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2016 DIGILAW 565 (ORI)

State of Orissa v. Pilatush @ Blasius Singh

2016-07-27

D.P.CHOUDHURY

body2016
JUDGMENT Dr. D.P. CHOUDHURY, J. - Challenge has been made to the judgment of acquittal dated 22.5.1995 passed by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Baripada for the offence under Sections 498-A/306/34 I.P.C. in S.T. Case No.3/211 of 1993-94. FACTS 2. The backdrop of the case of the prosecution is that accused-appellant Pilatush had married deceased Sabitri on 23.5.1993 in a Church at Midnapore, West Bengal. Thereafter they lived as husband and wife. After marriage they were blessed with a son out of their wedlock. It is alleged, inter alia, that after some months of happy conjugal life accused Pilatush made demand for cash, a cycle and a gold ring from his wife Sabitri. Due to non-fulfillment of dowry, accused persons appellants harassed the deceased woman and demanded the aforesaid dowry. Due to non-payment of any dowry amount accused persons started ill treatment to deceased Sabitri. All the appellants did not give food to the deceased and also restricted her entry to the kitchen and abused the deceased Sabitri as Majhiani. Deceased Sabitri has narrated such ill treatment to her relatives wherever she got opportunity. On 7.6.1994 deceased left the house of accused persons, came to the house of her brother-in-law Hijnus Murmu (P.W.1) and narrated the incident of ill treatment. She became perturbed and thereafter on 8.6.1994 at about 2.00 P.M. she committed suicide by hanging herself from the roof of the house of P.W.1. Then the matter was reported to the Police who made Station Diary entry and sent the same to Betnoti Police Station for registration. At Betnoti Police Station a case was registered and O.I.C. Betnoti P.S. investigated the case. During investigation autopsy over the dead body was conducted, necessary seizure was made and chemical examination of seized property were made. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was submitted. 3. The plea of the accused persons is a bare denial to the charges levelled against them. It is stated by accused Pilatush that they have been falsely implicated in this case as at the time of occurrence accused Pilatush and his wife Sabitri were living separately from each other. He also admitted that the death took place in the house of the father of the deceased and with a view to harass the appellants, the present false case has been filed. SUBMISSION 4. He also admitted that the death took place in the house of the father of the deceased and with a view to harass the appellants, the present false case has been filed. SUBMISSION 4. Learned Additional Standing Counsel submits that the judgment of the learned trial Court is cryptic, perverse and illegal for which same should be interfered with. It is also submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the glaring evidence on record, learned trial Court should have recorded the finding to the extent that accused-appellants are responsible to cause death of the deceased. Learned trial Court has erred in law by not observing the provisions of law relating to demand of dowry. According to him, learned trial Court should have at least convicted the accused persons under Sections 306/34 and 498-A/34 I.P.C. and sentenced them thereunder. None appears for the respondents for taking steps at the time of hearing. 5. POINTS FOR DETERMINATION (i) Whether accused Pilatush being the husband of the deceased and other accused persons being in-laws of the deceased subjected her to cruelty. (ii) Whether accused Pilatush abetted his wife to commit suicide. DISCUSSIONS Point No.(i) 6. It is reported in Gangabhavani vs Rayapati Venkat Reddy & others ( 2013 (11) SCALE 132 ) where Their Lordships observed in para-6: “6. This Court has persistently emphasised that there are limitations while interfering with an order against acquittal. In exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate Court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate Court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the acquittal by the lower Court bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference”. 7. With due respect to the aforesaid decision, since it is a case of appeal against acquittal, Court is required to interfere if the impugned order of acquittal is found to be perverse and liable to be interfered with. In the case of appeal against acquittal the presumption of innocence of accused along with the order of acquittal by the lower Court reinstate the presumption of innocence of the accused. In the case of appeal against acquittal the presumption of innocence of accused along with the order of acquittal by the lower Court reinstate the presumption of innocence of the accused. In such cases interference is uncalled for but in exceptional cases interference is warranted. It is, therefore, the duty of the appellate Court to judge the case independently and come to a conclusion where order of acquittal is justified on re-appreciation of evidence by the appellate Court. Bearing in mind of this principle the material on record requires close scrutiny. 8. Section 498-A I.P.C. was enacted with a view to punish the husband and his relatives if they are indulged in causing cruelty to the wife concerned. Wife is not meant to be slave but a member of family. She should be respectful honoured being newly added member of family. She cannot be kept in a cage like animal and subjected to unnecessary indignified harassment. Every member has responsibility to take her care. The provisions of Section 498-A I.P.C. are:- “498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty. – Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.-For the purpose of this Section, “cruelty” means- (a) Any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) Harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.” The statutory provision makes it clear that such offence has got two explanations to clarify what is cruelty. 9. It is admitted fact that the respondent No.1 is the husband of the deceased and other co-accused persons are relatives of accused Pilatush. It is also admitted fact that both deceased and accused Pilatush have been blessed with a male child. It is admitted fact that after marriage the death of the deceased occurred. 9. It is admitted fact that the respondent No.1 is the husband of the deceased and other co-accused persons are relatives of accused Pilatush. It is also admitted fact that both deceased and accused Pilatush have been blessed with a male child. It is admitted fact that after marriage the death of the deceased occurred. Now it has to be scrutinized whether during life time of the deceased she was being subjected to cruelty as defined in the Explanation (a) and (b) of Section 498-A I.P.C. 10. Prosecution has examined 13 witnesses out of whom P.W.1 is the informant. P.Ws.12 and 13 are I.Os. Rest of the witnesses are relatives of the deceased and independent witnesses. Prosecution has proved the postmortem report vide Ext.4. It appears from the verification report and order sheet dated 9.5.1995 that the postmortem report vide Ext.4 has been admitted without objection although the doctors were present as witnesses on that day and their examinations were declined. It is the duty of trial Court to examine doctors present to prove post mortem report, even if defence declines to cross-examine them and admit the post mortem report. A duty is cast on prosecution to examine from the beginning of the trial if in the event of non-examination of the expert witnesses, can the documents be admitted in evidence on admission by defence under law so that Court would not waste the time to call upon them and by that trial can be expedited. But it should be remembered that all the documents examined by expert or prepared by expert may not be admitted under Section 294 Cr.P.C. However, it is revealed from Ext.4 that the cause of death is asphyxia as a result of hanging. 11. It is assimilated from the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.9 that in the house of P.W.1 deceased committed suicide by hanging and they opened the rope and informed the doctor. So, it is proved by prosecution through the evidence of post occurrence witnesses and doctor that the deceased died due to hanging and such hanging took place by suicide committed by the deceased. 12. P.W.1 who is a relative of the deceased Sabitri revealed that he was the mediator in the marriage between the deceased and the accused Pilatush. According to him at the time of marriage except dress materials nothing was given to the accused Pilatush. 12. P.W.1 who is a relative of the deceased Sabitri revealed that he was the mediator in the marriage between the deceased and the accused Pilatush. According to him at the time of marriage except dress materials nothing was given to the accused Pilatush. But after marriage the brother of the deceased gave the utensils, bed and Rs.800/- to accused Pilatush for their maintenance. Further the accused Pilatush asked for a Pressing machine for preparation of leave plates to maintain his livelihood and that demand was fulfilled. He stated that after three months accused Pilatush further demanded a cycle and gold ring. After eight months accused Pilatush and other accused persons illtreated Sabitri. He has not explained as to how he came to know about the demand of gold ring and cycle and the illtreatment to Sabitri in the house of accused because house of P.W.1 is at a distance from the house of the accused persons. He stated to have lodged the F.I.R. vide Ext.1 because in his house the deceased committed suicide by hanging. Moreover, he had not explained in his evidence as to the manner of illtreatment. He admitted in para-8 of the cross-examination that he has not mentioned in the F.I.R. vide Ext.1 that a cycle and gold ring were given to accused Pilatush on demand. In fact Ext.1 does not disclose that the accused Pilatush demanded cycle and gold ring after eight months of marriage. He also admitted to have not mentioned in Ext.1 that utensils were required at the time when accused Pilatush himself separated from his family. It is the settled law that the F.I.R. is used for the purpose of contradiction or corroboration against the maker and it is not a substantive piece of evidence. When the material fact about the demand of cycle and gold ring has not been mentioned in the F.I.R. as admitted by P.W.1, definitely he has resiled from his earlier statement made in the F.I.R. about demand of the cycle and gold ring and the delivery of the utensils. At the same time he has also admitted to have no personal knowledge about payment of Rs.800/- by the brother of the deceased to the accused Pilatush. 13. At the same time he has also admitted to have no personal knowledge about payment of Rs.800/- by the brother of the deceased to the accused Pilatush. 13. P.W.1 has stated in para-4 that on 7.6.1994 when they returned from their field at 6.00 P.M. they found deceased was there in their house and she stated in crying that accused persons have not provided her food for which had complained to the Father of the Church who sent her to the house of P.W.1. P.W.1 came to know from his son Tapan that accused Pilatush had come to take her back but she refused, accused Pilatush assaulted the deceased. Tapan who is examined as P.W.10 has not stated to have informed P.W.1 about the assault to deceased by accused Pilatush for which statement of P.W.1 about assault is not admissible being hearsay. Under Section 6 read with Section 60 of the Evidence Act, hearsay evidence is not admissible unless corroborated by the witness from whom the witness has heard. On the whole, it is found that evidence of P.W.1 is not clear, cogent and consistent to prove the demand of cycle and gold ring by the accused Pilatush and payment of cash. Also his evidence is not above the reproach to be relied on solely to prove the ill-treatment meted out to the deceased by the accused persons. 14. It is revealed from the evidence of P.W.2, who is the wife of P.W.1 that deceased Sabitri was complaining before her about ill-treatment meted out to her by the accused persons for not bringing cycle and utensils. She has also testified that accused persons abused the deceased as Majhiani and was not allowed to enter inside the kitchen for cooking. At the same time it was admitted in cross-examination that there was no demand of dowry at the time of marriage and the deceased was residing in the house of accused persons happily with them. Thus, the statement of P.W.2 is not consistent and trustworthy to show as to how the deceased was being ill-treated for demand of cycle and utensils. It is only forthcoming from the evidence of P.W.2 that Sabitri had written a letter for a cycle and gold ring to her brother Mihir but that letter was not proved by the prosecution. Thus, the statement of P.W.2 is not consistent and trustworthy to show as to how the deceased was being ill-treated for demand of cycle and utensils. It is only forthcoming from the evidence of P.W.2 that Sabitri had written a letter for a cycle and gold ring to her brother Mihir but that letter was not proved by the prosecution. When Sabitri (deceased) had written a letter, it cannot be said that it is the accused persons who had demanded such cycle and gold ring. So, the statement of P.W.2 is not trustworthy to prove the demand of dowry and ill-treatment meted out thereby to deceased by the accused persons. 15. P.W.5 who is the wife of P.W.1’s younger brother. According to her on 7.6.1994 deceased told her that she was not being liked by her husband and in-laws because she had not brought gold ring and cycle. In cross-examination denying suggestion of defence she stated to have stated such fact before the I.O but I.O. denied about such statement before him. So, P.W.5 has omitted to state such material fact in her earlier statement. Moreover, she has not clarified as to why she met the deceased when the deceased had gone to the house of P.W.1. So, the evidence of P.W.5 is not trustworthy to prove the demand of dowry and ill-treatment made by the accused persons upon the deceased. 16. It is revealed from the evidence of P.W.8, who is the mother of the deceased that there is no demand at the time of marriage. According to her three months after marriage her daughter and accused Pilatush visited their house, the said accused asked for utensils to cook, and demanded for gold ring, cycle and they paid Rs.500/- on one occasion and then again paid Rs.800/-. But the I.O. denied about such statement before him while P.W.8 was examined by him. So, the evidence about the demand of the gold ring, cycle and payment of money is subsequent development. On the other hand, she has further alleged that while she had been to the house of accused persons, she found at the time of her delivery his son-in-law was assaulting the deceased. The I.O. denied about such statement of P.W.8 before him. This is another development with the evidence of P.W.8. On the other hand, she has further alleged that while she had been to the house of accused persons, she found at the time of her delivery his son-in-law was assaulting the deceased. The I.O. denied about such statement of P.W.8 before him. This is another development with the evidence of P.W.8. On the other hand, her statement clearly shows that the deceased and accused Pilatush were frequently visiting her house. Thus, the evidence of P.W.8 is full of exaggeration and surmises to prove the demand of dowry and ill-treatment meted to deceased by the accused persons. 17. It is revealed from the evidence of P.W.9, who is the brother of the deceased that three months after marriage, accused Pilatush demanded a cycle, gold ring and Rs.800/- was paid to him but the I.O. denied about such statement of P.W.9 before him while he was examined by the Police. So, this fact is also subsequent development with the evidence of P.W.9. It is also revealed that accused Pilatush further demanded money to purchase the leaf plate preparing machine for which he was paid Rs.600/-. I.O. denied about such statement of P.W.9 before him. In cross-examination it is revealed that this demand was made by accused Pilatush for maintaining the livelihood. So, the evidence of P.W.9 also not clear, consistent and cogent to prove that the accused persons demanded gold ring and cycle, was paid with cash and deceased was ill-treated thereby for not fulfilling same. 18. P.W.10, who is the son of the P.W.1 did not disclose about the demand of gold ring and cycle but it is revealed from his evidence that on 7.6.1994 Sabitri had come to their house. Accused Pilatush came and insisted to take Sabitri back but she refused and accused Pilatush assaulted her by giving slaps and fist blows. At about 7.00 P.M. accused Pilatush again came to their house and wanted to take her forcibly but when she refused, accused Pilatush assaulted her but his parents intervened. She refused to go stating that she would not be safe if she would go with the accused. In cross-examination he admitted that he had not stated before police about such facts. P.Ws. 1 and 2 have not stated that accused Pilatush assaulted the deceased in their house when Sabitri disclosed not to go apprehending danger to her life. She refused to go stating that she would not be safe if she would go with the accused. In cross-examination he admitted that he had not stated before police about such facts. P.Ws. 1 and 2 have not stated that accused Pilatush assaulted the deceased in their house when Sabitri disclosed not to go apprehending danger to her life. So, the evidence of P.W.10 is also not clear, consistent and cogent about the ill-treatment meted out by the accused persons to the deceased. 19. From the evidence of P.W.11, who is the father of the Church it is revealed that deceased had informed him that she did not like to go back to her in-laws house and he tried to convince her and called her husband accused Pilatush. When he advised accused Pilatush to live happily with deceased Sabitri, he accepted the advice but Sabitri wanted to remain in the Church. For that P.W.11 sent her back to the house of P.W.1. It appears from his evidence that Sabitri did not agree to go with accused Pilatush although there was no extraordinary circumstances for their separation. However, the evidence of P.W.11 is not clear as to any demand of dowry or ill-treatment to deceased Sabitri by the accused persons. 20. From the aforesaid analysis, it is found that the prosecution has not proved by the consistent, clear, trustworthy and cogent evidence of the P.Ws.1, 2, 5 ,8, 9 and 10 who are relatives of the deceased and also other P.Ws. that accused Pilatush and other accused persons demanded cycle and gold ring as dowry and due to non-fulfillment she was ill-treated by them. The manner of ill-treatment has not been proved by any of the P.Ws. It is true that for the maintenance of accused persons some utensils and household articles were given but they cannot be treated as dowry on demand to prove ingredient of dowry under the provision of Dowry Prohibition Act. 21. It is reported in Ghusabhai Raisangbhai Chorasiya vs. State of Gujurat; (2015) 11 SCC 753 at paras- 16 and 17, where Their Lordships have observed as follows:- “16. This Court in Girdhar Shankar Tawade v. State of Maharashtra examining the scope of Section 498-A IPC, has observed thus: (SCC p.180, para3) “3. 21. It is reported in Ghusabhai Raisangbhai Chorasiya vs. State of Gujurat; (2015) 11 SCC 753 at paras- 16 and 17, where Their Lordships have observed as follows:- “16. This Court in Girdhar Shankar Tawade v. State of Maharashtra examining the scope of Section 498-A IPC, has observed thus: (SCC p.180, para3) “3. The basic purport of the statutory provision is to avoid “cruelty” which stands defined by attributing a specific statutory meaning attached thereto as noticed hereinbefore. Two specific instances have been taken note of in order to ascribe a meaning to the word “cruelty” as is expressed by the legislatures: whereas Explanation (a) involves three specific situations viz. (i) to drive the woman to commit suicide or (ii) to cause grave injury or (iii) danger to life, limb or health, both mental and physical, and thus involving a physical torture or atrocity, in Explanation (b) there is absence of physical injury but the legislature thought it fit to include only coercive harassment which obviously as the legislative intent expressed is equally heinous to match the physical injury: whereas one is patent, the other one is latent but equally serious in terms of the provisions of the statute since the same would also embrace the attributes of “cruelty” in terms of Section 498-A.” 17. In Gurnaib Singh V. State of Punjab, while analyzing the aforesaid provision, it has been opined that Clause (a) of the Explanation to Section 498A IPC defines cruelty to mean “any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide”. Clause (b) of the Explanation pertains to unlawful demand and Clause (a) can take in its ambit mental cruelty.” 22. With due respect to the decision cited above for the offence under Section 498A of IPC the cruelty has to be proved by considering the explanation at Clause (a) or Clause (b) or both. The situation may arise when woman would be tempted to commit suicide because of the willful conduct which is of serious in nature. But Clause (b) of the explanation pertains to unlawful demand for demand of dowry as the case may be. There is no doubt that mental cruelty can also be taken into consideration in addition to physical cruelty. The situation may arise when woman would be tempted to commit suicide because of the willful conduct which is of serious in nature. But Clause (b) of the explanation pertains to unlawful demand for demand of dowry as the case may be. There is no doubt that mental cruelty can also be taken into consideration in addition to physical cruelty. So, before findings the accused persons guilty under Section 498A of IPC, the Court has to find out from the facts proved whether the elements of cruelty have been well-proved. Now applying such principle of law, in the instant case, except omnibus allegation about demand of gold ring, cycle and ill-treatment meted out thereby to deceased without same being proved, it is difficult to hold that prosecution has been able to prove cruelty as defined under Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 498A of IPC for which the findings of the learned lower Court in this regard cannot be said to be perverse or incorrect. 23. So far as the offence under Section 306 of IPC is concerned, it is necessary to explain the law in this regard. It is reported in Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal V. State of Gujurat; (2013) 10 SCC 48 at para-27, where Their Lordships observed as follows:- ”27. Section 306 refers to abetment of suicide. It says that if any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 10 years and shall also be liable to fine. The action for committing suicide is also on account of mental disturbance caused by mental and physical cruelty. To constitute an offence under Section 306, the prosecution has to establish that a person has committed suicide and the suicide was abetted by the accused. Prosecution has to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased committed suicide and the accused abetted the commission of suicide. But for the alleged extra marital relationship, which if proved, could be illegal and immoral, nothing has been brought out by the prosecution to show that the accused had provoked, incited or induced the wife to commit suicide.” The aforesaid authorities have been also relied upon by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the decision Ghusabhai Raisangbhai Chorasiya (supra). 24. But for the alleged extra marital relationship, which if proved, could be illegal and immoral, nothing has been brought out by the prosecution to show that the accused had provoked, incited or induced the wife to commit suicide.” The aforesaid authorities have been also relied upon by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the decision Ghusabhai Raisangbhai Chorasiya (supra). 24. With due respect to the decision, it must be established by the prosecution beyond all doubts that deceased had committed suicide and such suicide was abetted by the accused persons. Of course, those authorities considered the facts where question arose whether the accused can be held guilty for the commission of suicide by the wife merely because the husband has got extra marital relationship, which is of course illegal and immoral. But the principles of law as embodied are that the prosecution has to show that the accused had provoked, incited or induced the wife to commit suicide. 25. Section 107 of IPC defines the abetment in the following manner:- “107. Abetment of a thing.—A person abets the doing of a thing, who— (First) — Instigates any person to do that thing; or (Secondly) —Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or (Thirdly) — Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Explanation 1.—A person who, by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing. Illustration A, a public officer, is authorized by a warrant from a Court of Justice to apprehend Z. B, knowing that fact and also that C is not Z, wilfully represents to A that C is Z, and thereby intentionally causes A to apprehend C. Here B abets by instigation the apprehension of C. Explanation 2.—Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitate the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act.” 26. After going through the aforesaid provisions, it is clear that abetment can be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence. The manner of the acts as postulated in three clauses under Section 107 of IPC can lead to abetment. In the aforesaid decision, the Hon’ble Apex Court have also observed that there must be provocation, incitement or inducement to the wife to commit suicide. In the instant case, as observed earlier the demand of dowry or unlawful demand or ill-treatment to deceased has not been established by the prosecution beyond all shadow of doubts for which it is difficult to observe that the ingredients of Section 107 of IPC have been proved. 27. Section 113A of the Evidence Act can be taken into consideration to presume the abetment to commit suicide. In order to establish the offence under Section 306 of IPC it has to be discussed the basic requirement to attract Section 113A of the Evidence Act. Section 113A of the Evidence Act speaks in the following manner:- ”113A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman.—When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband. Explanation.—For the purposes of this Section, “cruelty” shall have the same meaning as in Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).” 28. It appears from the above provision for the purpose of Section 113A of the Evidence Act, cruelty shall have the same meaning as in Section 498A of IPC. So, in order to draw the presumption under Section 113A of the Evidence Act, the following ingredients have to be fulfilled:- (i) There must be commission of suicide by the woman. (ii) The suicide was committed within a period of 7 years from the date of her marriage. (iii) That the husband or his relatives have subjected the such woman to cruelty. (ii) The suicide was committed within a period of 7 years from the date of her marriage. (iii) That the husband or his relatives have subjected the such woman to cruelty. If any of the aforesaid ingredients of Section 113A of the Evidence Act is not proved, the presumption of abetment of suicide cannot be drawn. On the other hand, the Court before drawing presumption of commission of offence under Section 306 of IPC, four pre-conditions as mentioned above must be proved by the prosecution. 29. Now adverting to the facts of the case. It is revealed from the evidence of P.Ws. including the doctor and I.O. that deceased died out of asphyxia by hanging. On the other hand, the P.Ws. have categorically stated that she committed suicide. It is also revealed from the evidence of P.Ws. that her death took place within a period of two years of her marriage, but the abetment in terms of Section 107 of IPC have not been established by the P.Ws. either by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence. In the aforesaid paragraphs, it has been already observed that prosecution could not prove that she was subjected to cruelty by accused Pilatush and his relatives who are other accused persons. Thus, all pre-conditions of Section 113A of the Evidence Act have not been established by the prosecution to draw presumption of commission of offence under Section 306 of IPC against the accused persons. So the prosecution has failed to establish the offence under Section 306 of IPC against accused Pilatush and other accused persons beyond all shadow of doubts. CONCLUSION 30. By going through the judgment of the learned trial Court, it appears that learned trial Court has also analyzed the evidence of P.Ws. and reached out at the conclusion that prosecution has not been able to prove the offence under Sections 306/498A/34 of IPC against the accused persons. By re-appreciation of evidence and coming to the independent conclusion, it appears no other different view can be taken as taken by the learned trial Court. This Court is, therefore, of the view that learned Additional Standing Counsel has not been able to prove the case to overturn the findings of the order of acquittal against the accused persons. By re-appreciation of evidence and coming to the independent conclusion, it appears no other different view can be taken as taken by the learned trial Court. This Court is, therefore, of the view that learned Additional Standing Counsel has not been able to prove the case to overturn the findings of the order of acquittal against the accused persons. Hence, there is nothing to interfere with the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial Court and as such the Government Appeal being devoid of merit stands dismissed. The accused persons be discharged from the bail bond. Registry is directed to intimate the learned trial Court, accordingly. Appeal dismissed.