JUDGMENT : ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J. 1. This Reference arises out of an application for bail of the petitioner, Tousif Sohrab @ Tausiff Sohrab @ Sambia. The petitioner was arrested on 16th January 2016 late in the evening, at about 10:40 p.m in connection with Maidan Police Station Case No. 9 of 13th January 2016, and Charge-sheet has been submitted against him involving offences under Sections 302/307/201/212 and 427 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 115/194 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The petition for bail was instituted on 26th April 2016, after submission of Charge sheet on 10th March 2016. The petition for bail was heard by a Division Bench of this Court. The Hon’ble Presiding Judge of the Bench was pleased to reject the prayer for bail by an order passed on 29th April 2016. The Hon’ble Companion Judge, however, expressed a different view, and opined that the petitioner ought to be enlarged on bail subject to certain conditions and on furnishing bond as specified in this Lordship’s order. Mr. Manjit Singh, learned Public Prosecutor opposing the prayer for bail however, submitted that the order of the Hon’ble Companion Judge is dated 9th May 2016. In view of difference of opinion of the Hon’ble Judges constituting the Division Bench, this matter has been referred to me. No specific points of difference, however, have been formulated, but the points of difference emerge from the orders of the two Hon’ble Judges of the Bench to which I shall refer to briefly later in this order. 2. But before I do so, I shall briefly narrate the allegations of the prosecution against the petitioner, which has been summarized by Mr. Manjit Singh, learned Public Prosecutor, drawing my attention primarily to materials included in the Case Diary, and in particular, pages 14 to 43 thereof. The prosecution case has also been broadly reproduced in the respective orders of the two Hon’ble Judges, who have ultimately differed on the point of grant of bail. Manjit Singh, learned Public Prosecutor, drawing my attention primarily to materials included in the Case Diary, and in particular, pages 14 to 43 thereof. The prosecution case has also been broadly reproduced in the respective orders of the two Hon’ble Judges, who have ultimately differed on the point of grant of bail. The prosecution case is:- i. The Commissioner of Police, Kolkata had issued a notification on 30th December 2015 under different statutory provisions directing closure of certain roads in the Kolkata Maidan area for vehicular traffic to prevent “danger, obstruction or inconvenience to the public in connection with the reherseals for Republic Day Parade on 30th & 31st December 2015, 2nd, 4th, 6th, 8th, 9th, 11th, 13th, 15th, 16th, 18th, 20th, 22nd and 24th January, 2016….”. The time between which such restriction was to operate on 13th January, 2016 was 05.00 hours and 09.00 hours or till the end of reherseals. Altogether eleven roads were brought within the scope of restriction, which included Khidderpore Road and Red Road. ii. The Parade Reherseal on 13th January 2016, being the date of occurrence of the incident started at about 06.00 A.M., and different contingents of the Armed Forces were marching through the eastern flank of Khidderpore Road, towards Red Road. A white coloured Audi (the subject-vehicle) without any registration number had entered the “No-Entry” zone of Khidderpore Road through the mud-path avoiding the guard-rails placed near “Vidyasagar Setu”. Then it proceeded from southern flank of Khidderpore Road to the north on very high speed. The vehicle ignored the signal of the traffic policeman on duty near the crossing of Lovers’ Lane urging him to stop, crashed through the guard rails placed on the road, and proceeded along the “No-Entry” zone towards Red Road crossing, commonly known and Jenson & Nicolson Island. iii. The subject-vehicle again ignoring hand-signal of the police personnel on duty requiring it to stop, took a U-turn from the Jenson & Nicolson Island and entered the eastern flank of Khidderpore Road, through which the contingents of the armed forces were marching at that point of time. In the eastern flank of Khidderpore Road, between the concrete road divider and the space being used by the marching contingents, the gap was narrow. In the eastern flank of Khidderpore Road, between the concrete road divider and the space being used by the marching contingents, the gap was narrow. Through this narrow gap, the vehicle was being driven at a high speed against the direction in which the army contingents were marching, and one army personnel was hit, but he escaped major injury. Thereafter, with same high speed the vehicle hit Corporal Gaud Abhimanyu Rangalal of the Indian Air Force, who was moving along with an Air Force contingent at a distance two or three yards left of the said contingent. Said Gaud Abhimanyu Rangalal ultimately succumbed to the injuries he suffered on being hit by the offending vehicle, after he was taken to the Command Hospital. iv. The subject-vehicle, instead of stopping at the spot, tried to flee, and in the process crashed into guard rails placed on the course the vehicle was taking on Khidderpore Road, ignoring signals by traffic police on duty to stop. Impact of the crash caused inflation of the air bags and certain parts of the vehicle were also damaged. The vehicle ultimately stopped at a distance of about 150 meters away from the South gate of Fort William. v. The subject-vehicle did not have regular registration number. The person who was driving the car could not be intercepted at the time of occurrence of the incident or immediately thereafter. After getting down from the car, the driver of the vehicle had escaped. The “TC” number plates from both the frontal and rear side of that vehicle were also removed, and submission of Mr. Singh is that it was the driver of the vehicle who had removed the “TC” number plates. vi. Subsequent investigation by police led to identification of the dealer of the subject-vehicle as also identity of the petitioner as the one who was driving the vehicle at the material point of time. The petitioner was placed in Test Identification Parade and was identified as the person driving the said vehicle by fifteen witnesses. vii. It is also the case of the prosecution that the petitioner could not be traced in spite of raids being conducted on his house and other places where he could ordinarily be found, though the prosecuting agency had become aware of his identity on the date of occurrence of incident itself. vii. It is also the case of the prosecution that the petitioner could not be traced in spite of raids being conducted on his house and other places where he could ordinarily be found, though the prosecuting agency had become aware of his identity on the date of occurrence of incident itself. He could be apprehended on 16th January 2016 at about 10:40 p.m near his in-laws’ house in Kolkata itself. 3. Mr. Pinaki Misra, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner has pressed for bail of the petitioner, urging me to concur with the view expressed by the Hon’ble Companion Judge of the Division Bench. In support of his prayer for bail, petitioner’s contention is that it was a case of accident, if at all. Charge sheet has already been submitted and the State is in possession of all the offending articles. The petitioner is in custody for over six months and there is no chance of influencing any witness or tampering with any evidence as majority of the witnesses are personnel of defence and police forces. He has questioned import of Sections 302 and 307 of the 1860 Code in the Charge sheet, arguing that the case is of rash and negligent driving at the worst, which has been the view of the Hon’ble learned Companion Judge. He pointed out in particular that there was no motive to sustain a case under Section 302 or Section 307 of the 1860 Code. He has further submitted that on pure humanitarian ground, the grand-father of the petitioner is interacting with the family of the victim for considering the question of compensation. 4. Mr. Misra has relied on the cases of State of Gujarat Vs. Haiderali Kalubhai, [ (1976)1 SCC 889 ], Prabhakaram Vs. State of Kerala, [ (2007)14 SCC 269 ], Naresh Giri Vs. State of M.P., [ (2008)1 SCC 791 ], Manish Jalan Vs. State of Karnataka, [ (2008)8 SCC 225 ] and Alister Anthony Pareira Vs. State of Maharashtra, [ (2012)2 SCC 648 ], all being decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and two judgments of this Court, being the cases of H. W. Smith Vs. Emperor, (91 Ind Cas 889) and Goutam Singh Vs. State of West Bengal, [(2010)1 C Cr LR (Cal) 586]. Submission of Mr. State of Maharashtra, [ (2012)2 SCC 648 ], all being decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and two judgments of this Court, being the cases of H. W. Smith Vs. Emperor, (91 Ind Cas 889) and Goutam Singh Vs. State of West Bengal, [(2010)1 C Cr LR (Cal) 586]. Submission of Mr. Misra, relying on these .authorities is that in all these cases, death was caused by reckless driving but punishment under Section 302 of the 1860 Code was not awarded. In Haidarali Kalubhai (supra), conviction was under Section 304A of the 1860 Code. Same was the case in Prabhakaran (supra). In Naresh Giri (supra), the appellant challenged the order of framing charge in relation to offences under Section 302 and alternatively under Sections 304, 325 and 323 of the 1860 Code, which was eventually altered to Section 304A along with Sections 279 and 337 of the 1860 Code. In the case of Alister Anthony Pareira (supra), conviction was under Part II of Section 304 of the Code, and three years’ imprisonment was prescribed. Such punishment, it was however observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court to be lenient. These authorities were cited mainly to question implicating the accused/petitioner on charge of murder. Contention of Mr. Misra is that there was no aggravating factors warranting charge for murder or attempt to murder which could add to the seriousness of the offence alleged, while this Court is examining the question of grant of bail. 5. Mr. Misra, also took me through the Post-mortem report, and on that basis submitted that the nature of injuries reflected in the report did not suggest that the subject-vehicle had directly hit the victim. As regards injury caused to the other army personnel, submission of Mr. Misra is that such injury, if at all, was caused by the projected side-mirror of the vehicle in question and the nature of injury was not serious enough to justify or sustain charge under Section 307 of the 1860 Code. 6. On the question of grant of bail, Mr. Misra has argued that pre-trial detention ought not to be transformed into interim punishment, and the cases relied upon in support of this argument are State of Rajasthan, Jaipur Vs. Banchand @ Baliay, [ (1977)4 SCC 308 ], Gurcharan Singh & Ors. Vs. State, [ 1978 (2) SCR 358 ], Gudikanti Narasimhulu & Ors. Vs. Misra has argued that pre-trial detention ought not to be transformed into interim punishment, and the cases relied upon in support of this argument are State of Rajasthan, Jaipur Vs. Banchand @ Baliay, [ (1977)4 SCC 308 ], Gurcharan Singh & Ors. Vs. State, [ 1978 (2) SCR 358 ], Gudikanti Narasimhulu & Ors. Vs. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., ( AIR 1978 SC 429 ), Sanjay Chandra Vs. CBI, [ (2012)1 SCC 40 ] and Dipak Subhashchandra Mehta Vs. CBI, [ (2012)4 SCC 134 ]. His main argument on this count is that there is no compelling necessity to keep the petitioner in custody pending trial, and he highlighted the fact that the case was yet to be committed and the petitioner cannot be subjected to indefinite pre-trial detention with no prospect of the trial being concluded in near future. 7. Mr. Misra also referred to certain materials disclosed in the Charge sheet to contend that the prosecution case ought to fail in trial. He argued that sufficient public notice was not there declaring the roads involved to be “No-Entry” zone. The allegations of crashing the guard-rails at the initial stages are untrue as the vehicle has in-built system to make it stop immediately after a collision. In an application for bail, however, I do not think there is scope of detailed examination of evidence for the purpose of forming an opinion on these points. That would be judging on merit of a case before the trial has commenced. In this case, Charge has not been framed as yet. 8. Mr. Singh, resisting the prayer for bail, outlined in his argument the seriousness and gravity of the offence involved and also highlighted post-occurrence conduct of the petitioner. It is his case, at the prima facie stage, the prosecution had sufficient material to implicate the petitioner in offences specified in the Charge sheet. His submission is that act of the petitioner was of such nature that case of Sections 302 and 307 of the 1860 Code could be made out even without any direct evidence of motive. On this point, he drew my attention to the fourth factor stipulated in Section 300 of the 1860 Code with reference to illustration (d) thereof. This provision has been recorded in the order of the Hon’ble Presiding Judge of the Bench as submission of Mr. On this point, he drew my attention to the fourth factor stipulated in Section 300 of the 1860 Code with reference to illustration (d) thereof. This provision has been recorded in the order of the Hon’ble Presiding Judge of the Bench as submission of Mr. Singh, by which the bail plea of the petitioner was rejected. He sought to distinguish the cases of Haidarali Kalubhai (supra), Prabhakaran (supra) and Alister Anthony Pareira (supra), as in these cases trial was concluded. In the case of Manish Jalan (supra), conviction of the accused was under Sections 279 and 304A of the IPC, which was sustained. On the point of Charge under Section 307 of the Code, Mr. Singh submitted that the determining factor is not the nature of the injury suffered, but the nature of the act itself. In the case of H .W. Smith (supra), the incident coincidentally occurred in the same area, near Red Road. The accused driving his vehicle had crashed a barrier created for repairing the road and killed to loaders (coolies) in the month of May of 1925. A Division Bench of this Court acquitted him of the offence of Section 304A of the 1860 Code. But this was again a judgment in appeal against conviction. 9. The judgment in the case of Goutam Singh (supra) was delivered by the Hon’ble Presiding Judge of the Division Bench, sitting singly in Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction of this Court. It was a case of an Ambassador car dashing against a motor vehicle, killing the rider on National Highway No. 6. Charge was framed against him under Sections 279/427/304/304A of the 1860 Code. Following Naresh Giri (supra) Prabhakaran (supra), Manish Jalan (supra) and Hydarali Kalubhai (supra) as also certain other authorities, charge under Section 304 of the 1860 Code was quashed. The Hon’ble Judge, upon going through the materials on the basis of which Charge sheet had been submitted found that the prosecution never made out a case of any wilful and deliberate act on the part of the accused and no case was also made out that the accused caused the death by such act with the knowledge that it was likely to cause death. So far as this case is concerned, Charge is yet to be framed. I do not think any forensic analysis of evidence at this stage is warranted. So far as this case is concerned, Charge is yet to be framed. I do not think any forensic analysis of evidence at this stage is warranted. I ought to look at materials only on surface. On such surface analysis, I am unable to arrive at prima-facie opinion on innocence of the accused in relation to any of the offences specified in the Charge sheet. 10. It appears from the opinion of the Presiding Judge that what weighed with His Lordship in rejecting the prayer of bail of the petitioner was gravity or seriousness of the offence alleged and the fact that the petitioner could not be traced to his own house, or to places where he would have been normally found. The Hon’ble Companion Judge, on the other hand, has summarised his reasons for grant of bail in fifteen points. His Lordship appears to have come to a definitive conclusion that Sections 302 and 307 of the IPC would not apply in this case. His Lordship has considered the fact that the accused/petitioner is a married man with education having roots in a family and also having moveable and immoveable property. The Hon’ble Companion Judge, against point no. 10 of His Lordship’s differing opinion has laid stress on compensation the victim’s family might be entitled to under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. His Lordship has also accepted the argument of the petitioner that tampering of evidence is not likely to take place if the petitioner is enlarged on bail, as most of the witnesses are attached to the defence force. 11. Before me, elaborate submissions were made by the learned Advocates appearing for the parties. Mr. Singh had submitted that the petitioner had been identified in the Test Identification Parade by several witnesses, but impact of such T.I. Parade was sought to be negated by Mr. Misra on the ground that the image of the petitioner had already been flashed in the media. That factor alone in my opinion cannot be a ground for grant of bail, as there are sufficient materials in the Case Diary from which I can take a prima-facie view of involvement of the petitioner in the offence alleged. 12. Now comes the question as to whether these materials can justify continued detention of the petitioner pending trial. Mr. Misra has emphasised on the fact that no commitment has as yet been made. Mr. 12. Now comes the question as to whether these materials can justify continued detention of the petitioner pending trial. Mr. Misra has emphasised on the fact that no commitment has as yet been made. Mr. Singh’s submission on this point is that there is delay in progress of the proceeding because it is the accused persons who are stalling the progress of the case on one pretext or the other before the committal Court. He has referred to an order passed on 12th July 2016 by the Chief Judge, City Sessions Court staying the entire proceeding pending before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 7th Court, Calcutta till the next date of hearing, which is fixed on 26th July 2016. This order was passed in a Revisional proceeding initiated by a co-accused, Md. Sohrab primarily on the question of making available copies of certain documents. According to Mr. Singh, these are dilatory tactics whereas Mr. Misra’s contention is that the petitioner is entitled to fair trial and an accused is entitled to bring legitimate actions to ensure that he can defend his case properly. I do not want to make any comment on the proceeding before the learned Revisional Court. Further, I am to decide this reference on the basis of materials and position as it existed on the day the Hon’ble Judges of the Division Bench gave their differing views. Even if I am to consider subsequent events sitting as the Third Judge, such subsequent event ought to have major and substantial impact on the case which I am hearing, which if ignored, would cause serious prejudice to the petitioner. Delay in progress of the proceeding since the day the Hon’ble two Judges took differing views in my opinion cannot be said to have such a major impact on the question of grant of bail to the petitioner. An accused, in any event, can always take recourse to appropriate legal proceeding to enable him to set up proper defence. But if proceedings brought by the accused for such purpose cause delay, the accused would not be entitled to take advantage of such delay, which cannot be directly attributed to any deliberate fault on the part of the prosecution. 13. But if proceedings brought by the accused for such purpose cause delay, the accused would not be entitled to take advantage of such delay, which cannot be directly attributed to any deliberate fault on the part of the prosecution. 13. Having gone through the materials available in the Case Diary, and upon considering submissions made on behalf of the petitioner and the State, I am satisfied that allegations against the accused petitioner are grave and serious in nature. The accused is alleged to have entered a zone closed to vehicular traffic, which is a major distinguishing feature of this case in comparison to the factual background of the set of authorities cited on behalf of the petitioner relating to deaths on being hit by a vehicle. Death in this case was caused in a venue temporarily closed to regular vehicular traffic. In H.W. Smith (supra), the accused had strayed into a road under repair, but there was evidence that the accused was driving at a speed not more than 10 miles an hour, at about 10:30 or 11:30 at night, and drove over the two deceased persons sleeping on the road. In the present case, the incident took place in the morning hours, and the petitioner is alleged to have entered into “No-Entry” zone swerving the road barrier, through mud-path abutting the metal road, ignored two signals given by uniformed policemen to stop, crashed road barrier grill and then alleged to have missed full hit on an army officer attached to a contingent before his vehicle has struck the unfortunate Air Force Corporal on duty, preparing for Republic Day Parade. The vehicle all along alleged to have been in high speed. The petitioner, it is alleged, was on conscious state of mind as Case Diary does not reveal any material to show he was under influence of alcohol or other intoxicants. 14. None of the authorities cited by the petitioner lay down in absolute terms bail ought to be automatically granted after filing of Charge Sheet. The judgment in the cases of Banchand @ Baliay (supra), Gurcharan Singh (supra), Gudikanti Narasimhulu & Ors. (supra) lay down broad principles guiding the question of grant of bail. The basic principle that emerges from these authorities is that pre-trial detention ought not to be the regular course, but an accused should be in custody only if absolutely necessary pending trial. (supra) lay down broad principles guiding the question of grant of bail. The basic principle that emerges from these authorities is that pre-trial detention ought not to be the regular course, but an accused should be in custody only if absolutely necessary pending trial. The judgment in the case of Sanjay Chandra (supra) was delivered in a case of economic offence, and reconfirms these basic principles. In the case of Dipak Shubhaschandra Mehta (supra), again the same principle was applied, with an additional factor being health condition of the applicant which was considered while granting bail to him. I am unable to agree with the view of the Hon’ble Companion Judge that case under Sections 302 or 307 of the 1860 Code has not been made out. It is too early to come to such a conclusion. The post-occurrence conduct of the accused, as was pointed out by Mr. Singh, does not rule out the possibility of absconsion of the petitioner if enlarged on bail. Though in the cases of Manish Jalan (supra) and Alister Anthony Pareira (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court had considered the aspect of compensation, in my opinion in this case possibility of paying the victim’s family compensation cannot be a ground for enlarging the petitioner on bail. Having regard to the dimension of the offence alleged and the other factors which I have discussed in this judgment, I do not think this is fit case for granting bail. Keeping in mind the parameters set down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the question of grant of bail, my opinion in this case coincides with the view of the Hon’ble Presiding Judge of the Division Bench, expressed in His Lordship’s order passed on 29th April, 2016. 15. I, accordingly, reject the prayer for bail of the petitioner. Trial of the petitioner ought to conclude expeditiously, preferably within a period of six months from the date of framing of the charge, provided finally charge is framed, and shall be conducted on a day to day basis in terms of Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. These are in substance the directions of the Hon’ble Presiding Judge of the Division Bench also, contained in the order rejecting prayer of the petitioner for bail. 16. The Case Diary be returned to the learned Public Prosecutor. 17. These are in substance the directions of the Hon’ble Presiding Judge of the Division Bench also, contained in the order rejecting prayer of the petitioner for bail. 16. The Case Diary be returned to the learned Public Prosecutor. 17. The file, along with this order may now be placed before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice. 18. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this order be given to the parties expeditiously, if applied for.