JUDGMENT S.N.PRASAD, J. - This writ petition has been filed seeking for the following reliefs: (i)To quash Annexure-8 (ii)To direct the opposite parties to pay fixed salary of Rs25,000/- along with D.A. as admissible from time to time without deduction of pension during the said period. 2.The fact of the case of the petitioner as per the pleading made in the writ petition is that the petitioner joined as Professor under Ravenshaw College on 24.8.1995. While working as Director, State Bureau of Text Book Production and Preparation, Bhubaneswar, he was appointed as Vice-Chancellor of Berhampur University. He retired from Government service w.e.f. 31.1.1996.The petitioner’s service for the period from 31.1.1996 till 23.8.1998 has been treated as deputation on foreign terms and conditions on his grade pay of Rs.4500/- - Rs.6300/-. The petitioner has drawn his pay as Vice-Chancellor @ 7600/- per month along with admissible D.A. as per the provisions contained in Statute 10 (1) (a) of the Orissa University (Amendment) Statutes, 1996 (hereinafter to be referred to as “Statute, 1996”) from 1.2.1996 to 23.8.1998, i.e. the date of making over charge of the office of Vice-Chancellor. The petitioner while serving as Vice-Chancellor, the pay scale was revised by virtue of the recommendation of 5th Pay Commission, which was implemented w.e.f. 1.1.1996 and according to the said recommendation, the salary for the post of Vice-Chancellor was fixed at Rs.25,000/- per month from time to time the authorities have paid the salary/consolidated amount according to the post to which the petitioner was holding during the relevant time, but all on a sudden the authorities have taken a decision to make recovery of certain amount, which according to the petitioner is absolutely without any application of mind and there cannot be any recovery since the petitioner has not misrepresented anything. 3.Learned Counsel representing the petitioner has submitted that if the order of recovery is allowed to stand, it would be very harsh for the petitioner since he has already retired from service and as such, on this ground, the impugned order of recovery should be quashed. 3.Learned Counsel representing the petitioner has submitted that if the order of recovery is allowed to stand, it would be very harsh for the petitioner since he has already retired from service and as such, on this ground, the impugned order of recovery should be quashed. 4.Opposite Party No.1-State and Opposite Party No.3-University have appeared and filed their respective counter affidavits taking a common stand, inter alia, stating that the petitioner while on Government service working as Director, State Bureau of Text Book Production and Preparation, Bhubaneswar has been appointed as Vice-Chancellor of Berhampur University on 24.8.1995 and continued for a period of three years up to 23.8.1998. The petitioner retired from Govt. service w.e.f. 31.1.1996.The competent authority of the State Government has taken a decision to count the period of service of the petitioner from 24.8.1995 to 31.1.1996 as deputation on foreign service terms and conditions. The petitioner has withdrawn his pay for the post of Vice-Chancellor @ Rs7600/- per month along with admissible D.A. as per the provisions contained under Statute 10 (1) (a) of Statute, 1996 from 1.2.1996 to 23.8.1998.The provision as contained in Statute 10 (1) (a) of Statute, 1996 envisages that a person after retirement from pensionable service appointed as Vice-Chancellor shall be entitled to draw such pay as will be arrived at after reducing the pay fixed under these statutes by the gross amount of pension before communication without temporary increase subject to a minimum of rupees twenty five thousand per month. According to the opposite parties, the petitioner was entitled to be given the salary of re-employment in pursuance to the provisions of Statute 10 (1) (a) of Statute, 1996, but on re-employment in addition to his salary, the Vice-Chancellor has also drawn his provisional pension (without temporary increase), which he should not have drawn in view of the express provision contained in Statute 10 (1) (a) of Statute, 1996. It has been contended that since the petitioner was holding the post of Vice-Chancellor and as such, it was his duty to draw the salary of the post as per the statutory provision, but he even knowing about the statute has withdrawn excess money and hence, the amount received by the petitioner in excess of his entitlement has been directed to be recovered and as such, no illegality has been committed by the authorities in taking a decision vide Annexure-8. 5.Mr. 5.Mr. Amit Pattnaik, learned Counsel for the State-opposite party has submitted that the petitioner has challenged Annexure-8, but in Annexure-8 his pay has also been fixed at Rs.25,000/- + D.A. per month with other stipulation that he should not draw pension and temporary increase during his re-employment as Vice-Chancellor, but the petitioner has challenged the entire Annexure-8, which contains his pay scale of Rs.25,000/-. 6.Heard learned Counsel for the parties. On perusal of the documents available on record, it is evident that the petitioner was initially engaged as Professor in English under Berhampur University and thereafter he was given the assignment to work as Director, State Bureau of Text Book Production and Preparation, Bhubaneswar and while he was working as such, he has been offered with the appointment to perform as Vice-Chancellor of Berhampur University, which he has accepted and immediately he joined and remained there up to 23.8.1998. Normally, the age of superannuation of the petitioner working under the State Government was 31.1.1996 and hence, his service from 24.8.1995 till 31.1.1996 has been treated as deputation on foreign service terms and conditions with his grade pay of Rs.4500/- 6300/-. The petitioner has also drawn his pay as Vice-Chancellor @ Rs.7600/- per month along with admissible D.A. as per the provisions contained in Statute 10 (1) (a) of Statute, 1996 for the period from 1.2.1996 to 23.8. 1998. The petitioner has drawn his salary as Vice-Chancellor along with his provisional pension (without temporary increase), which was not permissible in view of the provisions contained in Statute 10 (1) (a) of Statute, 1996, which needs to be referred as hereunder: “The Vice-Chancellor shall be paid a fixed salary of rupees twenty five thousand per month or as determined by University Grant Commission from time to time and dearness allowances as admissible from time to time with effect from 01.01.1996. Provided that a person after retirement from a pensionable service appointed as Vice-Chancellor, shall be entitled to draw such pay as will be arrived at after reducing the pay fixed under these statute by the gross amount of pension before commutation without temporary increase subject to the minimum of rupees twenty five thousand per month. Provided that a person after retirement from a pensionable service appointed as Vice-Chancellor, shall be entitled to draw such pay as will be arrived at after reducing the pay fixed under these statute by the gross amount of pension before commutation without temporary increase subject to the minimum of rupees twenty five thousand per month. Provided further that a retired person not holding a pensionable post including persons who are covered by contributory fund scheme, on appointment as Vice-Chancellor, shall be allowed a fixed salary of rupees twenty five thousand and dearness allowance as admissible on rupees twenty five thousand from time to time, and in case of a person continuing in service on appointment as Vice-Chancellor shall be paid a fixed salary of rupees twenty five thousand and dearness allowance as admissible on rupees twenty five thousand from time to time. 7.By going through the provisions of Statute 10 (1) (a) of Statute, 1996, it is apparent that the petitioner is coming under the parameters of the first proviso of the said provision, which was implemented w.e.f. 1.1.1996, which provides that a person after retirement from pensionable service appointed as Vice-Chancellor shall be entitled to draw such pay as will be arrived at after reducing the pay fixed under these statutes by the gross amount of pension before commutation without temporary increase subject to a minimum of rupees twenty five thousand per month. The admitted case of the petitioner is that although he is coming under the first proviso of Statute 10 (1) (a) of Statute, 1996, but he has withdrawn salary while working as Vice-Chancellor from 1.2.1996 to 23.8.1998 in addition to his provisional pension (without temporary increase). As such, the money which was withdrawn by the petitioner is contrary to the statutory provision as contained in Statute 10 (1) (a) of Statute, 1996 and therefore, the authorities have passed order to deduct the amount excess taken by the petitioner. As such, the money which was withdrawn by the petitioner is contrary to the statutory provision as contained in Statute 10 (1) (a) of Statute, 1996 and therefore, the authorities have passed order to deduct the amount excess taken by the petitioner. Hence, against that decision, the petitioner has filed this writ petition especially against the decision No. (iii) of the letter dated 15.11.2003.The sole ground taken by the petitioner wile arguing the case is that whatever amount has been withdrawn by the petitioner that was in between 1.2.1996 to 23.8.1998, but the authorities had taken a decision after lapse of about 5 years that too after separation from service in the capacity of Vice-Chancellor, which will be absolutely harsh and the petitioner will have to bear excess financial burden and hence, the prayer has been made to ask the Government not to recover the said amount. 8.Admittedly, the petitioner has discharged his duties under the State Government in the capacity of Director, State Bureau of Text Book Production and Preparation, Bhubaneswar and under the University as Professor and thereafter as Vice-Chancellor and while working as Vice-Chancellor, he has withdrawn excess provisional pension contrary to the statutory provision and in the light of this, it is to be examined as to whether recovery as directed by the competent authority is proper or not ? 9.There was no dispute about the fact that there was divergent view of the Apex Court with respect to the decision as to whether recovery is to be made or not. 10.The Apex Court in Shyam Babu Verma v. Union of India, (1964) 2 SCC 521 has held that it shall only be just and proper not to recover any excess amount which has already been paid to them. 11.Similar view has also been taken by the Apex Court in Sahib Ram v. Union of India, 1995 (1) SCC 18, wherein it has been held that the amount paid may not be recovered from the appellant. 12.In B.J.Akkara v. Govt. of India, (2006) SCC 709, the Apex Court has held as follows : “xxxxxA Government servant, particular one in the lower rungs of service would spend whatever emoluments he receives for the upkeep of his family. If he receives an excess payment for a long period, he would spent it genuinely believing that he is entitled to it. of India, (2006) SCC 709, the Apex Court has held as follows : “xxxxxA Government servant, particular one in the lower rungs of service would spend whatever emoluments he receives for the upkeep of his family. If he receives an excess payment for a long period, he would spent it genuinely believing that he is entitled to it. As any subsequent action to recover the excess payment will cause undue hardship to him, relief is granted in that behalf. But where the employee had knowledge that the payment received was in excess of what was due or wrongly paid, or where the error is detected or corrected within a short time of wrong payment, Courts will not grant relief against recovery. The matter being in the realm of judicial discretion, Courts may on the facts and circumstances of any particular case refuse to grant such relief against recovery.” (emphasis supplied) 13.In Syed Abdul Qadir v. State of Bihar, (2009) 3 SCC 475 the Apex Court has held that the relief against recovery is granted by Courts not because of any right in the employees, but in equity, exercising judicial discretion to relieve the employees from the hardship that will be caused if recovery is ordered. 14.In Chandi Prasad Uniyal and others v. State of Uttarakhand and others, (2012) 8 scc, 417 their Lordships of the Apex Court has been pleased to hold that excess payment of public money which is often described as “tax prayers money” which belongs neither to the officers who have effected over-payment nor that of the recipients. Any amount paid/received without authority of law can always be recovered barring few exceptions of extreme hardships but not as a matter of right, in such situations law implies an obligation on the payee to repay the money, otherwise it would amount to unjust enrichment. 15.In the case of State of Punjab and others v. Rafiq Masih (White Washer) and others, (2015) 4 SCC 334 , the Apex Court has been pleased to held as under : “18. It is not possible to postulate all situations of hardship which would govern employees on the issue of recovery, where payments have mistakenly been made by the employer, in excess of their entitlement. It is not possible to postulate all situations of hardship which would govern employees on the issue of recovery, where payments have mistakenly been made by the employer, in excess of their entitlement. Be that as it may, based on the decisions referred to hereinabove, we may, as a ready reference, summarise the following few situations, wherein recoveries by the employers, would be impermissible in law: (i)Recovery from the employees belonging to Class-III and Class IV service (or Group C and Group D service) (ii)Recovery from the retired employees, or the employees who are due to retire within one year, of the order of recovery. (iii)Recovery from the employees, when the excess payment has been made for a period in excess of five years before the order of recovery is issued. (iv)Recovery in cases where an employee has wrongfully been required to discharge duties of a higher post, and has been paid accordingly, even though he should have rightfully been required to work against an inferior post. (v)In any other case, where the Court arrives at the conclusion that recovery if made from the employee, would be iniquitous or harsh or arbitrary to such an extent, as would far outweigh the equitable balance of the employer’s right to recover.” 16.It is settled that the judgment having divergent view, the recent judgment is to be followed and as such, the guidelines which have been fixed by the Apex Court in the case of Rafiq Masih (supra) and also the proposition laid down in Chandi Prasad Uniyal (supra) regarding exception of extreme hardship for recovery of excess amount paid, but not as a matter of right, are being taken into consideration in the case at hand. 17.In Rafiq Masih (supra, also some guidelines have been inserted in paragraph 18 and on perusal of the same, it is found that recovery from the employees belonging to Class III and Class IV service, recovery from the retired employees, or the employees who are due to retire within one year of the order of recovery, recovery from the employees, when the excess payment has been made for a period in excess of five years before the order of recovery is issued, and recovery in cases where an employee has wrongfully been required to discharge duties of a higher post, and has been paid accordingly, even though he should have rightfully been required to work against an inferior post, has been said to be impermissible in law. The last situation, which is important for consideration in this case, is where the Court arrives at a conclusion that recovery if made from the employee, would be iniquitous or harsh or arbitrary to such an extent, as would for outweigh the equitable balance of the employer’s right to recover. 18.Now the fact of the present case is to be examined in the light of situation No. (iv) of paragraph 18. Admittedly, the petitioner all along in his service career has held the post, which was higher in hierarchy, i.e. initially Professor in Ravenshaw College, Cuttack, when Director of a Department under the State Government and thereafter Vice-Chancellor of Berhampur University. The dispute arose in this case is for the period of his incumbency as Vice-Chancellor of Berhampur University. The post of Vice-Chancellor is a creation of statute, who is the ultimate authority of the University just below Chancellor. Although the Chancellor is the ultimate authority of all the Universities, but the Vice-Chancellor is concerned with the day to day functioning of the University concerned and he is the ultimate authority to take all decisions in this regard. The petitioner has withdrawn excess amount, which is contrary to the statutory provisions as contained in Statute 10 (1) (a) of Statute, 1996. It cannot be expected from the petitioner, who was holding the post of Vice-Chancellor that he was not aware of the statutory provision, but even knowing the same, he has withdrawn the money and given excess burden to the State Exchequer for his gain. It cannot be expected from the petitioner, who was holding the post of Vice-Chancellor that he was not aware of the statutory provision, but even knowing the same, he has withdrawn the money and given excess burden to the State Exchequer for his gain. The authorities after considering all these aspects of the matter have taken a decision to recover the excess amount, which has been withdrawn by the petitioner. Since the petitioner is getting handsome pension by virtue of holding higher post under the State Government, if the recovery in question is made, it will not be said to be iniquitous or harsh or arbitrary, rather if there is no recovery, certainly the State will be put to loss and ultimately the people at large will suffer. Hence, in my considered view no case is made out by the petitioner that in case of recovery, it would be iniquitous or harsh or arbitrary to such extent as would far outweigh the equitable balance of the employer’s right to recover. 19.Taking into consideration the entire aspect of the matter as discussed hereinabove, in my considered view, the decision of the authority to recover excess amount drawn by the petitioner cannot be said to be illegal. Accordingly, the writ petition fails and the same is dismissed. Petition dismissed.