Jyotirmay Bhattacharya, J. 1. While disposing of two applications filed by the respective parties in connection with this appeal yesterday, we were requested by the learned counsel appearing for the parties to hear out this appeal on merit. We were informed by the learned counsel of the parties that all the papers which are relevant for the purpose of disposal of the appeal are available with them and they produced those papers before this Court for our consideration. 2. On such request being made by the learned counsel appearing for the parties, we decided to hear out this appeal on merit on the basis of the papers placed before us by dispensing with the requirement of filing paper books in this appeal. Accordingly, we fix this appeal for hearing today. 3. Let us now consider the merit of the instant appeal in the facts of the present case. 4. The instant first miscellaneous appeal is directed against an order of remand dated 5th July, 1999 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) & Assistant Sessions Judge, Sealdah in Title Appeal No. 101 of 1995. In this appeal we will have to consider the legality of the remand order passed by the learned first Appellate Court in the facts of the present case. 5. The plaintiffs/appellants filed a suit for eviction against the defendant/respondent on the ground of default in payment of rent and also on the ground of expiry of the lease by efflux of time. Admittedly, the tenancy was created on the basis of a registered lease dated 15th November, 1961 for a period of 25 years, commencing from 15th November, 1961 and ending with 14th November, 1986. The instant suit for eviction was filed sometime in 1987. 6. The defendant appeared in the said suit and contested the same by filing written statement. Apart from denying the allegations made out by the plaintiffs in the plaint, the defendant claimed that he was a thika tenant in respect of the suit property and with the enactment of the Calcutta Thika and Other Tenancies and Lands (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 1981, the interest of the landlord in the thika tenancy vested under the State and he became a direct tenant under the State of West Bengal. 7. Several issues were framed by the learned Trial Judge in the said suit. 7. Several issues were framed by the learned Trial Judge in the said suit. Those are as follows : (i) Is the suit maintainable ? (ii) Are the plaintiff owner of the suit property ? (iii) Is the lease deed valid on commencement of the Calcutta Thika and Other Tenancies and Lands (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 1981 ? (iv) Are the plaintiffs entitled to get the decree ? (v) Is the suit bad for non-joinder of necessary party ? (vi) To what other reliefs are the plaintiffs entitled ? 8. The parties led evidence in support of their respective claims in the suit. Ultimately, the learned Trial Judge held that the defendant is not a thika tenant within the meaning of “Thika Tenant” as defined in Section 3(8) of the Calcutta Thika and Other Tenancies and Lands (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 1981. 9. The learned Trial Judge after considering the lease deed, particularly the schedule of the demised property and the terms and conditions for letting out the demised property, as contained therein, ultimately held that the thika tenancy was not created in favour of the defendant by the said lease deed. The learned Trial Judge, thus, held that the Thika Controller is not a necessary party in such a suit. The learned Trial Judge after considering the documents of title produced by the plaintiffs in the said suit, declared the plaintiffs as owners of the suit property and the suit was ultimately decreed in favour of the plaintiffs on the ground of expiry of lease by efflux of time. 10. The legality and/or propriety of the said judgment and/or decree of the learned Trial Court was challenged by the defendant before the learned first Appellate Court. 11. In course of hearing of the appeal, the defendant/appellant therein filed an application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking permission to adduce further evidence in support of his claim that in pursuance of the permission granted to him under the lease, he raised structure on the suit property after obtaining sanctioned plan from Kolkata Municipal Corporation on 15th February, 1962. As a matter of fact, by filing the said application, the defendant sought for permission from the first Appellate Court to adduce further evidence with regard to the building plan sanctioned by the Municipal authority permitting him to raise construction over the suit property. 12. As a matter of fact, by filing the said application, the defendant sought for permission from the first Appellate Court to adduce further evidence with regard to the building plan sanctioned by the Municipal authority permitting him to raise construction over the suit property. 12. The learned first Appellate Court was of the view that the sanctioned plan might have some relevance on the issue involved in the suit. The learned first Appellate Court held that apart from the sanctioned plan, relayment of the construction raised by the defendant/appellant therein by expert engineer is also necessary. Accordingly, judgement and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge was set aside. The suit was sent back on remand with a direction upon the learned Trial Court to allow the parties to lead their evidence in support of their case and the documents viz. sanctioned building plan etc. with a further direction upon the learned Trial Court to consider the petition for appointment of expert engineer and to deliver a fresh judgment after taking into consideration those additional evidence in the suit. The learned Trial Judge was also directed to frame an additional issue i.e. whether the defendant is a thika tenant in respect of the suit property or not. 13. We will have to test the legality of such judgment and/or order of remand in the facts of the present case. Though we find that the defendant/respondent herein set up a plea of his thika tenancy right in the written statement, but neither at the inception of creation of such tenancy nor during the continuance of the lease, he set up such a plea of his thika tenancy right over the suit property under the landlord. 14. Be that as it may, since such a plea of thika tenancy right was set up by the defendant in the written statement, the learned Trial Judge framed an issue as to whether the lease deed was valid on the commencement of the Calcutta Thika and Other Tenancies and Lands (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 1981. However, no issue directly on the point as to whether the defendant was a thika tenant under the plaintiffs in respect of the suit property was framed in the said suit. 15. However, no issue directly on the point as to whether the defendant was a thika tenant under the plaintiffs in respect of the suit property was framed in the said suit. 15. Though no such issue directly on the point of the defendant’s right of thika tenancy was framed by the learned Trial Judge, but, in our considered view, the issue on thika tenancy as framed by the learned Trial Judge, as mentioned above, indirectly covers the dispute relating to the status of the defendant/respondent as that of a thika tenant in respect of the suit property under the said Act. 16. On perusal of the pleadings of the respective parties, we find that the parties led sufficient evidence with regard to their rival contentions about the creation and/or non-creation of the thika tenancy right in favour of the defendant/respondent herein in respect of the suit property. In our view, the lease deed by which admittedly the tenancy was created by the plaintiffs in favour of the defendant is the primary document which, in our view, is the principal determining factor on the issue regarding the thika tenancy right of the defendant in respect of the suit property. 17. Three State legislations were enacted from time to time. First of such State legislation was enacted in 1949 i.e. Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949. Subsequently the said Act was repealed and a new legislation was enacted i.e. the Calcutta Thika and Other Tenancies and Lands (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 1981. The said Act was again replaced by another subsequent legislation i.e. West Bengal Thika Tenancy (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 2001. Admittedly at the time when the lease deed was executed between the parties in the year 1961, the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949 was in force. 18. Let us now consider the definition of thika tenant as per the definition clause of Section 2(5) of the said Act of 1949 which, in our view, will throw light on the issue before us. 18. Let us now consider the definition of thika tenant as per the definition clause of Section 2(5) of the said Act of 1949 which, in our view, will throw light on the issue before us. Section 2(5) of the said Act runs as follows :- “2 (5) - “thika tenant” means any person who holds, whether under a written lease or otherwise, land under another person, and is or but for a special contract would be liable to pay rent, at a monthly or any other periodical rate, for that land to that another person and has erected or acquired by purchase or gift any structure on such land for a residential, manufacturing or business purpose and includes the successors in interest of such person, but does not include a person- (a) who holds such land under that another person in perpetuity; or (b) who holds such land under that another person under a registered lease, in which the duration of the lease is expressly stated to be for a period of not less than twelve years; or (c) who holds such land under that another person and uses or occupies such land as a khattal.” 19. The subsequent legislation of 1981 also defined thika tenant under Section 3(8) of the said Act which runs as follows :- “3(8) – “thika tenant” means any person who occupies, whether under a written lease or otherwise, land under another person, and is or but for a special contract would be liable to pay rent, at a monthly or any other periodical rate, for that land to that another person and has erected or acquired by purchase or gift any structure on such land for residential, manufacturing or business purpose, and includes successors-in-interest of such person.” The subsequent legislation of 2001 also defined thika tenant in Section 2(14) of the said Act in the following manner :- “2(14) – “thika tenant” means any person who occupies, whether under a written lease or otherwise, land under another person, and is, or but for a special contract, would be, liable to pay rent at a monthly or any other periodical rate for that land to that another person, and has erected or acquired by purchase or gift any structure including pucca structure, if any, on such land for residential, manufacturing or business purpose, and includes successors-in-interest of such persons but excludes any resident of a structure forfeited to the State under sub-section (2) of section 6 of this Act irrespective of the status, he may have enjoyed earlier.” Thika land has also been defined in the said Act of 2001 under Section 2 (15) which says as follows :- “2(15) – “thika land” means any land comprised in and appurtenant to, tenancies of thika tenant irrespective of the fact whether there is any claim of such tenancy or not and includes open areas and roads on such land.” 20. Thus, if we consider the definition of thika tenant in all these three Acts, we find that consistently all the aforesaid statutes provide that in order to be a thika tenant, the first and foremost condition which is required to be satisfied is that the tenant must be a tenant of a bare land and thereafter he will have to satisfy that he is liable to pay rent for such land to the landlord and has erected or acquired by purchase or gift any structure on such land. Initially in 1949 Act and/or in 1981 Act, construction of pucca structure was not contemplated for acquiring the status of a thika tenant under those two Acts. The concept of construction of pucca structure on a land let out to the tenant was introduced in the Act of 2001 by way of amendment introduced therein in 2010. 21. Be that as it may, if we consider all these three Acts minutely, then it appears to us that to become a thika tenant, the first and foremost condition which a person who is claiming to be a thika tenant must prove that a bare land was let out to him and he is liable to pay rent to his landlord and he has raised kutcha or pucca structure thereon depending upon the provisions made in those three Acts from time to time. 22. Keeping in mind the aforesaid provisions of the law, we are now required to consider the lease deed itself to find out as to whether bare land was let out to the tenant or not. If we find that bare land was let out to the tenant and he paid rent for the land and subsequently, he raised structure i.e. either kutcha or pucca depending upon applicability of those three enactments, then he can be regarded as a thika tenant subject to fulfilment of other conditions of those three different legislations which came into existence from time to time. 23. In this regard we have considered the lease deed minutely. The lease deed provides that by the said lease deed, the lessor demised unto the lessee all that Garden houses with brick built pucca structure together with lands being premises No. 30A, Beerpara Lane, Dum Dum, more fully described in the schedule mentioned therein. The description of the demised property as mentioned in the said schedule runs as follows :- “All that one storied brick built messuage tenement or dwelling house with a portion of tank together with the piece or parcel of land thereunto belonging or on part thereof the same is erected and built containing an area of 1 bigha 1 cottah 16 sq.ft. be the same a little more or less, situate, lying at and being premises No. 30A, Beerpara Lane (formerly 13, Sreenath Mukherjee Lane) Dum Dum within Division “1” subdivision 17 within thana Chitpore Mouza Dum Dum in the District of 24-Parganas.” By the said lease deed, lessee was permitted to complete the building with roof as indicated in the plan and repaired the building thoroughly with a rider that the roof will be constructed with rods and concrete and shall be made waterproof within a period of two years from date. By the said lease deed, the lessee was also given the right to construct a new or additional structures in the premises with the sanction of Calcutta Corporation or other appropriate authorities. The said lease also provides that the lessee will not remove any pucca structure or construction that are existing there or may thereafter be put up in the demised premises. Those constructions will belong to the lessor. The lease deed also provides that the lessee shall be at liberty to remove from the said premises at his pleasure the machinery, installation and kutcha structures etc. which may be erected or installed thereon by the lessee. 24. Considering the lease deed and the covenants made therein as a whole, we have no hesitation to hold that by the said lease deed, a tenancy was created by the lessor in favour of the lessee in respect of a premises which consists of one storied brick built building, a dwelling house with a portion of tank together with piece and parcel of land appurtenant thereto. Thus, we find that this is not a lease of bare land. If on such demised property, the lessee is further authorised to raise some additional construction and if on the strength of such authorisation, the lessee raised any construction therein, such lessee cannot claim himself to be a thika tenant under the provisions of any of the three Acts as mentioned above. In our view, the defendant/respondent failed to fulfil the basic criteria in support of his claim for thika tenancy in respect of the suit premises. 25. Mr. Basu, learned advocate appearing for the respondent, however, has drawn our attention to the provision contained in Section 23 of 1981 Act by which the civil court’s jurisdiction to decide certain disputes as to the thika tenancy was barred. Mr. 25. Mr. Basu, learned advocate appearing for the respondent, however, has drawn our attention to the provision contained in Section 23 of 1981 Act by which the civil court’s jurisdiction to decide certain disputes as to the thika tenancy was barred. Mr. Basu has also drawn our attention to an identical provision contained in Section 5(3) of 2001 Act wherein an identical bar on the civil court’s jurisdiction to decide certain disputes has also been created. Relying upon those provisions, Mr. Basu contends that since such an dispute was raised by the defendant/respondent in the said suit, the civil court should have refrained itself from deciding the issue as to whether the defendant was a thika tenant or not as, according to Mr. Basu, the jurisdiction to decide such issue was solely vested with the Controller appointed under the said Act. 26. The dispute so raised by Mr. Basu is no longer a res integra in view of the decision of this Hon’ble Court in the case of Shrenik Kumar Singhee Vs. State of West Bengal & Ors. reported in 2006 (1)CHN 540 wherein it was held that the Thika Controller was not vested with the power to adjudicate any dispute regarding the title to a property of the rival claimants. It was also held therein that the power to adjudicate as to whether a person is a thika tenant or not has not been vested with the Thika Controller under the provisions of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 1981. It was further held therein that such a dispute which requires declaration of title of the rival claimants can only be resolved by the civil court of competent jurisdiction. If this test is applied in the present case, then we have no hesitation to hold that the Thika Controller has no jurisdiction to decide the issue relating to vesting of the landlord’s interest in the land with the State and consequently creation of a new relationship of landlord and tenant between the State and the defendant. As such, we cannot accept such contention of Mr. Basu. 27. As such, we cannot accept such contention of Mr. Basu. 27. That apart, we like to add further that merely for introduction of a plea of thika tenancy at the instance of the defendant in his pleading, the civil court does not lose its jurisdiction provided at a glance of the lease deed itself, it appears that bare land was not let out by the lessor to the lessee and the lessee is not required to pay ground rent for the land only. As such, we hold that the learned first Appellate Court was not justified in remanding the suit back to the learned Trial Court for fresh hearing, as we are of the view that raising pucca construction with the plan duly sanctioned by the Municipal authority on a portion of the suit property does not convert the tenancy which was governed by the Transfer of Property Act into a thika tenancy. 28. Mr. Basu also relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Nemai Chandra Kumar & Ors. Vs. Mani Square Ltd. & Ors. reported in (2015) 2 WBLR (SC) 321 in support of his contention that his client having raised construction of permanent nature on the vacant land, should be considered as a thika tenant as per the said decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 29. We cannot agree with such contention of Mr. Basu for the simple reason that the defendant has failed to fulfil the first and foremost condition to become a thika tenant under his landlord i.e. leasing out of a bare land by the landlord in favour of the lessee and his liability to pay ground rent for the demised land. As such, we find no other alternative, but to set aside the order of remand passed by the learned first Appellate Court and affirm the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge. The appeal, thus, stands allowed. The remand order is set aside. 30. The decree of eviction passed by the learned Trial Court is approved. The tenant is given one month time to vacate the suit premises and to deliver vacant and peaceful possession of the suit property to the plaintiffs/appellants. In default, the plaintiffs/appellants will be at liberty to recover khas possession of the suit premises from the defendant/respondent herein by evicting him therefrom through the process of execution. The tenant is given one month time to vacate the suit premises and to deliver vacant and peaceful possession of the suit property to the plaintiffs/appellants. In default, the plaintiffs/appellants will be at liberty to recover khas possession of the suit premises from the defendant/respondent herein by evicting him therefrom through the process of execution. The decree for mesne profit which was passed by the learned Trial Court is also affirmed. 31. Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties as expeditiously as possible.