JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. This writ petition has been filed taking exception to the order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh whereby the original application preferred by the petitioner challenging the order of his removal from service came to be dismissed. 2. The minimal facts as are necessary for the adjudication of this case are that in the year 1981 the petitioner came to be appointed as Branch Post Master and while working as such was served with an office memorandum dated 27th August, 2007 whereby he was placed under put off duty under Rule 12(i) of the Gramin Dak Sewak (Conduct and Employment) Rules, 2001. The charge against the petitioner was that he on 01.05.2006 had kept with himself the salary of Jai Ram ‘Dak Distributor’ and had himself signed for Jai Ram in the acquittance roll of the month and by doing so had violated Rule 138(2) of the Branch Post Office Rules. After completion of all procedural requirements, the inquiry eventually culminated into an order of removal of the petitioner from service. 3. The appeal preferred against such removal was rejected by respondent No.3 and thereafter the revision petition preferred against such orders also came to be dismissed by respondent No.2 on 14.07.2010. The petitioner thereafter filed original application before the learned Central Administrative Tribunal which too came to be dismissed vide order dated 03.08.2011. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the material placed on record. 4. Shri Surender Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner has made two-fold submissions. Firstly, the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the petitioner and thereafter the removal as confirmed by the various authorities including the learned Tribunal are perverse and, therefore, deserve to be set aside and secondly that even if the allegations are taken to be proved, even then the penalty of removal from service cannot be sustained as it is totally disproportionate. 5. It would be noticed that the petitioner himself during the course of inquiry had confessed to his guilt, although he did try to take a stand that the concerned employee i.e. Jai Ram had authorized him to sign on his behalf which did not find favour with any of the authorities or the learned Tribunal. 6. 5. It would be noticed that the petitioner himself during the course of inquiry had confessed to his guilt, although he did try to take a stand that the concerned employee i.e. Jai Ram had authorized him to sign on his behalf which did not find favour with any of the authorities or the learned Tribunal. 6. That apart, it would also be noticed that the order of removal from service of the petitioner has been upheld by the first appellate authority, the revisional authority and thereafter by the learned Tribunal and there is nothing to suggest that the findings recorded by any of the authorities below are in any manner perverse. 7. Insofar as the reliability and adequacy of the evidence is concerned, this Court cannot venture into re-appreciation of the evidence and act as third appellate authority. 8. The scope of interference by the High Court in such matters has been succinctly summed up by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its recent decision in Union of India and others versus P.Gunasekaran AIR 2015 SC 545 in the following terms:- “13. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge No.I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority; b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; c. there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; d. the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; g. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; h. the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i). re-appreciate the evidence; (ii). interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv). go into the reliability of the evidence; (v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” 9. Notably, the case of the petitioner does not fall within any of the exceptions enumerated above so as to call for any interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. 10. Now adverting to the second contention regarding the proportionality of punishment, it was held in P.Gunasekaran’s case (supra) that the High Court would go into the question of proportionality of punishment only in case it shocks its conscience, but then this Court would not re-appreciate the evidence for reaching at such conclusion. 11. As observed earlier, the indictment of the petitioner was mainly on the basis of the confession made by him. 11. As observed earlier, the indictment of the petitioner was mainly on the basis of the confession made by him. Once the petitioner confessed to the charge of impersonation and retained the salary for 10 days before handing to Jai Ram, no leniency could have been shown by the Department. 12. It is trite that punishment is the discretion of the disciplinary authority and the Court would not substitute its own judgment unless the punishment shocks the conscience. Even, in such case, it has been held that the Court should ordinarily remit the matter to the disciplinary authority for consideration of punishment. 13. The scope and power of judicial review of the Courts while dealing with the validity of quantum of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority was subject matter of discussion before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India and others versus S.Vasanthi (2014) 9 SCC 315 wherein it was reiterated that the High Court in exercise of its powers of judicial review cannot assume the role of sitting as a departmental appellate authority as the same is not permissible under law. It shall be apt to reproduce paras 10 and 11 of the judgment which read thus:- “10. The scope and power of judicial review of the courts while dealing with the validity of quantum of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is now well settled. In Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangthan v. J. Hussain (2013) 10 SCC 106 , the law on this subject, is recapitulated in the following manner: (SCC pp.110-12, paras 7-10) “7. When the charge is proved, as happened in the instance case, it is the disciplinary authority with whom lies the discretion to decide as to what kind of punishment is to be imposed. Of course, this discretion has to be examined objectively keeping in mind the nature and gravity of charge. The Disciplinary Authority is to decide a particular penalty specified in the relevant Rules. Host of factors go into the decision making while exercising such a discretion which include, apart from the nature and gravity of misconduct, past conduct, nature of duties assigned to the delinquent, responsibility of duties assigned to the delinquent, previous penalty, if any, and the discipline required to be maintained in department or establishment where he works, as well as extenuating circumstances, if any exist. 8. 8. The order of the Appellate Authority while having a relook of the case would, obviously, examine as to whether the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority is reasonable or not. If the Appellate Authority is of the opinion that the case warrants lesser penalty, it can reduce the penalty so imposed by the Disciplinary Authority. Such a power which vests with the Appellate Authority departmentally is ordinarily not available to the Court or a Tribunal. The Court while undertaking judicial review of the matter is not supposed to substitute its own opinion on reappraisal of facts.(See: Union Territory of Dadra & Nagar Haveli vs. Gulabhia M.Lad (2010) 5 SCC 775 .) In exercise of power of judicial review, however, the Court can interfere with the punishment imposed when it is found to be totally irrational or is outrageous in defiance of logic. This limited scope of judicial review is permissible and interference is available only when punishment is shockingly disproportionate, suggesting lack of good faith. Otherwise, merely because in the opinion of the Court lesser punishment would have been more appropriate, cannot be a ground to interfere with the discretion of the departmental authorities. 9. When the punishment is found to be outrageously disproportionate to the nature of charge, principle of proportionality comes into play. It is, however, to be borne in mind that this principle would be attracted, which is in tune with doctrine of Wednesbury4 Rule of reasonableness, only when in the facts and circumstances of the case, penalty imposed is so disproportionate to the nature of charge that it shocks the conscience of the Court and the Court is forced to believe that it is totally unreasonable and arbitrary. This principle of proportionality was propounded by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions vs. Minister for Civil Service 1985 AC 374 : (1984) 3 WLR 1174, in the following words: (AC p. 410 D-E) ‘….Judicial review has I think developed to a stage today when, without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads of the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call “illegality”, the second “irrationality” and the third “procedural impropriety”. The first ground I would call “illegality”, the second “irrationality” and the third “procedural impropriety”. This is not to say that further development on a case by case basis may not in course of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of “proportionality”.’ 10. An Imprimatur to the aforesaid principle was accorded by this Court as well, in Ranjit Thakur vs. Union of India (1987) 4 SCC 611 . Speaking for the Court, Justice Venkatachaliah (as he then was) emphasizing that “all powers have legal limits” invokes the aforesaid doctrine in the following words: (SCC p.620, para 25) ’25….The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the court-martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise within the exclusive province of the court-martial, if the decision of the court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognized grounds of judicial review. ’” 11. We are of the opinion that the High Court transgressed its limits of judicial review by itself assuming the role of sitting as departmental appellate authority, which is not permissible in law. The principles discussed above have been summed up and summarised as follows in the case of Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank . v. Rajendra Singh, (2013) 12 SCC 372 ( SCC p.382, , para 19) “19.1. When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry, the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities. 19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary/ departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. 19.3 Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court. 19.3 Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court. 19.4 Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case. 19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the co-delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct were identical or the co-delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the doctrine of equality when it is found that the employee concerned and the co-delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge-sheet in the two cases. If the co-delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him would be justifiable.” 14. The legal position has thereafter been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its recent decision in Diwan Singh versus Life Insurance Corporation of India and others (2015) 2 SCC 341 and it was held as under:- “8. As far as argument relating to quantum of punishment, as modified by the High Court, which results in consequential forfeiture of pensionary benefits in view of Rule 23, quoted above, is concerned, we do not find the punishment to be harsh or disproportionate to the guilt, in view of the nature of the charge of which the appellant is found guilty in the present case. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that in such matters no sympathy should be shown by the Courts. 9. In NEKRTC v. H. Amaresh (2006) 6 SCC 187 , this Court, in para 18 of the judgment has expressed the views on this point as under: (SCC p.193) "18. In the instant case, the misappropriation of the funds by the delinquent employee was only Rs 360.95. 9. In NEKRTC v. H. Amaresh (2006) 6 SCC 187 , this Court, in para 18 of the judgment has expressed the views on this point as under: (SCC p.193) "18. In the instant case, the misappropriation of the funds by the delinquent employee was only Rs 360.95. This Court has considered the punishment that may be awarded to the delinquent employees who misappropriated the funds of the Corporation and the factors to be considered. This Court in a catena of judgments held that the loss of confidence is the primary factor and not the amount of money misappropriated and that the sympathy or generosity cannot be a factor which is impermissible in law. When an employee is found guilty of pilferage or of misappropriating the Corporation's funds, there is nothing wrong in the Corporation losing confidence or faith in such an employee and awarding punishment of dismissal. In such cases, there is no place for generosity or misplaced sympathy on the part of the judicial forums and interfering therefore with the quantum of punishment." 10. In Karnataka SRTC v. A.T.Mane (2005) 3 SCC 254 in which unaccounted amount was only Rs.93/- this Court expressed its opinion in para 12 as under: (SCC p.259) "12. Coming to the question of quantum of punishment, one should bear in mind the fact that it is not the amount of money misappropriated that becomes a primary factor for awarding punishment; on the contrary, it is the loss of confidence which is the primary factor to be taken into consideration. In our opinion, when a person is found guilty of misappropriating the corporation's funds, there is nothing wrong in the corporation losing confidence or faith in such a person and awarding a punishment of dismissal". 11. In Niranjan Hemchandra Sashittal and another v. State of Maharashtra (2013) 4 SCC 642 , this Court has made following observations in paragraph 25 of the judgment: (SCC p.654). "25..... In the present day scenario, corruption has been treated to have the potentiality of corroding the marrows of the economy. There are cases where the amount is small, and in certain cases, it is extremely high. The gravity of the offence in such a case, in our considered opinion, is not to be adjudged on the bedrock of the quantum of bribe. There are cases where the amount is small, and in certain cases, it is extremely high. The gravity of the offence in such a case, in our considered opinion, is not to be adjudged on the bedrock of the quantum of bribe. An attitude to abuse the official position to extend favour in lieu of benefit is a crime against the collective and an anathema to the basic tenets of democracy, for it erodes the faith of the people in the system. It creates an incurable concavity in the Rule of Law." 12. In Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and another v. Bajrang Lal (2014) 4 SCC 693 , this Court, following Municipal Committee, Bahadurgarh v. Krishnan Behari and others (1996) 2 SCC 714 , has opined that in cases involving corruption there cannot be any other punishment than dismissal. It has been further held that any sympathy shown in such cases is totally uncalled for and opposed to public interest. The amount misappropriated may be small or large; it is the act of misappropriation that is relevant. In said case (Rajasthan SRTC6), the respondent employee was awarded punishment of removal from service. In the present case it is compulsory retirement. Learned counsel for respondents submitted that on earlier occasion, appellant was awarded minor punishment, for his misconduct, regarding defalcation of stamps. And now he is found guilty for the second time.” 15. It would be evident from the aforesaid exposition of law that it is not the amount misappropriated but the loss of confidence which is the primary factory to be considered while awarding punishment. No doubt, the amount in this case belongs to one Jai Ram and not the Department, but then this incident in itself was sufficient for the employer to lose confidence or faith in the petitioner and award punishment of removal. In such cases, there is no place for generosity or sympathy on the part of judicial forum and, therefore, the same calls for no interference. 16. To be fair to the learned counsel for the petitioner, it may be noted that he has placed heavy reliance on the affidavit executed by Jai Ram wherein it is stated that he had no grievance against the petitioner and the allegations against him i.e. the petitioner were without any foundation and thus were baseless. 16. To be fair to the learned counsel for the petitioner, it may be noted that he has placed heavy reliance on the affidavit executed by Jai Ram wherein it is stated that he had no grievance against the petitioner and the allegations against him i.e. the petitioner were without any foundation and thus were baseless. Suffice it to say that the affidavit relied upon by the petitioner is clearly an afterthought. This is evident from the affidavit which has been executed 04.11.2009, whereas, the petitioner already stood removed from service before this date vide order dated 30.09.2009. 17. As a sequel to the aforesaid discussion, we find no merit in this petition and the same is accordingly dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.