JUDGMENT S.N.PRASAD, J. - The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, being the petitioner, has filed this writ petition seeking to quash the order dated 20.10.2010 passed by the Employees Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi in ATA No.249 of 2006. 2. The short fact of the case of the petitioner is that the Orissa State Road Transport Corporation (OSRTC), Rourkela in the district of Sundargarh was covered under the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter to be referred to as the “Act, 1952”, in short) bearing Code No.OR/1321, but failed to remit the PF dues within due dates granted under the statute and accordingly, notice was issued upon the Corporation under Sections 14B and 7Q of the Act, 1952 for assessment for the period 3/1992 to 2/1994 along with details of the belated remittance of the payments. In response to the said notice, the Divisional Manager of the establishment appeared and admitted the delay reason being was not intentional. Accordingly, the competent authority has passed order on 24.05.2004 levying damages of Rs.2,04,962.00 under Section 148 and nil amount under Section 7Q of the Act, 1952. Assessment was done as per Para 32A of the Employees Provident Fund Scheme, 1952 (hereinafter to be referred to as the “Scheme, 1952”). Opposite party- Corporation challenged the same before the appellate Tribunal as per Section 7I of the Act, 1952 and the said appeal has been registered as ATA No. 249 (10) of 2006. The appellate authority remitted the matter back to the petitioner with a direction to assess the dues @ 10% inclusive of interest. The petitioner aggrieved with the order passed by the appellate authority is before this Court in the present writ petition inter alia challenging on the ground that the rate of damages, which is to be levied under Section 14B of the Act, 1952 has been fixed as per Para 32A of the Scheme, 1952 with effect from 1.9.1991 and as such, since the rate of damages has been provided under the statute, the Tribunal, who is only the fact finding authority, cannot go beyond the statute. It has also been contented by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the authority is duty bound to assess the quantum of damage in view of the specific provision as contained in Para 32A, which has been implemented w.e.f. 1.9.1991. 3. It has also been contented by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the authority is duty bound to assess the quantum of damage in view of the specific provision as contained in Para 32A, which has been implemented w.e.f. 1.9.1991. 3. After being noticed, opposite party-Corporation appeared and filed counter affidavit. Learned counsel representing the opposite party-Corporation has submitted that the learned Tribunal has not committed error in passing the order and taking into consideration the situation, which the Corporation was facing at that time and taking a lenient view, the learned Tribunal has reduced the assessment to 10%, which is not contrary to rule and does not suffer from illegality. Learned counsel for the opposite party-Corporation has placed reliance upon one letter issued on 29.5.1990 in which reference has been made regulating levy of damages at the revised rates in respect of all defaults arising on and after 1.6.1990, i.e. defaults arising in the payment of dues for the month of May 1990 onwards subject to the condition as specified in the preceding paragraphs. Placing reliance on the same, it has been submitted the Tribunal has not committed any error and as such, the writ petition is not worthy to be considered and accordingly, is fit to be dismissed. 4. Learned counsel representing the Corporation has submitted that Para 32B provides that the authority can reduce or waive the damages levied under Section 14B. Rebutting this argument, learned counsel representing the petitioner has submitted that there is no question of application of the provisions of Para 32B of the Scheme, 1952 since Para 32B is applicable with respect to the second proviso to Section 14B of the Act, 1952. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and after going through the records available with the pleading, the sole question, arises for consideration is as to Whether the learned Tribunal in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 7I of the Act, 1952, has got power to go beyond the statute ? 6. In order to answer this question, it is necessary to refer to the provision of Section 7I of the Act, 1952, which is as under: “7 –I. Appeals to the Tribunal. 6. In order to answer this question, it is necessary to refer to the provision of Section 7I of the Act, 1952, which is as under: “7 –I. Appeals to the Tribunal. – (1) Any person aggrieved by a notification issued by the Central Government, or an order passed by the Central Government, or any authority, under the proviso to sub-Section 3, or sub-Section4, of Section I, or Section3, or sub-Section 1 of Section 7A, or Section 7B except an order rejecting an application for review referred to in sub-Section 5 thereof, or Section 7C, or Section 14B may prefer an appeal to a Tribunal against such order. (2) Every appeal under sub-Section 1 shall be filed in such form and manner, within such time and be accompanied by such fees, as may be prescribed.” Section 7L of the Act, 1952, which is being referred, is as hereunder: 7L. Orders of Tribunal. – (1) A Tribunal may, after giving the parties to the appeal, an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit, confirming, modifying or annulling the order appealed against or may refer the case back to the authority which passed such order with such directions as the tribunal may think fit, for a fresh adjudication or order, as the case may be, after taking additional evidence, if necessary. (2) A Tribunal may, at any time within five years from the date of its order, with a view to rectifying any mistake apparent from the record, amend any order passed by it under sub-Section 1 and shall make such amendment in the order if the mistake is brought to its notice by the parties to the appeal: Provided that an amendment which has the effect of enhancing the amount due from, or otherwise increasing the liability of, the employer shall not be made under this sub-Section, unless the Tribunal has given notice to him of its intention to do so and has allowed him a reasonable opportunity of being heard. (3) A Tribunal shall send a copy of every order passed under this Section to the parties to the appeal. (4) Any order made by a Tribunal finally disposing of an appeal shall not be questioned in any Court of law.” 7. Para 32A of the Scheme, 1952 is quoted as hereunder: “32A. (3) A Tribunal shall send a copy of every order passed under this Section to the parties to the appeal. (4) Any order made by a Tribunal finally disposing of an appeal shall not be questioned in any Court of law.” 7. Para 32A of the Scheme, 1952 is quoted as hereunder: “32A. Recovery of damages for default in payment of any contribution (1) Where an employer makes default in the payment of any contribution to the fund, or in the transfer of accumulations required to be transferred by him under sub-Section (2) of Section 15 or sub-Section (5) of Section 17 of the Act or in the payment of any charges payable under any other provisions of the Act or Scheme or under any of the conditions specified under Section 17 of the Act, the Central Provident Fund Commissioner or such officer as may be authorised by the Central Government by notification in the Official Gazette, in this behalf, may recover from the employer by way of penalty, damages at the rates given below:— Period of default Rate of damages (% of arrears per annum) (a) Less than two months 17 (b) Two months and above but less than four months 22 (c) Four months and above but less than six months 27 (d) Six months and above 37 (2) The damages shall be calculated to the nearest rupee, 50 paise or more to be counted as the nearest higher rupee and fraction of a rupee less than 50 paise to be ignored.” 8. On perusal of the provisions as contained in Section 7I, it is evident that any person aggrieved by a notification issued by the Central Government, or an order passed by the Central Government, or any authority, under the proviso to sub-Section 3, or sub-section 4, of Section I, or Section 3, or sub-section 1 of Section 7A, or Section 7B except an order rejecting an application for review referred to in sub-section 5 thereof, or Section 7C, or Section 14B may prefer an appeal to a Tribunal against such notification or order. 9. 9. Section 7L also provides that the Tribunal may, after giving the parties to the appeal an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit, confirming, modifying or annulling the order appealed against or may refer the case back to the authority which passed such order with such directions as the Tribunal may think fit, for fresh adjudication or order, as the case may be, after taking additional evidence, if necessary. Thus, it is evident that the Tribunal has been vested with the power to confirm, modify or annul the order appealed against or remit the matter for fresh adjudication or order, as the case may be. In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-Section (1) of Section 21 of the Act, 1952, the Central Government has made the rule known as “Employees’ Provident Funds Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1997. 10. So far as the case in hand is concerned, the factual position, which is not in dispute is that the Corporation which is coming under the purview of the Act, 1952 has defaulted in depositing the statutory contribution in the PF account and as such proceeding under Section 14B and 7Q has been initiated and the authorities after hearing the establishment passed order determining the damages due from the establishment under the Act, 1952. The Corporation being aggrieved with the decision of the authority dated 25.05.2004 has preferred an appeal before the EPF Tribunal taking therein the ground that the Corporation had sustained huge loss and as such, the delay in deposit of the contribution was not intentional rather it is due to the situation beyond its control and taking into consideration this aspect of the matter, the Tribunal has passed the following order: “Hence, the order. The appeal is allowed. The case is remanded. The damages be assessed @ 10% with as usually interest and the same may be realized from the appellant. Copy of the order be sent to both the parties. File be consigned to record room.” The petitioner being aggrieved with the order regarding direction to assess the dues @ 10% inclusive of interest is before this Court on the ground that the Tribunal has got no jurisdiction to sit over the statutory provision. 11. Copy of the order be sent to both the parties. File be consigned to record room.” The petitioner being aggrieved with the order regarding direction to assess the dues @ 10% inclusive of interest is before this Court on the ground that the Tribunal has got no jurisdiction to sit over the statutory provision. 11. On perusal of the provisions as contained in Section 14B, it is evident that the said statute has provided in a situation when the employer makes default in payment of any contribution to the Fund and the provision for fixing the quantum of damages as per Para 32A, which has been implemented with effect from 1.9.1991 wherein specific rate of damages (percentage of arrears per annum) has been provided. 12. Argument has been advanced on behalf of the learned counsel representing the opposite party-Corporation that the authority has resorted to the provisions made in Para 32B and according to him, the Tribunal by following the provisions as contained in Para 32B has rightly passed the order. 13. After a close scrutiny of the provisions as contained in Para 32B, it is evident that the provisions contained therein provides the power to the Central Board to reduce or waive the damages levied under Section 14B of the Act, 1952 in relation to the establishments specified in the second proviso to Section 14B subject to certain terms and conditions. From a bare perusal of the second proviso to Section 14B, it is evident that the said provision confers power upon the Central Board to reduce or waive damages levied under this Section in relation to an establishment, which is a sick industrial company and in respect of which a scheme for rehabilitation has been sanctioned by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) established under Section 4 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, but this is not the case of the opposite party-Corporation, which was ever been declared as a sick industrial company by the BIFR and as such, there is no question of application of the provisions of Para 32B of the Scheme, 1952. 14. There is no dispute about the fact that the Court of law or the Tribunal or quasi judicial authority is expected to follow the statute and they are duty bound to follow it. 14. There is no dispute about the fact that the Court of law or the Tribunal or quasi judicial authority is expected to follow the statute and they are duty bound to follow it. The Act, 1952 being a Central Act has been promulgated to provide the benefit to the down trodden people being a beneficial legislation. In order to implement the provisions of the Scheme in a proper manner, power has been conferred upon the competent authority under Section 5 to frame a Scheme. In pursuance to the power conferred under Section 5 of the Act, 1952, the Central Government promulgated a provision under the Scheme, 1952 containing therein Para 32A, which provides the procedure to assess the rate of damages percentage wise per annum. Thus, the Scheme, 1952 has a statutory force and as such, the same is to be followed in its letter and spirit. 15. The opposite party-Corporation has challenged the order passed by the competent authority under Section 14B of the Act, 1952 stating therein that the rate of percentage of damages may be reduced considering the precarious financial condition of the Corporation and accepting the said contention, the Tribunal by exceeding its jurisdiction has modified the order passed by the competent authority by giving a go bye to the statutory provision as contained in Para 32A of the Scheme, 1952. Thus, there is no doubt in my mind that the Tribunal has never been conferred with any power to sit over the statutory provision on whatsoever ground may be, otherwise, there will be no sanctity of the statutory provision. Moreover, it is not the duty of the Court or Tribunal to sit over the statutory provision, rather it is the duty of the Court of law to see as to whether the order passed is in accordance with law and certainly if the order is not in accordance with law, the Tribunal or Court of law has got power to rectify the same in consonance with the statute or direct the authorities to rectify the mistake, but in no circumstances, the Court of law or Tribunal can sit over the statutory provision on the basis of sympathy. To note here that in our democratic system, Parliament and Legislature are supreme and once the rule making body has framed a Rule, the Court is to see that the rule of law is to be followed. To note here that in our democratic system, Parliament and Legislature are supreme and once the rule making body has framed a Rule, the Court is to see that the rule of law is to be followed. But without considering this, the Tribunal has passed order travelling beyond the statute as provided under Para 32A of the Scheme, 1952. Further, on perusal of the powers conferred under Section 7I, 7L or even under Rules,1997 no such power has been conferred upon the Tribunal. The Tribunal is only to see the fact whether there is any error in the fact finding or not and not by calling upon the witnesses or evidence assuming the power of a Civil Court, but no where it has been reflected in the statute that the Tribunal can go beyond the statute. 16. There is no dispute about the fact that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed in any statute, the act must be done in that manner. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Apex Court rendered in State of Jharkhanda v. Ambay Cements and another, 2005(I) SCC 368 wherein it has been held that it is the cardinal rule of interpretation that where a statute provides that a particular thing should be done, it should be done in the manner prescribed and not in any other way. 17. In Babu Verghese and others v. Bar Council of Kerala and others, (1993) 3 SCC 422 their Lordships of the Apex Court has been pleased to hold as under: “31. It is the basic principle of law long settled that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all.” 18. The aforesaid principle has since been approved by the Apex Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 322 and in Deep Chand v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 1527 . These two cases have again been considered by the Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh, AIR 1964 SC 358 . This rule has since been applied to the exercise of jurisdiction by Courts and has also been recognized as a salutary principle of administrative law. These two cases have again been considered by the Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh, AIR 1964 SC 358 . This rule has since been applied to the exercise of jurisdiction by Courts and has also been recognized as a salutary principle of administrative law. In this respect, reference may also be made to the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Zuari Cement Ltd. v. Regional Director, E.S.I. Corporation and another, (2015) 7 SCC 690 and in paragraph 15, it has been held as follows : “15. Where there is want of jurisdiction, the order passed by the Court/ tribunal is a nullity or non-est. What is relevant is whether the Court had the power to grant the relief asked for. ESI Court did not have the jurisdiction to consider the question of grant of exemption, order passed by the ESI Court granting exemption and consequently setting aside the demand notices is non-est. The High Court, in our view, rightly set aside the order of ESI Court and the impugned judgment does not suffer from any infirmity warranting interference.” 19. In view of the aforesaid settled proposition of law, in my considered view, the Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction in passing the order impugned by remitting the matter back to the authority to assess the rate of damage @ 10% per annum. Accordingly, the impugned order being not sustainable, is quashed. 20. The writ petition stands allowed. No costs. Petition allowed.