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2016 DIGILAW 542 (MP)

Kedar Jatav v. State of M. P.

2016-07-11

VED PRAKASH SHARMA

body2016
ORDER 1. Legality, propriety and correctness of the order dated 10th September, 2015 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Gohad, District Bhind in S.T. No.145/2015 has been challenged in this revision petition preferred under sections 397/401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 2. By the order impugned, charge for the offence punishable under section 307 and in alternate section 307/34 IPC has been framed against the petitioners for attempting to commit murder of complainant, Balkishan. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners has challenged the impugned order on three grounds : firstly; the injury, allegedly, found on the person of the complainant, Balkishan has not been reported to be dangerous to life, secondly; simple fracture of rib has been reported and there is no other grievous hurt and thirdly; it cannot be said on the basis of the material submitted along with the charge sheet, that petitioners had an intention to commit murder of Balkishan. Therefore, as submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners, the learned Additional Sessions Judge has committed a serious illegality in framing aforesaid charge against the petitioners. It is submitted that at the most a charge for offence punishable under section 325 and in the alternate section 325/34 IPC could have been framed against the petitioners. 4. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the petitioners has placed strong reliance on the decision of the apex Court in the case of Sakharam v. State of Madhya Pradesh and another, reported in 2015(3) JLJ 197= (2015)10 SCC 557 . Inviting attention of this Court to paragraphs 9 and 10 of the aforesaid judgment, it is submitted that the injuries found on the person of Balkishan will not bring the case within the ambit of section 307 IPC. The decision of this Court in the case of Vardichand v. Rameshwar and others, reported in 2006 CrLR (MP) 202, has further been relied upon in this regard. 5. Per contra, the learned counsel for the State has submitted that as per MLC report, apart from fracture of 5th rib on right side of the chest, one lacerated wound has also been found on the forehead of the complainant. The injury pertaining to fracture of rib, as a matter of chance, has not caused any damage to the lungs of Balkishan, otherwise the same could have proved fatal to him. The injury pertaining to fracture of rib, as a matter of chance, has not caused any damage to the lungs of Balkishan, otherwise the same could have proved fatal to him. With the aforesaid submissions, the learned counsel for the State has supported the impugned order. 6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and after going through the record, I am of the view that the decision rendered by the apex Court in the case of Sakharam (supra), is squarely not applicable to the facts of the present case for the simple reason that the apex Court in that case was considering the appeal against conviction while in the instant case, the matter is at the stage of framing of charge only. It is clearly born out from Para 9 of the report in Sakharam's case (supra), that the Doctor neither gave any opinion regarding nature of injuries caused to the victim nor questions in that regard were put to him during his examination before the trial Court. In the instant case, the stage of examining the doctor and putting the questions, as regards nature of injuries caused to victim, will come at a later stage. Therefore, the petitioners cannot derive any benefit from the decision rendered by the apex Court in Sukharam's case (supra). In Vardichand's case (supra), only simple injuries were found on the non-vital parts of the body of the victim, therefore, the same is distinguishable on facts. 7. It is pertinent to state here that at the time of framing of charge, the Court has to prima facie come to the opinion whether there is sufficient material to entertain grave and serious suspicion regarding complicity of the accused in the alleged offence. At that stage, the question of determination of guilt or culpability is not required to be examined. In this connection, the law laid down by the apex Court in the case of State of M.P. v. S.B.Johari and others [ 2000(1) JLJ 142 = AIR 2000 SC 665 ], can be usefully referred to, the relevant part whereof runs as under : “It is settled law that at the stage of framing the charge, the Court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The Court is not required to appreciate the evidence and arrive at the conclusion that the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused. If the Court is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out for proceeding further then a charge has to be framed.” As regards quashment of charge in the aforesaid case, it has been further held as under : “The charge can be quashed if the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted before it is challenged by cross-examination or rebutted by defence evidence, if any, cannot show that accused committed the particular offence. In such case there would be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial.” 8. Considering the facts of the present case in the light of the aforesaid judicial pronouncement, it can safely be said that there was sufficient material before the trial Court to entertain serious suspicion regarding complicity of the petitioners for an offence under section 307 and in alternate section 307/34 IPC. Therefore, it cannot be said that the impugned order suffers from any illegality or impropriety. 9. Accordingly, this petition is hereby dismissed in limine. Deependra Singh Kushwah for petitioners; Vijay Sundaram, Panel Lawyer for respondent No.1/State; Rahul Bansal for respondent No.2/complainant.