JUDGMENT : Dipankar Datta, J. 1. This writ petition registers a challenge to an order dated February 26, 2016 passed by the Commissioner, Durgapur Commissionerate confirming demands of excise duty and customs duty in sums of Rs.3,52,99,354/- and Rs.6,24,07,996/-, respectively; imposing penalty of equivalent sums and interest at the appropriate rates under the Central Excise Act, 1994 (hereafter the 1994 Act) and the Customs Act, 1962 (hereafter the 1962 Act); and, ordering recovery of the same from the petitioner. 2. A preliminary objection to the entertain ability of the writ petition has been raised by Mr. Roy, learned advocate for the respondents. According to him, the Bench ought to refuse to hear the petitioner because of availability of an appellate remedy (under section 35B of the 1994 Act) that it has not pursued. 3. Mr. Sen, learned senior advocate representing the petitioner countered the objection by contending as follows : (i) The Commissioner acted without jurisdiction; (ii) Although the petitioner had responded to the show cause notice dated October 7, 2013 by submitting a detailed written reply, the Commissioner observed that the petitioner had failed to respond; (iii) The petitioner was not asked to show cause notice under section 114A of the 1962 Act and by imposing penalty there under, it was practically condemned unheard. Elaborating the first point, it was contended by Mr. Sen that four show-cause notices had been carried forward leading to a common order being passed by the Commissioner, Durgapur Commissionerate, impugned in this writ petition. However, the first two of such show-cause notices dated October 7, 2013 and April 29, 2014 had been issued by the Commissioner, Central Excise, Bolpur. The argument that has been advanced is that the Commissioner, Durgapur Commissionerate had no authority to decide the proceedings initiated by the show-cause notices issued by the Commissioner, Central Excuse, Bolpur and, accordingly, has acted without jurisdiction. Insofar as the second point is concerned, it was submitted that the show-cause notice dated October 7, 2013 issued by the Commissioner, Central Excuse, Bolpur was duly responded to by the petitioner by its reply dated January 21, 2014, received in the office of the Commissioner, Central Excise, Bolpur, on January 22, 2014. However, the Commissioner, Durgapur Commissionerate at paragraph 3.1 (page 5) of his order recorded that no written reply was submitted by the petitioner. However, the Commissioner, Durgapur Commissionerate at paragraph 3.1 (page 5) of his order recorded that no written reply was submitted by the petitioner. It was, accordingly, contended that the points raised by the petitioner in such reply went unattended which, apart from being a glaring instance of non-application of mind, is in breach of natural justice. On the third point, attention of the Bench was drawn to the fact that although the petitioner was called upon to show-cause why penalty under section 112 of the 1962 Act shall not be imposed, which was duly countered in the reply, penalty under section 114A thereof has been imposed without the petitioner being put on notice in that regard and having any opportunity to meet the point. These, according to Mr. Sen, constitute exceptional reasons for which the writ court ought to entertain the writ petition. 4. To impress upon the Bench that availability of an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar for entertaining a writ petition, reliance was placed on the decisions in State of U.P. v. Md. Nooh, reported in AIR 1958 SC 86 , Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai & ors., reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1 , Harbanslal Sahania & anr. v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. & ors., reported in AIR 2003 SC 2120 , and Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. L. K. Ratna & ors., reported in (1986) 4 SCC 537 . It was urged that having regard to the exceptional nature of the claim raised by the petitioner, this Bench ought to entertain the writ petition and decide it on merits. 5. The decisions in Commissioner of Central Excise, Nagpur v. Ballarpur Industries Ltd., reported in 2007 (215) ELT 489 (S.C.), Commissioner of Central Excise & Customs, Surat v. Sun Pharmaceuticals Inds. Ltd., reported in 2015 (326) ELT 3 (S.C.), Noble Moulds (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, reported in 2010 (259) ELT 338 (Del.), and Amrit Foods v. Commissioner Central Excise, U.P., reported in 2005 (190) ELT 433 (S.C.), were relied on to support the contention that without a show-cause notice having been issued under section 114A of the 1962 Act, penalty could not have been imposed. 6. Mr. Roy was called upon by the Bench to answer the jurisdictional point raised by Mr. Sen. 7. On behalf of the respondents, Mr. 6. Mr. Roy was called upon by the Bench to answer the jurisdictional point raised by Mr. Sen. 7. On behalf of the respondents, Mr. Roy placed before the Bench a notification dated September 16, 2014 issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue), whereby in super session of an earlier notification dated March 8, 2002, the Central Board of Excise and Customs specified the jurisdiction of the Principal Chief Commissioners of Central Excise, the Chief Commissioners of Central Excise, the Principal Commissioners of Central Excise, the Commissioners of Central Excise, the Commissioners of Central Excise (Appeal) or the Commissioners of Central Excise (Audit), etc. Attention of the Bench was drawn to Table III(B) specifying the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Central Excise, Bolpur at serial no. 19. It reveals that jurisdiction of such commissioner extends to the Districts of Murshidabad, Birbhum, Purulia and Bardhaman (except Sub-Division Durgapur of Bardhaman District) in the State of West Bengal. Insofar as the Commissioner, Durgapur at serial no. 32 is concerned, the jurisdiction is exercisable by him in the District of Bankura and Sub-Division Durgapur of Bardhaman District in the State of West Bengal. It is his contention that no error of jurisdiction was committed by the Commissioner, Durgapur Commissionerate in assuming jurisdiction. 8. The parties have been heard. 9. The decisions in Md. Nooh (supra), Whirlpool (supra), Harbanslal Sahnia (supra) and Ratna (supra) no doubt lay down that an alternative remedy available to a party approaching the court under Article 226 of the Constitution does not oust the jurisdiction of the writ court. However, importantly, none of these relate to revenue matters. 10. It would be proper at this stage to take note of certain decisions of the Supreme Court in revenue matters laying down guidelines when a writ petition ought not to be entertained having regard to an efficacious remedy made available by statutory dispensation. 11. In Sales Tax Officer vs. Shiv Ratan G. Mohatta, reported in AIR 1966 SC 142 , the Supreme Court was considering an appeal carried against an order of the Rajasthan High Court quashing an order passed by the Sales Tax Officer holding that the writ petitioners had collected and retained certain amount, which should have gone to the Government. Although the issues involved in the appeal were decided on merits, the Court observed as follows: “12. Although the issues involved in the appeal were decided on merits, the Court observed as follows: “12. We are of the opinion that the High Court should have declined to entertain the petition. No exceptional circumstances exist in this case to warrant the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226. It was not the object of Article 226 to convert High Courts into original or appellate assessing authorities whenever an assessee chose to attack an assessment order on the ground that a sale was made in the course of import and therefore exempt from tax. It was urged on behalf of the assessee that they would have had to deposit sales tax, while filing an appeal. Even if this is so does this mean that in every case in which the assessee has to deposit sales tax, he can bypass the remedies provided by the Sales Tax Act? Surely not. There must be something more in a case to warrant the entertainment of a petition under Article 226, something going to the root of the jurisdiction of the Sales Tax Officer, something to show that it would be a case of palpable injustice to the assessee to force him to adopt the remedies provided by the Act.***” 12. The next decision requiring consideration is Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. v. D.P. Dube, Sales Tax Officer, reported in AIR 1967 SC 549 . The Madhya Pradesh High Court had dismissed the writ petition of the appellant by which quashing of the order of the respondent imposing liability for payment of sales tax was prayed. The Court held that the High Court committed an error in dismissing the writ petition on a ground not set up by the respondent in his counter affidavit. While dismissing the appeal on merits considering the other contentions that were raised in the writ petition, this is what the Court said : “7. The legislature has set up an elaborate and self-contained machinery for investigating whether a transaction is liable to be taxed because it is of the nature of a retail sale within the meaning of the Act. The Taxing Officer is invested with authority to determine the nature of the transaction and its liability to tax, and against his decision there is an appeal to the Appellate Authority and a further right of revision to the Commissioner. The Taxing Officer is invested with authority to determine the nature of the transaction and its liability to tax, and against his decision there is an appeal to the Appellate Authority and a further right of revision to the Commissioner. It is true that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is extensive, but normally the High Court does not exercise that jurisdiction by entertaining petitions against the order of taxing authorities, when the statute under which tax is sought to be levied provides a remedy by way of an appeal or other proceeding to a party aggrieved and thereby by-pass the statutory machinery. That is not to say that the High Court will never entertain a petition against the order of the Taxing Officer. The High Court has undoubtedly jurisdiction to decide whether a statute under which a tax is sought to be levied is within the legislative competence of the legislature enacting it or whether the statute defies constitutional restrictions or infringes any fundamental rights, or whether the taxing authority has arrogated to himself power which he does not possess, or has committed a serious error of procedure which has affected the validity of his conclusion or even where the taxing authority threatens to recover tax on an interpretation of the statute which is erroneous. The High Court may also in appropriate cases determine the exigibility to tax of transactions the nature of which is admitted, but the High Court normally does not proceed to ascertain the nature of a transaction which is alleged to be taxable. The High Court leaves it to the tax payer to obtain an adjudication from the taxing authorities in the first instance.” 13. In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, reported in (1983) 2 SCC 433 , an order passed by the Orissa High Court dismissing a writ petition on the ground of availability of an efficacious alternative remedy, was under challenge. The Court ruled : “6. In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, reported in (1983) 2 SCC 433 , an order passed by the Orissa High Court dismissing a writ petition on the ground of availability of an efficacious alternative remedy, was under challenge. The Court ruled : “6. We are constrained to dismiss these petitions on the short ground that the petitioners have an equally efficacious alternative remedy by way of an appeal to the Prescribed Authority under sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Act, then a second appeal to the Tribunal under sub-section (3)(a) thereof, and thereafter in the event the petitioners get no relief, to have the case stated to the High Court under Section 24 of the Act. ************* 11. Under the scheme of the Act, there is a hierarchy of authorities before which the petitioners can get adequate redress against the wrongful acts complained of. The petitioners have the right to prefer an appeal before the Prescribed Authority under sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Act. If the petitioners are dissatisfied with the decision in the appeal, they can prefer a further appeal to the Tribunal under sub-section (3) of Section 23 of the Act, and then ask for a case to be stated upon a question of law for the opinion of the High Court under Section 24 of the Act. The Act provides for a complete machinery to challenge an order of assessment, and the impugned orders of assessment can only be challenged by the mode prescribed by the Act and not by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is now well recognized that where a right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute only must be availed of.***” 14. Yet recently, the Supreme Court in CIT v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal, reported (2014) 1 SCC 603 , upon considering a host of decisions had the occasion to opine that : “15. Yet recently, the Supreme Court in CIT v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal, reported (2014) 1 SCC 603 , upon considering a host of decisions had the occasion to opine that : “15. Thus, while it can be said that this Court has recognized some exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy i.e. where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, or when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice, the proposition laid down in Thansingh Nathmal case ( AIR 1964 SC 1419 ), Titaghur Paper Mills case [ (1983) 2 SCC 433 ] and other similar judgments that the High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance still holds the field. Therefore, when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation.” 15. Reading of the aforesaid authorities makes the position clear that insofar as taxing statutes are concerned, interference by a writ court should be few and far between. It cannot be disputed that the 1994 Act has been introduced with the object of consolidating and amending the law relating to Central duties of excise on goods manufactured or produced in the country. A complete machinery is envisaged for the purposes of charging of duty of excise, which is in the nature of a liability for the assessee, as well as seeking relief in respect of improper or erroneous orders made by the authorities vested with power to charge duty, which is in the nature of a right of the assessee. At or about the time an adjudication is in progress, it is for the relevant authority to ascertain facts and apply the law that are applicable to a particular situation, to return findings on each and every point that arises in course of the proceedings and to end his order by recording his conclusions. At or about the time an adjudication is in progress, it is for the relevant authority to ascertain facts and apply the law that are applicable to a particular situation, to return findings on each and every point that arises in course of the proceedings and to end his order by recording his conclusions. Should the party proceeded against feel aggrieved by an order passed under the Act, he/it has a right of preferring an appeal under section 35B to the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal constituted under section 129 of the Customs Act, 1962. A further right of appeal to a Bench of the High Court comprised of not less than two judges is conferred by section 35G of the 1994 Act, stating that the case involves a substantial question of law and if satisfied the High Court is required to formulate such question and decide it. Section 35L also contemplates an appeal to the Supreme Court. Invocation of the High Court’s power to issue high prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution in matters relating to charging and demanding duty, in view of such fora made available by the statute, ought not to be permitted as a matter of course or else the will of the people expressed by the legislature in the relevant enactment would be rendered nugatory. It is only in very exceptional cases when a party complains of infringement of fundamental rights, or where facts are not disputed and such party establishes assumption of jurisdiction by an authority without being possessed thereof, or the complaint of violation of natural justice is so pronounced and gross, that a writ court in the judicious exercise of its discretion may choose to interfere. 16. Bearing in mind the above, none of the three points raised by Mr. Sen has appealed to this Bench to entertain the writ petition by derailing the procedure prescribed by the 1994 Act and it proposes to relegate the petitioner to the Appellate Tribunal under section 35B thereof for a decision on the legality and/or propriety of the impugned order. 17. The argument of Mr. Roy, insofar as the jurisdictional point based on notification dated September 16, 2014, prima facie appears to be sound. 17. The argument of Mr. Roy, insofar as the jurisdictional point based on notification dated September 16, 2014, prima facie appears to be sound. There is no stipulation in the notification dated September 16, 2014 that any show-cause notice issued prior thereto by a commissioner of a particular region shall be taken to its logical conclusion by such commissioner even though on and from the date of the notification, the jurisdiction of the commissioner might suffer a change. In order to encourage the Bench to go ahead and entertain the writ petition based on the point of error of jurisdiction, the petitioner was required to satisfy the Bench that the error of jurisdiction attributed to the Commissioner, Durgapur Commissionerate is clear, conspicuous and obtrusive. Unfortunately, in its pursuit to satisfy this Bench the petitioner has miserably failed and hence, no exception can be taken to the impugned order by reason of the plea raised by Mr. Sen at least at this stage. 18. It is quite true that paragraph 3.1 of the order incorrectly records that the petitioner did not respond to the show cause notice dated October 7, 2013. However, the Commissioner, Durgapur Commissionerate considered the reply of the petitioner dated May 5, 2014 in answer to the second of the show cause notices in the series dated April 29, 2014. Except for a plea of limitation raised in the first reply, it could not be shown that there was any material difference in the contents of the two replies. The second reply, sans the point of limitation, has been considered in detail and, therefore, there is no gross violation of principle of natural justice. A distinction must always be drawn between a total violation of natural justice (rule of audi alteram partem) and violation of a facet of such rule, i.e. between ‘no notice’/‘no hearing’, and ‘no fair/no proper hearing’, as propounded in the decision in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, reported in (1996) 3 SCC 364 . Had it been a case of non-consideration of the second reply too, the situation could have been otherwise. Had it been a case of non-consideration of the second reply too, the situation could have been otherwise. Insofar as the plea of limitation is concerned, it is settled law that the point of limitation always involves a mixed question of law and fact and, therefore, if at all the proceeding initiated by the show cause notice dated October 7, 2013 is barred by limitation, such point is available to be taken before the Appellate Tribunal by the petitioner. This Bench need not decide a mixed question of law and fact in a writ petition particularly when an efficacious appellate remedy is available to the petitioner. 19. Regarding the third point raised by Mr. Sen, the same proceeds to challenge only a part of the impugned order. Even if the writ petition is entertained restricting the challenge to imposition of penalty, the petitioner’s challenge to the demands of excise duty and customs duty noticed above as well as interest, if any, would stand foreclosed. Entertaining the writ petition only on the third point would surely be fatal for it. 20. A host of other decisions have been relied on referred to in paragraph 5 (supra), which do not come to the aid of the petitioner for the foregoing discussion. 21. Apart from what has been said above, it appears from paragraph 55 of the writ petition that presentation of this writ petition has been occasioned to avoid the pre-deposit that is required to be made by the petitioner in terms of section 35F of the 1994 Act. The petitioner ought not to be permitted to abandon the machinery for escaping payment as envisaged in the statute, and to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution when the remedy open to him by an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal is adequate and efficacious. 22. The writ petition is not entertained and stands dismissed, without costs. This order shall, however, not preclude the petitioner to work out its remedy in accordance with law. Needless to observe, all points available to it are permitted to be raised before the Appellate Tribunal. 23. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this judgment and order, if applied, may be furnished to the applicant at an early date. Later: Mr. Shroff, learned advocate for the petitioner has prayed for stay of operation of the judgment and order. Needless to observe, all points available to it are permitted to be raised before the Appellate Tribunal. 23. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this judgment and order, if applied, may be furnished to the applicant at an early date. Later: Mr. Shroff, learned advocate for the petitioner has prayed for stay of operation of the judgment and order. The same is considered by the Bench and refused.