JUDGMENT : G.K. Vyas, J. In this criminal jail appeal, the accused appellant, Mangilal has challenged the validity of judgment dated 26th July, 2007 passed by learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Deedwana, District: Nagaur, in Session Case No. 18/2006, whereby the learned trial court while acquitting him for offence under Section 307 IPC convicted the accused appellant for the offences under Sections 302 and 323 IPC and passed the following sentence: Under Section: 302 IPC: Imprisonment for Life with a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo for a period of one month's RI. Under Section: 323 IPC: Imprisonment for six months' simple imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 100/- and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo seven days' additional imprisonment. 2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that on 16th August, 2006, at 10.30 AM, the Ex-Sarpanch, Ramuram (PW.11) gave a telephonic information to the S.H.O. of Police Station: Ladnu that in Village Gudila, one Mangilal Meghwal, has murdered his wife, so also, caused injuries to his son and daughter Suman. Upon the aforesaid telephonic information, ASI, Latif Khan along with other police officials went to the place of occurrence after recording the said information in "Rojnamcha". The police reached on the spot at 12.00 AM where PW.11 Ramuram gave written report (Exhibit-P/20), alleging therein that today in the morning, one Shankarlal informed him that daughter of Mangilal is crying in the house and Mangilal is sitting outside his house. Upon such information, Ramuram and Shankarlal both went to the house of appellant-Mangilal, where accused Mangi Lal was sitting outside his house and his daughter Suman was crying on the roof of the house. 3. The complainant and Shankerlal, both went to the roof, where body of Geeta wife of Mangilal was lying dead and blood was coming out from her mouth and neck, due to injuries on the neck of the deceased. The son of the appellant (Mukesh) aged 7-8 years was also found on the cot in unconscious condition, and there was injury upon his head. Similarly, Suman daughter of Mangilal was also having injury upon her head. 4. The complainant made an inquiry from Mangilal about incident, then he pelted one stone on him, therefore, he went out of the house. Similarly, Suman daughter of Mangilal was also having injury upon her head. 4. The complainant made an inquiry from Mangilal about incident, then he pelted one stone on him, therefore, he went out of the house. According to complainant Mangilal, killed his wife, Smt. Geeta and also gave beatings to his son and daughter in the night. It is also reported that the mental condition of the appellant, Mangilal was not good and he was taking treatment for mental disorder. Upon aforesaid written report given by the complainant PW.11, Ramuram an F.I.R. No. 117/2006 was registered at Police Station: Ladnu, for the offences under Sections 302, 307 and 323 IPC against the accused appellant. 5. After registration of the FIR, inspection of the site was carried out and a Site Plan (Exhibit-P/9) was prepared, and after taking photographs of the place of occurrence, the condition of dead body of Geeta upon place of occurrence was recorded vide Exhibit-P/10. After preparing the "Panchnama", the blood stained clothes of deceased, viz. blouse, and a piece of bed (fcLrj) was also taken in possession vide Exhibit-P/11 and Exhibit-P/12, respectively. 6. After completion of the proceedings on spot, the dead body of deceased Geeta was sent for postmortem to Hospital and after conducting postmortem, the postmortem report vide Exhibit-P/8 was prepared. The injured son Mukesh was also taken to the hospital where he was declared dead, and after conducting post mortem the report Ex.P/2 was prepared. The dead body of Smt. Geeta and Mukesh were handed over to the relatives vide Exhibit-P/25 and P/26. 7. The statement of the prosecution witnesses were recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and accused appellant, Mangilal was arrested vide Ex.P/17 on 16.08.2006. After arrest upon information furnished by the appellant under Section 27 of the Evidence Act with regard to recovery of one "Lathi" (bZl) it was recovered from the house of accused appellant vide Exhibit-P/14. 8. The investigation of the case culminated into the submission of a charge sheet against the appellant in the court of learned Judicial Magistrate, Ladnu, on 25.09.2006, from where the case was committed to the court of learned Addl. Sessions Court, Deedwana, for trial. The learned trial court after providing an opportunity of hearing to the appellant framed charges for the offences under Section 302 and 307 IPC against accused appellant and commenced the trial. 9. Sessions Court, Deedwana, for trial. The learned trial court after providing an opportunity of hearing to the appellant framed charges for the offences under Section 302 and 307 IPC against accused appellant and commenced the trial. 9. In support of prosecution case, statements of 16 witnesses were recorded and certain documents were also exhibited. 10. After recording statements of prosecution witnesses, statement of accused appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C. were recorded in which accused appellant denied the allegation and said that the occurrence took place in the spur of moment due to mental disorder. In defence, the statements of Kamla were recorded, thereafter final arguments were heard by the learned trial court. 11. The learned trial court after examining and discussing the entire evidence, in the light of arguments made by both the parties, proceeded to convict the appellant for the offences under Sections 302 and 323 IPC and passed sentence aforesaid vide judgment dated 26.7.2007. 12. In this criminal jail appeal, the appellant has challenged the validity of judgment on various grounds. 13. Mr. Dilip Sharma, learned amicus curiae, appearing on behalf of the appellant vehemently argued that it is a case in which the incident took place in a spur of moment because the mental condition of the accused was in disorder and he was taking treatment for his mental illness. According to learned counsel for the appellant, in the statements recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., the appellant has not denied the incident but submitted that on the relevant day quarrel took place in a spur of moment due to anger, therefore, conviction of the accused appellant for the offence under Section 302 IPC is not sustainable in the eye of law. The crux of argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the finding of guilt arrived at by the learned trial court so as to convict the appellant for the offence under Section 302 IPC is perverse and erroneous because on the basis of such prosecution evidence, the case cannot travel beyond the offence under Section 304 Part I of the IPC, for the reason, the main ingredient of the definition of murder, which is "motive" is absolutely missing. 14. 14. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that there is ample evidence on record to prove the fact that the mental condition of the appellant was not in order, so also, he was taking treatment for mental illness and due to sudden provocation, the incident took place, therefore, the conviction of the appellant for the offence under Sections 302 IPC deserves to be quashed because upon assessment of the entire evidence, the offence cannot travel beyond Section 304 Part I of IPC, therefore, while altering the conviction from offence under Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part I IPC, the sentence awarded to the appellant may kindly be reduced from life imprisonment to ten years in the facts and circumstances of the case. 15. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor vehemently argued that it is a case in which innocent wife and son are murdered by the accused appellant for no reason, the accused appellant is not disputing the incident in his statements recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., therefore, it cannot be said that finding given by the learned trial court to convict him for the offence under Sections 302 and 323 IPC, is illegal. According to learned Public Prosecutor entire evidence of prosecution loudly speaks that it is a case in which the appellant is guilty for the offence under Sections 302 and 323 IPC. 16. While inviting attention of the Court towards the conduct of the appellant it is submitted that as per complainant, PW.11, Ramuram, when he reached on the spot and made inquiry, the accused appellant tried to assault him by pelting stone on him. He further submitted that the appellant was present on the place of incident and admitted the occurrence, therefore, no interference is called for in the judgment impugned, hence this appeal may be dismissed. 17. After hearing the learned Amicus Curiae as well as the learned Public Prosecutor we have examined the finding given by the learned trial court for conviction under Section 302 IPC in the light of the prosecution evidence on record. The learned Amicus Curiae is not disputing the incident in which Geeta wife of the accused appellant and his six years old son Mukesh died due to the injuries caused by him. The learned Amicus Curiae is not disputing the incident in which Geeta wife of the accused appellant and his six years old son Mukesh died due to the injuries caused by him. Upon assessment of the entire evidence, the following facts emerges for consideration: A. Admittedly, there is no eye witness in this case and FIR was registered on the basis of the statement of PW-11 Ramu Ram, who reached on spot after incident took place. The witness PW-11 Ramu Ram categorically stated before the court that: " djhc 6 ekg iwoZ esjs ikl lqcg 8-00 cts 'kadj esjs ikl vk;k vkSj esjs dks crk;k dh ekaxhyky dh Nr ij ,d cPph jks jgh gSA fQj eSa o ljiap o 'kadj] eqy0] ekaxhyky ds ?kj ij x;sA ekaxhyky dh Nr ij eSa] ljiap izsekjke 'kekZ o 'kadj x;sA ns[kk fd xhrk [kRe gqbZ iM+h FkhA eqds'k o lqeu ds pksVsa yxh gqbZ FkhA xhrk ds ,d flj esa pksV yxh gqbZ FkhA eqds'k ds Hkh pksVs yxh gqbZ FkhA lqeu ds Hkh pksVsa yxh gqbZ FkhA eqy0 ekaxhyky ?kj ds xsV ds ckgj feyk FkkA ekaxhyky ls gekjs dksbZ ckr ugha gqbZ FkhA xhrk pksV yxus ls ejh FkhA ?kVuk jkr dh gSA lqeu o eqds'k dks bykt ds fy, ykmuwa vLirky Hkstk FkkA " The witness Shanker Lal (PW07) is the person who informed the incident to the author of the FIR Ramu Ram (PW-11). The witness PW-7 Shanker Lal give following statement in the trial, which reads as under: " djhc 4&5 eghus igys dh ckr gSA lqcg ds le; ekaxhyky vius edku ds xsV ds ikl [kM+k FkkA mlds edku esa cPph jks jgh FkhA eSaus jksrs gq, lquk ekaxhyky us eq>sa dgk fd esjs Vkcjksa ds yx x;h esjs dkdk dks cqykdj ykvks fQj eSa mlds dkdk jkewjke dks cqykus igys <+k.kh x;k <+k.kh esa ugha feyk fQj mls xkao ls cqykdj yk;kA ekaxhyky us jkewjke dks dgk fd esjs cPpksa dks ns[kksaA eSa o jkewjke ekaxhyky ds edku dh Nr ij x,A Nr ij ekaxhyky dh vkSjr xhrk rks ejh iM+h FkhA mlds xnZu o eqag ij pksVs Fkh [kwu vk jgk FkkA mldk yM+dk eqds'k o yM+dh lqeu csgks'k iM+s FksA eqds'k ds xnZu esa yxh rFkk [kwu vk jgk Fkk lqeu ds Hkh ekFks esa yxh Fkh mls psrk ugha Fkh mldk dkdk fQj ljiap dks cqykus x;k ljiap izsekjke czkgkz.k ekSds ij vk;kA eqds'k dks vLirky ys x, Fks og [kRe gks x;k FkkA ekaxhyky us ljiap o jkewyky dks dgk Fkk fd buds esjs ls gh yxh Fkh ,d bZ'k Nr ij iM+h FkhA ekaxhyky us dgk fd bZ'k }kjk esjs ls yx x;h gSA ekjus dk dkj.k ugha crk;kA " Upon perusal of above statement of both the witnesses, it is apparent that prosecution has established the fact that on the date of incident in the presence of the accused appellant, they went in his house and saw that body of his wife Geeta was lying upon the roof and his son Mukesh having injury upon his head was also lying upon cot in unconscious condition, so also daughter of accused appellant was also there having injury upon her body. B. In this case PW-4 Bhanwar Lal stated that upon inquiry by him the accused appellant made confession before him and said that I have inflicted injury to my wife by brick but investigating officer recovered Ish (Wooden stick) upon information given by the accused appellant under Section 27 of the Evidence Act vide Ex.P/14. The prosecution case is that injuries were caused by the accused appellant to the deceased and his children by Ish and blood was found upon Ish. The prosecution case is that injuries were caused by the accused appellant to the deceased and his children by Ish and blood was found upon Ish. We have perused the post mortem report of deceased Smt. Geeta W/o accused appellant (Ex.P/26) dated 16.8.2006 and post mortem report of son of the accused appellant (Ex.P/2) dated 16.8.2006. As per post mortem report there was one injury upon partial bone leaving to extensive hemorrhage and as per opinion of the doctor the cause of death was head injury. Upon perusal of the post mortem report of Smt. Geeta (Ex.P/28), three injuries were found upon her body and cause of death was head injury. Meaning thereby, both the son and wife of accused appellant died due to the head injuries, which is established by the post mortem reports and statement of PW- 2 Dr. Lalit Kumar Sharma. C. The accused appellant in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. gave the following explanation is given by the accused appellant, which reads as under: "iz'u 18%& vkidks vkSj D;k dguk gS\ mRrj%& eqds'k ds fxjus ls pksVs vk;h vkSjr dks tku ls ekjus dh bPNk ugha Fkh vkilh yM+kbZ esa mlds pksV vk;hA" 18. Upon consideration of entire evidence, we find that there is no eye witness of the incident and there is no evidence of motive on record but it appears that some quarrel took place in between the husband and wife in spur of moment in which the accused appellant inflicted injury either by brick or Ish which is said to be recovered at the instance of the accused appellant. 19. It is settled provision of law that to prove the prosecution case, the prosecution is required to adduce reliable and trustworthy evidence and there must be transparency in the evidence so as to arrive at the conclusion that the accused appellant is guilty for offence, but in this case, there is some deficiency in the evidence but this Court cannot lose sight of the fact that the accused appellant himself stated in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. that occurrence took place in the spur of moment and due to quarrel took place between him and his wife, she died, but there was no intention to kill her. It is also stated that son fell down, therefore, injury was caused to him. 20. It is also stated that son fell down, therefore, injury was caused to him. 20. In defence a plea is taken by the accused appellant that he is suffering from mental disorder and to establish this fact the witness DW-1 Kamla Meghwal, real sister is produced to support his plea. The statement of DW-1 Kamla Meghwal reads as under: " ge lkr cgu HkkbZ gSA ekaxhyky esjk HkkbZ yxrk gSA esjh ls cM+h ,d cgu vkSj gSA gekjs ,d gh HkkbZ ekaxhyky gSA esjh ekrkth dh fnekxh gkyr Bhd ugha gSA og Hkh ikxy gS tks djhc chl lky ls gSA ekaxhyky ds rhu cPps FksA vc nks yM+fd;kWa gSA ekaxhyky dks ikxyiu ds nkSjs fiNys nl lkyksa ls iM+rs gSA mldks ikxyiu ds nkSjs dHkh dHkh vkts gSA ekaxhyky dks ikxyiu ds nkSjs vkrs rc og dq.M esa iM+ tkrk rks dHkh Qkalh [kk ysrk FkkA ge bldks ,d ckj lhdj bykt gsrq ysdj x;s FksA lhdj bykt djok;k mlds dkxt esjs ikl ugha gSA ekaxhyky ds ikl gh Fks] blus dgka j[ks eq>s irk ughaA ekaxhyky dh cfPp;kWa vHkh esjs ikl jg jgh gSA ekaxhyky us esjh HkkstkbZ rFkk Hkrhts ds lkFk ikxyiu ds nkSjs esa ekjihV dh FkhA og ysfV~ax rFkk is'kkc Hkh vUnj gh djrk FkkA vxj vc gesa ekaxhyky dks lkSai fn;k tkrk gS rks ge mldh ns[kHkky djsaxs rFkk byktr djok;saxsA ekaxhyky dh cfPp;ka rFkk mldh eka dh ns[kHkky djus okyk vkSj dksbZ ugha gSaA etcwjh ge mudh ns[kHkky dj jgs gSaA /kwfM;k esa ekaxhyky dk edku vHkh can iM+k gSA esjh ekrkth 70 o"kZ dh gSA ekaxhyky dh ,d cPph vkB lky dh rFkk nwljh vHkh ,d lky dh gSA " 21. Although a plea has been taken by the appellant, with regard to suffering from mental disorder but no cogent evidence is produced by him except statement of his sister DW-1 Kamla Meghwal, it is also worthwhile to observe that Suman daughter of the deceased injured in the incident has not been produced as witness in the court though she was eye witness of the incident, therefore, it is obvious that prosecution has tried to hide evidence in the trial. The statement of daughter of appellant Suman were recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and her name was also included in the list of witnesses, but prosecution has not produced the said eye witness so as to prove the case against the accused appellant for the offence under Section 302 IPC. 22. Upon above discussion of the evidence, we are of the opinion that although the prosecution has proved the fact that incident took place in the house of accused appellant in between the night of 15th and 16th of August, 2008 but has failed to prove the motive and the fact how the occurrence took place, therefore, in absence of main ingredient of motive of murder, we are of the opinion that the finding arrived at by the learned trial court to convict the accused appellant for offence under Section 302 IPC is not sustainable in law, as per prosecution evidence, the case cannot travel beyond offence under Section 304 Part I of IPC. 23. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dayanand v. State of Haryana reported in 2008 Cri.L.J. 2975 held that in absence of motive or intention and upon the fact that there was no repeated blow upon the vital part of the body, then offence cannot travel beyond offence under Section 304 Part I IPC. The paras nos.10 to 13 of the said judgment reads as under:- "10. The crucial question is as to which was the appropriate provision to be applied. In the scheme of the IPC culpable homicide is genus and 'murder' its specie. All 'murder' is 'culpable homicide' but not vice-versa. Speaking generally, 'culpable homicide' sans 'special characteristics of murder is culpable homicide not amounting to murder'. For the purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of the generic offence, the IPC practically recognises three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, what may be called, 'culpable homicide of the first degree'. This is the gravest form of culpable homicide, which is defined in Section 300 as 'murder'. The second may be termed as 'culpable homicide of the second degree'. This is punishable under the first part of Section 304. Then, there is 'culpable homicide of the third degree'. This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is also the lowest among the punishments provided for the three grades. The second may be termed as 'culpable homicide of the second degree'. This is punishable under the first part of Section 304. Then, there is 'culpable homicide of the third degree'. This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is also the lowest among the punishments provided for the three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under the second part of Section 304. 11. The academic distinction between 'murder' and 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder' has always vexed the Courts. The confusion is caused, if Courts losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms used by the legislature in these sections, allow themselves to be drawn into minute abstractions. The safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used in the various clauses of Sections 299 and 300. The following comparative table will be helpful in appreciating the points of distinction between the two offences. Section 299 Section 300 A person commits culpable homicide if the act by which the death is caused is done Subject to certain exceptions culpable homicide is murder if the act by which the death is caused is done - Intention (a) with the intention of causing (1) with the intention of death; or causing death; or (b) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death; or (2) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused; or (3) With the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; or Knowledge (c) with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death. (4) with the knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as is mentioned above. **** 12. Clause (b) of Section 299 corresponds with clauses (2) and (3) of Section 300. **** 12. Clause (b) of Section 299 corresponds with clauses (2) and (3) of Section 300. The distinguishing feature of the mens rea requisite under clause (2) is the knowledge possessed by the offender regarding the particular victim being in such a peculiar condition or state of health that the internal harm caused to him is likely to be fatal, notwithstanding the fact that such harm would not in the ordinary way of nature be sufficient to cause death of a person in normal health or condition. It is noteworthy that the 'intention to cause death' is not an essential requirement of clause (2). Only the intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with the offender's knowledge of the likelihood of such injury causing the death of the particular victim, is sufficient to bring the killing within the ambit of this clause. This aspect of clause (2) is borne out by illustration (b) appended to Section 300. 13. Clause (b) of Section 299 does not postulate any such knowledge on the part of the offender. Instances of cases falling under clause (2) of Section 300 can be where the assailant causes death by a fist blow intentionally given knowing that the victim is suffering from an enlarged liver, or enlarged spleen or diseased heart and such blow is likely to cause death of that particular person as a result of the rupture of the liver, or spleen or the failure of the heart, as the case may be. If the assailant had no such knowledge about the disease or special frailty of the victim, nor an intention to cause death or bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the offence will not be murder, even if the injury which caused the death, was intentionally given. In clause (3) of Section 300, instead of the words 'likely to cause death' occurring in the corresponding clause (b) of Section 299, the words "sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death" have been used. Obviously, the distinction lies between a bodily injury likely to cause death and a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The distinction is fine but real and if overlooked, may result in miscarriage of justice. Obviously, the distinction lies between a bodily injury likely to cause death and a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The distinction is fine but real and if overlooked, may result in miscarriage of justice. The difference between clause (b) of Section 299 and clause (3) of Section 300 is one of the degree of probability of death resulting from the intended bodily injury. To put it more broadly, it is the degree of probability of death which determines whether a culpable homicide is of the gravest, medium or the lowest degree. The word 'likely' in clause (b) of Section 299 conveys the sense of probable as distinguished from a mere possibility. The words "bodily injury ....... sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death" mean that death will be the "most probable" result of the injury, having regard to the ordinary course of nature." 24. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ranjit Sarkar v. State of Tripura (Cr. Appeal No. 1247/2015) decided on 23.9.2015 gave the following verdict in paras Nos. 10 to 12, which reads as under: "10. We have carefully gone through the statement of PW-15 Dr. Ranjit Kumar Das, who conducted post mortem examination on the dead body of Anil Das on 18.6.2007. In fact, first four ante mortem injuries mentioned by the Medical Officer relate to single injury. The first one is stitched wound. The second is haematoma on the deeper layer of scalp over right parietal region. The third injury also relates to the same as it discloses fracture on the depressed bone of the head on anterior part of right parietal bone. The fourth ante mortem injury also relates to above three injuries, which discloses subdural hemorrhage present over cerebral hemispheres. The only ante mortem injury No. 5 is actually the second injury which is an abrasion measuring 3 cm x 2 cm over the dorsum of left wrist joint. 11. PW-2 Anil Das also does not state about more than one blow given by the appellant on the head of the deceased with wooden file. The injury on the dorsum of left wrist joint could have been caused when the injured fell down on the ground. 11. PW-2 Anil Das also does not state about more than one blow given by the appellant on the head of the deceased with wooden file. The injury on the dorsum of left wrist joint could have been caused when the injured fell down on the ground. As such, in substance the evidence on record suggests only one blow given by the appellant on the head of the deceased which appears to have been given with full force. 12. In the above facts and circumstances, having reassessed the depositions of witnesses and other evidence on record, we are of considered opinion that the act on the part of the appellant is covered by Part I of Section 304 IPC. Therefore, we set aside the conviction and sentence under Section 302 IPC, awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the High Court. Instead, the appellant Ranjit Sarkar is convicted under Section 304 Part I, and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for a period of ten years. With this modification in the conviction and sentence, the appeal stands disposed of." 25. Upon perusal of the above adjudication along with the evidence on record, we have no hesitation to hold that the finding given by the learned trial court to convict the accused appellant for offence under Section 302 IPC suffers from patent illegality. The learned trial court while acquitting the accused appellant for offence under Section 307 IPC gave the finding that no offence under Section 307 IPC is made out then how offence under Section 302 IPC is made out in absence of evidence of motive. 26. In view of the above discussion, it is a fit case to alter the conviction from offence under Section 302 IPC to offence under Section 304 Part I IPC while maintaining the finding for offence under Section 323 IPC. 27. Consequently, this jail appeal is partly allowed, the conviction of the accused appellant for offence under Section 302 IPC vide judgment dated 26.7.2007 in Sessions Case No. 18/2006 by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Deedwana is hereby altered to the offence under Section 304 Part I IPC and his sentence of life imprisonment is hereby reduced to 10 years RI with fine of Rs. 5,00/- and in default of payment of fine to further undergo one months SI. Sessions Judge, Deedwana is hereby altered to the offence under Section 304 Part I IPC and his sentence of life imprisonment is hereby reduced to 10 years RI with fine of Rs. 5,00/- and in default of payment of fine to further undergo one months SI. The conviction and sentence for the offence under Section 323 IPC as imposed by the learned trial court is hereby maintained.