JUDGMENT : Nishita Mhatre, J. 1. The short question involved in the present petition is whether compensation is payable to the widow of an employee working in the collieries who was missing for seven years and was declared dead by the Civil Court. 2. The husband of the Respondent No.1 was employed as a Security Guard with J. K. Ropeways. He was working till 28th August, 1998. On and from 29th August, 1998, the employee was missing. A complaint was lodged with the Police on 6th September, 1998 being G.D. Entry No.282. Despite the search conducted, the employee was not found. An FIR was lodged on 13th July, 1999, being Andal Police Station Case No.160 of 1999 under Sections 302, 201, 120B and 84 of the IPC. According to the police, the husband of Respondent No.1 was murdered by some miscreants and his body was missing. 3. On 9th May, 2000 the Respondent No.1 submitted an application for employment in place of her husband under the provisions of the National Coal Wage Agreement. However, her application was rejected as there was no definite proof that her husband was dead. After seven years from the date on which the employee went missing, the Respondent No.1 filed Title Suit No.168 of 2005 before the Civil Judge (Junior Division), 1st Court, Durgapur. The suit was filed for a declaration that Md. Alam, the husband of Respondent No.1, should be deemed to be dead as he was missing since 29th August, 1998. Eastern Coal Fields Limited and its officers as well as J.K. Ropeways were impleaded as defendants in the suit. 4. The Trial Court considered the evidence led by Respondent No.1 and her witnesses to prove that that there was no trace of Md. Alam since 29th August, 1998. No evidence was led by the defendants in rebuttal. On consideration of the evidence before the Court, the learned Judge declared that Md. Alam was deemed to be dead. This declaration was issued on the basis of the presumption of law under Section 108 of the Indian Evidence Act because Md. Alam had not been heard of since 29th August, 1998 for more than seven years by his relatives, colleagues and neighbours who would have heard of him had he been alive. The Court also noted that the defendants did not affirm that Md. Alam had not been heard of since 29th August, 1998 for more than seven years by his relatives, colleagues and neighbours who would have heard of him had he been alive. The Court also noted that the defendants did not affirm that Md. Alam was alive by filing a written statement or by cross-examination of the plaintiff or her witnesses. 5. On obtaining such a declaration, the Respondent No.1 submitted an application for compensation as her husband would have to be presumed to have died in harness. She therefore claimed all the benefits available under the National Coal Wage Agreement payable to her as the female dependent of Md. Alam. 6. The Respondent No.1 was informed by a communication dated 20th January, 2009 that it was not possible to offer her employment in case of the deemed death of her husband. Being aggrieved by the decision of the appellants, she filed W.P. No.16580(W) of 2009 in which she prayed for employment in view of the death of her husband while he was in service and for release of all the benefits payable on the death of her husband. This writ petition was opposed by the appellants on the ground that there was no provision under the National Coal Wage Agreement to grant appointment on compassionate grounds on the basis of the deemed death of an employee. 7. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition to the extent that the Respondent No.1 was entitled to all monetary benefits including the compensation payable under the National Coal Wage Agreement. It was held that the Respondent No.1 was not entitled to appointment on compassionate grounds, because she and the rest of her family had survived for almost two decades without the income of the breadwinner of the family. The learned Judge then observed that the scheme which was applicable to the Respondent No.1 provided for payment of compensation in lieu of compassionate appointment. The Court observed that the respondent authority, i.e., the appellants in this case, may have been harsh to decline compassionate appointment; but the Respondent No.1 herein could be compensated by directing the payment of compensation due to her in accordance with the National Coal Wage Agreement VIII. The Court observed that the respondent authority, i.e., the appellants in this case, may have been harsh to decline compassionate appointment; but the Respondent No.1 herein could be compensated by directing the payment of compensation due to her in accordance with the National Coal Wage Agreement VIII. The Court further observed that the Respondent No.1 was entitled to monthly compensation due to her as the widow of the erstwhile workman with effect from September, 2005 and that she would be entitled to interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the last day of the relevant month to the date of payment for the entire payment due till the year 2012. Thereafter from January, 2013, the Court held that the Respondent No.1 was entitled to interest at the rate of 8% per annum from the last day of the relevant month till the date of payment. A further direction was issued to make the entire payment in terms of the order within six months or else interest at the two stages of the stand enhanced by 2 percentage points. 8. Mr. Tilak Bose, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants, submitted that the learned Single Judge has erred in allowing the petition. He submitted that the National Coal Wage Agreement VIII did not provide for compensation to be paid to the female dependant of an employee who is deemed to have died in harness. According to him, it was only when there is a permanent disablement of an employee due to a mine accident that employment is to be offered to the female dependant of the employee and if she does not opt for the same, she is entitled to the compensation. He further submitted that even assuming the Respondent No.1 was entitled to compensation, interest ought not to have been awarded on such compensation as there was no prayer for the same. Furthermore, he urged that the learned Single Judge has erred in granting interest from September, 2005 when the decree under which Md. Alam was presumed to be dead is dated 25th July, 2008. He submitted that interest could have been awarded, if at all, only from the date of the decree as that should be accepted as the date of death. Alam was presumed to be dead is dated 25th July, 2008. He submitted that interest could have been awarded, if at all, only from the date of the decree as that should be accepted as the date of death. Reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel on the judgment of the Privy Council in Lal Chand Marwari vs. Mahant Ramrup Gir and Another reported in AIR 1926 Privy Council 9 and on the judgment of Saroop Singh vs. Banto & Ors reported in AIR 2005 SC 4407 in support of his submissions. 9. Mr. Chittaranjan Chakraborty, the learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents, pointed out that it is no longer open for the appellants to contend that compensation is not payable after the deemed death of an employee. He pointed out that in Writ Petition No.972 of 2010 (Smt. Dhanmati Debi & Anr. vs. Coal India Limited & Ors) decided on 5th August, 2010, a learned Single Judge of this Court had held that such compensation can be claimed by the widow on the basis of the death being declared by a Civil Court in terms of the provision of Section 108 of the Indian Evidence Act. He further urged that the National Coal Wage Agreement VIII very clearly mentions that such claims can be made in respect of the death of an employee due to causes other than a mine accident. He submitted that the appellants had unnecessarily sought to differentiate between the death of an employee in normal circumstances and of an employee who was missing for seven years, and is therefore presumed to be dead in view of the declaration of a Civil Court. He drew our attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court in LIC of India vs. Anuradha reported in AIR 2004 SC 2070 to fortify his submission that when the Civil Court had declared that the employee had died in September, 2005, the appellants were bound to accept that as the month of death since there was no appeal against that order. 10. 10. The provisions of the National Coal Wage Agreement VIII which are relevant in this case read as follows: “9.5.0 Employment/Monetary compensation to female dependant Provision of employment/monetary compensation to female dependants of workmen who die while in service and who are declared medically unfit as per Clause 9.4.0 above would be regulated as under: (i) In case of death due to mine accident, the female dependant would have the option to either accept the monetary compensation of Rs.4,000/- per month or employment irrespective of her age. (ii) In case of death/total permanent disablement due to causes other than mine accident and medical unfitness under Clause 9.4.0., if the female dependant is below the age of 45 years she will have the option either to accept the monetary compensation of Rs.3,000/- per month or employment. In case the female dependant is above 45 years of age she will be entitled only to monetary compensation and not to employment. (iii) In case of death either in mine accident or for other reasons or medical unfitness under Clause 9.4.0, if no employment has been offered and the male dependant of the concerned worker is 12 years and above in age, he will be kept on a live roster and would be provided employment commensurate with his skill and qualifications when he attains the age of 18 years. During the period the male dependant is on live roster, the female dependant will be paid monetary compensation as per rates at paras (i) & (ii) above. This will be effective from 1.1.2000. (iv) Monetary compensation wherever applicable, would be paid till the female dependant attains the age of 60 years. (v) the existing rate of monetary compensation will continue. The matter will be further discussed in the Standardisation Committee and finalised.” 11. Clause 9.5.0 of the agreement comes into play when a workman dies while in service. Employment or monetary compensation is available to the female dependants of such a workman. The Clause further provides that in case of death due to a mine accident, the female dependant may accept monetary compensation or employment irrespective of her age. However, when the death is due to causes other than a mine accident, the female dependant is entitled to employment or compensation if she is below the age of 45 years; beyond that age, she is only entitled to monetary compensation. However, when the death is due to causes other than a mine accident, the female dependant is entitled to employment or compensation if she is below the age of 45 years; beyond that age, she is only entitled to monetary compensation. Such monetary compensation is payable till the female dependant attains the age of 60 years. This Clause evidently has been included in the National Coal Wage Agreement to lend some succour to the female dependant of an employee who is suddenly unable to work either because of his death or because of his permanent disablement. The National Coal Wage Agreement does not confine the term “death” only to mean one which arises in a mine accident. It includes deaths which may occur for any reason and not merely on account of disability as suggested by the learned Counsel for the appellant. There is no provision in the Agreement to deny the female dependant of an employee who died while in service though the cause of death is not known. It also does not exclude the payment of such benefits to a female dependant of an employee who is presumed to be dead by the application of law. Therefore, the distinction sought to be drawn by the learned Counsel for the appellant is untenable. The compensation falls due to the female dependant on the occurrence of the death and is not reliant on the nature of the death. 12. The next issue which has been argued is whether the month of death should be taken as September, 2005 or the date on which the declaration was made by the Civil Court. In the case of Lal Chand Marwari (supra), the Privy Council reiterated its earlier decision that there is a presumption of law that a person who has not been heard of for seven years is dead; but the time at which he died is not a matter of presumption but of averments and pleadings. The onus of proving that the death took place on a particular time within seven years lies upon the person who claims right to establish that fact. There can be no dispute about this proposition of law. In the present case the Civil Court has declared that the employee died in September, 2005. Therefore, this judgment is not relevant. 13. The onus of proving that the death took place on a particular time within seven years lies upon the person who claims right to establish that fact. There can be no dispute about this proposition of law. In the present case the Civil Court has declared that the employee died in September, 2005. Therefore, this judgment is not relevant. 13. In the case of Saroop Singh (supra), the Supreme Court observed that because of the presumption which can be drawn by the Court under Section 108 of the Evidence Act, a person may be presumed to have died if she had not been heard of for seven years by those who would naturally have heard of her, had she been alive. That by itself would not be a ground to presume that she had died seven years prior to the date of institution of the suit for possession and permanent injunction. 14. There can be no quarrel with this proposition of law. However, as already stated the Civil Court having declared that Md. Alam had died in September, 2005, the appellants are not entitled to question that fact when they had every opportunity to oppose the contentions of the Respondent No.1 in the suit. Significantly, the order of the Civil Court has not been challenged by the appellants. 15. In the case of LIC of India vs. Anuradha (supra) the Supreme Court observed as follows: “14. On the basis of the above said authorities, we unhesitatingly arrive at a conclusion which we sum up in the following words. The law as to presumption of death remains the same whether in Common Law of England or in the statutory provisions contained in Sections 107 and 108 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. In the scheme of Evidence Act, though Sections 107 and 108 are drafted as two Sections, in effect, Section 108 is an exception to the rule enacted in Section 107. The human life shown to be in existence, at a given point of time which according to Section 107 ought to be a point within 30 years calculated backwards from the date when the question arises, is presumed to continue to be living. The rule is subject to a proviso or exception as contained in Section 108. The human life shown to be in existence, at a given point of time which according to Section 107 ought to be a point within 30 years calculated backwards from the date when the question arises, is presumed to continue to be living. The rule is subject to a proviso or exception as contained in Section 108. If the persons, who would have naturally and in the ordinary course of human affairs heard of the person in question, have not so heard of him for seven years the presumption raised under Section 107ceases to operate. Section 107 has the effect of shifting the burden of proving that the person is dead on him who affirms the fact. Section 108, subject to its applicability being attracted, has the effect of shifting the burden of proof back on the one who asserts the fact of that person being alive. The presumption raised under Section 108 is a limited presumption confined only to presuming the factum of death of the person who's life or death is in issue. Though it will be presumed that the person is dead but there is no presumption as to the date or time of death. There is no presumption as to the facts and circumstances under which the person may have died. The presumption as to death by reference to Section 108 would arise only on lapse of seven years and would not by applying any logic or reasoning be permitted to be raised on expiry of 6 years and 364 days or at any time short of it. An occasion for raising the presumption would arise only when the question is raised in a Court, Tribunal or before an authority who is called upon to decide as to whether a person is alive or dead. So long as the dispute is not raised before any forum and in any legal proceedings the occasion for raising the presumption does not arise. 15. If an issue may arise as to the date or time of death the same shall have to be determined on evidence-direct or circumstantial and not by assumption or presumption. The burden of proof would lay on the person who makes assertion of death having taken place at a given date or time in order to succeed in his claim. If an issue may arise as to the date or time of death the same shall have to be determined on evidence-direct or circumstantial and not by assumption or presumption. The burden of proof would lay on the person who makes assertion of death having taken place at a given date or time in order to succeed in his claim. Rarely it may be permissible to proceed on premise that the death had occurred on any given date before which the period of seven years' absence was shown to have elapsed.” 16. In the present case not only there is a declaration from the Civil Court but an FIR was lodged in 1999 indicating that Md. Alam had been murdered by miscreants. 17. Taking into account all these factors, in our opinion, the learned Single Judge has not committed any error by accepting the month of death as September, 2005. Although the employee had not prayed for interest as pointed out by the learned Counsel for the appellants, the learned Single Judge has, in our opinion, rightly awarded the interest. Cogent reasons have been given for the award of interest. We have no reason to differ with that view. 18. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed. The application for stay being CAN 4512 of 2015 is also dismissed. 19. Urgent certified photocopies of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the learned Advocates for the parties upon compliance of all formalities. Later The learned Counsel appearing for the appellants seeks a stay of our judgment. We do not find it necessary to stay our decision for the reasons mentioned in the judgment. Accordingly the stay is refused.