JUDGMENT : Rajiv Sharma, J. This FAO (HMA) is directed against the judgment dated 17.11.2015, passed by the learned Addl. District Judge-I, Kangra at Dharamshala, Distt. Kangra, H.P. in HMA No. 40-D/III/07. 2. Key facts, necessary for the adjudication of this appeal are that the appellant-petitioner (hereinafter referred to as the appellant) has instituted a petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), against the respondent. The marriage between the parties was solemnized on 5.12.1994 according to Hindu rites and customs at Nangal, Roopnagar (Punjab). A daughter was born out of the wed lock on 23.2.1996. According to the averments contained in the petition, the petitioner was in service and posted at Tonk in Rajasthan. After the marriage the respondent did not accompany him to Tonk, however, preferred to live with his parents at Talwara. In the month of May, 1996, the petitioner was transferred to Talwara where both the parties resided together. In the month of July, 1996, the father of the petitioner was transferred to Nangal. The respondent instead of staying with the petitioner at Talwara went to her parents’ house at village Badala. In the month of May, 1997, the petitioner was transferred to Dharamshala and as such, he went to village Badala to bring the respondent, but she preferred to stay at Nangal with the parents of the petitioner. In the month of December, 1997, the respondent left Nangal and instead of coming to Dharmamshala went to her parents’ house at village Badala. In the month of May, 2001, the respondent lodged a false complaint against the petitioner and his parents, brother and sister at Police Station, Nangal. The matter was compromised. After one month, the petitioner brought the respondent to Dharamshala and the parties lived together for some time. After that the respondent left the company of the petitioner. The petitioner was constrained to file a petition under Section 9 of the Act on 11.4.2002. In retaliation, the respondent also filed a petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C. before the learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Una on 25.5.2002. The learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Una ordered monthly maintenance of Rs. 2500/- to the respondent. The respondent has left the company of the petitioner. 3. The petition was contested by the respondent. She denied the averments made in the petition. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Una on 25.5.2002. The learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Una ordered monthly maintenance of Rs. 2500/- to the respondent. The respondent has left the company of the petitioner. 3. The petition was contested by the respondent. She denied the averments made in the petition. According to her, the petitioner was having extra marital affair with one Lata Sharma daughter of Baba Jayendra Puri of Baijnath temple. The petitioner did not prefer to take respondent along with him to Tonk in Rajasthan. The petitioner himself asked the respondent to stay with his parents at Talwara. When the parents of the petitioner went to Nangal, the respondent did not go to her parents’ house at village Badala but she went to her in-laws house at Nangal. The family of the petitioner used to maltreat her. They used to abuse her on the pretext that she was not beautiful and has not brought sufficient dowry. The petitioner and his parents also held the respondent guilty for delivering a female child. The petitioner never asked the respondent to join his company at Dharamshala on his transfer. She was forced to report the matter to the police when the cruelty of the in-laws became intolerable. The matter was compromised on 17.6.2001. The respondent stayed at Dharamshala for three months in rented accommodation but the petitioner stayed in some other accommodation. She admitted that petition was filed under Section 125 Cr.P.C since the petitioner had refused to maintain her. The matter was compromised before learned Addl. District Judge-II, Kangra at Dharamshala. However, the petitioner kept the respondent again in separate accommodation. The petition was dismissed by the learned Addl. District Judge-II, Kangra at Dharamshala on 17.11.2015. 4. The issues were framed by the learned Addl. District Judge-I, Kangra on 11.5.2010. The learned Addl. District Judge-I, Kangra, dismissed the petition on 17.11.2015. Hence, this petition. 5. I have heard learned Senior Advocates for the parties and gone through the impugned judgment very carefully. 6. The petitioner has appeared as PW-1. He has reiterated the contents made in the petition. In his cross-examination, he testified that he remained posted at Tonk for three years. The respondent did not join his company at Tonk. He admitted that during the period he remained at Tonk, the respondent lived with her parents. 6. The petitioner has appeared as PW-1. He has reiterated the contents made in the petition. In his cross-examination, he testified that he remained posted at Tonk for three years. The respondent did not join his company at Tonk. He admitted that during the period he remained at Tonk, the respondent lived with her parents. He denied the suggestion that his parents used to beat and treat the respondent as a servant. His parents had never harassed her for bringing insufficient dowry. He admitted that when he came to Dharamshala, the respondent was staying at village Badala. He denied the suggestion that at Dharamshala he provided separate accommodation to the respondent. He denied that he has ousted the respondent after beating her. 7. PW-2 Sukhdev Singh is the father of the petitioner. He has led his evidence by filing affidavit Ext. PW-2/A. He admitted that when the petitioner was transferred to Dharamshala, the respondent lived with them. He admitted that the petitioner kept the respondent with him at Dharamshala for one month. He admitted that respondent lodged a complainant against them at Police Station Nangal and the matter was compromised. He also admitted that he disinherited the petitioner from his property. 8. The respondent has led her evidence by filing RW-1/A. She denied the suggestion that she did not accompany the petitioner during his posting at Tonk. She admitted that after the compromise at Police Station Nangal, her husband took her to Dharamshala from the house of her maternal uncle. She admitted that there were 8-10 houses in the vicinity where the parties were living at Dharamshala. She denied specifically that in October, 2001 she herself left the house of the petitioner without any reason. 9. RW-2 Prem Kumar, brother of the respondent tendered his affidavit vide Ext. RW-2/A. RW-3 Asha Devi and RW-4 Pushpa Devi also tendered their evidence by way of affidavits Ext. RW-3/A and Ext. RW-4/A, respectively. They have denied the suggestion that respondent was neither maltreated nor ousted by the petitioner and his parents. 10. The respondent was always willing and ready to go to Tonk but the petitioner has never taken her to Tonk. She was staying either at Nangal or Talwara with the parents of the petitioner. The respondent was mal-treated by the parents of the petitioner. 10. The respondent was always willing and ready to go to Tonk but the petitioner has never taken her to Tonk. She was staying either at Nangal or Talwara with the parents of the petitioner. The respondent was mal-treated by the parents of the petitioner. It is, in these circumstances, she was constrained to file complaint against the petitioner and his family members. The matter stood compromised between the parties on 17.6.2001. Since the petitioner has failed to maintain respondent and her child, she was constrained to file petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C. The learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Una has ordered the petitioner to pay monthly maintenance at the rate of Rs. 2500/- per month to the respondent. 11. The matter was also compromised before the learned Addl. District Judge-II, Kangra at Dharamshala in the proceedings initiated under Section 9 of the Act and the petitioner had agreed to take the respondent on 14.3.2003. It is the petitioner who has ousted the respondent from his house. He cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own wrongs. It was necessary for the petitioner to prove animus deserendi. The petitioner has forced the respondent either to live with his parents at Talwara or Nangal or with her parents at Badala. Since the petitioner and his family members have harassed the respondent for bringing insufficient dowry, she had no other alternative except to stay with her parents. 12. The petitioner has miserably failed to lead any tangible and reliable evidence to prove the allegation that he was treated with cruelty by the respondent. The petitioner has neither maintained the respondent nor he has taken the respondent to the place of his work. The petitioner has also failed to prove that the respondent has deserted him without sufficient cause. Merely that the respondent has failed to prove that the petitioner was living adulterous life, will not amount to cruelty, as canvassed by Sh. R.K. Sharma, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner. 13. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manisha Tyagi vs. Deepak Kumar reported in 2010(1) Divorce & Matrimonial Cases 451, have explained the term ‘cruelty’ as under: “24. This is no longer the required standard. R.K. Sharma, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner. 13. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manisha Tyagi vs. Deepak Kumar reported in 2010(1) Divorce & Matrimonial Cases 451, have explained the term ‘cruelty’ as under: “24. This is no longer the required standard. Now it would be sufficient to show that the conduct of one of the spouses is so abnormal and below the accepted norm that the other spouse could not reasonable be expected to put up with it. The conduct is no longer required to be so atrociously abominable which would cause a reasonable apprehension that would be harmful or injurious to continue the cohabitation with the other spouse. Therefore, to establish cruelty it is not necessary that physical violence should be used. However, continued illtreatment cessation of marital intercourse, studied neglect, indifference of one spouse to the other may lead to an inference of cruelty. However, in this case even with aforesaid standard both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court had accepted that the conduct of the wife did not amount to cruelty of such a nature to enable the husband to obtain a decree of divorce.” 14. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ravi Kumar vs. Julumidevi reported in (2010) 4 SCC 476, have explained the term ‘cruelty’ as under: “19. It may be true that there is no definition of cruelty under the said Act. Actually such a definition is not possible. In matrimonial relationship, cruelty would obviously mean absence of mutual respect and understanding between the spouses which embitters the relationship and often leads to various outbursts of behaviour which can be termed as cruelty. Sometime cruelty in a matrimonial relationship may take the form of violence, sometime it may take a different form. At times, it ma be just an attitude or an approach. Silence in some situations may amount to cruelty. 20. Therefore, cruelty in matrimonial behaviour defies any definition and its categories can never be closed. Whether the husband is cruel to his wife or the wife is cruel to her husband has to be ascertained and judged by taking into account the entire facts and circumstances of the given case and not by any predetermined rigid formula. Cruelty in matrimonial case can be of infinite variety – it may be subtle or even brutal and may be by gestures and word. Cruelty in matrimonial case can be of infinite variety – it may be subtle or even brutal and may be by gestures and word. That possible explains why Lord Denning in Sheldon v. Sheldon held that categories of cruelty in matrimonial case are never closed. 21. This Court is reminded of what was said by Lord Reid in Gollins v. Gollins about judging cruelty in matrimonial cases. The pertinent observations are (AC p.660) “.. In matrimonial cases we are not concerned with the reasonable man as we are in cases of negligence. We are dealing with this man and this woman and the fewer a priori assumptions we make about them the better. In cruelty cases one can hardly ever even start with a presumption that the parties are reasonable people, because it is hard to imagine any cruelty case ever arising if both the spouses think and behave as reasonable people.” 22. About the changing perception of cruelty in matrimonial cases, this Court observed in Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi at AIR p. 123, para 5 of the report: (SCC p.108, para 5) “5. It will be necessary to bear in mind that there has been (a) marked change in the life around us. In matrimonial duties and responsibilities in particular, we find a sea change. They are of varying degrees from house to house or person to person. Therefore, when a spouse makes complaint about the treatment of cruelty by the partner in life or relations, the court should not search for standard in life. A set of facts stigmatized as cruelty in one case may not be so in another case. The cruelty alleged may largely depend upon the type of life the parties are accustomed to or their economic and social conditions. It may also depend upon their culture and human values to which they attach importance. We, the Judges and lawyers, therefore, should not import our own notions of life. We may not go in parallel with them. There may be a generation gap between us and the parties.” 15. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bipinchandra Jaisinghbai Shah versus Prabhavati, AIR 1957 SC 176 have held that two essential conditions must be there to prove the desertion : (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi). Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bipinchandra Jaisinghbai Shah versus Prabhavati, AIR 1957 SC 176 have held that two essential conditions must be there to prove the desertion : (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi). Their Lordships have held that desertion is a matter of interference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances of each case. Their Lordships have held as under: “What is desertion? "Rayden on Divorce" which is a standard work on the subject at p.128 (6th Edn.) has summarized the case-law on the subject in these terms:- "Desertion is the separation of one spouse from the other, with an intention on the part of the deserting spouse of bringing cohabitation permanently to an end without reasonable cause and without the consent of the other spouse; but the physical act of departure by one spouse does not necessarily make that spouse the deserting party". The legal position has been admirably summarized in paras 453 and 454 at pp. 241 to 243 of Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edn.), Vol. 12, in the following words:- "In its essence desertion means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other's consent and without reasonable cause. It is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage. In view of the large variety of circumstances and of modes of life involved, the Court has discouraged attempts at defining desertion, there being no general principle applicable to all cases. Desertion is not the withdrawal from a place but from the state of things, for what the law seeks to enforce is the recognition and discharge of the common obligations of the married state; the state of things may usually be termed, for short, 'the home'. There can be desertion without previous cohabitation by the parties, or without the marriage having been consummated. The person who actually withdraws from cohabitation is not necessarily the deserting party. The fact that a husband makes an allowance to a wife whom he has abandoned is no answer to a charge of desertion. There can be desertion without previous cohabitation by the parties, or without the marriage having been consummated. The person who actually withdraws from cohabitation is not necessarily the deserting party. The fact that a husband makes an allowance to a wife whom he has abandoned is no answer to a charge of desertion. The offence of desertion is a course of conduct which exists independently of its duration, but as a ground for divorce it must exist for a period of at least three years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition where the offence appears as a cross-charge, of the answer. Desertion as a ground of divorce differs from the statutory grounds of adultery and cruelty in that the offence founding the cause of action of desertion is not complete, but is inchoate, until the suit is constituted. Desertion is a continuing offence". Thus the quality of permanence is one of the essential elements which differentiates desertion from wilful separation. If a spouse abandons the other spouse in a state of temporary passion, for example anger or disgust, without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will not amount to desertion. For the offence of desertion, so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there namely, (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi). Similarly two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned: (1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the necessary intention aforesaid. The petitioner for divorce bears the burden of proving those elements in the two spouses respectively. Here a difference between the English law and the law as enacted by the Bombay Legislature may be pointed out. Whereas under the English law those essential conditions must continue throughout the course of the three years immediately preceding the institution of the suit for divorce, under the Act, the period is four years without specifying that it should immediately precede the commencement of proceedings for divorce. Whether the omission of the last clause has any practical result need not detain us, as it does not call for decision in the present case. Desertion is a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances to each case. Whether the omission of the last clause has any practical result need not detain us, as it does not call for decision in the present case. Desertion is a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances to each case. The inference may be drawn from certain facts which may not in another case be capable of leading to the same inference; that is to say, the facts have to be viewed as to the purpose which is revealed by those acts or by conduct and expression of intention, both anterior and subsequent to the actual acts of separation. If in fact, there has been a separation, the essential question always is whether that act could be attributable to an animus deserendi. The offence of desertion commences when the fact of separation and the animus deserendi co-exist. But it is not necessary that they should commence at the same time. The de facto separation may have commenced without the necessary animus or it may be that the separation and the (animus deserendi) coincide in point of time; for example, when the separating spouse abandons the marital home with the intention, express or implied of bringing cohabitation permanently to a close. The law in England has prescribed a three years period and the Bombay Act prescribed a period of four years as a continuous period during which the two elements must subsist. Hence, if a deserting spouse takes advantage of the locus poenitentiae thus provided by law and decides to come back to the deserted spouse by a bona fide offer of resuming the matrimonial home with all the implications of marital life, before the statutory period is out or even after the lapse of that period, unless proceedings for divorce have been commenced, desertion comes to an end, and if the deserted spouse unreasonably refuses to offer, the latter may be in desertion and not the former. Hence it is necessary that during all the period that there has been a desertion, the deserted spouse must affirm the marriage and be ready and willing to resume married life on such conditions as may be reasonable. It is also well settled that in proceedings for divorce the plaintiff must prove the offence of desertion, like and other matrimonial offence, beyond all reasonable doubt. It is also well settled that in proceedings for divorce the plaintiff must prove the offence of desertion, like and other matrimonial offence, beyond all reasonable doubt. Hence, though corroboration is not required as an absolute rule of law the courts insist upon corroborative evidence, unless its absence is accounted for to the satisfaction of the court. In this connection the following observations of Lord Goddard CJ., in the case of Lawson v. Lawson, 1955 1 AllER 341 at p. 342(A), may be referred to :- "These cases are not cases in which corroboration is required as a matter of law. It is required as a matter of precaution...... " With these preliminary observations we now proceed to examine the evidence led on behalf of the parties to find out whether desertion has been proved in this case and, if so, whether there was a bona fide offer by the wife to return to her matrimonial home with a view to discharging marital duties and, if so, whether there was an unreasonable refusal on the part of the husband to take her back. 16. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal, the same is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, shall stand dismissed.