State Government on an application by any such body or by the Corporation.” 17. Section 171(8) of the KMC Act clearly mentions that notwithstanding the provisions Sub-Section (2) of Section 171 which stipulate that the annual value of a building space has to be determined under Section 174, the tax on the property demised, i.e., the land in question which is undoubtedly owned by the KMDA, shall be ten per cent of its annual value. The annual value is determined under Chapter 12 of the Act. It is well-recognized that the owner of the land and the structures thereon need not be the same. Therefore, the land demised to Fabworth is owned by KMDA, and therefore, taxable in the latter’s hands. Under Section 193 the incidence of payment of property tax on lands and buildings is primarily on the lessor. Therefore, from Clause 2 of the Lease Deed it is apparent that what was agreed between the parties was that after the land was assessed in the hands of KMDA, the amount so assessed would be paid by Fabworth to KMC. What is material here is that the land is owned by the KMDA and the Lease Deed only affords an opportunity to Fabworth to construct its buildings on the demised land. Therefore, the land demised must be taxed in the hands of the KMDA as its owner. Once such an assessment is made the amount shall be paid by Fabworth. There is no dispute that the tax which Fabworth would pay on the building would be different from that charged on the land. Therefore, the land demised must be taxed in the hands of the KMDA as its owner. Once such an assessment is made the amount shall be paid by Fabworth. There is no dispute that the tax which Fabworth would pay on the building would be different from that charged on the land. This is the interpretation of law which was propounded in the judgment of Kar Gupta, J. and which has been reiterated by Banerjee, J. After considering the provisions of law and the Lease Deed we do not find that the learned Single Judge has erred in his interpretation of the law with respect to payment of property tax. It matters little whether the land demised had been assessed earlier. It is for reasons best known to KMDA and the KMC why the land had not been assessed for payment of property tax till the Lease Deed was executed. The land was acquired for KMDA and it became the owner of the land after certain formalities were completed. Once it became the owner, there was no reason why the land could not have been assessed by KMC in the hands of KMDA which was the owner of that land. Therefore, whether such an assessment was made earlier or not is not relevant for deciding on whom the primary liability rests for payment of tax on the demised land. 18. The learned Advocate General urged on the basis of the judgments in the case of Joginder Patjoshi (supra), Ramnarayan Mor (supra) and Gramophone Company of India Ltd (supra) that when two distinct phrases namely “owned by” and “belonging to” are used by the legislature in section 171(8) and section 176 respectively, each of those phrases must be given a specific meaning. In Joginder Patjoshi’s case (supra) the Supreme Court reiterated the principle for interpretation of statutes enunciated in Union of India & Anr. vs. Hansoli Devi & Ors. In Joginder Patjoshi’s case (supra) the Supreme Court reiterated the principle for interpretation of statutes enunciated in Union of India & Anr. vs. Hansoli Devi & Ors. reported in (2002) 7 SCC 273 in which the earlier judgments of the Supreme Court as well as of the English Courts was considered in the following manner: “It is no doubt true that if on going through the plain meaning of the language of statues, it leads to anomalies, injustices and absurdities, then the court may look into the purpose for which the statute has been brought and would try to give a meaning, which would adhere to the purpose of the statute. Patanjali Sastri, C.J. in the case of Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose ( AIR 1952 SC 369 ) had held that it is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surplus age, if they can have appropriate application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute. In Quebec Rly., Light, Heat & Power Co. Ltd. v. Vandry ( AIR 1920 PC 181 ) it had been observed that the legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain and a construction which attributes redundancy to the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons. Similarly, it is not permissible to add words to a statute which are not there unless on a literal construction being given a part of the statute becomes meaningless. But before any words are read to repair an omission in the Act, it should be possible to state with certainty that these words would have been inserted by the draftsman and approved by the legislature had their attention been drawn to the omission before the Bill had passed into a law. At times, the intention of the legislature is sound to be clear but the results in apparent ineffectiveness of the language and in such a situation, it may be permissible for the court to reject the surplus words, so as to make the statute effective.” 19. It is well-settled that the scope of legislation on the intention of the legislature cannot be enlarged when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. It is well-settled that the scope of legislation on the intention of the legislature cannot be enlarged when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. Statutory enactments must ordinarily be construed according to their plain meaning as per the observations of the Supreme Court in Bhavnagar University vs. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd., reported in (2003) 2 SCC 111 . 20. In the case of Ramnarayan Mor (supra) the Supreme Court interpreted certain provision of the Criminal Procedure Code and examined whether an accused can be asked to explain circumstances appearing against him only from the oral evidence recorded and not from circumstances appearing from the documents submitted in Court. The majority view of the Constitution Bench held as follows: “Whether the word “evidence” which was used in Subsections (6) and (7) of Section 207A of the Cr.P.C., 1898 had the same meaning in each context that it was used. The Court held that the interpretation of the word must take colour from the context in which it is used and that the same word may have a different meaning depending on the place that it is used.” 21. In the case of Gramophone Company of India Ltd (supra) the Supreme Court observed that when a word is not defined in the Copyright Act, the same word may mean different things in different enactments and in different contexts. It may mean different things at different places in the same statute depending on sense of the provision where it occurs. Reference to dictionaries in such a case would be hardly of any avail, particularly when the word is used in ordinary parlance with a variety of well-known meanings. Such words take colour from the context. 22. In the case of V. Jaya Prakash (supra) the Supreme Court observed as follows: “20. When the law to be applied in a given case requires interpretation of statute, the Court has to ascertain the facts and then interpret the law to apply to such facts. Interpretation cannot be in a vacuum or in relation to hypothetical facts. It is, therefore, for this reason that in interpretation by applying the principles of jurisprudence differ from the interpretation of law by a law-applying organs like Courts. The ultimate interpretation of law is the province of the Court alone. Interpretation cannot be in a vacuum or in relation to hypothetical facts. It is, therefore, for this reason that in interpretation by applying the principles of jurisprudence differ from the interpretation of law by a law-applying organs like Courts. The ultimate interpretation of law is the province of the Court alone. Indeed, “it is the function of the Legislature to say what shall be the law and it is only the Court to say what is law.” 21. ‘Golden Rule’ of interpretation of statues was that statutes are to be interpreted according to grammatical and ordinary sense of the word in grammatical or liberal meaning unmindful of consequences of such interpretation. It was predominant method of reading the statutes. More often than not, such grammatical and literal interpretation leads to unjust result which Legislature never intended. The golden rule of giving undue importance to grammatical and literal meaning of late gave place to ‘rule of legislative intent’. The world over, the principle of interpretation according to the legislative intent is accepted as more logical principle.” 23. In the case of Babaji Kondaji (supra) the Supreme Court observed that it was not possible to accept the contention that “a view of law or a legal provision expressed by a Government officer can afford reliable basis or even guidance in the matter of construction of a legislative measure. It is the function of the court to construe legislative measure and in reaching the correct meaning of statutory provision, opinion of executive branch is hardly relevant. Nor can the court abdicate in favour of such opinion.” 24. Considering the view expressed by the Supreme Court in the judgments which have been cited at the bar with respect to interpretation of statutes, it is evident that the words used in a statute must be given a plain and ordinary meaning. If there is no ambiguity in the word used, there is no need to take the crutches of any other source for interpretation of the statute. 25. The learned advocate General has argued that the phrases “owned by” or “belonging to” can have different meanings, depending on the context that they are used in the Act. He urged that the same word used in different places in the Act can be variously construed or interpreted. In Raja Mohammed (supra) the Supreme Court observed as follows: “14. 25. The learned advocate General has argued that the phrases “owned by” or “belonging to” can have different meanings, depending on the context that they are used in the Act. He urged that the same word used in different places in the Act can be variously construed or interpreted. In Raja Mohammed (supra) the Supreme Court observed as follows: “14. Now to revert to paras 2, 5 and 8 which the learned Judges considered amounted to a clear and unequivocal denial of the Government’s title, they referred in para 2 to the words “belonging to me” as constituting a disclaimer of the tenancy and a repudiation of the landlord’s title. We do not agree that this is the only or proper construction which the words are capable of bearing. Though the word “belonging” no doubt is capable of denoting an absolute title, is nevertheless not confined to connoting that sense. Even possession of an interest less than that of full ownership could signified by that word. In Webster “belong to” is explained as meaning inter alia “to be owned by, be the possession of”. The precise sense which the word was meant to convey can therefore be gathered only by reading the document as a whole and adverting to the context in which it occurs.” 26. This judgment is not applicable to the facts in the present case. The dispute related to the nature of the title to the interest in a property which was admittedly nazul land and whether the appellant in that case had forfeited his leasehold interest by reason of his acts and conduct. The appellant had denied the title of the Government to the leasehold property. After considering the clauses in the Lease Deed, the Court observed as above. Since the appellant had asserted that the property in question “belonged to him” by reason of his conduct, the Court held that the assertion was not an unequivocal one so as to entail the forfeiture of the tenancy. 27. The word “own” has been defined in the Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Edition, as to rightfully have or possess as property; to have legal title to. 27. The word “own” has been defined in the Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Edition, as to rightfully have or possess as property; to have legal title to. The word “owner” is defined thus: who has the right to possess, use and convey something; a person in whom one or more interests are vested; an owner may have complete property in the own or may have parted with some interests in it (as by granting an easement on making a lease). The word “belong” has been defined thus: to be the property of a person or own; to be connected with as a member. For our purpose, the first meaning is relevant. 28. The Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 11th Edition, gives the meaning of “belong” as: (v.) be the property of; be the rightful possession of; be due to; be a member of; (of a person) fit or be acceptable in a specified place or environment; (of a thing) be rightly placed in or assigned to a specified position. The word “own” has been defined as: (adj. & pron.) (with a possessive) belonging or relating to the person specified; done or produced by the person specified; particular to the person or thing specified; individual; (v.) possess; have; admit or acknowledge that something is the case. 29. Considering the meanings of these words as defined both in the Black’s Law Dictionary as well as the Concise Oxford English Dictionary, it is evident that the words are synonymous and therefore the phrases “owned by” and “belong to” are also synonymous. 30. The phrases “owned by” or “belonging to”, in our opinion, cannot have two distinct meanings, even if we consider the context in which they occur in Section 171(8) of the KMC Act. The annual valuation of lands or buildings belonging to various statutory bodies mentioned in Clause (a) of Sub-Section (8) of Section 171 is to be determined under Section 176. The Annual value of such amounts is depending on the cost of acquisition of the same. Therefore, though the lands were not originally owned by the statutory bodies including the KMDA, they “belong to” such bodies after the acquisition of such lands and are therefore, “owned by” such bodies. The phases “owned by” and “belonging to” are synonymous and we affirm the view taken by the learned Single Judge on this aspect. 31. Therefore, though the lands were not originally owned by the statutory bodies including the KMDA, they “belong to” such bodies after the acquisition of such lands and are therefore, “owned by” such bodies. The phases “owned by” and “belonging to” are synonymous and we affirm the view taken by the learned Single Judge on this aspect. 31. We are fortified in our interpretation of these provisions by a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Calcutta Swimming Club (supra). In this judgment the land in question was owned by the Government. It was leased to the Calcutta Swimming Club. The provisions of the Lease Deed for payment of taxes were similar to the provisions in the present case. The vacant land which was leased by the Government to the Calcutta Swimming Club was used for construction of a swimming pool. The issue raised was whether the Calcutta Swimming Club was liable to pay tax both on the land and buildings constructed thereon. After considering the provisions of the Lease Deed and on interpreting Section 193 of the KMC Act the Court held that the primary liability to pay property tax in respect of land in question which was leased to a private body could not be placed on that body as the land was owned by the Government and the private body was merely an occupier or lessee of the land. The Court therefore held that though the liability to pay property tax in respect of building, structures and swimming pool constructed over the land was that of the swimming club, the liability to pay tax on the land was that of the Government. 32. The question of law on this issue having attained finality in the case of Calcutta Swimming Club (supra) the learned Single Judge has interpreted the Lease Deed in the present case and the provisions of law in tune with the aforesaid judgment. There is therefore no need to differ with the view taken by the learned Single Judge. It is a possible interpretation which cannot be considered to be arbitrary perverse or capricious. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the learned Single Judge. 33. If we are to accept the interpretation of the phrases as suggested by the learned Advocate General, we will be doing violence to the language of the Section. It is a possible interpretation which cannot be considered to be arbitrary perverse or capricious. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the learned Single Judge. 33. If we are to accept the interpretation of the phrases as suggested by the learned Advocate General, we will be doing violence to the language of the Section. Merely because the lessee occupies the land and constructs buildings thereon which are to be used for 5/7 Star Hotel, it would not mean that the lessee becomes the owner of the land. The ownership of the land remains with the KMDA. It may be that for all practical purposes the Fabworth will enjoy the land as its own for 99 years under the Lease Deed. However, several restrictions have been placed on its enjoyment of the land under the Lease Deed. In our opinion by no stretch of imagination can Fabworth be the “owner” of the land, nor can the land be said to “belong to” Fabworth. The use of the phrase “belonging to” in Section 171(8) is obviously with reference to the land being acquired for the statutory authorities mentioned in Section 171(8). On acquisition the land belongs to them though it was earlier owned by someone else. Lands which were owned initially by these statutory authorities are to be taxed in the same manner. The phrase “belonging to” does not refer to the possession of the land demised to the lessee. As mentioned earlier the ownership right in a land can never be transferred when the land is leased. 34. For all these reasons in our opinion the Hearing Officer has erred in concluding that the land in question must be assessed in the hands of Fabworth which is the lessee. It must be assessed in the hands of the statutory body-KMDA. After such assessment is made, Fabworth will pay the amount to KMC as agreed by in the Lease Deed. Besides, Fabworth will be liable to pay property tax on the buildings and other constructions that it erects on the aforesaid land in accordance with law. 35. The judgment and order of the learned Single Judge is affirmed. The appeal is dismissed. 36. Urgent certified photocopies of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the learned Advocates for the parties upon compliance of all formalities.