JUDGMENT : Mir Dara Sheko, J. 1. This first appeal preferred by the wife/appellant/defendant is against the Judgment and decree dated 25th day of July 2013, passed by Learned Additional District Judge 4th Court, Barasat North 24 Parganas in Matrimonial Suit No. 2 of 2013 (renumbered from Matrimonial Suit No. 382/1995 on being transferred by Order No. 86 dated 4.1.2013) wherein a decree of divorce was passed dissolving the marriage in favour of the husband/respondent/plaintiff on the ground of cruelty. 2. The case of the respondent is that negotiated marriage was held on 1st February, 1994 between the plaintiff and the defendant in accordance with Hindu Rites and Customs which was duly consummated by residing together as husband and wife. But the conjugal life lasted only for a year and twenty six days within which the respondent came across the arrogant, obstinate, and abnormal attitude of the appellant incurring severe cruelty which the respondent could not condone. 3. The following allegations of cruelty and misbehaviour were made by the respondent :- (a) The respondent since could not agree that his wife would leave matrimonial home whenever she would like without asking her husband or mother-in-law, and would stay overnight at her father’s house. Since the respondent and his mother used to object to such conduct, the appellant would became furious and used to abuse them at the top of her voice in filthy language. (b) The appellant used to keep the keys of almirah and suitcase in her custody without allowing the respondent to get access to the same. (c) The appellant was disinterested in performing household duties, and even would refuse to cook and serve food to the respondent and to his old mother. (d) To change the mind of the appellant, the respondent took his wife to Darjeeling on tour in the month of March 1994, but due to the non-cooperative and quarrelsome attitude of the appellant, the respondent was compelled to return. (e) The appellant used to allege that the respondent was having illicit relationship with his mother and used to divulge that the lady (being the mother of the respondent) was not his mother but his first wife and the respondent had married the appellant as an eye wash before the society and the respondent on call used to share bed with his mother. (f) The respondent also asserted that the appellant used to allege that there was illicit relationship between the respondent and his elder sister and since his elder sister had no issue after her wedlock, the respondent used to frequently visit the house of his elder sister and at times in the absence of his elder sister’s husband. (g) Further case is that the respondent, to overcome the unbearable situation had to keep his mother at the residence of his elder sister. The respondent, being a police officer, then attached to Anti Dacoity Section, whenever, at times he came back to his residence, either to take any official paper or to take meal, would notice that the door of the residential quarter would remain under lock and key and if an enquiry was made the appellant used to call him a liar. (h) Further case is that the appellant, in front of the colleagues of the respondent and others used to allege that the respondent was a characterless person and on her misrepresentation, her father and brother also used to abuse him in slang language and whenever he used to go to his father-in-law’s house he was ill treated and was never offered food or even a cup of tea or approached even to take seat. Whenever the respondent protested against such ill-treatment and misbehaviour, the appellant became more violent and used to threaten that she would teach a good lesson by filing criminal case under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. (i) The respondent further averred that due to ill-behaviour of the appellant he could never pass single day with mental peace. The appellant continued her unbearable and non-cooperative attitude towards the respondent and his mother in all respect and used to pick-up quarrel and abuse them in filthy language for no cogent reason. Though at home except the respondent and his aged mother there was no other female member in the family, yet she would stay at her parents’ house, and in spite of the best care, love and affection by the respondent and his mother, the attitude of the appellant towards the respondent could not be changed. (j) It is further averred that the appellant without the knowledge and consent of the respondent left the residence of the respondent on 12th December, 1994 leaving a written note that she had gone to her paternal house. (j) It is further averred that the appellant without the knowledge and consent of the respondent left the residence of the respondent on 12th December, 1994 leaving a written note that she had gone to her paternal house. Though soon thereafter the respondent had gone to his in-law’s house at Dumdum to bring the appellant back, she declined to return. (k) It is contended that due to such regular misconduct and ill-behaviour of the appellant, the respondent wrote a letter to his father-in-law on 28th February, 1994 sent by registered post, to seek redress of his grievances. However, there was no reply. (l) The respondent tried to change the mindset of the appellant by proposing to have a child but she refused. 4. The respondent averred that on 19th February,1995 when he went to his in-law’s house at Dumdum to take his wife back she expressed her unwillingness. Being supported by her father she proposed to have a decree of divorce, and, her parents and brother alleged he was a characterless man having the habit of taking liquor and visiting pros quarters frequently apart from keeping relations with some call girls with whom the respondent used to stay at night outside home. 5. The respondent further contended that his mother, elder sister, brother-in-law and some relatives tried to convince the appellant for restoration of peaceful marital life and they also requested the uncle of the appellant to look after the matter however the efforts failed. Rather the appellant withdrew herself from the society of the respondent by leaving the marital home finally on 26th February, 1995 by taking away all her belongings. 6. The respondent further averred that though despite several meetings were held in the house of the appellant’s father at Dumdum in presence of the guardians and relations of both sides, however, the appellant was determined to break up the marital tie, and since the appellant left the company by withdrawing herself from the society of the respondent with the sole motive of destroying the marital relationship, the respondent thereby having no other option, filed the application seeking divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion. 7. The appellant in her written statement and the additional written statement denied the allegations made in the plaint. She stated that despite lodging complaints against her husband before the superior authority of her husband no lawful action was ever taken. 8. 7. The appellant in her written statement and the additional written statement denied the allegations made in the plaint. She stated that despite lodging complaints against her husband before the superior authority of her husband no lawful action was ever taken. 8. Further averred that her husband did not take any initiative to take her back: On the contrary, she had sent different persons to get the marital dispute settled so that the conjugal could life be restored, but in vain. 9. She alleged that she being an educated lady having graduated in Fine Arts, was severely tortured by her husband, and his relatives and her husband managed to obtain her signatures on some blank papers at gun point for having some documents of his own choice. 10. Further although she was tortured in various ways by her husband, mother-in-law and sister-in-law, she tried to adjust in her matrimonial home but they had started planning as to how she would be driven out from her in law’s house and on false pretext, she was sent to her father’s house at Dum Dum by her husband consoling that she would be taken back very soon. However, after a few days when she tried to come back she was restrained, and, so, she was compelled to leave her matrimonial home. Further stated that her husband was ill-tempered and in collusion with his mother and other relatives and in order to deprive her of enjoying her marital life, had made reckless and false allegations in the plaint which are untrue and the appellant/wife thereby prayed for dismissal of the matrimonial suit. 11. Learned Trial Judge framing as many as six issues and recording evidence, adduced by the parties, decreed the suit dissolving the marriage by a decree of divorce against the wife/appellant only on the ground of cruelty since “legal desertion” under section 13(1)(ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 was not proved. 12. At the very outset, it is pertinent to mention that the respondent did not press the ground of desertion and he did not also file any cross objection or appeal against refusal of divorce on the ground of desertion. Therefore, we proceed to consider the propriety of the judgment and decree on the following points : (a) Whether the decree of divorce granted by the learned Trial Judge on the ground of cruelty can be upheld ? Therefore, we proceed to consider the propriety of the judgment and decree on the following points : (a) Whether the decree of divorce granted by the learned Trial Judge on the ground of cruelty can be upheld ? or, (b) Whether the judgment and decree suffers from any illegality ? 13. Mr. Bidyut Banerjee, learned senior advocate for the appellant/ wife argued that the averments of the husband towards the alleged cruelty remained uncorroborated. Alternatively, it is argued, even if there were any incident of cruelty, the pleadings vis-à-vis the evidence are silent as to whether those incidents were ever condoned or not. Finally, it is argued that the learned Trial Judge having not discharged the duty vested on him under Section 23 of the Hindu Marriage Act by not giving findings that the alleged acts of cruelty were never condoned by respondent/husband and there being also no attempt of reconciliation by the learned Trial Judge, the judgment under appeal should be held to have been vitiated and thus after setting aside the decree of divorce the suit should be remanded to the Trial Court. 14. Mr. Prabal Kumar Mukherjee, learned senior advocate for the respondent supporting the impugned judgment submitted that the span of conjugal life between the parties was only for 1 year and 26 days. Since the pleadings, coupled with the evidence of P.W.1, the husband, was corroborated by his mother and his elder sister with whom the allegations of illicit relationship were also levelled by his wife and since there was no counter case or claim in the tune of restitution of conjugal right and since the lapse of 21 years already took away the best part of the marital life equalising to waiver of right of re-union, the decree in question need not be interfered with. 15. Learned senior advocates for the parties have referred to some judgements in support of their submission which will be dealt with appropriately. 16. It is obvious that since the matrimonial suit for divorce was filed by the respondent/ husband, the onus of proving the averments regarding the incidents of cruelty lies on him. We find that the Evidence in Chief of the respondent/husband, is more or less a replica of the averments made in the plaint. Therefore, let us scrutinize the cross examination to weigh as to how far he has been able to withstand it. 17. We find that the Evidence in Chief of the respondent/husband, is more or less a replica of the averments made in the plaint. Therefore, let us scrutinize the cross examination to weigh as to how far he has been able to withstand it. 17. Some basic facts should be kept in mind on which there is no dispute, i.e. the marriage took place on 1st February, 1994. The conjugal life ended with effect from 14th February, 1995 and the appellant left the marital home finally on 26th February, 1995. Thereafter, there is no instance that for a single day they remained together. On query, P.W. 1 in his cross examination answered, “My conjugal life ended on 14.2.1995”. While further question was put to PW1 to narrate the manner of torture he answered "Soon after the marriage, the respondent used to disbelieve me and subjected to torture upon me in a silent manner in such a way that the family peace of my home had been deteriorated”. In cross examination, P.W. 1 further stated “I narrated the matter to the father of the respondent. He also informed that he had to bear Rs. 1500 to 2000 as pocket money of his daughter. That apart, she was not willing to stay with me. She kept in an indifferent manner in respect of all domestic affairs.” P.W. 1 further stated, “The respondent used to leave my house frequently on different occasion and most of the days of the week without knowledge and consent of either myself or my mother and on being asked after return even at late night, she became violent and replied that we were liar. The respondent used to accuse me by saying that I have illicit relation with my mother and my mother is my first wife. She used to give same allegation in respect of my elder sister also. I also informed the matter afterwards to Shyamal Mitra, the uncle of the respondent and also the father of the respondent.” In this regard, it is relevant to note that the house of the parties are situated within 1½ to 2 Kms., as disclosed by the P.W. 1 in cross examination. 18. Mr. I also informed the matter afterwards to Shyamal Mitra, the uncle of the respondent and also the father of the respondent.” In this regard, it is relevant to note that the house of the parties are situated within 1½ to 2 Kms., as disclosed by the P.W. 1 in cross examination. 18. Mr. Bidyut Banerjee invited our attention to Exhibit-2, the letter dated 28th December, 1994, sent by the respondent to his father-in-law about 4/5 months before institution of the suit and submitted that had there been any incident of cruelty then why any of those allegations was not reflected in the said letter and, thus the evidence of P.W. 1, quoted in the previous paragraph herein, should be disbelieved as concocted. 19. From the text of the letter (Ext.2), it appears to us that it is an emotional appeal made by a son-in-law to his father-in-law which was full of anxiety, so that, his father-in-law with some care could counsel his daughter to restore peace in their marital life. It was stated in the letter that he being the only son of the family it would not be possible for him to leave either his mother or his sister, rather he was very eager to continue the family life with his wife peacefully within his limited source of earning. He further expressed his dismay that despite putting the best effort, he could not make his wife happy. If each and every word or sentence of the letter (Exhibit-2) is construed in its true letter and spirit, there cannot be any doubt that it was as a sincere emotional appeal with eagerness of a son-in-law to his father-in-law so that his father-in-law could take care of the matter by moulding the mentality of his daughter for restoration of their peaceful family life. 20. It is noteworthy that except the appellant/wife, no witness was examined on her side though in written statement she contended that different persons were sent to get her marital life restored. 20. It is noteworthy that except the appellant/wife, no witness was examined on her side though in written statement she contended that different persons were sent to get her marital life restored. It remains very surprising though such a serious issue amounting to the disruption of marital life of a daughter was raised and the marital tie was at stake as the husband prayed for a decree of divorce with so many allegations of cruelty against his daughter, what had prevented the wife’s father to give evidence in aid of his daughter or to come forward to deny the contention of his son-in-law. In the plaint, in paragraph 8, the husband also averred “That the mother, the elder sister and her husband and some relatives of your petitioner gave proposal to the respondent to live at the residence of your petitioner by adjusting with your petitioner and they also requested the uncle of the respondent (emphasis supplied) to look after the matter but the uncle refused your petitioner, his mother and his other relatives also by saying, that he has no grip over the respondent.” On query, PW1 disclosed in cross-examination that Shyamal Mitra was the name of said uncle of the respondent/wife. Said Shyamal Mitra also was not examined by the appellant to deny the fact contended by the respondent. 21. It is obvious that any part of the text of the plaint cannot be taken into consideration unless it is proved by evidence and any evidence on oath or portion thereof can always be dissected for evaluating the merit of a case. Apart from stating in Examination-in-Chief PW1, the husband on query explained in cross examination as to why he wrote the letter (Exhibit-2). PW1 told, “I wrote letter to my father-in-law with a prayer for his help and as he was not available all time in his house for hearing my problems regarding the respondent. The letter was also written so that my father in law could go through the contents of the same and could realize the real problem and could make the respondent understand. But he did not reply.” This evidence earned credence both about the text and purpose of writing of the letter Ext.2. 22. The letter was also written so that my father in law could go through the contents of the same and could realize the real problem and could make the respondent understand. But he did not reply.” This evidence earned credence both about the text and purpose of writing of the letter Ext.2. 22. P.W. 1 in tune with the averments in the plaint and the evidence in chief answered in cross examination “In answer to my proposal to have a child, the respondent replied that I was a characterless, without morality and had no standard to become her match.” This uncontroverted evidence is unambiguously indicative towards refusal by the appellant to live together as husband and wife to fulfil the aspiration of having a child out of the wedlock. By scanning the evidence of the P.W. 1, the husband, we find that despite cross examining him, the instances of cruelty, as averred in the plaint and stated by him in evidence that his wife often would leave the matrimonial home without the consent of the husband or his mother, would not perform household duties, would misbehave with the inmates at home. That apart his evidence about the defiant attitude of the appellant, the attitude of defiance, making allegations against the husband about maintaining illicit relationship with his mother as well as his elder sister, her conduct of humiliating the husband by alleging him publicly to be a characterless person, refusal to allow the husband to have a child out of the wedlock, and the contention of the husband in the matter of seeking help of his father-in-law and his uncle-in-law, could not be demolished by cross-examination. It is needless to mention that in an Indian society the mother enjoys an exalted position. Any aspersion heaped on her as evident from unshakened evidence of PW1, which is in tune with the plaint, is looked down not only by the family but the society in general as it brings disrespect not only on the person who levels such charge but to the family as well. 23. P.W.2, Mala Chakraborty, the elder sister of the respondent in her Examination in Chief corroborated the alleged incidents of cruelty. 23. P.W.2, Mala Chakraborty, the elder sister of the respondent in her Examination in Chief corroborated the alleged incidents of cruelty. She, being an employee of District Registry office, had corroborated in her cross examination by saying, “I have seen that the respondent used to go outside without any knowledge and consent of my brother or my mother at her own wish and will. I saw her not to work in the house. I saw her neglecting my mother even not to provide her medicine. She also neglected my brother”. She further corroborated in her cross examination “She used to rebuke me due to her suspicious mind in respect of all. She used to allege that my brother has illicit relation with my mother, myself and other women”. 24. Thus, examining the evidence in Chief and the cross examination of the P.W. 2, we find that Learned Trial Judge rightly accepted evidence of P.W.2 as corroboration to the case of the husband on the point of departure from marital home of the appellant without the consent and knowledge of the husband or mother-in-law, allegation of maintaining illicit relation with the mother and elder sister of the respondent husband, and also on the final dates of departure of the wife from the marital home, i.e. on 14th February, 1995 and then on 26th February, 1995 apart from other contents of misbehaviour of the wife towards the husband. We find that the corroborative value, as revealed from the evidence of PW2, could not be demolished despite intense cross-examination. 25. Now, let us examine the evidence of the mother of the respondent against whom, according to the case of the respondent, his wife used to put aspersion that her husband had illicit relationship with her mother-in-law as if her mother-in-law was her husband’s first wife. In evidence in chief, Krishna Chowdhury, P.W. 3 the mother of the respondent denied the allegations by saying “My daughter-in-law Alpana, the respondent herein used to behave very badly with me and used to abuse in very filthy language. Respondent used to stain my relation with my son with suspicion.” This divulgence, on the part of a mother during examination, is sufficiently indicative that what slur she had to face. Respondent used to stain my relation with my son with suspicion.” This divulgence, on the part of a mother during examination, is sufficiently indicative that what slur she had to face. Further corroborating the plaint case she also stated in Examination in Chief that “One day she tried to kill me by strangulating me upon my throat, but by the grace of God Almighty, I somehow escaped myself. Immediately thereafter my younger daughter, her husband and their son by chance came to my son’s quarter who found me trembling in fear”. Against such statement in chief, in cross examination P.W. 3 was further asked as to whether she was thereafter treated by any doctor or not and if so, what was the name of the doctor, to which P.W. 3 successfully answered “I was taken by my elder daughter to her house thereafter to the physician Dr. Sikdar”. Suggestion was put to her that the contents of her affidavit in chief were false which was denied by her. Though the younger daughter of PW3 was not examined but in cross-examination her eldest daughter PW2 who was aware of that incident, corroborated the said fact materially and said PW2 also disclosed the name of the attending doctor as Aniruddha Sikdar. 26. We have already mentioned that to test the case or evidence of the respondent, which have been corroborated by the P.W. 2 and P.W. 3, there is solitary evidence adduced by the appellant/ wife herself, and none of her relations, even her father or uncle, did come forward to her aid to deny the contention of the respondent involving them too. DW1, though in chief told “I am always ready and willing to lead conjugal life with my husband at my matrimonial house”, but we do not find any attempt on her part to show readiness by filing a suit for restitution of conjugal rights. In cross-examination the appellant wife stated, “I have tried to get a decree of restitution of conjugal rights and took opinion of a Ld. Advocate but he misguided me. But I cannot disclose his name. I also consulted my present Ld. Advocate Mr. Ajoy Sankar Sanyal for getting decree of restitution of conjugal rights.” Rather, apart from making complaint ‘Ext. In cross-examination the appellant wife stated, “I have tried to get a decree of restitution of conjugal rights and took opinion of a Ld. Advocate but he misguided me. But I cannot disclose his name. I also consulted my present Ld. Advocate Mr. Ajoy Sankar Sanyal for getting decree of restitution of conjugal rights.” Rather, apart from making complaint ‘Ext. E’ to the higher authority of the respondent in 1995 the appellant made the apprehension of the respondent as true by lodging really a criminal case under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code following the complaint dated 9.8.2001 bearing allegations of physical and mental cruelty. Said criminal case, of course, ended into acquittal. It is pertinent to mention that in the said complaint the appellant not only impleaded her husband but also eleven other relatives of the husband, including her mother-in-law as accused persons. After investigation it ended into charge-sheet suggesting prosecution against the husband and his mother only. After trial, presumably due to lack of evidence, the respondent and his mother were acquitted on 30.1.2009 (Ext.6). The wife in her cross examination admitted “At the time of marriage the petitioner was S.I. of Anti-dacoity line. I married him after knowing fully well about his nature of job”. She also admitted “My husband wrote a letter to my father and my father did not respond”. As regards the alleged illicit relationship of the respondent with his mother and the sister, one suggestion was put to her to which, she answered, “Not a fact that all the allegations against my mother-in-law and Mala Chakraborty made by me are false”, which means she admitted the aspersion made by her on her husband of having illicit relation of her husband with his mother and the elder sister. She also admitted in her cross examination, “It is fact that I used to leave my matrimonial home off and on without knowledge and consent of my husband and in laws to my paternal home”. The evidence of course is unequivocally indicative to attract the elements of cruelty suffered by the respondent. We find that the suit for divorce was filed by the respondent husband in 1995. Admittedly the appellant wife finally left her marital home on 26th February, 1995. The evidence of course is unequivocally indicative to attract the elements of cruelty suffered by the respondent. We find that the suit for divorce was filed by the respondent husband in 1995. Admittedly the appellant wife finally left her marital home on 26th February, 1995. There is nothing on record to show that the appellant had ever come back to the company of her husband even on a single occasion to make out a case of attempting resumption of conjugal life. Therefore, the sequence of lodging FIR by the appellant in the year of 2001, after about six years from the date of institution of the divorce suit, impleading as many as 12 persons initially as accused persons clearly indicate that the answer of the appellant as DW1, is deceptive and cunning as her deposition to the effect that her signatures were obtained by the respondent on blank papers under gun point are nothing but a false plea to give an eyewash. 27. It is obvious that the concept of cruelty, depending upon their surrounding circumstances may differ from person to person. There is no straight jacket formula. It is evident that the respondent, being a police officer was then attached to Anti dacoity squad. Except himself and his old widow mother, there were no regular inmate at home. After marriage the appellant being also an well-educated girl joined the family of the respondent. On the face of the evidence on record coupled with the result of the criminal proceeding under Section 498-A I.P.C., judgment being marked as Ext.6, and referring also to the complaint letter of the appellant, Ext. 5, and Ext. F, Mr. Mukherjee relying on the judgements in G.V. N. Kameswara Rao (2002) 2 SCC 2968, IN Malathi Ravi, M.D. Versus B.V. Ravi M. D.: (2014) 7 SCC 640 submitted that the harassment suffered by the respondent due to the complaints made by the appellant, which could not be proved by her, tantamounted to mental cruelty suffered by the respondent. The Supreme Court in the case of Malathi Ravi M.D.(supra), taking note of the illustrative examples from the case of Samar Ghosh Vs. Jaya Ghosh (2007)4 SCC 511 had laid down the following parameters regarding mental cruelty. The Supreme Court in the case of Malathi Ravi M.D.(supra), taking note of the illustrative examples from the case of Samar Ghosh Vs. Jaya Ghosh (2007)4 SCC 511 had laid down the following parameters regarding mental cruelty. - “(i) On Consideration of complete matrimonial life of the parties, acute mental pain, agony and suffering as would not make possible for the parties to live with each other could come within the broad parameters of mental cruelty. (ii) On comprehensive appraisal of the entire matrimonial life of the parties, it becomes abundantly clear that situation is such that the wronged party cannot reasonable be asked to put up with such conduct and continue to life other party. (iv) Mental cruelty is a state of mind. The feeling of deep anguish disappointment, frustration in one spouse caused by the conduct of other for a long time may lead to mental cruelty. (vii) Sustained reprehensible conduct, studied neglect, indifference or total departure from the normal standard of conjugal kindness causing injury to mental health or deriving sadistic pleasure can also amount to mental cruelty. (x) The married life should be reviewed as a whole and a few isolated instances over a period of years will not amount to cruelty. The ill conduct must be persistent for a fairly lengthy period, where the relationship has deteriorated to an extent that because of the acts and behaviour of a spouse, the wronged party finds it extremely difficult to live with the other party any longer, may amount to mental cruelty. (xiv) Where there has been a long period of continuous separation, it may fairly be concluded that the matrimonial bond is beyond repair. The marriage becomes a fiction though supported by a legal tie. By refusing to sever that tie, the law in such cases, does not serve the sanctity of marriage; on the contrary, it shows scant regard for the feelings and emotions of the parties. In such like situations, it may lead to mental cruelty.” 28. The respondent husband not only averred in the plaint mentioning the instances of cruelty as well as the allegations of his wife towards maintaining illicit relationship between the respondent and his mother and elder sister, but also produced them as witnesses being P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 to controvert the allegations and also allowed opportunity to the appellant/ wife to cross examine them. On examination of the entire evidence, we find no material to disbelieve the case made out in the plaint. Rather, accepting the text of Exhibit-2 and the evidence of P.W. 1 sufficiently corroborated by the unshaken evidence of P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 and considering the principles of law laid down in the judgements cited in the foregoing paragraph 27, we have no hesitation in accepting the findings of the learned Trial Judge wherein while deciding the issue No.2, in favour of the respondent held as under:- “Therefore, in the light of the discussion made in the foregoing paragraphs, I have no hesitation to conclude that the petitioner-husband has been able to establish that the respondent subjected the petitioner to cruelty by following means : 1. By calling her mother-in-law as first wife of her husband; 2. By stating that the petitioner-husband had illicit relationship with his elder sister; 3. By refusing co-habitation; 4. By leaving her matrimonial home frequently without any knowledge and consent of the petitioner and his mother; 5. By instituting various complaints against the petitioner before different authority; 6. By hackling the petitioner before the outsiders, even before his in-laws, calling him as a characterless person. As a result, it has been well established that the respondent-wife has perpetrated cruelty upon the petitioner-husband. So, issue no. 2 is decided in affirmative.” 29. Mr. Bidyut Banerjee, learned senior advocate appearing for the appellant/wife relying on the judgement in of N.G. Dastane vs Mrs. S. Dastane : AIR 1975 SC 1534 argued that the husband could not prove his case of cruelty so as to cause a reasonable apprehension in his mind that it would be harmful or injurious to live with his wife. It was submitted that the evidence as adduced to prove the allegations is not of so high standard which could have earned confidence and the satisfaction of the court from the angle of preponderance of probabilities. Further submitted that the learned Trial Court did not comply with the provisions laid down under section 23 of the Hindu Marriage Act which is mandatory before passing a decree of divorce specially on the ground of cruelty. 30. The appellant in her written statement contended that the respondent was a man of bad temperament and habit. Further submitted that the learned Trial Court did not comply with the provisions laid down under section 23 of the Hindu Marriage Act which is mandatory before passing a decree of divorce specially on the ground of cruelty. 30. The appellant in her written statement contended that the respondent was a man of bad temperament and habit. In order to deprive her of enjoying her marital life in collusion with his mother and other family members, the respondent had made some reckless and false allegations which got no factual relations with the actual state of affairs at all. It was also contended by the appellant that at gun point her signatures were obtained by her husband on some blank papers which were reduced to some documents for the purpose of the suit for divorce. In this regard it is to be noted that Ext. E, the letter of complaint dated 27.12.1995 or even Ext.5 the FIR, are silent regarding obtaining of any signed blank paper at the gun point from the appellant. 31. Rather the respondent after examining himself as PW1 got sufficient corroboration from his elder sister and mother about the grave and weighty instances of cruelty and about putting aspersion on him towards maintaining illicit relationship with his mother and elder sister. PW2 and PW3 also corroborated about frequent leaving of marital home by the wife beyond knowledge and consent of the inmates of the house. Further, the threatening of the appellant about initiation of criminal case under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code came true since ultimately the same ended in acquittal for want of proof of the allegations made in the complaint by the wife. Thus after examining the entire evidence on record we find sufficient proof with corroboration about the misbehaviours of the wife, which all were within the parameters of mental cruelty. On the other hand the appellant failed to offer any proof showing any reasonable or compelling cause to withdraw herself or to remain away of the society of her husband continuously since 26th February, 1995. Hence, we are of the view that the solitary evidence of the wife is not at all competent to demolish the evidence of mental cruelty suffered very gravely by the husband by losing the best part of the conjugal life. The conjugal life of a couple is based and founded upon mutual belief and confidence. Hence, we are of the view that the solitary evidence of the wife is not at all competent to demolish the evidence of mental cruelty suffered very gravely by the husband by losing the best part of the conjugal life. The conjugal life of a couple is based and founded upon mutual belief and confidence. Where there is lack of trust and confidence, there is hardly any martial life. While in the plaint and in the evidence we find that the husband approached his father-in-law by writing letter and his uncle-in-law was requested to restore their conjugal life, but neither the father-in-law nor the uncle-in-law nor even any of the relatives of the wife came forward to depose and lend support to the wife denying the assertions of the respondent/ husband which were alleged by the appellant as reckless statements. In this situation, we find no hesitation to draw adverse inference against the plea of the wife and to allow presumptive value towards the claim of the respondent who really with the honest and sincere intention had approached his father-in-law and uncle-in-law to get back peaceful marital life with his wife whom he married after negotiation, but ultimately had to suffer cruelty well within meaning of Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act. 32. Relying on N.G. Dastane (supra), Mr. Banerjee submitted that the mandatory provisions of section 23(1)(b), (2) and (3) of the Hindu Marriage Act having not been complied with by Learned Trial Judge, which were supposed to be complied with even in an undefended case, where the ground of divorce is founded on cruelty, the judgment should be held to have been vitiated and the case should be remanded setting aside the judgment. Submission was that in the case in hand there was no evidence led by the husband in not condoning the alleged acts of cruelty except putting single word in paragraph 7 of the plaint. The relevant portion of paragraph 7 of the plaint which is as follows :- “That some of the acts and conducts exposing Respondent’s desperate, insolent and abnormal nature causing mental pain amounting to mental torture towards the Petitioner which the Petitioner never condoned”. Accordingly we find that in plaint the respondent averred that the acts of cruelty were never condoned by him. 33. Accordingly we find that in plaint the respondent averred that the acts of cruelty were never condoned by him. 33. The relevant portion of the Evidence in Chief of the husband as P.W. 1, is set out hereunder : “I state that I am not inclined to maintain any kind of relationship with the defendant. Due to the defendant I had to and am still undergoing great mental stress which is becoming unbearable day by day. I cannot be expected to cohabit with her anymore. I cannot condone her acts and behaviour.” In cross examination, P.W. 1 disclosed “My conjugal life ended on 14.2.1995”. Again in cross examination on recall on 18th March, 2013, P.W. 1 stated “My wife deserted me on 14.2.1995. She never returned to my house after 26.2.1995.” In this regard it is to be noted that admittedly the parties have no issue. So, the exception about having no evidence of condonation of the acts of cruelty, as submitted by Mr. Banerjee did not more arise, because on the point of not condoning the acts of cruelty we find the established evidence, though not many in quantity, but how low so ever it existed, apart from averment in the plaint, was qualitative, which by way of cross examination could not be demolished. Thus we found that the acts of cruelty, proved in evidence in tune with the plaint case, were not condoned by the respondent. In the case of N.G. Dastane (supra) principles underlying condonation has been well defined in paragraph 55 which is set out hereunder : “Condonation means forgiveness of the matrimonial offence and the restoration of offending spouse to the same position as he or she occupied before the offence was committed. To constitute condonation there must be, therefore, two things : forgiveness and restoration:---------------The evidence of condonation in this case is, in our opinion, as strong and satisfactory as the evidence of cruelty. But the evidence does not consist in the mere fact that the spouses continued to share a common home during or for sometime after the spell of cruelty. Cruelty, generally does not consist of a single, isolated act but consists in most cases a series of acts spread over a period of time. ” 34. But the evidence does not consist in the mere fact that the spouses continued to share a common home during or for sometime after the spell of cruelty. Cruelty, generally does not consist of a single, isolated act but consists in most cases a series of acts spread over a period of time. ” 34. Therefore, to fulfil the element as to whether the acts of cruelty were ever condoned by the husband or not, the evidence of co-habitation between the spouses and resumption of conjugal life even for a shorter period after the spell of cruelty, complained of, would be sufficient, which is absolutely absent in the case on hand. Rather, the evidence of the P.W. 1, well corroborated by his sister and mother, established that virtually since 14th February, 1995, there was no occasion on the part of the husband and wife to stay together and all the incidents of cruelty asserted by the husband were of the period previous to the said date. Even, the wife while deposing in her turn, could not give any single instance of condonation of such acts of cruelty by the respondent. Rather during cross-examination on 21.05.2013 the wife admitted, “Till 26.2.1995 I resided in my matrimonial home. lodged 5 to 7 complaints in Lal Bazar against the petitioner”. 35. True, learned Trial Judge did not use the exact words enshrined under section 23 of the Act before recording the concluding part of the decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty, however, at the end of decision on issue nos. 5 and 6 it was recorded as follows: “Furthermore, the parties have been living separately since the year 1995 and the imputation on character by the wife upon the husband clearly show that their marital tie has irretrievably broken down. It is obviously, better for them to get rid of the so called marital tie.” Mr. Banerjee submitted that the words “irretrievably broken down” are not the approved words to grant decree of divorce. It is obviously, better for them to get rid of the so called marital tie.” Mr. Banerjee submitted that the words “irretrievably broken down” are not the approved words to grant decree of divorce. Since we are on first appeal against the decree in question, in view of the provisions laid down under Order XLI Rule 33 read with Rule 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, we do not find any difficulty to dispose of the appeal finally on merit since the evidence, as adduced, is found by us is sufficient in fulfilling the terms of section 23 of the Act. Therefore, the evidence on record being found sufficient, the appeal can be disposed of finally since the proceeding has been continuing for 21 years. 36. Mr. Banerjee relying upon the case of Smt. Manju Singh vs Ajay Bir Sing : AIR 1986 Delhi 420 and the case of Balwinder Kaur vs Hardeep Singh : (1997) 11 SCC 701 argued that the learned Trial Judge did not adopt the course of reconciliation between the parties, there was no compliance with the statutory provision. Undisputedly, Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been introduced in addition to Section 23 (2) of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955, and, Section 23(3) of the Act of 1955 has been brought subsequently by amendment for settlement of disputes outside the court. To counter such submission, Mr. Mukherjee, for the respondent/husband invited our attention to the order no. 86 recorded by the learned trial Judge on 4th January, 2013 against however Mr. Banerjee submitted that the said order was passed in a different context i.e. at the stage of consideration of alimony pendete lite. Said order no. 86 dated 4th January, 2013 is set out hereunder : “Ld. Advocate of both sides are present. Today is fixed for submission of the order of the Hon’ble Court. Indeed the Hon’ble Court had given direction to this court for early disposal of the application relating to application u/s 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act. In obedience to the order of the Hon’ble Court the matter was disposed of granting Rs.9000/- p.m. as alimony pendentelite and awarding Rs. 40000/- towards the costs of the litigation. Indeed the Hon’ble Court had given direction to this court for early disposal of the application relating to application u/s 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act. In obedience to the order of the Hon’ble Court the matter was disposed of granting Rs.9000/- p.m. as alimony pendentelite and awarding Rs. 40000/- towards the costs of the litigation. This court by giving heed to the Hon’ble Court’s order has taken all sincere endeavour for early conclusion of the suit and as a progressing action of which issues were framed but the trial has not been concluded for any of the unpredictable reasons. The suit has been pending for a long period. So, to my mind a positive determination has to be adopted for conclusion of the suit. Today an application has been filed by the petitioner husband u/s 151 o Cr. P.C seeking privilege to proceed with the hearing of the Matrimonial Suit on day by day basis. One other application is filed by the respondent wife that revision application filed by the lady is still pending for adjudication. So, one month’s time for adjournment should be given to the petitioner lady. The court had expressed its desire for adopting the course of mediation which the Ld. Advocate of both sides flatly refused.” (emphasis supplied to the words “flatly refused”) 37. In the case of Manju Singh (supra), the respondent/wife was pregnant of advanced stage and due to that reason, on receipt of notice of the suit prayer was made to the Court, for adjourning the case for a period of 1½ month for reconciliation prior to filing of the written statement which was rejected by the learned trial judge which had given rise to the revisional application before the Delhi High Court. The direction of the learned trial judge in not adjourning the case for reconciliation was interfered with the following observations : In the instant case the petitioner-wife through her counsel made a request for adjourning the case for a period of 1½ months for reconciliation prior to filing of the written statement. It is not denied she was in advanced stage of pregnancy and she delivered a female child on 13th Sept., 1984. The period of 1 ½ months from 11th Sept., 1984 for appearance and reconciliation was not unreasonable period in the circumstances of this case. It is not denied she was in advanced stage of pregnancy and she delivered a female child on 13th Sept., 1984. The period of 1 ½ months from 11th Sept., 1984 for appearance and reconciliation was not unreasonable period in the circumstances of this case. The trial court by directing the petitioner to file written statement and not adjourning the case for reconciliation acted illegally in the exercise of its jurisdiction affecting the ultimate decision of the case. The revision petition is accepted setting aside the impugned order dt.11th Sept., 1984. Parties are directed to appear before the trial Court on 18th march, 1985. The court may make an endeavour for reconciliation on that date or on any other date convenient to the court. If the court comes to the conclusion that the reconciliation was not possible the petitioner may be directed to file written statement and the divorce petition be disposed of in accordance with law. 38. The facts in Balwinder Kaur (supra) was peculiar in nature. Therein the wife lodged a complaint before the Superintendent of Police alleging harassment caused by her husband in connivance with his parents. On the one hand the husband had filed a petition against his wife seeking restitution of conjugal rights and on the other hand in the name of his illiterate wife, a suit for divorce was filed which was decreed exparte in favour of the wife on the ground of cruelty and desertion for non-appearance of the husband. Later on, as the wife realised that fraud was practised upon her, she came up with an application before the Hon’ble High Court alleging that fraud was perpetrated upon her by her husband in obtaining her signature on the petition of divorce and then bringing her to court to record her statement while she was unaware of its consequence, and in effect, she never wanted divorce. However the High Court dismissed the application and appeal of the wife. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in those circumstances observed “a duty is also cast on the court in the first instance, in every case where it is possible so to do consistently with the nature and circumstances of the case to make endeavour to bring about a reconciliation between the parties”. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in those circumstances observed “a duty is also cast on the court in the first instance, in every case where it is possible so to do consistently with the nature and circumstances of the case to make endeavour to bring about a reconciliation between the parties”. Since the judgement of the District Judge in that case was silent about compliance of the provisions in section 23 of the Act, the Hon’ble Supreme Court though observed that “To direct the appellant to file a separate suit for setting aside the decree of divorce on the ground of fraud otherwise is hardly a solution to the case. (paragraph 16) directed in paragraph 17 as under “As to the correctness otherwise of the allegations made by the appellant or the stand taken by the respondent, we do not wish to comment as it might prejudice the case of either of the parties as we are considering of remanding the matter back to the District Judge for trial of the case afresh.” In this perspective, the provisions of section 23 subsections (2) and (3) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 require consideration for better understanding which are as under:- “Section 23 sub-section (2): Before proceeding to grant any relief under this Act, it shall be the duty of the court in the first instance, in every case where it is possible so to do consistently with the nature and circumstances of the case, to make every endeavour to bring about a reconciliation between the parties : Sub-section (3): For the purpose of aiding the court in bringing about such reconciliation, the court may, if the parties so desire or if the court thinks it just and proper so to do, adjourn the proceedings for a reasonable period not exceeding fifteen days and refer the matter to any person named by the parties in this behalf or to any person nominated by the court if the parties fail to name any person, with directions to report to the court as to whether reconciliation can be and has been, effected and the court shall in disposing of the proceeding have due to the report.” 39. Now, if we interpret sub-section (2) of section 23 of the Act read with Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, we find that it is obligatory on the part of the Court in the first instance to make attempt for reconciliation in every case where it is possible so to do consistently (emphasis supplied) which should have been done watching “With the nature and circumstances of the case” (emphasis supplied). However, under sub-section (3) again such act of reconciliation should be opted “If the parties so desire” (emphasis supplied) or “If the court thinks it just and proper so to do” (emphasis supplied). Now, looking back to the order no. 86 dated 04.01.2013 of the learned Trial Judge or its preceding orders or subsequent to it, we find that on one hand there were always an effort made by the husband to get the suit, instituted by him in the year 1995, expedited for which he had knocked the door of the Court to obtain appropriate orders, and on the other hand the suit instituted in the year 1995 got inordinate delay due to some revisional proceedings instituted at the instance of the appellant /wife . It is pertinent to mention that apart from facing some complain letters by the respondent issued by the appellant to the higher authority of husband amidst the proceeding, the husband also had to undergo with the criminal trial lodged by his wife impleading not only her husband but also his eleven other relatives, which of course after investigation ended into charge-sheet with regard to the husband and his mother for trial discharging ten other relatives. The said criminal trial ultimately on 30th January, 2009 ended in acquittal. 40. On scrutiny of record, we find that order no. 86 dated 04.01.2013 was passed by the learned Trial Judge after a few months of passing the order of maintenance pendente lite. Thereafter since so much time had been elapsed and in the meantime there were complaints and criminal trial in which allegations of cruelty and torture against her husband and old mother-in-law were levelled which ended ultimately into acquittal it was quite normal that there would remain hardly any favourable circumstances to materialise any possible chance of reconciliation between the parties. Still however we find that Learned Trial Judge offered both the parties the chance of mediation which was “flatly refused”. Still however we find that Learned Trial Judge offered both the parties the chance of mediation which was “flatly refused”. The very words “flatly refused” recorded by the learned trial Judge had some special bearing which went to show that no chance of reconciliation would remain between the parties, quite presumably, in view of the facts and circumstances as detailed hereinbefore. Learned advocates are the representatives of the parties to plead and to act before the court on instructions. Therefore as both the parties through their Learned Advocates “flatly refused” in accepting the chance of mediation, we found that there was literally compliance of the provisions contained in section 23 of the Act. It is also pertinent to note that this Court also in the amidst of hearing of the appeal tried to reconcile between the parties by interacting with each of them separately. However, it failed. In view of the discussions as above, and as reconciliation failed and before the Learned Trial Judge the parties “flatly refused” to reconcile, the judgment in Balwinder Kaur (supra) and Manju Singh (supra), relied on by Mr. Banerjee do not require any consideration. 41. Learned Trial Judge in his judgment did not commit any illegality in arriving at the conclusion in deciding issue nos. 1, 2 and 4 framed in the suit after by examining the evidence on record and after taking note of the incidents of cruelty as have been established through evidence adduced on behalf of the husband corroborated by his elder sister and mother apart from the admission of his wife on some material points. The evidence on the incidents of cruelty noted by learned Trial Judge are so severe which we accept as lawful evidence, both oral and documentary after re-verification find semblance with the parameters of mental cruelty defined in Samar Ghosh Vs. Jaya Ghosh (supra), which have not been condoned by the respondent as appears from uncontroverted examination-in-Chief i.e., “I cannot be expected to cohabit with her anymore. I cannot condone her acts and behaviour”. We realised that the outcome of proven torture during the very short span of total conjugal life had a deep rooted impact on the husband. The respondent found impossible to live together. The question of further condonation does not arise. 42. I cannot condone her acts and behaviour”. We realised that the outcome of proven torture during the very short span of total conjugal life had a deep rooted impact on the husband. The respondent found impossible to live together. The question of further condonation does not arise. 42. Thus on re-examining the evidence on record and on examining the impugned judgment, we find that the decision of Learned Trial Judge in dissolving the marriage of the parties by a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty does not suffer from any illegality. Therefore, we uphold the said judgment and decree. The appeal therefore, fails and stands dismissed. No order as to costs. 43. Now, the application being CAN 7326 of 2014, submitted by the wife appellant, as directed for disposal along with the appeal, is taken up for consideration. Admittedly, by virtue of the order dated 13.12.2013 this Court in modification of earlier order of maintenance pendente lite enhanced it to Rs.11,200/- and the appellant has been receiving Rs.11,200/- per month as maintenance pendente lite apart from having received a sum of Rs. 40,000/- as litigation cost. As we are informed, till date, payment at that rate has been made. By this application, the appellant has prayed for enhancement of alimony to Rs.15,000/- per month. 44. As per direction of this Court, the respondent, who is now in the rank of Inspector of Police has submitted copies of last three months’ salary statements from his department. We find his gross salary is Rs. 43,186/-. Mr. Mukherjee, submits, on instructions that the respondent apart from his salary has no other income. There is also no counter material placed before us by the appellant controverting such submission. Since we have upheld the decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty, now taking note of the age and status of both the parties, the appellant being a graduate in Fine Arts, we think, it is proper to fix the permanent alimony to be paid by the respondent to the appellant at Rs. 14,000/- per month with effect from 1st January, 2016. 14,000/- per month with effect from 1st January, 2016. Be it made clear that since with the decision in this appeal we have fixed the amount of permanent alimony, to preclude the respondent from any further financial burden, this amount of permanent alimony is directed to be inclusive of all or any amount which might have fallen due by this time in any proceeding either within the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law. Be it made further clear that any amount, if already claimed or might have been claimed or directed anywhere beyond the purview of this proceeding, shall be deemed to have been merged with such monthly rate of permanent alimony as determined finally and shall remain in force so long the respondent remains alive or so long the wife remains unmarried, or, alive, or, so long the appellant is not gainfully employed elsewhere. The application being CAN 7326 of 2014 is thus finally disposed of along with the appeal. 45. Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be furnished on priority basis. SOUMITRA PAL, J.- I agree.