JUDGMENT : Vijay Bishnoi, J. This joint criminal misc. petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been preferred by the accused-petitioner Nos.1 to 3 and complainant petitioner No.4 with the prayer for quashing the proceedings pending against the petitioner Nos.1 to 3 before Additional Metropolitan Magistrate No.2, Jodhpur Metropolitan (hereinafter referred to as 'the trial court') in Criminal Case No.150/2013 - State of Rajasthan v. Dalveer Singh & Ors. (arising out of FIR No.35/2013 of Women Police Station, District Jodhpur East), whereby the trial court vide order dated 05.02.2016 has attested the compromise for the offences punishable under Sections 406 and 323 IPC but refused to attest the compromise for the offence punishable under Section 498-A IPC as the same is not compoundable. 2. Brief facts of the case are that on a complaint lodged at the instance of petitioner No.4, the FIR No.35/2013 was registered at Women Police Station, District Jodhpur East against the petitioner Nos. 1 to 3. After investigation, the police filed charge-sheet against the petitioner Nos. 1 to 3 for offences punishable under Sections 406, 323 and 498-A IPC in the trial court wherein the trial is pending against the petitioner Nos. 1 to 3 for the aforesaid offences. During the pendency of the trial, a joint application was preferred on behalf of the accused-petitioner Nos. 1 to 3 and complainant petitioner No.4 while stating that the parties have entered into compromise and the petitioner No.1 and the petitioner No.4 have decide to live separately and, therefore, the proceedings pending against the petitioner Nos. 1 to 3 may be terminated. The trial court vide order dated 05.02.2016 has allowed the parties to compound the offences punishable under Sections 406 and 323 IPC, however, rejected the application so far as it relates to compounding the offence under Section 498-A IPC. 3. The present joint criminal misc. petition has been preferred by the accused-petitioner Nos.1 to 3 and complainant-petitioner No.4 for quashing the said proceedings against the petitioner Nos. 1 to 3. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that as the complainant-petitioner No.4 and the accused-petitioner Nos. 1 to 3 have already entered into compromise and on the basis of it, the petitioner Nos. 1 to 3 has been acquitted for the offences punishable under Sections 406 and 323 IPC, there is no possibility of conviction of the petitioner Nos.
The learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that as the complainant-petitioner No.4 and the accused-petitioner Nos. 1 to 3 have already entered into compromise and on the basis of it, the petitioner Nos. 1 to 3 has been acquitted for the offences punishable under Sections 406 and 323 IPC, there is no possibility of conviction of the petitioner Nos. 1 to 3 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A IPC. It is also contended by learned counsel for the petitioners that the petitioner No.1 and the petitioner No.4 have decided to live separately by mutual consent and in this regard a joint application under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 was filed and the same had been decided as well as a divorce decree had also been issued by the Family Court No.1, Jodhpur. It is also argued that no useful purpose would be served by continuing the trial against the petitioner Nos. 1 to 3 for the offence punishable under Section 498-A IPC because the same may derail the compromise arrived at between the parties. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioners has admitted on behalf of the petitioner No.4 that the parties have already entered into compromise and the petitioner No.1 and the petitioner No.4 decided to live separately and the petitioner No.4 does not want to press the charges levelled against the petitioner Nos. 1 to 3 in relation to offence punishable under Section 498-A IPC. 6. The petitioner Nos. 1 and 4 present in person and have been identified by their counsel, have stated that they have already entered into compromise and decided to live separately and the petitioner No.4 does not want to press the charges levelled against the petitioner Nos. 1 to 3 in relation to offence punishable under Section 498-A IPC. 7. The Hon'ble Apex Court while answering a reference in the case of Gian Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr. reported in JT 2012(9) SC – 426 has held as below:- "57. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code.
The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim.
In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above questions is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding." 8. Having considered the facts and circumstances of the case and looking to the fact that the petitioner No.1 and petitioner No.4 have decided to live separately and in pursuance of that appropriate proceedings for decree of divorce has already been decided by Family Court No.1, Jodhpur, there is no possibility of accused-petitioner Nos. 1 to 3 being convicted in the case pending against them. When once the matrimonial disputes have been settled by the mutual compromise, then no useful purpose would be served by keeping the criminal proceedings pending. 9. Keeping in view the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gian Singh's case (supra), this Court is of the opinion that it is a fit case, wherein the criminal proceedings pending against the petitioners can be quashed while exercising powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 10. Accordingly, this criminal misc. petition is allowed and the criminal proceedings pending against the petitioner Nos.1 to 3 before the Additional Metropolitan Magistrate No.2, Jodhpur Metropolitan (hereinafter referred to as 'the trial court') in Criminal Case No.150/2013 - State of Rajasthan v. Dalveer Singh & Ors.(arising out of FIR No.35/2013 of Women Police Station, District Jodhpur East) are hereby quashed.