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2016 DIGILAW 570 (RAJ)

Sher Jang Khan v. R. S. R. T. C.

2016-04-23

VEERENDR SINGH SIRADHANA

body2016
JUDGMENT : Veerendr Singh Siradhana, J. 1. The petitioner aggrieved of the order dated 11th May, 2015, terminating his services; has instituted the present writ application, praying for the following reliefs. "(i) The impugned order dated 08.10.2014 passed by respondent No. 1 as well as order dated 11.5.2015 passed by respondent No. 3 may kindly be quashed and set aside and the respondents be directed to reinstate the petitioner back in service on the post of conductor with all consequential benefits; (ii) Any other order which this Hon'ble Court deems fit in the facts and circumstances of the case may also be passed in favour of the petitioner." 2. Briefly, the essential skeletal material facts necessary for appreciation of the controversy are that the petitioner was accorded appointment under the compassionate appointment quota vide order dated 19th December, 2013, on a fixed salary of Rs. 7,900/- per month. The appointment contemplated probation period of two years followed by confirmation after successful completion. On 22rd April, 2015, the local M.L.A. - Shri Kanwar Lal Meena, inspected the vehicle No. 0544 of the respondent-Corporation, while it was being plied on Jhalawar-Kota-Mahnohar thana - Binaganj-Kota route. In the inspection 20 passengers were found without ticket from whom the fare was collected but were not furnished with the ticket. The M.L.A., who has been impleaded as respondent No. 4, to the writ proceedings, addressed a letter to the Chairman-Cum-Managing Director of the respondent-Corporation, enclosing a copy of the log sheet to substantiate the fact that the petitioner was carrying 20 passengers without ticket, having charged fare from them. On 22nd April, 2015, the petitioner was placed under suspension in view of the contemplation of an enquiry as would be reflected from Annexure-3. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner, reiterating the pleaded facts and grounds of the writ application vehemently argued that despite decision taken by the respondent-Corporation to conduct an enquiry while placing the petitioner under suspension in contemplation thereof, but no enquiry was ever conducted. Therefore, termination of petitioner’s services vide impugned order dated 11th May, 2015; is illegal, arbitrary and stigmatic on the face of it. 4. Learned counsel would further submit that the M.L.A. had no authority to inspect the bus and charge the petitioner of the alleged misconduct. Therefore, termination of petitioner’s services vide impugned order dated 11th May, 2015; is illegal, arbitrary and stigmatic on the face of it. 4. Learned counsel would further submit that the M.L.A. had no authority to inspect the bus and charge the petitioner of the alleged misconduct. That apart, despite service of notice of the writ application on the M.L.A., who has been impleaded as respondent No. 4 to the writ proceedings, no response has been filed in denial thereof. 5. Learned counsel further urged that a bare perusal of the reply to the writ application, would reveal that the facts detailed out have been admitted, and therefore, the termination of the petitioner’s service for the alleged misconduct as reported by the M.L.A. is, illegal, invalid and cannot be sustained in the eye of law. In support of his submissions, reliance has been placed on the opinion of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of V.P. Ahuja v. State of Punjab & Ors., 2000 (3) SCC 239 , Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satyendra Nath Bose National Center For Basic Sciences, Calcutta & Ors. 1999 (3) SCC 60 , State Bank of India & Ors. v. Palak Modi & Anr., 2013 (3) SCC 607 , Jaswantsingh Pratapsingh Jadeja v. Rajkot Municipal Corporation & Anr., 2007 (10) SCC 71 , and a batch of writ applications adjudicated upon by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court at Principal Seat, Jodhpur lead case being S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 9242/2014 (Hanuwant Singh v. RSRTC & Ors.), vide order dated 13th August, 2015, affirmed by the Division Bench in the intra-court appeal No. 968/2015 (Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur & Ors. v. Hanuwant Singh), decided on 13th January, 2016. 6. In response to the notice of the writ application, the respondent-Corporation has filed its counter-affidavit while supporting its action in terminating the employment of the petitioner vide impugned order dated 11th May, 2015, while he was on probation. 7. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-Corporation referring to the Rajasthan State Road Transport Workers and Workshop Employees Standing Orders, 1965 (for short, ‘Standing Orders of 1965’) asserted that Clause (iii) and (iv) of Rule 8 of the Standing Orders of 1965, contemplates the procedure with reference to the recruitment of probationer. 8. 7. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-Corporation referring to the Rajasthan State Road Transport Workers and Workshop Employees Standing Orders, 1965 (for short, ‘Standing Orders of 1965’) asserted that Clause (iii) and (iv) of Rule 8 of the Standing Orders of 1965, contemplates the procedure with reference to the recruitment of probationer. 8. It is further asserted that the normal period of probation in respect of the drivers and conductors is two years unless it is extended by specific time not exceeding six months. 9. According to the learned counsel, the petitioner was not found of ‘unquestionable integrity’ and keeping in view the assessment of his work and conduct during the period of probation, his services have been terminated in exercise of Clause (iii) and (iv) of Rule 8 of the Standing Orders of 1965. In support of his submissions, reliance has been placed on the opinion of a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Nand Singh Rathore v. Chairman Cum Managing Director, Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & Anr., S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6346/2015, along with connected matter, decided on 29th January, 2016. The view has been confirmed by the Division Bench as the intra-court appeal against the judgment and order dated 29th January, 2016 in D.B. Civil Special Appeals (Writ) No. 270/2016 and 271/2016, have been dismissed, vide judgment dated 18th March, 2016. Reliance has also been placed on the opinion of the Division Bench in the case of Kalyan Singh @ K.S. Goswami v. State of Rajasthan & Anr., 2015 (2) WLC (Raj.) 569 and in the case of Rajesh Kohli v. High Court of Jammu and Kashmir & Anr., 2010 (12) SCC 783 ; pointing out that reference to unsatisfactory service while terminating the services cannot be termed as a stigmatic. 10. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance perused the materials available on record as well as gave my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions at Bar. 11. Indisputably, the inspection of the vehicle alleging that the petitioner was carrying 20 passengers without ticket despite having charged fare; was made by the local M.L.A. - Shri Kanwar Lal Meena, who has been impleaded as a party respondent No. 4 to the writ proceedings. Even after service of notice, no response has been filed, denying the statement made in the writ application; 12. Even after service of notice, no response has been filed, denying the statement made in the writ application; 12. Moreover, the factual matrix in this reference is also not in dispute for what has been stated by the respondent-Corporation in its counter-affidavit under paragraph 3 and 6, which reads thus: "3. That the contents of para 3 of the writ petition are not admitted in the manner stated and are relied in terms that when the petitioner was serving his duty on Corporation’s vehicle No. 0544 on the route of Jhalawar-Kota-Mahnoharthana-Binaganj-Kota, a sudden inspection was carried out by the local MLA namely Kanwar Lal Meena and in the inspection 20 passengers were found without tickets. It is respectfully submitted that the MLA asked the passengers, the passengers informed the MLA that the payment of the tickets has been received by the petitioner but requisite tickets were not given by the conductor to them. It is submitted that the remark was also made on the log sheet on which the petitioner and the driver of the vehicle namely Tej Singh Devra had subscribed their signatures. 6. That the contents of para 6 of the writ petition are not admitted in the manner stated and are replied on terms that the termination of the petitioner was made because of his dissatisfactory service and the petitioner was under the probation period and, therefore, the probation period was also terminated. The inspection as carried out by the MLA wherein 20 passengers were found without tickets. The MLA also made a remark and thus on account of violation of condition Nos. 8 & 9 of the appointment order No. 1004 dated 19.12.2013, the petitioner’s probation period was ordered to be terminated and therefore the termination of the petitioner was just and proper and in accordance with the terms and conditions of the appointment order No. 1004 dated 19.12.2013. It is submitted that the services and conduct of the petitioner were not found up to mark and satisfactory as per requirement of Rules 8 (iii) of the Standing Order, 1965 of the Corporation and therefore services of the petitioner were terminated. The order impugned in the present writ petition is simple in nature and cannot be said to be stigmatic." 13. The order impugned in the present writ petition is simple in nature and cannot be said to be stigmatic." 13. It is also not in dispute that the petitioner was placed under suspension vide order dated 22nd April, 2015, in view of contemplation of an enquiry. Further, no enquiry was conducted while the services of the petitioner have been terminated vide impugned order dated 11th May, 2015. At this juncture, it will be relevant to consider the text of the order of terminating the services of the petitioner, which reads thus: ^^dk;kZy; eq[; izcU/kd] jktLFkku jkT; iFk ifjogu fuxe] >kykokM+ vkxkjA** dzekad % eqiz@laLFkk@ifj@vuq@2015@2523 fnukad 11-05-2016 Jh 'ksjtax [kka iq= Jh vCnqy jtkd fLFkj osru izkscs'kuj Vs~uh ifjpkyd >kykokM+ vkxkj dh Integrity unquestionable ugha gksus rFkk izf'k{k.k dky esa vkpj.k ,oa lsok;sa larks"ktud ugha ik, tkus ij fu;qfDr i= esa of.kZr 'krksZa ,oa jktLFkku jkT; iFk ifjogu fuxe deZpkjh ,oa dk;Z'kkyk deZpkjh LFkk;h vkns'k 65 dh /kkjk 8 ¼3½ ,oa ¼4½ ds rgr ifjoh{kkdky lekIr djrs gq, budks rqjUr izHkko ls fuxe lsok ls i`Fkd~ fd;k tkrk gSA ¼'kEHkwflag½ eq[; izcU/kd] >kykokM+ fnukad 11-05-2015** 14. From a glance of the communication dated 22nd April, 2015, addressed to the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the respondent-Corporation (respondent No.1) by respondent No. 4-Shri Kanwar Lal Meena, along with log-sheet, the fact that the inspection was carried out by the M.L.A., is apparent on the face of record and this fact is not disputed. The petitioner was placed under suspension on the same day in contemplation of an enquiry. Instead of conducting enquiry, the services of the petitioner have been terminated invoking Clause (iii) and (iv) of Rule 8 of the Standing Orders of 1965. 15. By now, it is well settled law that if the services of the probationer employee are terminated, the termination must be based on the assessment and performance of the probationer during the period of probation. Further, if the termination of service is found to be punitive and stigmatic on the basis of allegations of misconduct which is the foundation of action taken, in that event such an order would be nullified for violation of principles of natural justice. 16. Further, if the termination of service is found to be punitive and stigmatic on the basis of allegations of misconduct which is the foundation of action taken, in that event such an order would be nullified for violation of principles of natural justice. 16. Similar view has been taken by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in a batch of writ applications, lead case being Hanuwant Singh (supra), which has been referred to and relied upon in support of the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner, while assailing the legality and validity of the impugned order dated 11th May, 2015. In somewhat similar circumstances, in the case of Hanuwant Singh (supra), the orders were not interfered with and quashed by the learned Single Judge. The intra-court appear [(D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 968/2015 : Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur & Ors. v. Hanuwant Singh], preferred; was declined upholding the view of the learned Single Judge, relying upon the opinion of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Anoop Jaiswal v. Government of India & Anr. AIR 1984 SC 636 , vide order dated 13th January, 2016. 17. In the case of Hanuwant Singh (supra), the Coordinate Bench of this Court, in unequivocal terms observed that if the order is punitive in nature or casts stigma; enquiry into the matter is a condition precedent. However, it depends on facts of each case. There cannot be a dispute that an order of termination which casts stigma cannot be sustained unless it was made in compliance of the principles of natural justice. 18. From the facts and materials available on record, indisputably the respondent No. 4-M.L.A. conducted the inspection of the vehicle of the petitioner on 22nd April, 2015, and transmitted a copy of the log-sheet to the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of respondent-Corporation. The petitioner was placed under suspension on the same day on 22nd April, 2015, in contemplation of an enquiry. Thus, the foundation of the order, terminating the services of the petitioner, is the inspection/allegation against the petitioner for carrying 20 passengers without ticket. The order of appointment of the petitioner contemplated, under condition No. 9 that in the event the petitioner was found carrying passengers without ticket or violating any of the Rules and Regulations, he would be liable to be proceeded with departmental enquiry in accordance with the Rules. 19. The order of appointment of the petitioner contemplated, under condition No. 9 that in the event the petitioner was found carrying passengers without ticket or violating any of the Rules and Regulations, he would be liable to be proceeded with departmental enquiry in accordance with the Rules. 19. In the case of State Bank of India & Ors. v. Palak Modi & Anr. (supra), relying upon the opinion of a three judge Bench in the case of Union of India v. Mahaveer C. Singhvi, it has been declared that a probationer has no right to hold the post and his service can be terminated at any time during or at the end of the period of probation on account of general unsuitability for the post held by him. However, if an allegation of misconduct constitutes the ‘foundation’ of the action taken, the ultimate decision taken by the competent authority can be nullified on the ground of violation of the rules of principle of natural justice. At this juncture, it will be relevant to consider the text of para 24 and 25, which reads thus : "19. In Union of India v. Mahaveer C. Singhvi the three-Judge Bench considered the question whether termination of the Respondent’s service who was serving as I.F.S. probationer by way of discharge in accordance with the terms of employment was punitive. The Court noted that the Respondent’s service was terminated because he had sought extension to join the Mission at Madrid in Spain because of sudden deterioration in the health condition of his parents and also requested for providing medical facilities and diplomatic passports to them. The Court also noted that the Ministry of External Affairs had taken cognizance of the complaint made by one Mrs. Narinder Kaur Chadha that the Respondent had been threatening her entire family and in particular her daughter which was followed by some enquiries conducted into his conduct or character by Joint Secretary, Foreign Service Institute and a memorandum was issued to the Respondent alleging his unauthorized absence. The Joint Secretary found that the complaint was wholly unfounded. The Court then referred to the principles laid down in earlier judgments and approved the view taken by the High Court that even though the order of discharge did not contain any stigma, the same was not conclusive and the High Court had rightly termed the same as punitive. The Joint Secretary found that the complaint was wholly unfounded. The Court then referred to the principles laid down in earlier judgments and approved the view taken by the High Court that even though the order of discharge did not contain any stigma, the same was not conclusive and the High Court had rightly termed the same as punitive. Some of the observations made in the judgment are extracted below : (SCC p. 233 para 47) "47. The materials on record reveal that the complaint made by Mrs. Narinder Kaur Chadha to the Minister of External Affairs had been referred to the Joint Secretary and the Director (Vigilance) on 8-2-2002 with a direction that the matter be looked into at the earliest. Although, nothing adverse was found against the Respondent on 19-2-2002, the Joint Secretary (Vigilance) held further discussions with the Joint Secretary (Admn.) in this regard. What is, however, most damning is that a decision was ultimately taken by the Director, Vigilance Division, on 23-4-2002, to terminate the services of the Respondent, stating that the proposal had the approval of the Minister of External Affairs. This case, in our view, is not covered by the decision of this Court in Dipti Prakash Banerjee case. 25. The ratio of the above noted judgments is that a probationer has no right to hold the post and his service can be terminated at any time during or at the end of the period of probation on account of general suitability for the post held by him. If the competent authority holds an inquiry for judging the suitability of the probationer or for his further continuance in service or for confirmation and such inquiry is the basis for taking decision to terminate his service, then the action of the competent authority cannot be castigated as punitive. However, if the allegation of misconduct constitutes the foundation of the action taken, the ultimate decision taken by the competent authority can be nullified on the ground of violation of the rules of natural justice." 20. In the case of V.P. Ahuja v. State of Punjab & Ors. (supra), while explaining the scope of protection to probationer/temporary servant, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, observed thus : "7. In the case of V.P. Ahuja v. State of Punjab & Ors. (supra), while explaining the scope of protection to probationer/temporary servant, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, observed thus : "7. A probationer, like a temporary servant, is also entitled to certain protection and his services cannot be terminated arbitrarily, nor can those services be terminated in a punitive manner without complying with the principles of natural justice. 8. The affidavits filed by the parties before the High Court as also in this Court indicate the background in which the order, terminating the services of the appellant, came to be passed. Such an order which, on the face of it, is stigmatic, could not have been passed without holding a regular enquiry and giving an opportunity of hearing to the appellant. 10. For the reasons stated above, the appeal is allowed, the judgment dated 26-3-1999 passed by the High Court is set aside and the writ petition of the appellant is allowed. The order dated 2-12-1998, by which the services of the appellant were terminated, is quashed with the direction that he shall be put back on duty with all consequential benefits. No costs." 21. In the case of Dipti Prakash Banerjee (supra), while explaining the difference between ‘foundation’ and ‘motive’, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that if findings were arrived at in an inquiry as to misconduct, without a regular departmental enquiry, the simple order of termination is to be treated as ‘founded’ on the allegations and will be bad in the eye of law. The view has been reiterated in the case of Rajendra Kumar v. The Chairman, RSRTC & Ors., 2008 (4) WLC (Raj.) 359. 22. In the case of Jaswant Singh Pratapsingh Jadeja, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while explaining the criteria for determination of the order as ’punitive’ or ‘simpliciter’ observed that the discharge order making allegations against the employee while terminating his employment; the surrounding circumstances which indicated that the discharge was not based solely on the assessment of employee’s work and conduct during the period of probation such a termination was held to be stigmatic and punitive. It will be relevant to consider the text of para 9, 10, 16 and 28, which reads thus: "9. The tests governing termination of probation is no longer res integra. It will be relevant to consider the text of para 9, 10, 16 and 28, which reads thus: "9. The tests governing termination of probation is no longer res integra. When a disciplinary enquiry is initiated on the premise that there are serious allegations of misconduct on the part of the delinquent officer; his explanation thereupon had been rejected pursuant whereto a full scale formal enquiry has been initiated culminating ion a finding of guilt, the order terminating the service would be held to be stigmatic. There may also be cases where the allegations involved moral turpitude on the part of the delinquent officer. The language used in the order of termination of service may ex-facie be stigmatic. The language used therein may also show that there was something over and above the assertion that the officer was found unsuitable for the job. The aforementioned tests, however, are not exhaustive. 10. We may apply the said tests in the instant case. In the instant case, the language used in the impugned order is ex-facie stigmatic. It referred to the earlier orders containing allegations of misconduct on the part of the appellant and the fact that he had been found guilty thereof. Appellant was said to have been absented from duties. He had been found guilty of negligence, carelessness and showing absolute disregard towards his duties. A disciplinary proceeding was initiated therefore. His explanation to the show cause notice was rejected. He was, therefore, found guilty of the charges levelled against him. Only thereafter, he was discharged from service by reason of the impugned order dated 29.4.2003. 16. If the satisfaction of the employer rested on the unsatisfactory performance on the part of the appellant, the matter might have been different, but in that case, from the impugned order it is evident that it was not the unsatisfactory nature and character of his performance only which was taken into consideration but series of his acts as well, misconduct on his part had also been taken into consideration therefore. It is one thing to say that he was found unsuitable for a job but it is another thing to say that he was said to have committed some misconduct. 27. From the discussions made hereinbefore, it is evident that termination of services of the appellant purporting to discharge him simpliciter cannot be accepted, being stigmatic in nature. It is one thing to say that he was found unsuitable for a job but it is another thing to say that he was said to have committed some misconduct. 27. From the discussions made hereinbefore, it is evident that termination of services of the appellant purporting to discharge him simpliciter cannot be accepted, being stigmatic in nature. The form of the order terminating the services coupled with the background facts clearly leads to the conclusion that the order impugned in the writ petition by the appellant was punitive." 23. In the case of Nand Singh Rathore (supra), the Coordinate Bench of this Court while appreciating the facts of those cases, considered the fact that before passing the order of termination of the petitioners therein, they were served with a notice. From the observations made by the Coordinate Bench of this Court, it is evident that the facts of those cases are entirely different and distinguishable for what has been observed by the Coordinate Bench at page No. 6 and 7 of the judgment, which reads thus: "It is however true that impugned order of termination has been passed after service of notice making allegations against the petitioners. The impugned order is however not in reference or is based on the said notice. It is also a fact that if notice dated 24th march, 2015 in the case of Nand Singh is seen, the allegations of the similar nature were previously in other five charge sheets also. He was punished on two occasions but discontinuance of the probation was not made as a consequence of service of charge sheet on earlier occasion. The impugned order has been passed when the authority was not satisfied by the services rendered by the petitioners and order cannot be said to be punitive because it is not referring to the charges framed against the petitioners. The facts of this case do not support petitioners to hold impugned order to be punitive in nature. It is not in dispute that if order is punitive in nature or cast stigma, inquiry into the matter is a condition precedent. It depends on the facts of each case. Learned counsel for the petitioners has referred several judgments to support their case. It is not in dispute that if order is punitive in nature or cast stigma, inquiry into the matter is a condition precedent. It depends on the facts of each case. Learned counsel for the petitioners has referred several judgments to support their case. In the case of Ram Bahadur Pandey (supra), the termination was made finding irregularity in disappointment and it was without providing opportunity of hearing thus set aside with liberty to take action in accordance to the rules. In the case of V.P. Ahuja (supra), it was held that service of probationer cannot be terminated erroneously or with punitive orders in violation of principles of natural justice. There Apex Court found that if order casts stigma then termination cannot be without compliance of the principles of natural justice. In the case of Hari Ram Maurya (supra), it was held that if order of termination is punitive, inquiry is mandatory. The same is the position in the case of Ramraj Gurjar S/o Shri Suraj Mal (supra) so as other judgments referred by learned counsel for petitioners, it is settled law that whenever order is punitive or casts stigma, principles of natural justice is to be followed." 24. Therefore, the opinion referred to and relied upon is of no help to the respondent-Corporation to support the stand in the instant case at hand. 25. In the case of Kalyan Singh @ K.S. Goswami (supra), the Division Bench of this Court while dealing with the case of a Civil Judge (Jr. Div.) & Judicial Magistrate in the cadre of the Rajasthan Judicial Service, arrived at the conclusion on the basis of overall performance of the petitioner (Kalyan Singh @ K.S. Goshwami), which included integrity of Officer, his work, knowledge of law, conduct & behaviour on the basis of reports submitted by the respective Direct Judges and the Hon'ble Inspecting Judges, ACR and further outcome/report of the complainants submitted by the Registrar (Vigilance), and after due discussion and deliberation, the Committee of Hon'ble Judges resolved to recommend confirmation of RJS Officers. Thus, the factual matrix detailed out and taken note of by the Division Bench, in the case referred to and relied upon, is quite different and distinguishable from the facts and circumstances of the case at hand. 26. Thus, the factual matrix detailed out and taken note of by the Division Bench, in the case referred to and relied upon, is quite different and distinguishable from the facts and circumstances of the case at hand. 26. In the case of Rajesh Kohli (supra), who was a member of Judicial Service, the matter was dealt with by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its singular contextual facts. It will be relevant to take note of the facts in the case of Rajesh Kohli (supra), wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court referring to the earlier opinion in the case of Pavanendra Narayan Verma v. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences, observed that the opinion expressed in the termination order that the probationer’s "work and conduct has not been found satisfactory" was not ex-facie stigmatic. 27. A glance of the facts and materials available on record in the instant case at hand, would reveal that the impugned order, in no certain terms, states that the integrity of the petitioner was not unquestionable. Further, in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondent-Corporation, the fact that the termination of services is based on the complaint made by the respondent No. 4-M.L.A., without conducting any enquiry, though the petitioner was placed under suspension in contemplation of enquiry; is apparent on the face of record as an admitted fact. It is significant to take note of the fact that the inspection of the Bus of the respondent-Corporation was carried out by local M.L.A., who has been impleaded as a party respondent No. 4 to the writ proceedings eo-nominee. Despite service of notice of the writ application neither respondent No. 4 has filed any written statement traversing the allegations and the facts nor he has arranged for his representation in the writ proceedings before this Court. The authority of the local M.L.A. to conduct an inspection and submit a report to the Chairman-Cum-Managing Director, is not contemplated by any stipulation in the Standing Orders of 1965. The petitioner has not been accorded any opportunity to rebut the allegations and the charge of carrying passengers without ticket. Thus, the ‘foundation’ of the impugned action is the charge of misconduct, without there being any enquiry and any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, in utter disregard and fragrant violation of the cardinal principles of natural justice. 28. The petitioner has not been accorded any opportunity to rebut the allegations and the charge of carrying passengers without ticket. Thus, the ‘foundation’ of the impugned action is the charge of misconduct, without there being any enquiry and any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, in utter disregard and fragrant violation of the cardinal principles of natural justice. 28. Thus, the order of termination of the services of the petitioners an outcome of the alleged misconduct being the ‘foundation’, and therefore, the impugned action, cannot be sustained. 29. For the reasons and discussions aforesaid, the writ applications succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned order dated 11th May, 2015, is hereby quashed and set aside. 30. The petitioner will be entitled to all the consequential benefits on notional basis. 31. However, the respondent-Corporation will be at liberty to conduct an enquiry, in accordance with law, without in any manner influenced by this order, if so advised. 32. The respondent-Corporation would ensure compliance of this order within a month from the date a certified copy of this order is presented to the respondent-Corporation. 33. No costs.