JUDGMENT : Sanjay Kumar, J. This appeal under Section 374(2) CrPC is directed against the judgment dated 09.09.2010 in Sessions Case No.108 of 2008, passed by the learned I Additional District and Sessions Judge, Ranga Reddy District-cum-Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Cyberabad at L.B.Nagar, convicting the appellant/A1 alone of the charge under Section 304-B IPC in relation to the death of his wife, Swaroopa, while acquitting him along with his mother, A2, of the charge under Section 302 IPC. The appellant/A1 was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life. The case of the prosecution before the Sessions Court was that the Head Constable, Medchal Police Station (P.W.11) was instructed by the Inspector of Police, Medchal Police Station (P.W.12), during the early hours of 8.02.2006 to get the dying declaration of Swaroopa, the wife of A1, recorded by a Magistrate. Ex.P.8 is the requisition. P.W.11 then went to Gandhi Hospital around 5.45 AM, where he found Swaroopa conscious and coherent. He recorded the statement of Swaroopa at 6.15 AM, wherein she said that on 08.02.2006 at about 12.00 AM, her mother-in-law/A2 and her husband/A1 poured kerosene on her and set her on fire with a matchstick. She further stated that the accused had harassed her, demanding additional dowry of Rs.1,00,000/- and a bike. P.W.11 obtained her right toe impression on the statement as both her hands were totally burnt. Ex.P.10 is the statement recorded by P.W.11. He then returned to the Police Station and handed over Ex.P.10 to P.W.12 at about 8.00 AM. P.W.12, basing on Ex.P.10, registered a case in Crime No.78 of 2006 under Sections 498A and 307 IPC at 8.30 AM on 08.02.2006. Ex.P.12 is the FIR. P.W.12 entrusted the case diary to the Sub-Inspector of Police, Medchal Police Station (P.W.13), for investigation. P.W.13 visited Gandhi Hospital where he examined and recorded the statements of Swaroopa, Nagulagari Kistamma (L.W.2), the mother of the deceased, and Pushpa Rani (P.W.2), the sister of the deceased. P.W.13 then went to the scene of the offence, the house of the accused at Gundlapochampally Village. There, he examined and recorded the statements of M. Vasantha (P.W.3), the landlady, Smt. Peddasetty Shanthi Kumari (L.W.5) and N. Yegonda (P.W.4). He conducted a panchanama of the scene of the offence (Ex.P.13) in the presence of mediators, D. Yadaiah (P.W.6) and T. Hanumanthu (P.W.7). Ex.P.13 is the rough sketch of the scene of the offence. There, he examined and recorded the statements of M. Vasantha (P.W.3), the landlady, Smt. Peddasetty Shanthi Kumari (L.W.5) and N. Yegonda (P.W.4). He conducted a panchanama of the scene of the offence (Ex.P.13) in the presence of mediators, D. Yadaiah (P.W.6) and T. Hanumanthu (P.W.7). Ex.P.13 is the rough sketch of the scene of the offence. During the inquest proceedings, P.W.13 also seized the partly burnt clothes, cigarette, kerosene tin, etc. MO.1 is the kerosene tin, MO.2 is the partly burnt pillow cover, MO.3 is the partly burnt cigarette, MO.4 is the match stick and MO.5 is the partly burnt saree. Ex.P.6 is the inquest report. P.W.13 then visited Gandhi Hospital where he examined and recorded the statements of M. Jaikishan (P.W.5) and Allakonda Sidda Goud (L.W.8). On 09.02.2006, P.W.13 received intimation of the death of Swaroopa at Gandhi Hospital and altered the provisions of law to Sections 302 and 304B IPC and sent the alteration memo (Ex.P.14) to all concerned. On the same day, he handed over the case diary to the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Alwal. The Assistant Commissioner of Police, Petbasheerabad (P.W.17), stated that his predecessors predecessor, K.Laxma Reddy (L.W.22) was the then Assistant Commissioner of Police, Alwal, who received the case diary from P.W.13 for further investigation. L.W.22 was stated to have retired from service and gone abroad. P.W.17 stated that on 11.02.2006, both the accused were produced before L.W.22 and after interrogation, he sent them for judicial remand. Further, upon collecting the post-mortem examination report (Ex.P.19) and on completion of the investigation, L.W.22 was stated to have laid the charge sheet. P.W.17 identified the signature of L.W.22 in the charge sheet filed before the Sessions Court. It may also be noted that on 08.02.2006, M. Venkat Ramesh, the learned XI Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Secunderabad, (P.W.14) received Ex.P.8 requisition to record the dying declaration of Swaroopa at Gandhi Hospital and immediately proceeded to the hospital, where he identified Swaroopa with the help of Dr. Ram Bhupal Rao (P.W.16), the Duty Doctor. Upon certification by P.W.16 as to her mental faculties and fitness to give a statement, P.W.14 put preliminary questions to her and after satisfying himself with the answers given by her, he disclosed his identity and the purpose for which he had come. Ram Bhupal Rao (P.W.16), the Duty Doctor. Upon certification by P.W.16 as to her mental faculties and fitness to give a statement, P.W.14 put preliminary questions to her and after satisfying himself with the answers given by her, he disclosed his identity and the purpose for which he had come. He then recorded the statement of Swaroopa verbatim, as stated by her in Telugu, to the effect that her husband poured kerosene on her and set her on fire; that her husband used to quarrel with her daily, demanding Rs.1,00,000/- and a bike; and that at the time he set her on fire, her mother-in-law (A2) was present. P.W.14 obtained the right leg big toe impression of Swaroopa on the dying declaration (Ex.P.18) as her hands were burnt. P.W.14 also obtained certification (Exs.P.16 and 17) from P.W.16, in whose presence he had recorded the dying declaration, that Swaroopa was conscious and coherent before and during the course of giving the statement. Recording of the dying declaration by P.W.14 was stated to have commenced at 6.05 AM and concluded at 6.25 AM on 08.02.2006. The Sessions Court framed two charges against A1 and A2. The first charge reads to the effect that A1 and A2 had caused the death of the deceased on or about 07.02.2006, within seven years of her marriage, by subjecting her to cruelty in connection with a demand for dowry of Rs.1,00,000/- and a motorcycle, and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 304B IPC. The second charge was that A1 and A2, on or about 07.02.2006, during the night hours in their house at Gundlapochampally village, committed murder of the deceased by pouring kerosene on her person and setting her ablaze, thereby committing an offence attracting Section 302 IPC. The accused denied the charges and claimed to be tried. At the trial, the prosecution examined 17 witnesses and marked 19 exhibits. Case properties were marked as MO.1 to MO.5. The defence did not choose to adduce any evidence. The Sessions Court acquitted both the accused of the charge under Section 302 IPC but held A1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 304B IPC and sentenced him to life imprisonment. At this stage, it would be useful to consider the evidence adduced by the prosecution before the Sessions Court. Shekar Goud (P.W.1) is the father of the deceased. The Sessions Court acquitted both the accused of the charge under Section 302 IPC but held A1 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 304B IPC and sentenced him to life imprisonment. At this stage, it would be useful to consider the evidence adduced by the prosecution before the Sessions Court. Shekar Goud (P.W.1) is the father of the deceased. He stated that the marriage of Swaroopa, his fifth daughter, was performed with A1 about five years prior thereto. He spoke of the deceased telling him that A1 was demanding Rs.1,00,000/- as additional dowry along with a motor cycle and title documents relating to land. He also spoke of A2, the mother-in-law, harassing the deceased mentally and physically in this regard. P.W.1 further stated that he had brought the deceased to his house in connection with Dussehra festival but after 15 days, A1 came along with his junior paternal uncle and convinced him that no harm would come to the deceased and took her away. On the day of the death of the accused, P.W1 stated that A1 had telephoned to his other son-in-law, Kishan Goud (P.W.5), and informed him that they had set fire to the deceased by pouring kerosene owing to a quarrel. P.W.5 then informed P.W.1 of this over the phone and also that the deceased had been shifted to Gandhi Hospital, Secunderabad. P.W.1, along with his wife, Nagulagari Kistamma (L.W.2), daughter, Pushpa Rani (P.W.2), and other relations went to Gandhi Hospital, and found that Swaroopa had died. In his cross-examination, P.W.1 denied that he had performed the marriage of the deceased with A1 against her wish as she wanted to continue her studies. He also denied the suggestion that the deceased became frustrated as she did not like A1and as her marriage was forcibly performed and committed self-immolation. Pushpa Rani (P.W.2), the sister of the deceased, stated that the marriage of the deceased with A1 was performed on 15.05.2005. She spoke of the articles and jewellery given at that time as dowry to A1. According to her, the deceased and A1 lived happily for about four months and at that point of time, A1 sold away the gold ornaments of the deceased and started harassing her to bring Rs.1,00,000/- in cash, a motor cycle and land documents from her father, P.W.1. According to her, the deceased and A1 lived happily for about four months and at that point of time, A1 sold away the gold ornaments of the deceased and started harassing her to bring Rs.1,00,000/- in cash, a motor cycle and land documents from her father, P.W.1. P.W.2 spoke of the deceased telling her during a visit about A1 selling away her gold ornaments and the harassment that she was subjected to. P.W.2 spoke of how A1 had come along with Allakonda Saya Goud (L.W.11) and had taken away the deceased after Dussehra festival. Two months thereafter in the morning at about 6.00 AM, P.W.2 stated that her brother-in-law, M. Jaikishan (P.W.5), had telephoned P.W.1 and informed him that the deceased was set on fire at the house of A1 and A2 and shifted to Gandhi Hospital, Secunderabad. P.W.2 stated that she, her father, Shekar Goud (P.W.1), her mother, Nagulagari Kistamma (L.W.2), and others went to Gandhi Hospital, and found Swaroopa unconscious and struggling for survival till the evening when she finally lost her breath. In her cross-examination, P.W.2 denied the suggestion that the deceased was married against her will and that she desired to continue her studies and that she disliked A1. M. Vasantha (P.W.3), the owner of the house where A1 and A2 along with the deceased had lived, spoke of cordial relations between the couple for a period of four months. As regards the fateful night, she said that she heard a big commotion and having come out from her house, she saw the accused with his two hands close to the deceased and by that time she was in flames. This incident was stated to have taken place at about 8.00 PM and at that time P.W.3 claimed that she had gotten up from her sleep. P.W.3 was declared hostile at this stage and denied the contents of the statement made by her to the police under Section 161 CrPC. In her cross-examination by the defence, P.W.3 stated that A1 had tried to rescue his wife, Swaroopa, when she caught fire and in that process he too received burn injuries. N. Yegonda (P.W.4), the elder brother of Shekar Goud (P.W.1), the father of the deceased, confirmed in his deposition that he had accompanied P.Ws.1, 2, 3 and others to Gandhi Hospital, but they had found the deceased in an unconscious state. N. Yegonda (P.W.4), the elder brother of Shekar Goud (P.W.1), the father of the deceased, confirmed in his deposition that he had accompanied P.Ws.1, 2, 3 and others to Gandhi Hospital, but they had found the deceased in an unconscious state. M. Jaikishan (P.W.5), the other son-in-law of Shekar Goud (P.W.1), stated that he was married to his eldest daughter. He confirmed that A1 and the deceased had led a happy married life for about three or four months and thereafter, A1 started harassing her for additional dowry of Rs.1,00,000/- and a motor cycle. He further stated that he received a phone message from A1 in the morning at about 5.00 AM on the fateful day stating that his wife, Swaroopa, was admitted in Gandhi Hospital with burn injuries which took place on the previous night at about 10.00 PM. P.W.5 said that when he, along with his wife, Malleshwari, went to Gandhi Hospital, they found Swaroopa covered with burn injuries and struggling to say something, but she could not do so. In his cross-examination, P.W.5, on the one hand, said that he could not give the names of the informants at the hospital who had told him that the accused had set fire to the deceased and on the other, he said that he had learnt that A1 had tried to save the deceased from the flames but he did not know whether A1 received burn injuries while trying to save his wife. D. Yadaiah (P.W.6) and T. Hanumanthu (P.W.7), the panch witnesses, turned hostile. D. Sama Goud (P.W.8), who signed as a panch witness on Ex.P6 inquest report, confirmed that the signature therein was his and that he had seen the body of the deceased covered with burns. G. Mukund Reddy (P.W.10) is the Mandal Revenue Officer, Medchal, who received a requisition from the Station House Officer, Medchal Police Station, and conducted an inquest over the body of the deceased. Ex.P6 was confirmed to be the inquest report prepared by him on the dictation of the Sub-Inspector of Police, Medchal. G. Mukund Reddy (P.W.10) is the Mandal Revenue Officer, Medchal, who received a requisition from the Station House Officer, Medchal Police Station, and conducted an inquest over the body of the deceased. Ex.P6 was confirmed to be the inquest report prepared by him on the dictation of the Sub-Inspector of Police, Medchal. P. Veeranna (P.W.11), the Head Constable at Medchal Police Station, spoke of recording the dying declaration of the deceased at about 6.15 AM on 08.02.2006, but this evidence is completely destroyed by the fact that M. Venkat Ramesh (P.W.14), the XI Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Secunderabad, recorded the dying declaration (Ex.P18) of the deceased between 6.05 AM and 6.25 AM. Ex.P10, recorded by P.W.11, therefore demonstrates undue anxiety on the part of the police to establish a case against the accused. Neither the evidence of P.W.11 nor Ex.P10 allegedly recorded by him commends credibility or acceptance. Sridhar Reddy (P.W.12) and A. Sanjeeva Rao (P.W.13), the Investigating Officers, spoke of the steps taken by them. M. Venkat Ramesh (P.W.14), the XI Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Secunderabad, detailed the steps taken by him to record the dying declaration (Ex.P.18). In his cross-examination, he confirmed that the deceased was neither tutored by her parents nor was she subjected to any influence at the time she gave the dying declaration and that he had satisfied himself that she was giving the said statement out of her own will. He further affirmed that he did not find any fluctuation in the voice or speech of the deceased while she was giving the statement. Dr. Rajender Kumar (P.W.15), Principal, Gandhi Medical College, Secunderabad, deposed on behalf of Dr. Damodar (L.W.5), who conducted the post-mortem examination of the body of the deceased. Dr. Damodar (L.W.5) was stated to be abroad. P.W.15 identified the signature of Dr. Damodar (L.W.5) in the post-mortem report (Ex.P.19). P.W.15 denied the suggestion of the defence that if the nose, lips and throat were burnt, a person could not speak. Dr. Ram Bhupal Rao (P.W.16) was the doctor present at Gandhi Hospital on the fateful day when the deceased was brought there with burns. He stated that he had asked the deceased as to how she had received the burn injuries and she told him that her husband and mother-in-law had poured kerosene and set her on fire at her residence on the intervening night of 07/08.02.2006 at midnight. He stated that he had asked the deceased as to how she had received the burn injuries and she told him that her husband and mother-in-law had poured kerosene and set her on fire at her residence on the intervening night of 07/08.02.2006 at midnight. He further stated that he was present when M. Venkat Ramesh (P.W.14) recorded the dying declaration of the deceased and confirmed that he certified in the beginning and the concluding stages of the recording of the said dying declaration that she was conscious and coherent while giving the statement. His endorsements were identified by him as Exs.P16 and P17. In his cross-examination, P.W.16 stated that P.W.14 had taken about half an hour to record the statement of the deceased and disagreed with the suggestion that the mental condition of the patient would change from time to time on account of receiving 95% burns. Ms. C. Vasundhara Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant/A1, would contend that conviction of A1 under Section 304-B IPC by the Sessions Court, after believing Ex.P.18 dying declaration, demonstrates total non-application of mind as once such a dying declaration was accepted, A1 ought to have been convicted under Section 302 IPC, but the Sessions Court acquitted A1 of the said charge. She would point out that the State did not choose to prefer an appeal against the acquittal of A1 in relation to the said charge and it is not open to this Court to interfere with the said acquittal. Undoubtedly, the approach of the Sessions Court in dealing with the case under Section 304-B IPC in the first instance and keeping aside the graver charge under Section 302 IPC for later consideration is not proper. The Sessions Court ought to have first considered the graver charge under Section 302 IPC and thereafter, the alternate charge under Section 304-B IPC. In this regard, reference may be made to the directions of the Supreme Court in Rajbir Alias Raju Vs. State of Haryana, (2010) 15 SCC 116 , whereby all trial Courts in India were instructed to add Section 302 IPC to the charge of Section 304-B IPC, so that death sentences can be imposed in such heinous and barbaric crimes against women. State of Haryana, (2010) 15 SCC 116 , whereby all trial Courts in India were instructed to add Section 302 IPC to the charge of Section 304-B IPC, so that death sentences can be imposed in such heinous and barbaric crimes against women. This clearly indicates that the Supreme Court was of the opinion that such offences should first be tested under Section 302 IPC and not be limited to consideration of the lesser charge under Section 304-B IPC. Surprisingly, the reason given by the Sessions Court for acquitting A1 under Section 302 IPC is that no motive was made out for him to kill the deceased. This understanding of the Sessions Court is completely incomprehensible as the Sessions Court itself recorded thereafter that in order to meet his illegal demands for additional dowry of Rs.1,00,000/- and a motor cycle, A1 harassed the deceased and inhumanly poured kerosene on her and set her on fire. It is not clear as to how the Sessions Court found no motive for the offence in the light of this finding recorded by it. The approach of the Sessions Court in the present case was therefore completely irregular, but in any event as A1 has already been acquitted under Section 302 IPC and the State did not prefer an appeal against his acquittal, the issue has attained quietus and does not warrant interference. As regards the conviction of A1 under Section 304B IPC, Ms. C. Vasundhara Reddy, learned counsel, would state that the prosecution failed to prove on facts that the deceased had met with her death at the hands of A1 and would therefore contend that he is entitled to acquittal by reason of benefit of doubt. She would further contend that Ex.P18 dying declaration does not commend acceptance. She would point out that P.W.14 failed to follow the prescribed procedure and that he committed serious irregularities, undermining the sanctity of the said dying declaration. She would further contend that the fact that the deceased did not know as to how she had come to the hospital clearly showed that she was incapable of making a coherent statement. While considering the aforestated issues raised by the learned counsel, it may be noted that in Major Singh Vs. She would further contend that the fact that the deceased did not know as to how she had come to the hospital clearly showed that she was incapable of making a coherent statement. While considering the aforestated issues raised by the learned counsel, it may be noted that in Major Singh Vs. State of Punjab, 2015 (2) ALD (Crl.) 617 (SC) the Supreme Court reiterated that to sustain a conviction under Section 304-B IPC, the following essential ingredients are to be established: (i) The death of a woman should be caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under a normal circumstance; (ii) Such a death should have occurred within seven years of her marriage; (iii) She must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband; (iv) Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry; and (v) Such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been meted out to the woman soon before her death. There can be no dispute that the first two ingredients are established in the present case. Whether the other requirements are also fulfilled has to be seen. It may be noticed that the case of the prosecution rests heavily upon Ex.P18 dying declaration recorded by a judicial officer, P.W.14, who meticulously followed the prescribed procedure as per Rule 33 of the Criminal Rules of Practice and Circular Orders, 1990. Further, P.W.14 faithfully recorded the statement of the deceased in Telugu verbatim. When P.W.14 asked her whether she knew that he was an Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate and had come there to record her version and that she could freely give the same and that he would record whatever she said, she stated to the effect that she did not know that he was a Magistrate but upon his saying so, she came to know that he was a Magistrate. When P.W.14 asked her as to what had happened to her and how it had happened, she stated in Telugu to the effect that her husband had poured kerosene over her and burnt her; that he fought with her every day asking her to bring Rs.1,00,000/- and a vehicle. She further stated that in her house, her husband had poured kerosene and lit fire and that her mother-in-law was present. Though Ms. She further stated that in her house, her husband had poured kerosene and lit fire and that her mother-in-law was present. Though Ms. C. Vasundhara Reddy, learned counsel, would point out that the deceased had said that her husband had poured kerosene in the house and not upon her, this argument amounts to mere nitpicking and the dying declaration, read as a whole, leaves no doubt in our mind as to what the deceased wanted to convey. The questions put to the deceased by P.W.14 to ascertain her mental fitness were sufficient for him to form an opinion in that regard and merely because he did not specifically ask her as to whether she was mentally capable of making a declaration, Ex.P18 is not rendered unreliable. This minor irregularity is not of such magnitude as to warrant discarding the dying declaration. All the more so, when the Duty Doctor (P.W.16) certified at the beginning, during the course of recording of the statement and at the end of the recording of the statement, that the patient was conscious and coherent. Reliance placed by Ms. C. Vasundhara Reddy, learned counsel, on the decisions in K. Ramachandra Reddy Vs. The Public Prosecutor, (1976) 3 SCC 618 and Nallapati Sivaiah Vs. Sub-Divisional Officer, Guntur, AIR 2008 SC 19 , A.P. is therefore of no avail, as those cases turned on facts and the dying declarations therein were not found to reliable. Further, the mere fact that the deceased could not state as to how she had come to the hospital is not enough to infer that she was not in a fit state of mind. As the deceased had suffered upto 95% burns and would have been brought to the hospital shortly thereafter in unbearable pain and trauma, it is very much possible that she would not have been aware of much else and in particular, of what was happening around her and how and where she was being taken. This fact is therefore not sufficient to dilute the strength of Ex.P18 or suspect the state of mind of the deceased at that point of time. Learned counsel would further assert that Ex.P18 dying declaration may have been concocted, as the deceased was unconscious by that time, as manifested by the evidence of P.Ws.2, 4 and 5. This fact is therefore not sufficient to dilute the strength of Ex.P18 or suspect the state of mind of the deceased at that point of time. Learned counsel would further assert that Ex.P18 dying declaration may have been concocted, as the deceased was unconscious by that time, as manifested by the evidence of P.Ws.2, 4 and 5. She would point out that the Duty Doctor (P.W.16) stated in his cross-examination that the entire body of the deceased was burnt, including her throat, lips and face and that there may be difficulty to speak in the case of a patient with 95% burns. Though P.Ws.2 and 4 stated that by the time they reached the hospital, the deceased was unconscious; neither of them mentioned the time at which they reached the hospital. On the other hand, P.W.5 stated that he and his wife, Malleshwari, reached the hospital and found Swaroopa struggling to say something but failing to do so. This evidence of P.W.5 indicates that the physical and mental condition of the deceased failed rapidly and the sequence of events demonstrates that P.W.16 and P.W.14 respectively first saw the deceased and interacted with her, at which point of time she was conscious and in a stable state of mind to give a statement but by the time P.W.5 and his wife, Malleshwari, reached the hospital her condition had deteriorated to a state where she was conscious but no longer able to speak and by the time P.Ws.2 and 4 reached the hospital, she was in a state of total unconsciousness. It may be noted that neither P.W.16 nor P.W.14 had reason to speak falsehoods against A1. P.W.14, a judicial Officer, was seized of the sacrosanct duty of recording a dying declaration of a victim of an offence who was at deaths door, and his evidence and actions cannot be doubted unless serious irregularities are shown in the manner he discharged this sacred duty. The exercise undertaken by P.W.14 therefore cannot be discarded lightly. P.W.16, the Duty Doctor, who was there when the deceased was brought to the hospital confirmed that when he asked her as to how she had received the burn injuries, she told him that her husband and mother-in-law had poured kerosene and had set her on fire at her residence. The exercise undertaken by P.W.14 therefore cannot be discarded lightly. P.W.16, the Duty Doctor, who was there when the deceased was brought to the hospital confirmed that when he asked her as to how she had received the burn injuries, she told him that her husband and mother-in-law had poured kerosene and had set her on fire at her residence. It may also be noticed that P.W.16, while stating that the deceased had sustained 95% burns on her body, including the throat, lips and face, asserted to the effect that the mental condition of a patient would not be unfit merely because of this fact. He also denied the suggestion that the deceased was not conscious and coherent enough to give a statement. The evidence of P.Ws.14 and 16 is highly trustworthy and believable and therefore, Ex.P18 dying declaration commends utmost credibility. The minor discrepancy between Ex.P18 dying declaration and the oral statement made by the deceased to P.W.16 as to the role played by her mother-in-law (A2) is also not sufficient to discredit Ex.P18. P.W.16 recounted before the Sessions Court what he recalled as having been told to him by the deceased, while P.W.14 recorded verbatim what was stated to him in Telugu by the deceased. In both the statements, the presence of the mother-in-law, A2, is clearly indicated. P.W.16s statement that the deceased told him that her husband and mother-in-law poured kerosene would therefore have to be viewed in the context of the deceased being aware of the mother-in-law being a silent and acquiescing spectator to the act committed by her son, A1. This minor discrepancy is therefore of no significance. Learned counsel would further point out that given the number of dying declarations allegedly recorded, one by P.W.14, the other by P.W.11 and the third by P.W.13, no weight could be attached to any of them and therefore, there is no evidence worth the name to link A1 to the death of the deceased. Though P.W.13 stated in his examination-in-chief that he recorded the statement of the deceased, the same never saw the light of day. As pointed out supra, the anxiety shown by the police to establish the guilt of the accused was wholly unnecessary and would ultimately be counter-productive, as demonstrated by the argument now advanced on behalf of A1. Though P.W.13 stated in his examination-in-chief that he recorded the statement of the deceased, the same never saw the light of day. As pointed out supra, the anxiety shown by the police to establish the guilt of the accused was wholly unnecessary and would ultimately be counter-productive, as demonstrated by the argument now advanced on behalf of A1. When P.W.14 had already been requisitioned to record the dying declaration of the deceased, there was no necessity for the police to overreach themselves by coming up with Ex.P10 dying declaration, allegedly recorded by P.W.11, and hinting at a third dying declaration, allegedly recorded by P.W.13. This Court therefore denounces the practice adopted by the police to emboss and exaggerate the actual evidence by concocting evidence to establish the guilt of the accused, or worse, create lapses and discrepancies to aid the accused. However, these overzealous measures on the part of the police do not in any way detract from the credibility that attaches to Ex.P18 dying declaration recorded by P.W.14. The evidence of P.W.16 who certified the mental fitness of the deceased before, during and after recording of the said statement remained unshaken. P.W.14 also followed the letter of the law in true and proper spirit while recording Ex.P18 and gave no scope to doubt the veracity of the said dying declaration. The navet and innocence of the deceased, who was at the threshold of death, clearly comes through in her use of language indicting A1, which was recorded verbatim by P.W.14 in the dying declaration. In Vadde Pallepu Sekhar Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2011 (2) ALD (Crl.) 396 (AP), this Court found fault with the prosecution for not entering in evidence the statement recorded by the police under Section 161 CrPC of the deceased which would have been admissible as a dying declaration. However, the dying declaration recorded by the Magistrate in that case was found to be very cryptic and was of no real assistance. That is not the situation in the present case where P.W.14 meticulously followed the procedure and recorded Ex.P18 dying declaration, clearly reproducing the lucid and coherent answers of the deceased to his questions, which he faithfully noted down in question and answer format in Telugu, as stated by her. That is not the situation in the present case where P.W.14 meticulously followed the procedure and recorded Ex.P18 dying declaration, clearly reproducing the lucid and coherent answers of the deceased to his questions, which he faithfully noted down in question and answer format in Telugu, as stated by her. In that view of the matter, this Court finds no reason to discard Ex.P18 dying declaration and in the light thereof, the culpability of A1 stands fully established. In Khushal Rao Vs. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 22 , the Supreme Court observed that it cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that a dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated and that each case would have to be determined on its own facts keeping in view the circumstances in which the dying declaration was made. The Supreme Court further observed that it cannot be laid down as a general proposition that a dying declaration is a weaker kind of evidence than other pieces of evidence and such a declaration, recorded by a competent Magistrate in the proper manner, that is to say, in the form of questions and answers, and, as far as practicable, in the words of the maker of the declaration, stands on a much higher footing than a dying declaration which depends upon oral testimony which may suffer from all the infirmities of human memory and human character. A dying declaration therefore has sanctity despite the fact that it is not made before the Court or on oath, in the light of the legal maxim nemo moriturus praesumuntur mentiri which would translate to mean a man would not meet his maker with a lie in his mouth. In their Treatise on the Evidence Act, Woodroffe and Amir Ali state: When a man is dying, the grave position in which he is placed is held by law to be sufficient ground for his veracity and therefore, the tests of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. In P. Mani Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2006) 3 SCC 161 , the Court was faced with a dying declaration which was doubted as the deceased had been nurturing a grudge against her husband for a long time and might have lied to implicate him, while committing suicide. In P. Mani Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2006) 3 SCC 161 , the Court was faced with a dying declaration which was doubted as the deceased had been nurturing a grudge against her husband for a long time and might have lied to implicate him, while committing suicide. The facts being essentially different in the present case, this judgment does not further the case of the appellant. In Rajulapadu Rambabu Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2011 (1) ALD (Crl.) 527 (AP), a Division Bench of this Court held that when two views are reasonably possible, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This observation was made in a case where suicide was a possible alternative and in that view of the matter, the accused was given the benefit of doubt in relation to the charge under Section 302 IPC. In the present case, no two views are possible in the light of the fact that Ex.P18 dying declaration is found to be completely trustworthy and reliable and accepting the same, the only inference that can be drawn is that A1 resorted to burning his wife by pouring kerosene on her and setting fire to her. In the alternative, the learned counsel would submit that even if Ex.P18 dying declaration is taken into account, the attending circumstances demonstrate that there was no premeditation and it was only upon a sudden quarrel that the incident occurred and therefore, the offence would fall under Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC. Learned counsel would submit that there is no evidence to prove the demand for dowry in the shape of Rs.1,00,000/- and a motor cycle and therefore, the conviction under Section 304-B IPC is not sound. She would state that a mere demand in this regard would be insufficient to make out an offence and there must be demonstrable cruelty. Though the learned counsel would argue that the offence in question would come under the fourth exception to Section 300 IPC, the fact that the Sessions Court acquitted A1 of the charge of murder would mean that the question of applying any of the exceptions under Section 300 IPC would not arise. Though the learned counsel would argue that the offence in question would come under the fourth exception to Section 300 IPC, the fact that the Sessions Court acquitted A1 of the charge of murder would mean that the question of applying any of the exceptions under Section 300 IPC would not arise. It may also be noted that even for culpable homicide not amounting to murder falling under Section 304 Part I IPC, the punishment may extend to imprisonment for life as is the case with a dowry death under Section 304-B IPC. The further argument that the deceased was not subjected to cruelty in relation to the demand for additional dowry, in the form of cash and a motor cycle, is without basis in the light of the evidence of her family members, P.Ws.1, 2, 4 and 5. The very fact that A1 resorted to burning the deceased by pouring kerosene on her demonstrates the extent of cruelty to which he subjected her to meet his unlawful demands for dowry and given the statutory presumption in law, the offence against A1 was clearly established under Section 304-B IPC. Ms. C. Vasundhara Reddy, learned counsel, would further contend that the deceased committed suicide and that A1 tried to save her and sustained burns in the process. There is however no evidence to support this except the statement of P.W.3, who only said that A1 had both his hands close to the deceased when she saw her in flames. It is not the evidence of P.W.3 that A1 was trying to put out the flames with any cloth or other means and just the presence of the hands of A1 in close proximity to the deceased, who was already in flames, could mean that P.W.3 might have come upon the scene just after A1 set the deceased on fire. Reliance sought to be placed upon RAJULAPADU RAMBABU8 is also of no avail to the appellant, as this Court finds no evidence whatsoever that the deceased committed suicide. Reliance is placed on Poola Ramesh Babu Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2015 (1) ALD (Crl.) 79 in the context of the observations made therein as to the accused trying to save his wife. However, no such evidence is available in the present case, whereby any useful purpose would be served by reference to this judgment. Reliance is placed on Poola Ramesh Babu Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2015 (1) ALD (Crl.) 79 in the context of the observations made therein as to the accused trying to save his wife. However, no such evidence is available in the present case, whereby any useful purpose would be served by reference to this judgment. The question then arises as to whether the highest permissible punishment under the law imposed upon A1 for his conviction under Section 304-B IPC warrants interference on the ground that the case on hand was not of such rarity or heinousness so as to justify it. Ms. C. Vasundhara Reddy, learned counsel, would contend that it is not so. She would rely on Hari Om Vs. State of Haryana, (2015) 1 SCC (Crl.) 141, wherein the Supreme Court observed that the extreme punishment of a life term for an offence under Section 304-B IPC should be awarded to the accused in rare cases and not in every case. In the present case, it is no doubt true that A1 was acquitted under Section 302 IPC, despite the Sessions Court believing Ex.P18 dying declaration. However, his conviction under Section 304-B IPC is unassailable as there can be no doubt that he caused the death of his wife by pouring kerosene on her and setting her on fire within seven years of their marriage. In his Section 313 CrPC statement before the Sessions Court, A1 claimed that he was not even there when the deceased went up in flames. This was the level of his remorse even at that stage. In this regard, reference may be made to the observations of the Supreme Court in Satya Narayan Tiwari Alias Jolly Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2010) 13 SCC 689 to the effect that bride burning cases have become common in our country and such cases of bride burning would fall in the category of the rarest of rare cases and would also deserve the death sentence. The Supreme Court further observed to the effect that crimes against women are not ordinary crimes committed in a fit of anger or for property but they are social crimes disrupting the entire social fabric and therefore, call for harsh punishment. The Supreme Court further observed to the effect that crimes against women are not ordinary crimes committed in a fit of anger or for property but they are social crimes disrupting the entire social fabric and therefore, call for harsh punishment. In the present case, Ex.P18 dying declaration demonstrates in no uncertain terms that the deceased, a young girl of 18 years, was put to death owing to the greed and avarice of her husband, A1, for a paltry motor cycle and extra cash. His coldblooded act of pouring kerosene over this young girl, his own wife, and setting her on fire with no second thought clearly indicates that this was a case warranting the highest punishment under Section 304-B IPC. On the above analysis, this Court finds that the prosecution proved beyond doubt that A1 was guilty of the offence under Section 304-B IPC and that the circumstances of the case warranted imposition of life imprisonment upon him. The appeal is therefore dismissed.