ORDER : M.S. Ramachandra Rao, J. 1. The brief facts leading to the filing of this Writ Petition are as under: The petitioner is a Member of the Legislative Assembly and leader of the Telugu Desam Legislature Party in the Telangana Legislative Assembly, the 1st respondent is the Legislative Secretariat of the State of Telangana, the 2nd respondent is the Speaker of the Telangana Legislative Assembly and respondent Nos. 3 to 14 are the Members of the Legislative assembly of Telangana, having go elected on B-Forms issued by the Telugu Desam party, have defected from the said party to the Telangana Rashtra Samithi Legislature Party and claim to have merged with the latter. 2. In May, 2014, elections to the Legislative Assembly of the State of Telangana were held in which 15 persons belonging to the Telugu Desam Party got elected. In the said election, the Telangana Rashtra Samithi Party got majority and formed the Government in the State of Telangana. 3. Thereafter initially 3 of the persons who got elected on the Telugu Desam Party ticket to the Legislative Assembly i.e. respondent Nos. 4, 7 and 11 defected to the Telangana Rashtra Samithi Party. There upon, the 3rd respondent, who was also elected as Member of the Legislative Assembly on a ticket from the Telugu Desam Party, filed petitions before the 2nd respondent under para-6 of Schedule X to the Constitution of India to disqualify them on 24-11-2014. They are still pending consideration before the 2nd respondent. 4. Subsequently 9 other members of the Legislative Assembly who had got elected on the basis of a B Form issued by the Telugu Desam Party i.e. respondent Nos. 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13 and 14 also defected to the Telangana Rashtra Samithi Party. All these 12 persons gave a letter on 11-02-2016 to the 2nd respondent that they have merged the Telangana Telugu Desam Legislature Party with the Telangana Rashtra Samithi Legislature Party. They stated that they constitute more than 2/3rds of the Telugu Desam Legislature Party and requested to take appropriate action in the matter. 5. Thereafter in February, 2016, petitions were filed before the 2nd respondent under Schedule X to the Constitution of India seeking the disqualification of these 9 persons also, invoking para-6 of Schedule X to the Constitution of India. 6. The 2nd respondent took note of the contents of the letter Dt. 5. Thereafter in February, 2016, petitions were filed before the 2nd respondent under Schedule X to the Constitution of India seeking the disqualification of these 9 persons also, invoking para-6 of Schedule X to the Constitution of India. 6. The 2nd respondent took note of the contents of the letter Dt. 11-02-2016 addressed by the respondent Nos. 3 to 14 and allotted seats to them along with the members of the Telangana Rashtra Samithi Legislature Party in the House. 7. This was made known by the respondent through a bulletin No. 5 Dt. 10-03-2016. 8. The petitioner, who is a member in the Telangana Legislative Assembly and who has also got elected on the Telugu Desam Party ticket, has filed this Writ Petition questioning the said bulletin and prayed as follows: "It is therefore prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to issue an order, direction or a Writ more particularly one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus declaration declaring the issuance of Bulletin No. 5 Dt. 10.03.2016 by the 1st respondent merging Telangana Telugu Desam Legislature Party with Telangana Rashtrasamithi party in Legislative assembly of Telangana State is unconstitutional as the schemes of Schedule-X of the Constitution of India or the Rules made there under do not contemplate the Speaker i.e. the 2nd respondent, embarking upon an independent enquiry as to whether there has been a merger under para-4 but, the Speaker who acts under the Schedule-X only on a claim for disqualification under paragraph No. 2 of the X Schedule of the Constitution of India gets that jurisdiction to decide such issues as fie qualified finality conferred by para 6(1) of the Xth was not available to the Order of the 2nd respondent and consequently declare that the respondent is not competent to decide a merger of a political party independently without recourse to paragraph No. 2 and paragraph No. 6(1) of the A' Schedule of the Constitution of India and consequently direct the respondent Nos. 2 to decide the disqualification petitions pending as expeditiously as possible preferably within 90 days as decided in 2013(11) SCC 794 and AIR (2013 1 SC 120, consequently suspend the Bulletin No. 5 Dt. 10.03.2016 issued by 1st respondents illegal and without Constitutional sanction and to pass such other order or orders as this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.." 9. 10.03.2016 issued by 1st respondents illegal and without Constitutional sanction and to pass such other order or orders as this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.." 9. The petitioner also filed W.P.M.P. No. 30111 of 2016 to suspend the operation of bulletin No. 5 Dt. IO-03-2016 issued by 1st respondent. 10. This Court ordered Notice before Admission on 08-08-2016 and permitted the counsel for the petitioner to take out personal notice to all respondents by R.P.A.D. and file proof of service. 11. Notices sent to respondent Nos. 2 and 7 by learned counsel for petitioner were returned with endorsement "not claimed". In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan and another (1999) 7 SCC 510 , and since the notices were dispatched by Post with correct address written on them, such notices are deemed to be served. 12. The matter was listed again on 23-08-2016. 13. On that date, the learned Advocate General took notice on behalf of 1st respondent. Proof of service was filed by petitioner with regard to respondent Nos. 1, 3 to 6, 8 to 11 and 14. 14. Arguments of counsel for petitioner and the learned Advocate General were heard on 23.8.2016 for more than one and half hours in this petition. When the arguments were about to be concluded, the Additional Advocate General came and stated that he is appearing for respondent Nos. 3 to 14. When he was asked to make his submissions, he stated that he was not ready to submit his arguments. Therefore the Court reserved orders in this W.P.M.P. 30111 of 2016. 15. However, the Court felt that it would be desirable if all parties were given an opportunity to file written submissions on the legal points which arise in this case and posted the matter under the caption "For being Mentioned" to 26-08-2016. 16. On that day, the Court granted time till 02-09-2016 to the learned counsel for -petitioner, learned Advocate General appearing for 1st respondent and learned Additional Advocate General appearing for respondent Nos. 3 to 14, to file written submissions. 17. Learned counsel for petitioner filed written submissions on 01-09-2016. The learned Advocate General sought extension of time to file written submissions on 06-09-2016, and such time was granted till 09-09-2016. The written submissions were filed by the learned Advocate General on 08-09-2016. 3 to 14, to file written submissions. 17. Learned counsel for petitioner filed written submissions on 01-09-2016. The learned Advocate General sought extension of time to file written submissions on 06-09-2016, and such time was granted till 09-09-2016. The written submissions were filed by the learned Advocate General on 08-09-2016. Though the learned Additional Advocate General was aware of the order granting time to respondent Nos. 3 to 14 to file written submissions on 26-08-2016 itself, and he was reminded of it on 08-09-2016 (after the learned Advocate General filed written submissions), till date no such submissions were filed on behalf of respondent Nos. 3 to 1.4. It appears, that he is not interested in filing any written submissions for respondent Nos. 3 to 14, though 3 weeks have passed by. 18. The contents of the Bulletin dated 10-03-2016 issued by the 1st respondent under Sec. 2(b) of the Business rules of the House states as under: "All the Members are informed that twelve Members of Telugu Desam Legislature Party viz., (1) Sri Errabelli Dayakar Rao, (2) Sri Talasani Srinivas Yadav, (3) Sri G. Sayanna, (4) Sri T. Prakash Goud, (5) Sri Teegala Krishna Reddy, (6) Sri Manchireddy Kishan Reddy, (7) Sri Madhavaram Krishna Rao, (8) Sri K.P. Vivekanand, (9) Sri Cholla Dharma Reddy, (10) Sri S. Rajender Reddy, (11) Sri Maganti Gopinadh and (12) Sri Arikepudi Gandhi have submitted a letter to the Hon'ble Speaker stating that they have merged with Telangana Rashtra Samithi Legislature Party (TRSLP). Further, they have stated that the said 12 members constitute more than two thirds of TDLP and requested to take appropriate action in the matter. The Hon'ble Speaker has taken note of the same and allotted seats to them along with the Members of TRSLP in the House." 19. The impugned Bulletin issued by the 1st respondent informs all the members of the Telangana Legislative Assembly of the decision of the Speaker to allot seats to respondent Nos. 3 to 14 along with members of the Telangana Rashtra Samithi Legislature Party in the House. It indicates that a letter had been given by respondent Nos. The impugned Bulletin issued by the 1st respondent informs all the members of the Telangana Legislative Assembly of the decision of the Speaker to allot seats to respondent Nos. 3 to 14 along with members of the Telangana Rashtra Samithi Legislature Party in the House. It indicates that a letter had been given by respondent Nos. 3 to 14 to the 2nd respondent stating that they have merged with Telangana Rashtra Samithi Legislature Party, that they constitute more than 2/3rds of the Telugu Desam Legislature Party and on such a letter, the 2nd respondent allotted seats to them along with members of the Telangana Rashtra Samithi Legislature Party in the House. 20. Copy of the said letter Dt. 11-02-2016 addressed by respondent Nos. 3 to 14 is also filed in the material papers. They stated in the said letter that they possessed the required strength to merge with the Telangana Rashtra Samithi Legislature Party under para-4 of Schedule X, to the Constitution of India. 21. The question to be considered is "whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner is entitled to the interim relief sought for by him?" 22. It is not in dispute that as against respondent Nos. 4, 7 and 11, petitions Nos. 5, 6 and 7 of 2014 were filed on 24-11-2014 under Schedule X of the Constitution of India before 2nd respondent, that they were taken on file and notices were issued on 05-12-2014. As against respondent Nos. 3, 5, 6, 8 to 10, 12 to 14, immediately after the letter Dt. 11-02-2016 was filed for merger, Disqualification Petitions were filed in February, 2016. Admittedly, the 2nd respondent has not passed any orders on these Disqualification Petitions filed against the respondent Nos. 3 to 14 till date. According to the petitioner, this is on account of the fact that the 2nd respondent decided that these persons have merged with the Telangana Rashtra Samithi Legislature Party. 23. Paragraph-2 of Schedule X to the Constitution of India states that subject to the provisions of paragraphs 4 and 5, a Member of a House belonging to any political party shall be disqualified for being a Member of the House, if he has voluntarily given up his Membership of such political party. 24. 23. Paragraph-2 of Schedule X to the Constitution of India states that subject to the provisions of paragraphs 4 and 5, a Member of a House belonging to any political party shall be disqualified for being a Member of the House, if he has voluntarily given up his Membership of such political party. 24. Paragraph-4 of Schedule X to the Constitution of India provides a defence to a Member of a House against whom an allegation of defection is made. It states that a Member of a House shall not be disqualified under sub-paragraph (1) of Paragraph-2 where his original political party merges with another political party and he claims that he and any other members of his original political party have become members of such other political party. 25. Paragraph-6 of the X Schedule empowers the Speaker of the House to decide the question whether a Member of a House has become subject to disqualification. 26. In Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu 1992 Supp. (2) SCC 651, the Supreme Court held, with regard to X schedule, the nature of power exercised by the Speaker under it that of judicial review of the decisions of the Speaker is permissible in certain circumstances. The Supreme Court held: "III. That the Tenth Schedule does not, in providing for an additional grant (sic ground) for disqualification and for adjudication of disputed disqualifications, seek to create a non-justiciable constitutional area. The power to resolve such disputes vested in the Speaker or Chairman is a judicial power. That Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule, to the extent it seeks to impart finality to the decision of the speakers/Chairmen is valid. But the concept of statutory finality embodied in Paragraph 6(1) does not detract from or abrogate judicial review under Articles 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution insofar as infirmities based on violations of constitutional mandates mala fides, non-compliance with Rules of Natural Justice and perversity, are concerned. That the deeming provision in Paragraph 6(2) of the Tenth Schedule attracts an immunity analogous to that in Articles 122(1) and 212(1) of the Constitution as understood and explained in Keshav Singh case to protect the validity of proceedings from mere irregularities of procedure. The deeming provision, having regard to the words 'be deemed to be proceedings in Parliament' or proceedings in the legislature of a State' confines the scope of the fiction accordingly. The deeming provision, having regard to the words 'be deemed to be proceedings in Parliament' or proceedings in the legislature of a State' confines the scope of the fiction accordingly. The Speakers Chairmen while exercising powers and discharging functions under the Tenth Schedule act as Tribunal adjudicating rights and obligations under the Tenth Schedule and their decisions in that capacity are amenable to judicial review. However, having regard to the Constitutional Schedule in the Tenth Schedule judicial review should not cover any stage prior to the making of a decision by the Speakers/Chairmen. Having regard to the constitutional intendment and the status of the repository of the adjudicatory power no quia timet actions are permissible, the only exception for any interlocutory interference being cases of interlocutory disqualifications or suspensions which may have grave immediate and irreversible repercussions and consequence." (emphasis supplied) 27. The paragraphs 2, 4 and 6 of the X schedule were again interpreted fifteen years later by the Supreme Court in Rajendra Singh Rana and others v. Swami Prasad Maurya and others 2007 (2) ALT 65 (SC) : (2007) 4 SCC 270 . 28. In the last mentioned case, application for disqualification of 13 Members of BSP in the Legislative Assembly of Uttar Pradesh was pending before the Speaker of the said Assembly, and during its pendency, the Speaker passed an order on a petition filed by 37 M.L.As. before him that there was a split in the BSP. When he passed that order on the claim of the M.L.As. who had left BSP he had postponed the decision on the petition for disqualification of 13 M.L.As. filed by one Maurya. He later rejected the disqualification petitions, on the ground that he had already recognized the split. By that time, a Writ Petition was pending in the High Court wherein the action of the Speaker recognizing a split in the BSP was questioned. A Full Bench of the High Court by majority quashed the orders of the Speaker and directed him to reconsider the matter with particular reference to the disqualification of 13 M.L.As. This was questioned in the Supreme Court. 29. The Supreme Court held that the whole proceeding under the X schedule to the Constitution is initiated or gets initiated as a part of disqualification of a Member of the House and that disqualification is by way of defection. This was questioned in the Supreme Court. 29. The Supreme Court held that the whole proceeding under the X schedule to the Constitution is initiated or gets initiated as a part of disqualification of a Member of the House and that disqualification is by way of defection. It held that only when a complaint is made that some Member or Members have voluntarily given up his or their Memberships in the Party, in terms of the X Schedule, the Speaker is called upon to decide the question of disqualification raised before him in the context of paragraph-6 of the X Schedule. It declared that independent of a claim that someone has to be disqualified, the scheme of the X Schedule or the Rules made thereunder, do not contemplate the Speaker embarking upon an independent enquiry as to whether there has been a split in a Political Party or there has been a merger. It observed that the Speaker, when deciding the question of disqualification of a Member, acts as a Tribunal. It observed that in the context of a claim against a Member to disqualify him, that Member can plead that there has been a merger of his Party with another Party in terms of paragraph-4 of the X Schedule; that a claim under paragraph-4 of X Schedule is really an answer to a prayer for disqualifying the Member from the Legislature on the ground of defection; and in that context, the Speaker cannot say that lie first decide whether there has been a split or merger as an authority and thereafter decide the question whether disqualification has been incurred by the Members, by way of a judicial adjudication sitting as a Tribunal. It held that it is part and parcel of his jurisdiction as a Tribunal, while considering a claim for disqualification of a Member or Members, to decide that question not only in the context of the plea raised by the complainant but also in the context of the pleas raised by those who are sought to be disqualified, that they have not incurred disqualification in view of a split in the Part) or in view of a merger. In other words, the question of disqualification has to be decided first by the Speaker before going into the question of split or merger. It held: "29. In other words, the question of disqualification has to be decided first by the Speaker before going into the question of split or merger. It held: "29. In the case on hand, the Speaker had a petition moved before him for disqualification of 13 members of BSP. When that application was pending before him, certain members of BSP had made a claim before hint that there has been a split in BSP. The Speaker, in the scheme of the Tenth Schedule and the rules framed in that behalf had to decide the application for disqualification made and while deciding the same, had to decide whether in view of para 3 of the Tenth Schedule, the claim of disqualification had to be rejected. We have no doubt that the Speaker had totally misdirected himself in purporting to answer the claim of the 37 MLAs that there has been a split in the party even while leaving open the question of disqualification raised before him by way of an application that was already pending before him. This failure on the part of the Speaker to decide the application seeking a disqualification cannot be said to be merely in the, realm of procedure. It goes against the very constitutional scheme of adjudication contemplated by the Tenth Schedule read in the context of Articles 102 and 191 of the Constitution. It also goes against the rules framed in that behalf and the procedure that he was expected to follow. It is therefore not possible to accept the argument on behalf of the 37 MLAs that the failure of the Speaker to decide the petition for disqualification at least simultaneously with the petition for recognition of a split filed by then' is a mere procedural irregularity. We have no hesitation in finding that the same is a jurisdictional illegality, an illegality that goes to the root of the so-called decision by the Speaker on the question of split put forward before him. Even within the parameters of judicial review laid down in Kihoto Holloban and in Jagjit Singh v. State of Haryana (2006) 11 SCC 1 it has to be found that the decision of the Speaker impugned is liable to be set aside in exercise of the power of judicial review." (emphasis supplied) 30. Even within the parameters of judicial review laid down in Kihoto Holloban and in Jagjit Singh v. State of Haryana (2006) 11 SCC 1 it has to be found that the decision of the Speaker impugned is liable to be set aside in exercise of the power of judicial review." (emphasis supplied) 30. The Court observed that when the Speaker left the question of disqualification undecided, and went into the question of merger/split, he failed to exercise jurisdiction conferred on him by paragraph-6 of the X Schedule and such failure of jurisdiction cannot be held to be covered by the shield of paragraph-6 of the X Schedule. It held that the Speaker committed an error that went to the root of the matter or an error that is so fundamental, that even under a limited judicial review, his order has to be interfered with. It upheld the decision of the majority of the Full Bench of the High Court quashing the decision of the Speaker. It observed: "40. It is clear that the Speaker in the original order, left the question of disqualification undecided. Thereby he has failed to exercise the jurisdiction conferred on him by para 6 of the Tenth Schedule-Such a failure to exercise jurisdiction cannot be held to be covered by the shield of Para 6 of the Schedule. He has also proceeded to accept the case of a split based merely on a claim in that behalf He has entered no finding whether a split in the original political party was prima facie proved or not. This action of his, is apparently based on his understanding of the ratio of the decision in Ravi S. Naik case (5) {Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India, 1994 Supp. (2) SCC 641). He has misunderstood the ratio therein. Now that we have approved the reasoning and the approach in Jagjit Singh case and the ratio therein is clear, it has to be held that the Speaker has committed an error that goes to the root of the matter or an error that is so fundamental that even under a limited judicial review the order of the Speaker has to be interfered with. We have, therefore no hesitation in agreeing with the majority of the High Court in quashing the decisions of the Speaker." (emphasis supplied) 31. We have, therefore no hesitation in agreeing with the majority of the High Court in quashing the decisions of the Speaker." (emphasis supplied) 31. Like in that case, in the present case also, while keeping the applications for disqualification of respondent Nos. 3 to 14 pending, the 2nd respondent accepted their merger with the Telangana Rashtra Samithi Legislative Party and allotted them seats in the House along with the Telangana Rashtra Sam ithi Legislative Party The decision of the 2nd respondent is evident from the contents of the impugned Bulletin issued by 1st respondent though no separate order passed by 2nd respondent in that regard has been placed before me. Therefore, since 2nd respondent first decided the question of merger of respondent Nos. 3 to 14 forming part of Telugu Desam Legislative Party with Telangana Rashtra Samiti Legislative Party on 10-03-2016 without deciding the question of disqualification of the said respondents, when applications for their disqualification were pending by February, 2016, prima facie he has failed to exercise jurisdiction conferred on him by paragraph-6 of the X Schedule, in the same manner as in the Rajinder Singh Rana 's case (Supra). 32. In Speaker, Hariyana Vidhan Sabha v. Kuldeep Bishnoi AIR 2013 SC 120 : 2013 (2) ALT 7 .1 (DN SC), when applications for disqualification of Members of Haryana Legislative Assembly were pending before the Speaker, a Writ Petition is filed in the High Court to quash an order of the Speaker of the House accepting the merger of the Members of the House whose disqualification was sought. A declaration was also sought that the said Members of the House were disqualified from the membership of the House. The Writ Petition was allowed by single Judge of the High Court and a direction was given to the Speaker to finally decide the Disqualification Petitions pending before him within four months. The Speaker appealed to the Division Bench which affirmed the decision of the Single Judge and stayed the operation of the orders passed by the Speaker accepting the merger and declared that the M.L.As. in question would be unattached Members of the Assembly with the right to attend the Sessions only and not as part of the Party with whom they claimed to have merged. in question would be unattached Members of the Assembly with the right to attend the Sessions only and not as part of the Party with whom they claimed to have merged. They were also prevented from discharging their functions as Members of the House even before the Disqualification Petitions filed against them could be heard and decided. The Speaker as well as the disqualified MLAs appealed to the Supreme Court. 33. The Supreme Court referred to the power of the High Court to pass interim orders under its judicial review powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India when Disqualification proceedings are pending before the Speaker and observed that normally judicial review could not cover any stage prior to the making of the decision of the Speaker, nor any quia timet action was contemplated or permissible. The Court held that the Speaker cannot be restrained from taking a decision under paragraph-6 of X Schedule by the High Court since the Speaker is conferred with power under the Constitution to take a decision under paragraph-6 of the X Schedule. It held that in a proceeding under paragraph-6 only, the Speaker assumes jurisdiction to pass a quasi judicial order, which is amenable to Writ jurisdiction of the High Court, and only in such proceedings the question relating to the disqualification is to be considered and decided. It held that though the Speaker is not entitled to adjudicate the question of merger in a petition under paragraph-4 of X Schedule, on that ground High Court cannot assume jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before a decision was taken by the Speaker under paragraph -6 of X Schedule. It therefore held that the High Court cannot pass an interim order which prevented the M.L.As. in question from effectively functioning as Members of the House. It, however, upheld the orders of the High Court insofar as it directed the Speaker to decide the petitions for Disqualifications of the M.L.As. in question within four months. It held that the M.L.As. in question can, in the meantime, function as Members of the House without any restrictions subject to the final decision that may be rendered by the Speaker in the Disqualification Petitions filed under paragraph-6 of the X Schedule. 34. in question within four months. It held that the M.L.As. in question can, in the meantime, function as Members of the House without any restrictions subject to the final decision that may be rendered by the Speaker in the Disqualification Petitions filed under paragraph-6 of the X Schedule. 34. In Errabelli Dayakar Rao v. Talasani Srinivas Yadav and others 2016 (1) ALT 530 (D.B.) also a view similar to Kuldeep Bishnoi (supra) was taken. That case concerned disqualification applications filed by the appellant therein (respondent No. 3 herein) against respondent Nos. 1 to 3 therein (respondent Nos. 4, 7 and 11 herein) which were then pending before the 2nd respondent and a direction was sought for a direction to the 2nd respondent to decide the pending Disqualification petition within a time frame. The Division Bench declined to issue any direction to the 2nd respondent in exercise of its judicial review powers and merely expressed a wish that the 2nd respondent decides the disqualification petitions pending before him expeditiously. The said judgment is said to be challenged in the Supreme Court of India. 35. The said case was decided on 28-09-2015, by the Division bench expressing hope that the 2nd respondent would decide the question of disqualification. But 6 months after it was decided, the impugned Bulletin Dt. 10.3.2016 was published by 1st respondent, but no order has been passed by 2nd respondent on the petitions for disqualification pending before him. In the impugned Bulletin, the 2nd respondent accepted the plea of respondent Nos. 3 to 14 that they have merged with the Telangana Rashtra Samithi Legislature Party and allotted them seats along with the Members of the said Party on 10-03-2016, took place. However, even today, when nearly one year has elapsed from the day when the Division Bench decided Errabelli Dayakar Rao's case (supra), the 2nd respondent has not chosen to pass any order in regard to the disqualification petitions filed before him to disqualify respondent Nos. 3 to 14. 36. Since 2nd respondent while exercising power under paragraph-6 of X schedule is acting as a Tribunal amenable to judicial review, as held by the Supreme Court, having regard to the fact situation of long delay as mentioned in para 36 supra and the 2nd respondent's action (to accept the merger of the respondent Nos. 3 to 14. 36. Since 2nd respondent while exercising power under paragraph-6 of X schedule is acting as a Tribunal amenable to judicial review, as held by the Supreme Court, having regard to the fact situation of long delay as mentioned in para 36 supra and the 2nd respondent's action (to accept the merger of the respondent Nos. 3 to 14 with the Telangana Rashtra Samithi Legislature Party and allow them to sit with members of the said party) being prima facie contrary to the ratio of decisions in Rajendra Singh Rana and others (supra) and Kuldeep Bishnoi (supra), I am inclined to issue a direction to the 2nd respondent to decide the applications for disqualification of respondent Nos. 3 to 4 within 3 months from today. Such a direction issued in Kuldeep Bishnoi (supra) by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana to the Speaker of the Haryana Legislature was affirmed by the Supreme Court also. 37. In Kihoto Hollohan (supra), the Constitution Bench of Supreme Court held that a decision of the Speaker under paragraph-6(1) of the X Schedule is not the decision of the House, nor is it subject to approval by the House and it operates independently of the House and therefore there is no immunity under Article 212 from judicial scrutiny of the decision of the Speaker exercising power under paragraph-6(1) of the X Schedule. 38. While the action of the 2nd respondent may also relate to sitting arrangements in the House, it prima facie, is a decision amenable to judicial review since the action of 2nd respondent is referable to paragraphs 4 and 6 also of X schedule, as directed by the Supreme Court in the above cases. 39. Therefore, the contentions of the learned Advocate General that the decision of the 2nd respondent as contained in the impugned Bulletin only relates to the day-to-day business of the House and are internal proceedings of the House and that the decision of the Speaker to allow respondent Nos. 3 to 14 to sit along with Telangana Rashtra Samithi Legislative Party Members only relates to sitting arrangements in the House and is not one under the X Schedule, are rejected. 40. 3 to 14 to sit along with Telangana Rashtra Samithi Legislative Party Members only relates to sitting arrangements in the House and is not one under the X Schedule, are rejected. 40. I am also unable to agree with the other contention this decision is not published in the Official Gazette as is required of a decision under X Schedule, since it is not very relevant in as much as prima facie the 2nd respondent accepted the merger without deciding the disqualification petitions. 41. For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the view of that the decisions in M.S.M. Sharma v. Dr. Shree Krishna Sinha AIR 1960 SC 1186 , Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narayan (1975) RD-SC 128 and Ramdas Athawale v. Union of India and others (2010) 4 SCC 1 regarding immunity of internal proceedings of the Legislature cited by the Advocate General, are not applicable to the present case. 42. I therefore propose to issue a direction similar to the direction issued by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Kuldeep Bishnoi (supra), which has been affirmed by the Supreme Court, i.e., to decide the applications for disqualification of respondent Nos. 3 to 14 within 3 months. Accordingly, an interim direction is issued to the 2nd respondent to decide the applications for disqualification of respondent Nos. 3 to 14 within 3 months from today.