JUDGMENT : D.P. CHOUDHURY, J. The appeal is assailed against the order of acquittal dated 24.2.1996 passed by the learned Special Judge, Bhubaneswar acquitting the accused person from the charges under Section 5 (2) read with Section 5 (1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (hereinafter called as “the P.C. Act”) and Section 161 of I.P.C. in T.R. No.39 of 1987. FACTS 2. The factual matrix leading to the case of the prosecution is that the accused was Sub-Inspector of Schools (S.I. of Schools) in Circle-I of Bhubaneswar Block. The complainant was working as a Primary School Teacher in Kalyanpur U.P. School during the year 1984 and his wife was also working as an Assistant Teacher in Bahadalpur U.P. School. Both the Schools are under Circle-I of Bhubaneswar Block. It is alleged, inter alia, by the complainant that due to distance between Schools of the complainant and his wife he approached the accused for his transfer to a nearer School of his wife. The accused asked the complainant to pay Rs.200/-as illegal gratification for his transfer to the School nearer to the School of his wife. 3. On 13.8.1984 at about 8.45 P.M. the complainant gave Rs.100/- to the accused and again agreed on demand to pay the balance amount of Rs.100/- on 21.8.1984. As the complainant was not willing to pay any money as bribe, he informed the matter to Vigilance Department for taking necessary action against the accused for demand of illegal gratification as a public servant. After the written complaint received by the Vigilance Department, the D.S.P. Vigilance Department arranged a trap party. On 21.8.1984 the Vigilance party called the complainant and prepared a preparatory note and after necessary requisition the Executive Magistrate and other witnesses proceeded to the spot. On the same day at about 4.30 P.M. complainant reached the Block office and on demand by accused he gave two currency notes of Rs.50/-denomination to accused who kept the same in his possession. Then immediately the Vigilance officials trapped the accused and seized said money from his possession. Thereafter the seized currency notes, hands of the accused and the wearing pant of the accused being turned to pink on reaction with sodium carbonate solution. It is the case of the prosecution that the currency notes were earlier mixed with phenolphthalein powder during the time of demonstration before the trapping at the instance of Vigilance party. Thereafter the seized currency notes, hands of the accused and the wearing pant of the accused being turned to pink on reaction with sodium carbonate solution. It is the case of the prosecution that the currency notes were earlier mixed with phenolphthalein powder during the time of demonstration before the trapping at the instance of Vigilance party. After the seizure, the seizure list was prepared by obtaining signature of witnesses. After completion of necessary investigation, charge-sheet was submitted. 4. The plea of the respondent-accused as derived from his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and the cross-examinations made to the prosecution witnesses that on 13.8.1984 he was not present in the Block Office for which offer of Rs.100/-is false and in number of occasions the accused has approached him for his transfer. On 10.8.1984 when the complainant came to know that he has been transferred to Paikarapur, he bore grudge against the accused and filed false case. The accused had taken further plea that he has not demanded any illegal gratification from the complainant nor accepted any illegal gratification from him. 5. Learned trial court after analysing the evidence of twelve witnesses came to a conclusion that the prosecution has utterly failed to prove the charge against the respondent because on 30.7.1984 the complainant has been already transferred for which the demand of illegal gratification by the complainant is not probable story of the prosecution. The trial court has also observed that there are major discrepancies between the witnesses as to receipt of illegal gratification by the accused. It is further observed that there is no valid sanction of the prosecution to proceed with the case against the accused. So, the learned trial court acquitted the accused of the charges. SUBMISSION 6. Learned Standing Counsel for the Vigilance submitted that the learned Special Judge has erred in law by recording the order of acquittal on irrelevant grounds. Learned Special Judge ought to have believed the evidence of the trapping party and should have found respondent guilty of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification. Learned trial court has erred in law by counting the minor contradictions between the evidence of witnesses. 7. Learned Special Judge ought to have believed the evidence of the trapping party and should have found respondent guilty of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification. Learned trial court has erred in law by counting the minor contradictions between the evidence of witnesses. 7. It is also submitted by the learned Standing Counsel that the learned trial court has erred in law by observing that the case of prosecution has been defeated due to lack of proper sanction by overlooking the evidence of I.O. inasmuch as the I.O. has categorically stated that after due sanction by the competent authority the case has been filed. So, it is submitted by the learned Standing Counsel to set aside the order of acquittal and allow the Government Appeal. None appeared for the Respondent. DISCUSSIONS 8. Since it is a case of appeal against acquittal, the principle of law to decide such appeal is no more res integra as it is reported in 1961 (3) SCR 120 (Sanwat Singh & others v. State of Rajasthan) where Their Lordships observed: “The foregoing discussion yields the following results: (1) an appellate court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) the principles laid down in Sheo Swarup's case(1) afford a correct guide for the appellate court's approach to a case in disposing of such an appeal; and (3) the different phraseology used in the judgments of this Court, such as, (i) "substantial and compelling reasons", (ii) "good and sufficiently cogent reasons", and (iii) "strong reasons" are not intended to curtail the undoubted power of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion; but in doing so it should not only consider every matter on record having a bearing on the questions of fact and the reasons given by the court below in support of its order of acquittal in its arriving at a conclusion on those facts, but should also express those reasons in its judgment, which lead it to hold that the acquittal was not justified”. 9. 9. With due respect to the decision, it appears that the aforesaid principle of law enunciated has been followed in Chandrappa & others v. State of Karnataka, reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415 Para 42 where Their Lordships observed in following manner: “From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge; (1) An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law; (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court”. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court”. The aforesaid decision has been also followed in the decision reported in Vinod Kumar v. State of Haryana, reported in (2015) 3 SCC 138 Para 19 where Their Lordships observed in following manner as principles to be followed by Appellate Court: “On the bedrock of aforesaid settled principles, it is our obligation to scrutinize the judgment of the High Court whether it withstands close scrutiny within the parameters stated hereinabove or a conviction has been recorded solely because a different view can be taken”. 10. With due respect to all the above decisions, this Court is obligated to find out whether learned trial court has justifiably recorded the order of acquittal. Since it is appeal against acquittal, this Court being an Appellate Court should not be reluctant to interfere with the acquittal by assessing the material on record on its own conclusion. On the other hand, in the appeal against acquittal the Appellate Court has got power to draw double presumption in favour of accused, firstly by presuming his innocence and secondly by reaffirming presumption in his favour as he has got order of acquittal in the court of first instance. 11. In A. Subair v. State of Kerala, reported in 2009 (6) SCC 587 where Their Lordships observed in following manner: “29. xxx xxx xxx Sub-Section (3) is a "non-obstante clause". It provides that where the gratification is trivial and the Court is of opinion that no inference of corruption may fairly be drawn, it may decline to draw the presumption as referred to in sub-Sections (1) and (2). In other words, the Court is not bound to draw a presumption under Section 20 where the alleged gratification is too trivial. 30. In a case such as this an inference of corruption may not be fairly drawn as the alleged demand was of Rs. 25/-only. In our view, the High Court was not justified in drawing the presumption under Section 20 and holding that offence punishable under Section 7 of the Act was proved. Mere recovery of currency notes (Rs. 30. In a case such as this an inference of corruption may not be fairly drawn as the alleged demand was of Rs. 25/-only. In our view, the High Court was not justified in drawing the presumption under Section 20 and holding that offence punishable under Section 7 of the Act was proved. Mere recovery of currency notes (Rs. 20/-and Rs.5/-) denomination, in the facts of the present case, by itself cannot be held to be proper or sufficient proof of the demand and acceptance of bribe. 31. When the evidence produced by the prosecution has neither quality nor credibility, it would be unsafe to rest conviction upon such evidence. It is true that the judgments of the courts below are rendered concurrently but having considered the matter thoughtfully, we find that the High Court as well as the Special Judge committed manifest errors on account of unwarranted inferences. The evidence on record in this case is not sufficient to bring home the guilt of the appellant. The appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt.” Such decision has been also followed in Selvaraj v. State of Karnataka, reported in (2015) 10 SCC 230 . 12. Learned Standing Counsel for the Vigilance relied upon the decision reported in AIR 2016 SC 1160 (Sadhu Saran Singh v. State of U.P. & others) where Their Lordships’ observed the following:- “xxx However, we believe that the paramount consideration of the Court is to do substantial justice and avoid miscarriage of justice which can arise by acquitting the accused who is guilty of an offence. A miscarriage of justice that may occur by the acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. Xxx” He also cited the decision reported in (2013) 54 OCR (SC)-974 (R. Shaji Vs. State of Kerala) paragraph-36 of which is quoted herein below:- “36. Be that as it may, when a statement is recorded in court, and the witness speaks under oath, after he understands the sanctity of the oath taken by him either in the name of God or religion, it is then left to the Court to appreciate his evidence under Section 3 of the Evidence Act. The Judge must consider whether a prudent man would appreciate such evidence, and not appreciate the same in accordance with his own perception. The Judge must consider whether a prudent man would appreciate such evidence, and not appreciate the same in accordance with his own perception. The basis for appreciating evidence in a civil or criminal case remains the same. However, in view of the fact that in a criminal case, the life and liberty of a person is involved, by way of judicial interpretation, Courts have created the requirement of a high degree of proof.” With due respect to the decisions, there is no dispute as to appreciation of evidence as enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex Court. Bearing in mind of these principles as enunciated by Hon’ble Apex Court, let the evidence on record be analysed. 13. It is revealed from the evidence of P.W.1 that he came to know that he was being transferred from Kalyanpur U.P. School on 10.8.1984 to a distant place which is far from the School where his wife was serving. According to him, the accused assured him to got him transferred to a nearer place if he would pay Rs.200/-. So, on 13.8.1984 he met accused who demanded Rs.200/-and P.W.1 paid Rs.100/-unwillingly and assured accused to pay Rs.100/-after eight days. So, P.W.1 informed the D.S.P., Vigilance and as per plan a trap party was arranged. On 21.8.1984 the complainant submitted a written report to D.S.P., Vigilance vide Ext.1. On the same day at about 4.30 P.M. they all went to the office of accused where on demand he gave two currency notes of denomination of Rs.50/-and then and there the Vigilance trapped him. In examination-in-chief he stated that while he gave money to accused, accused kept those currency notes in left side chest pocket. But in para-6 of the examination-in-chief he stated that the money was recovered from his pant pocket by the Vigilance Department and on being cleaned by hand wash, the currency notes and the hand of accused became pink in colour. In examination-in-chief it is not clear as to how the money recovered from the pant pocket although the accused took money from the complainant and kept same on the left side chest pocket. Apart from this, in cross-examination in paras-7 and 8 he has revealed that the D.I. of Schools is his transferring authority and suggestion is to be given by only accused for transfer. Apart from this, in cross-examination in paras-7 and 8 he has revealed that the D.I. of Schools is his transferring authority and suggestion is to be given by only accused for transfer. It is also clarified by him that D.I. of Schools was not bound to accept the suggestion given by the S.I. Moreover, it revealed from his cross-examination in para-8 that on 27.7.1984 accused S.I. had suggested his transfer to Sahani Kasipur U.P. School and that order was also passed by D.I. of Schools on 30.7.1984. If at all a transfer order has already been passed on 30.7.1984, it is not conceived as to how accused demanded for his transfer by taking bribe on 10.8.1984. Moreover, the evidence of P.W.1 does not show if an outsider has witnessed the demand of Rs.200/-by the accused. Adding to this, he admitted that he has not told to anybody that he gave Rs.100/-to accused on 13.8.1984. Thus, the statement of P.W.1 is not clear and cogent to find out the statement creditworthy inasmuch as his statement is not consistent as to when accused demanded and payment of Rs.100/-besides the trap made for rest of the amount of bribe to be paid. So, the statement of P.W.1 is not trustworthy to find out the genesis of the crime and consistent evidence to prove the demand of illegal gratification and acceptance of same in presence of Vigilance party for which it requires corroboration. 14. It is revealed from the evidence of P.W.2 that he is a overhearing witness in the raiding party of Vigilance. It appears from his evidence that he has not seen any demand of illegal gratification by the accused to P.W.1. At the same time he has seen the payment of money by complainant to accused. On the other hand, there is discrepancy between the statement of P.W.1 and P.W.2 as to the manner of handing over of money. P.W.1 stated to have paid the money to the accused and accused kept the same in his left side chest pocket whereas P.W.2 stated that accused kept the currency notes on his left side pant pocket. Thus, the manner of receiving illegal gratification by accused is not consistent between the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2. P.W.2 also denied to have heard any talk between the complainant and the accused. Thus, the manner of receiving illegal gratification by accused is not consistent between the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2. P.W.2 also denied to have heard any talk between the complainant and the accused. When he could not hear anything although stood at a distance of 10 feet from the accused, his evidence as to witnessing the acceptance of two currency notes of Rs.50/-denomination from P.W.1 is not credible. So, the statement of P.W.2 is crippled to be relied upon to lend corroboration to P.W.1 about demand and acceptance of two currency notes of Rs.50/-denomination. 15. P.W.3 is not trap witness but a seizure witness to the document as per seizure list. So, his evidence does not improve the case of the prosecution. 16. P.W.4 was the Executive Officer, Bhubaneswar Municipality on 21.8.1984 and also a witness to recovery of tainted money from the accused. But it is not available from the evidence of P.W.4 that he had witnessed the payment of illegal gratification money to the accused from P.W.1. It is only available from the evidence of P.W.4 that he had witnessed the money seized from the accused. In examination-in-chief he clarified that the accused brought out two notes from his pocket and produced the same for which the same was seized. Moreover, in para-13 of cross-examination it is admitted by P.W.4 that hands of the complainant were not washed with sodium carbonate solution at the Block office. When the sodium carbonate solution was not used by the complainant, mere turning of colour to pink at the instance of wash of the hand of accused does not justify necessarily to infer about acceptance of tainted money by accused from P.W.1. 17. It is revealed from the evidence of P.W.5 that at that time he was the Chairman of Bhubaneswar Panchayat Samiti. According to him after the order was passed by the D.I. of Schools, the S.I. of Schools has no role to play. So, it is made clear from his evidence that much before the occurrence the transfer of P.W.1 has been approved and the accused had no role by then. 18. P.W.6 is not a witness to trap and seizure of tainted money. P.W.7 has received complaint on 21.8.1984 from P.W.1 and registered case on the same day after direction from S.P. received. 18. P.W.6 is not a witness to trap and seizure of tainted money. P.W.7 has received complaint on 21.8.1984 from P.W.1 and registered case on the same day after direction from S.P. received. He asked the I.O. to proceed for trap as per the direction of the S.P. P.W.7 has followed the raiding party. He is a witness to preparation report and detection report vide Exts.2 and 3 respectively. But he is not the witness to trap. If he has followed the raiding party but not known why he was not witness to trap. 19. P.W.8 being the Police Officer has witnessed seizure of tainted money from accused but not proved his signature in the seizure list. If at all he was present, what made him not to sign on the seizure list. P.W. 10 is an Officer of State Forensic Science Laboratory but did not prove the seizure of tainted money. 20. P.W.11 is a witness to demonstration of the reaction of phenolphthalein powder with sodium carbonate solution. There is nothing found from his evidence to show incriminating circumstances against the respondent. P.W. 12 who is a Police Officer stated to have submitted charge-sheet, but his evidence shows that after hand of the accused was washed by Sodium Carbonate, accused brought out two currency notes from his pant pocket. He proved the seizure list vide Exts.4, 5, 6 and 7 but his evidence creates doubt in mind as to how hand of accused was washed before recovery of currency notes from him. Thus, P.W.12’s statement is not creditworthy about seizure of tainted money from the accused. 21. P.W.13 who is the main I.O. does not show that he had seen the demand of money by accused as illegal gratification from the complainant. But it appears from his evidence that the tainted money was recovered from the accused. 22. From the aforesaid discussions, it appears that there is no consistent and clear evidence of demand of Rs.200/- and the payment of Rs.100/- at first as same has not got any corroboration from any outside witness to the evidence of P.W.1. Moreover, the evidence of witnesses examined to prove the trapping is also not consistent, trustworthy and clear to prove the same. On the whole, I find the evidence of P.Ws. Moreover, the evidence of witnesses examined to prove the trapping is also not consistent, trustworthy and clear to prove the same. On the whole, I find the evidence of P.Ws. are not clear, cogent and proper to be reliable to prove the demand of illegal gratification and acceptance of same beyond all reasonable doubt. 23. Learned Standing Counsel for the State-Vigilance relied upon the decision reported in (2015) 61 OCR (SC) 431 (State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. P. Venkateshwarlu) where Their Lordships observed the following:- “Thus, the accused respondent has not successfully rebutted the presumption under Section 20 of the P.C. Act. The prosecution, on the other hand, has established the demand and acceptance of the tainted money. The recovery also has gone unchallenged. Therefore, we strike down the order of acquittal passed by the High Court in Criminal Appeal No.149 of 2000. We restore the judgment and order dated 24.01.2000 rendered by the Principle Special Judge for SPE & ACB cases, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, in C.C. No.10 of 1996, convicting the accused respondent under Sections 7 and 13 (1) (d) read with Section 13 (2) of P.C. Act and sentence him to suffer one year rigorous imprisonment under each count and also to pay a fine of Rs.1000/-under each count, in default to suffer simple imprisonment for two months under each count. Both the substantive sentences are to run concurrently. This appeal is accordingly allowed.” He also cited the decision reported in AIR 2015 SC 3681 (Indra Vijay Alok Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh) which is quoted herein below:- “xxx Prevention of Corruption Act (59 of 1988), Ss. 7, 13, 20 – Illegal gratification -Trap case -Appellant, patwari alleged to have demanded and accepted bribe of Rs.1,000/-from complainant and his mother for entering their names in revenue record-Prosecution case not shaken merely because panch witnesses has not supported it-Moreso, when statements of witnesses are credible and trustworthy -Presumption under S. 20 can be drawn regarding motive of receiving the gratification unless it is rebutted-Conviction and sentence against appellant, proper.” Relying upon the aforesaid decisions, he submitted that under Section 20 of the P.C. Act, the presumption has to be drawn against the respondent. With due respect to the aforesaid authorities, it is clear that when the witnesses prove the demand and acceptance of tainted money, Section 20 of the P.C. Act will be pressed into service. 24. With due respect to the aforesaid authorities, it is clear that when the witnesses prove the demand and acceptance of tainted money, Section 20 of the P.C. Act will be pressed into service. 24. Learned Standing Counsel for the State-Vigilance further relied upon the decision reported in (2013) 14 SCC 153 (State of Punjab Vs. Madan Mohan Lal Verma) where Their Lordships observed the following:- “11. The law on the issue is well settled that demand of illegal gratification is sine qua non for constituting an offence under the Act 1988. Mere recovery of tainted money is not sufficient to convict the accused when substantive evidence in the case is not reliable, unless there is evidence to prove payment of bribe or to show that the money was taken voluntarily as a bribe. Mere receipt of the amount by the accused is not sufficient to fasten guilt, in the absence of any evidence with regard to demand and acceptance of the amount as illegal gratification. Hence, the burden rests on the accused to displace the statutory presumption raised under Section 20 of the Act 1988, by bringing on record evidence, either direct or circumstantial, to establish with reasonable probability, that the money was accepted by him, other than as a motive or reward as referred to in Section 7 of the Act 1988. While invoking the provisions of Section 20 of the Act, the court is required to consider the explanation offered by the accused, if any, only on the touchstone of preponderance of probability and not on the touchstone of proof beyond all reasonable doubt. However, before the accused is called upon to explain how the amount in question was found in his possession, the foundational facts must be established by the prosecution. The complainant is an interested and partisan witness concerned with the success of the trap and his evidence must be tested in the same way as that of any other interested witness. In a proper case, the court may look for independent corroboration before convicting the accused person. (Vide: Ram Prakash Arora v. The State of Punjab AIR 1973 SC 498 ; T. Subramanian v. The State of T .N ., (2006) 1 SCC 401 ; State of Kerala & Anr. v. C.P. Rao, (2011) 6 SCC 450 ; and Mukut Bihari & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 11 SCC 642 )”. 25. (Vide: Ram Prakash Arora v. The State of Punjab AIR 1973 SC 498 ; T. Subramanian v. The State of T .N ., (2006) 1 SCC 401 ; State of Kerala & Anr. v. C.P. Rao, (2011) 6 SCC 450 ; and Mukut Bihari & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 11 SCC 642 )”. 25. With due respect to the aforesaid decision, it is further clear that demand of illegal gratification is sine qua none for constituting an offence under the P.C. Act and mere recovery of tainted money is not sufficient to convict the accused. Similarly, the explanation of the accused also should be considered before invoking Section 20 of the P.C. Act into service. Before any explanation of the accused to be considered the prosecution required to prove the foundation of facts, i.e., demand and acceptance of illegal gratification. Now adverting to the present case it has already been observed in the aforesaid para that prosecution has utterly failed to prove the demand of illegal gratification and acceptance of Rs.200/-, i.e., Rs.100/-on 13.8.1984 and Rs.100/-on 21.8.1984 by cogent, clear, consistent and trustworthy evidence. So, question of considering the explanation of the accused does not arise. However, even if the explanation of the accused is considered, it appears that he has produced Ext.A, the approved tour diary showing his tour on 13.8.1984 to Paikarapur School, by that, his absence at the alleged place of demand and acceptance of Rs.100/-at the first instance becomes probable. So, the defence plea has also been otherwise proved by preponderance of probability. At any rate, the presumption under Section 20 of the P.C. Act about his motive to accept illegal gratification in the instant case cannot be drawn against the accused in view of the ratio decided by the decision cited above. Hence, the contention of the learned counsel for the State-Vigilance is hereby jettisoned. 26. It is stated by learned counsel for the respondent before the court below that there is no proper sanction to the prosecution for which the case of prosecution fails. Learned Standing Counsel, Vigilance on the other hand stated that the evidence of I.O. is clear enough to show that he has obtained the sanction order and produced the same before the Court. Learned Standing Counsel, Vigilance on the other hand stated that the evidence of I.O. is clear enough to show that he has obtained the sanction order and produced the same before the Court. On going through the evidence it appears that no sanction order has been marked as exhibit as the same has not been produced before the Court. It is only available from the evidence of P.W.12 that he had received the sanction order prior to submission of charge-sheet. But necessary sanction order has not been proved in evidence by P.W.12. Had it been received prior to submission of charge-sheet it is not known why the same sanction order was withheld by the prosecution. On the other hand, there is no sanction of prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Even if there is oral evidence of P.W.12 that he has obtained sanction of prosecution, it is not spelt out what materials were produced before the sanctioning authority who after application of judicial mind sanctioned the prosecution. Such sanctioning authority has also not been examined. In toto it is found that there is no sanction of prosecution to prosecute the accused under the relevant provisions of law. It is reported in N.K. Ganguly v. Central Bureau of Investigation, New Delhi: (2016) 2 Supreme Court Cases 143 where Their Lordships observed at para-35: “35. From a perusal of the case law referred to supra, it becomes clear that for the purpose of obtaining previous sanction from the appropriate government under Section 197 of CrPC, it is imperative that the alleged offence is committed in discharge of official duty by the accused. It is also important for the Court to examine the allegations contained in the final report against the Appellants, to decide whether previous sanction is required to be obtained by the respondent from the appropriate government before taking cognizance of the alleged offence by the learned Special Judge against the accused. It is also important for the Court to examine the allegations contained in the final report against the Appellants, to decide whether previous sanction is required to be obtained by the respondent from the appropriate government before taking cognizance of the alleged offence by the learned Special Judge against the accused. In the instant case, since the allegations made against the Appellants in the final report filed by the respondent that the alleged offences were committed by them in discharge of their official duty, therefore, it was essential for the learned Special Judge to correctly decide as to whether the previous sanction from the Central Government under Section 197 of CrPC was required to be taken by the respondent, before taking cognizance and passing an order issuing summons to the appellants for their presence”. 27. With due respect to the decision, it is found that if there is an offence committed during discharge of official duty, the sanction of prosecution is must under Section 197 Cr.P.C. Section 197 Cr.P.C. can be also read along with Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act which also speaks that sanction of prosecution is necessary to proceed against the accused under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Since in the instant case, the allegation of illegal gratification is squarely come to end during the discharge of duties by accused and lack of necessary sanction has made the prosecution illegal and vulnerable. On the other hand, due to lack of sanction of prosecution the accused is entitled for protection and he is immured from prosecution. CONCLUSION 28. On going through the impugned judgment, the Court is of the view that learned trial court has taken the evidence of witnesses into consideration and found there are discrepancies between the witnesses as to demand and receipt of tainted money by accused. Also the learned trial court has found the prosecution illegal due to lack of sanction. On re-appreciation of evidence as discussed above and other point with regard to proper sanction, there is nothing found with the impugned judgment to take a different view as taken by the learned trial court. On the other hand, learned trial court has justifiably passed an order of acquittal after analysing all the evidences on record. So, this Court is reluctant to set aside the finding of the learned trial court. On the other hand, learned trial court has justifiably passed an order of acquittal after analysing all the evidences on record. So, this Court is reluctant to set aside the finding of the learned trial court. On the other hand, the submission of the learned Standing Counsel for Vigilance is not accepted being same untenable. The Court appreciates on record the endeavour made by learned Standing Counsel for the State Vigilance to defend the case of prosecution. 29. In the result, the Government Appeal being devoid of merit stands dismissed. The accused be discharged from the bail bond.