JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. 1. This regular second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been preferred against the judgment and decree passed by learned First Appellate court, whereby it reversed the judgment and decree passed by learned trial court, thereby dismissing the suit of the plaintiffs. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the land comprised in Khewat No.110 min, khatauni No. 156, Khasra Nos. 79, 83, 99, 101, 106, 107 and 110, kitta 7, measuring 1-14-16 bighas, was recorded in the ownership of the State of HP, but in possession of plaintiff No.2 as tenant at Will under the defendant-appellant, whereas land comprising in Khewat No 110 min, khatauni No.157, khasra Nos. 88, 90 and 92, Kittas 3, measuring 2-1-3 bighas, situated in mauza Dudar/345 was again recorded in the ownership of the State of HP, but was in possession of plaintiff No.1 as tenant at Will under the appellant and similarly the land comprised in Khewat No.110 min, khatauni No.158, khasra Nos, 91, 102 and 104, Kittas 3 measuring 1-10-16 bighas situated in mauja Dudar/345 was also recorded in the ownership of the State of HP but was in possession of the plaintiffs in equal share as tenant at Will under the appellant. It was averred that plaintiffs had been coming in possession of the suit land for the last more than 30 years as tenant at Will and has also been paying rent regularly, but since 1.2.1992, defendant started interfering in the suit land in order to dispossess the plaintiffs, constraining them to file the suit. 3. The defendant/appellant contested the suit by filing written statement, wherein preliminary objections regarding locus standi, cause of action and maintainability were raised. On merits, it was averred that plaintiffs have been recorded as ‘Kabze Nazayaz Dom’ under the defendant and this entry was wrong and incorrect. It is the defendant who is in actual and physical possession of the suit land for the last more than 70 years, that too from the time of his forefathers. It was further averred that the defendant had never inducted the plaintiffs as tenants nor they ever remained in possession of the suit land and accordingly prayed for dismissal of the suit with special cost. 4 On 7.11.1994, learned trial court framed the following issues:- “1. It was further averred that the defendant had never inducted the plaintiffs as tenants nor they ever remained in possession of the suit land and accordingly prayed for dismissal of the suit with special cost. 4 On 7.11.1994, learned trial court framed the following issues:- “1. Whether plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of injunction as prayed for? OPP. 2. Whether the plaintiffs have no locus-standi to file the present suit? OPD. 3. Whether the plaintiffs have no cause of action to file the present suit? OPD. 4. Whether this suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD. 5. Whether the defendant is entitled to special cost as alleged? OPD.” 5. The following additional issues were ordered to be framed by the learned Additional District Judge, Mandi, as per orders passed to this effect on 1.5.2002: “5-A Whether the defendant is in actual physical possession of the land and the revenue entries showing the plaintiffs as Kabaze Nazayaj Dom are wrong, incorrect as alleged ? OPD. 5-B Whether the plaintiffs were inducted as tenants t Will by the defendant on payment of rent as alleged ? OPP. 5-C Whether the suit has been filed by the plaintiffs on false frivolous grounds in order to harass the defendant as alleged ? OPD. 5-D Whether the revenue entries got incorporated by the plaintiffs in their favour in connivance with revenue officials taking undue advantage of the absence of the defendant as alleged ? OPD. 6. The learned trial court, after recording the statements of parties and evidence on record, dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs. Feeling aggrieved, respondents/ plaintiffs preferred first appeal before the learned first appellate court, which reversed the findings recorded by the learned trial court and allowed the suit of the plaintiffs/respondents. Feeling aggrieved with the same, appellant/defendant has filed the instant appeal. 7. This court vide its order dated 28.3.2006, admitted the appeal on the following substantial question of law: “1. Whether it is permissible under the law to grant decree of injunction in favour of a plaintiff, who seeks to be in possession on the basis of certain legal title, but fails to prove that title even though possession is proved?” 8. Admittedly, the suit is for injunction and this court, therefore, need not go into the question of title, lest it causes prejudice to either of the parties. Admittedly, the suit is for injunction and this court, therefore, need not go into the question of title, lest it causes prejudice to either of the parties. The learned first appellate court has held the plaintiffs/respondents to be in possession of the suit land. Now in what capacity or title etc. respondents are in possession, is hardly of any avail, because even a trespasser who is in possession of the property is entitled to the protection of law and can only be evicted by the rightful owner by taking recourse to law. 9. In Yeshwant Singh Vs. Jagdish Singh, AIR 1968 SC 620 , it was categorically held that the landlord has no right to re-enter and dispossess the tenant except by approaching a competent court. It was further held that forcible dispossession was illegal. 10. In Krishna Ram Mahale Vs. Shobha Venkat Rao, AIR 1989 SC 2097 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that where a person is in settled possession of property, even on the assumption that he had no right to remain on the property, he cannot be dispossessed by the owner of the property except by recourse to law. Relevant observation of the judgment reads thus:- “8………It is a well-settled law in this country that where a person is in settled possession of property, even on the assumption that he had no right to remain on the property, he cannot be dispossessed by the owner of the property except by recourse to law. If any authority were needed for that proposition, we could refer to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Lallu Yeshwant Singh v. Rao Jagdish Singh, (1968) 2 SCR 203 at pp.208-210: ( AIR 1968 SC 620 at pp.622-23). This Court in that judgment cited with approval the well-known passage from the leading Privy Council case of Midnapur Zamindary Company Limited v. Naresh Narayan Roy 51 Ind App 293 at p. 299 : ( AIR 1924 PC 144 ) where it has been observed (p-208) (of SCR): (at p.622 of AIR): “In India persons are not permitted to take forcible possession; they must obtain such possession as they are entitled to through a Court.” 11. This legal position was reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Walter Louis Franklin (Dead) through LRs Vs. George Singh (Dead) through LRs. (1997) 3 SCC 503 . 12. This legal position was reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Walter Louis Franklin (Dead) through LRs Vs. George Singh (Dead) through LRs. (1997) 3 SCC 503 . 12. Yet, again when the matter came before the Hon’ble three Judges in Rame Gowda (Dead) by LRs. Vs. M. Varadappa Naidu (Dead) by LRs & Anr (2004) 1 SCC 769 , it was reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that an occupant in “settled possession” cannot be dispossessed without recourse to law. The relevant observations are re-produced here-in-under:- “6. The law in India, as it has developed, accords with the jurisprudential thought as propounded by Salmond. In Midnapur Zamindary Co. Ltd. Vs. Kumar Naresh Narayan Roy and Ors., 1924 PC 144, Sir John Edge summed up the Indian law by stating that in India persons are not permitted to take forcible possession; they must obtain such possession as they are entitled to through a Court. 7. The thought has prevailed incessantly, till date, the last and latest one in the chain of decisions being Ramesh Chand Ardawatiya Vs. Anil Panjwani (2003) 7 SCC 350 . Inbetween, to quote a few out of severals, in Lallu Yeshwant Singh (dead) by his legal representative Vs. Rao Jagdish Singh and others (1968) 2 SCR 203 , this Court has held that a landlord did commit trespass when he forcibly entered his own land in the possession of a tenant whose tenancy has expired. The Court turned down the submission that under the general law applicable to a lessor and a lessee there was no rule or principle which made it obligatory for the lessor to resort to Court and obtain an order for possession before he could eject the lessee. The court quoted with approval the law as stated by a Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in Yar Mohammad Vs. Lakshmi Das ( AIR 1959 All. 1 , 4). "Law respects possession even if there is no title to support it. It will not permit any person to take the law in his own hands and to dispossess a person in actual possession without having recourse to a court. No person can be allowed to become a judge in his own cause.” (AIR p.5, para 13) In the oft-quoted case of Nair Service Society Ltd. Vs. K.C. Alexander and Ors. It will not permit any person to take the law in his own hands and to dispossess a person in actual possession without having recourse to a court. No person can be allowed to become a judge in his own cause.” (AIR p.5, para 13) In the oft-quoted case of Nair Service Society Ltd. Vs. K.C. Alexander and Ors. (1968) 3 SCR 163, this Court held that a person in possession of land in assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner. When the facts disclose no title in either party, possession alone decides. The court quoted Loft's maxim - 'Possessio contra omnes valet praeter eur cui ius sit possessionis (he that hath possession hath right against all but him that hath the very right)' and said: (AIR p.1175, para 20). "A defendant in such a case must show in himself or his predecessor a valid legal title, or probably a possession prior to the plaintiff's and thus be able to raise a presumption prior in time". In M.C. Chockalingam and Ors. Vs. V. Manickavasagam and Ors. (1974) 1 SCC 48 , this Court held that the law forbids forcible dispossession, even with the best of title. In Krishna Ram Mahale (dead) by his Lrs. Vs. Mrs. Shobha Venkat Rao (1989) 4 SCC 131 , it was held that where a person is in settled possession of property, even on the assumption that he had no right to remain on the property, he cannot be dispossessed by the owner of the property except by recourse to law. In Nagar Palika, Jind Vs. Jagat Singh, Advocate (1995) 3 SCC 426, this Court held that disputed questions of title are to be decided by due process of law, but the peaceful possession is to be protected from the trespasser without regard to the question of the origin of the possession. When the defendant fails in proving his title to the suit land the plaintiff can succeed in securing a decree for possession on the basis of his prior possession against the defendant who has dispossessed him. Such a suit will be founded on the averment of previous possession of the plaintiff and dispossession by the defendant. 8. When the defendant fails in proving his title to the suit land the plaintiff can succeed in securing a decree for possession on the basis of his prior possession against the defendant who has dispossessed him. Such a suit will be founded on the averment of previous possession of the plaintiff and dispossession by the defendant. 8. It is thus clear that so far as the Indian law is concerned the person in peaceful possession is entitled to retain his possession and in order to protect such possession he may even use reasonable force to keep out a trespasser. A rightful owner who has been wrongfully dispossessed of land may retake possession if he can do so peacefully and without the use of unreasonable force. If the trespasser is in settled possession of the property belonging to the rightful owner, the rightful owner shall have to take recourse to law; he cannot take the law in his own hands and evict the trespasser or interfere with his possession. The law will come to the aid of a person in peaceful and settled possession by injuncting even a rightful owner from using force or taking law in his own hands, and also by restoring him in possession even from the rightful owner (of course subject to the law of limitation), if the latter has dispossessed the prior possessor by use of force. In the absence of proof of better title, possession or prior peaceful settled possession is itself evidence of title. Law presumes the possession to go with the title unless rebutted. The owner of any property may prevent even by using reasonable force a trespasser from an attempted trespass, when it is in the process of being committed, or is of a flimsy character, or recurring, intermittent, stray or casual in nature, or has just been committed, while the rightful owner did not have enough time to have recourse to law. In the last of he cases, the possession of the trespasser, just entered into would not be called as one acquiesced to by the true owner. 9. It is the settled possession or effective possession of a person without title which would entitle him to protect his possession even as against the true owner. In the last of he cases, the possession of the trespasser, just entered into would not be called as one acquiesced to by the true owner. 9. It is the settled possession or effective possession of a person without title which would entitle him to protect his possession even as against the true owner. The concept of settled possession and the right of the possessor to protect his possession against the owner has come to be settled by a catena of decisions. Illustratively, we may refer to Munshi Ram and Ors. Vs. Delhi Administration (1968) 2 SCR 455 , Puran Singh and Ors. Vs. The State of Punjab (1975) 4 SCC 518 and Ram Rattan and Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (1977) 1 SCC 188 . The authorities need not be multiplied. In Munshi Ram & Ors.'s case (supra), it was held that no one, including the true owner, has a right to dispossess the trespasser by force if the trespasser is in settled possession of the land and in such a case unless he is evicted in the due course of law, he is entitled to defend his possession even against the rightful owner. But merely stray or even intermittent acts of trespass do not give such a right against the true owner. The possession which a trespasser is entitled to defend against the rightful owner must be settled possession, extending over a sufficiently long period of time and acquiesced to by the true owner. A casual act of possession would not have the effect of interrupting the possession of the rightful owner. The rightful owner may re-enter and re-instate himself provided he does not use more force than is necessary. Such entry will be viewed only as resistance to an intrusion upon his possession which has never been lost. A stray act of trespass, or a possession which has not matured into settled possession, can be obstructed or removed by the true owner even by using necessary force. In Puran Singh and Ors.'s case (supra), the Court clarified that it is difficult to lay down any hard and fast rule as to when the possession of a trespasser can mature into settled possession. The 'settled possession' must be (i) effective, (ii) undisturbed, and (iii) to the knowledge of the owner or without any attempt at concealment by the trespasser. The 'settled possession' must be (i) effective, (ii) undisturbed, and (iii) to the knowledge of the owner or without any attempt at concealment by the trespasser. The phrase 'settled possession' does not carry any special charm or magic in it; nor is it a ritualistic formula which can be confined in a strait-jacket. An occupation of the property by a person as an agent or a servant acting at the instance of the owner will not amount to actual physical possession. The court laid down the following tests which may be adopted as a working rule for determining the attributes of 'settled possession' (SCC p.527, para 12):- (i) that the trespasser must be in actual physical possession of the property over a sufficiently long period; (ii) that the possession must be to the knowledge (either express or implied) of the owner or without any attempt at concealment by the trespasser and which contains an element of animus possidendi. The nature of possession of the trespasser would, however, be a matter to be decided on the facts and circumstances of each case; (iii) the process of dispossession of the true owner by the trespasser must be complete and final and must be acquiesced to by the true owner; (iv) that one of the usual tests to determine the quality of settled possession, in the case of culturable land, would be whether or not the trespasser, after having taken possession, had grown any crop. If the crop had been grown by the trespasser, then even the true owner has no right to destroy the crop grown by the trespasser and take forcible possession. 10. In the cases of Munshi Ram and Ors. (supra) and Puran Singh and Ors. (supra), the Court has approved the statement of law made in Horam Vs. Rex AIR 1949 Allahabad 564, wherein a distinction was drawn between the trespasser in the process of acquiring possession and the trespasser who had already accomplished or completed his possession wherein the true owner may be treated to have acquiesced in; while the former can be obstructed and turned out by the true owner even by using reasonable force, the latter, may be dispossessed by the true owner only by having recourse to the due process of law for re-acquiring possession over his property.” 13. From the aforesaid exposition of law, it is absolutely clear that an ‘occupant’ in ‘settled possession’ cannot be dispossessed without recourse to law. In what capacity, the occupant has been occupying the land would hardly be of any consequence because as observed earlier, even a trespasser in settled possession can be dispossessed or evicted only by following due process of law. 14. To be fair to the learned counsel for the appellant, he has citied the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anathula Sudhakar Vs. Buchi Reddy (Dead) by L.Rs & Ors, AIR 2008 SC 2033 to canvass that the complicated questions regarding title could only be examined in a title suit and not in a suit relating to injunction. As I have already observed earlier that this court is not deciding the question of title and is only concerned with the question of possession of the land which has been found to be with plaintiffs/respondents. The substantial question of law is answered accordingly. 15. In view of the aforesaid discussion, there is no merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.