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2016 DIGILAW 574 (JK)

Dilar Singh v. State of J&K

2016-11-07

TASHI RABSTAN

body2016
JUDGMENT : Tashi Rabstan, J. 1. Invoking inherent jurisdiction of this Court enshrined under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. in the petition on hand petitioners seek redressal of their afflictions with choicest reliefs. Petitioners crave for quashment of FIR No. 27/2016, registered in Police Station Women Cell, Gandhi Nagar, Jammu, under Section 498-A/342/109 of Ranbir Penal Code, at the behest of complainant. Petitioners also seek quashment of proceedings and investigation, conducted by Station House Officer, Police Station, Women Cell, Gandhi Nagar, Jammu-Respondent No. 4. The case set up by petitioners is that marriage between Petitioner No. 1 and Respondent No. 5 was solemnized on 02.04.2015 according to Sikh rites and customs. Petitioner and Respondent No. 5 are said to have developed love and affection and for that reason, intended to marry but parents of Respondent No. 5 objected this marriage. As a consequence thereof, it is contended that the petitioner and Respondent No. 5 eloped and went to Punjab to get married and on 29.03.2015, Respondent No. 5 out of her own free will and wish converted to Sikhism in Gurudwara Dal Baba Bidhi Chandji Sur Singh, Amritsar and on 02.04.2015, they got married in Gurudwara Sadhu Sangat, Kot Khalsa, Amritsar, in accordance with Sikh rites and rituals under the Anand Karaj Act. An agreement was executed and marriage was duly registered before the Registrar of Marriages, Tehsil Amritsar. On 25.03.2015, father of Respondent No. 5 lodged an FIR against petitioners and others, being FIR No. 28/2015, under Sections 366/109 in Police Station, Channi Himmat, Jammu. It is alleged that under the pretext of said FIR, police attacked house of petitioners 2&3 along with relatives of Respondent No. 5. On 04.04.2015 Petitioner No. 1 and Respondent No. 5 filed joint petition in the Court of Sessions Judge, Amritsar, seeking protection. In the said petition, Respondent No. 5 is stated to have deposed that she had married Petitioner No. 1 out of her own free wish and will and without any pressure or coercion by anybody. On 04.04.2015 Petitioner No. 1 and Respondent No. 5 filed joint petition in the Court of Sessions Judge, Amritsar, seeking protection. In the said petition, Respondent No. 5 is stated to have deposed that she had married Petitioner No. 1 out of her own free wish and will and without any pressure or coercion by anybody. Petitioners' contention is that despite statement of Respondent No. 5, harassment by police did not stop, forcing Petitioner No. 1 and Respondent No. 5 to file joint petition before the Hon'ble Apex Court, wherein statement of Respondent No. 5 was again recorded and Hon'ble Judges of the Apex Court after satisfying themselves were pleased to direct the Police to give protection to petitioners, and no coercive measures would be adopted in FIR No. 28/2015. Subsequently, on 16.10.2015, the Hon'ble Apex Court quashed FIR No. 28/2015. It is contended that on 18.07.2016 Petitioner No. 1, as a usual routine, went to attend his job. His Uncle told him that some unknown persons forcibly abducted Respondent No. 5 and took her away to some unknown place. Petitioner No. 1, immediately lodged a complaint with concerned Police Station at Amritsar and the same was registered as FIR No. 0118 of 2016. However, to the utter surprise, petitioners came to know that Respondent No. 5 had lodged a complaint under Section 498-A/342/109 RPC with Respondent No. 4, which had been immediately converted to FIR No. 27/2016. It is this FIR quash-ment whereof is sought on the ground that the same has been lodged in most perfunctory manner, under pressure and is motivated by nefarious designs and mala fides, communal hatred and frenzy, which has hitherto fore also been exhibited at the time of marriage between Petitioner No. 1 and Respondent No. 5. It is contended that investigation and proceedings being conducted under the garb of FIR No. 27/2016, are sheer abuse of process of law. 2. Mr. Nanda, learned Sr. AAG, while filing compliance report in terms of order dated 20.09.2016, contends that on 19.07.2016, complainant Sana Choudhary wife of S. Daler Singh daughter of Yaseen Choudhary resident of Sainik Colony, Jammu, lodged a written complaint at Police Station Women Cell, Jammu, alleging that her husband and in-laws confined her in a room for many days and harassed, mentally tortured, beaten and abused her. On this, instant case has been registered and investigation of case was entrusted to ASI Subash Chander. Later on a SIT was constituted by SP City South, Jammu, headed by SDPO City South, comprising Inspector, Manjeet Singh, SHO P/s. Satwari. During the course of investigation, IO verified the facts of the case and conducted detailed questioning of complainant, during which she disclosed that alleged accused Daler Singh, his brother Sunny and some other persons committed natural and unnatural rape upon her, also kept her in illegal confinement, and beat her mercilessly. On this, her statement under Section 164-A Cr.P.C. was recorded before Sub-Registrar, Jammu, on 21.07.2016. Thereafter a SIT was constituted by S.P. City South Jammu. On 12.08.2016, Daler Singh and Sunny sons of Hardeep Singh; Hardeep Singh son of Chatter Singh; Davinder Kour wife of Hardeep Singh, appeared before the SIT, and other, three remained untraced. It is insisted that the detailed investigation into the matter being conducted, wherein it came to notice that Daler Singh married complainant at Amritsar and after that both approached Hon'ble Apex Court, which after recording their statements issued order for protection, on this FIR No. 28/2015, was closed as not admitted. It is further contended that during course of investigation phone numbers of all four persons along with phone number of complainant was taken and forwarded to Nodal Officers for obtaining their CDRs. After this, the victim was called at Police Station Women Cell, Jammu, to appear before the SIT for detailed inquiry of facts of the case. During questioning, she disclosed that she was studying in BA Part-II at Women College, Gandhi Nagar, Jammu and on 23.03.2015 she came to her college for attending practical examination when she came out of college premises, she received a call from a friend, who asked her to come at Kunjwani, when she reached at Kunjwani, her friend with Sandeep Singh Manhas and two more girls were present there. Further, they all sat in a car and proceeded towards Pahalwan Restaurant, Bari Brahmana, for eating snacks. After sometime she went out to receive a call from her aunty. After that she came back and had a glass of cold drink. Thereafter she along with her friends left that place and boarded on a bus towards home. Further, they all sat in a car and proceeded towards Pahalwan Restaurant, Bari Brahmana, for eating snacks. After sometime she went out to receive a call from her aunty. After that she came back and had a glass of cold drink. Thereafter she along with her friends left that place and boarded on a bus towards home. After some time in the bus, she slept and when she woke up, she found herself at Amritsar Bus Stand and Daler Singh was standing in front of her. Further she questioned Daler Singh that how she reached there, Daler Singh threatened her with dire consequences and later took her at Majitha Road, Amritsar, in the house of his real uncle, Gurcharan Singh. The detailed report of complainant's version of incident and the statement under Section 164-A Cr.P.C. is annexed with the CD file. The complainant strongly support the statement made by her under Section 164-A Cr.P.C. 3. Since both the complainant and accused-Daler Singh, during their questioning disclosed that they stayed in Amritsar for about 15 months since 27.03.2015, the allegations levelled by the complainant are required to be verified from the places where both of them stayed. Furthermore the call detail records are yet to be received and further analysis of which will put more light on investigation. 4. Heard learned counsel for parties and perused the record. 5. Learned counsel for Respondent No. 5 Mr. Latif places reliance on various judgments, to contend that once SIT is constituted, there is no scope of petition under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. Criminal proceedings must be allowed. 6. It is well settled that inherent powers under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. because of their plentitude, are to be exercised rarely, sparingly and with due circumspection. The Court in view of exercise of powers under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. is not expected to hijack trial proceedings pending before Trial Court or investigation from Investigating Officer and assume its role to sift evidence and find out whether investigation or trial should proceed. It is only to prevent abuse of process of court and prevent miscarriage of justice that inherent powers are to be exercised. 7. Bare reading of impugned FIR and meaningful consideration of allegations contained therein reveal that disclosure of commission of cognizable offence against the accused persons is ex facie discernible. It is only to prevent abuse of process of court and prevent miscarriage of justice that inherent powers are to be exercised. 7. Bare reading of impugned FIR and meaningful consideration of allegations contained therein reveal that disclosure of commission of cognizable offence against the accused persons is ex facie discernible. Law on the point is no more res integra that in exercise of inherent jurisdiction First Information Report (FIR) is to be quashed very sparingly and with circumspection and only in rarest of rare cases when no offences spelt therein. While considering the question of quashing FIR, on a petition under Section 561 Cr.P.C., prejudging the case by examining its weakness and contradictions is not permissible. Where allegations in FIR do not, prima facie, disclose commission of a criminal offence, FIR would be quashed. The authoritative pronouncement on the subject, by the Supreme Court, in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal & Ors. [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335], is very much relevant, wherein the Court has discussed ambit and scope of inherent powers under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. (State Code) pari materia to Section 482 Cr.P.C. (Central Code) threadbare. The Supreme Court has laid down guidelines for exercising inherent powers under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. for quashment of FIR or complaint and the criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court held: "102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extra-ordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated Under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." 8. The Supreme Court has also issued a word of caution that in exercise of inherent powers an inquiry, as to reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in FIR or complaint, is not required to be made. The Supreme Court held: "103. The Supreme Court has also issued a word of caution that in exercise of inherent powers an inquiry, as to reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in FIR or complaint, is not required to be made. The Supreme Court held: "103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the F.I.R. or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice." 9. The Supreme Court, in case of State of Orissa v. Saroj Kumar Sahoo [ (2005) 13 SCC 540 ], has held that "It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. When an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in the court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by themselves be the basis for quashing the proceedings." 10. The Supreme Court, in Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. & Ors. (2006) 6 SCC 736 ], has reiterated the principle laid down in Bhajan Lal's case (supra) and culled out following principles: 1. The High Courts should not exercise their inherent powers to repress a legitimate prosecution. The power to quash criminal complaints should be used sparingly and with abundant caution. 2. The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the alleged offence. The High Courts should not exercise their inherent powers to repress a legitimate prosecution. The power to quash criminal complaints should be used sparingly and with abundant caution. 2. The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the alleged offence. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the criminal complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the alleged offence. 3. It was held that a given set of facts may make out (a) purely a civil wrong, or (b) purely a criminal offence, or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. 11. In the backdrop of legal position, emerged out from various pronouncements of the Supreme Court, I am at loss to say that the contentions raised on behalf of learned counsel for petitioners that impugned FIR is not prima facie disclosing commission of cognizable offence by them, are not tenable. The plea sought to be raised by petitioners that whole endeavour of FIR is to harass and intimidate them, appears to be quite alluring, but devoid of any substance for want of any factual foundation that impugned FIR is actuated with ulterior motive. The contention of learned counsel for petitioners that frivolous and vexatious complaint has been filed against them, even on its face value, cannot be construed as a plausible ground to scuttle investigation into the impugned FIR much less for its quashment. 12. The extraordinary inherent jurisdiction enshrined under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. cannot be exercised to circumvent legitimate prosecution prematurely wherein allegations against the petitioners are of cruelty towards woman. The Supreme Court in a famous case, Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [ (1992) 4 SCC 305 ] while relying on Bhajan Lal's case (supra) has held: 136. Thus, the inherent power under this section can be exercised by the High Court (1) to give effect to any order passed under the Code; or (2) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court; or (3) otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Thus, the inherent power under this section can be exercised by the High Court (1) to give effect to any order passed under the Code; or (2) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court; or (3) otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In relation to exercise of inherent powers of the High Court, it has been observed in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, that the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party and that it [22] should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice and that it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code. Vide (1) Talab Haji Hussain v. Madhukar Purhsottam; (2) Khushi Ram v. Hashim; and (3) State of Orissa v. Ram Chander Agarwala. 137. This inherent power conferred by Section 482 of the Code should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a premature decision in a case wherein the entire facts are extremely incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved whether factual or legal are of great magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to the cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceedings at any stage. This Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, to which both of us were parties have dealt with this question at length and enunciated the law listing out the circumstances under which the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction in quashing proceedings. We do not, therefore, think it necessary in the present case to extensively deal with the import and intendment of the powers under Sections 397, 401 and 482 of the Code. 13. Further, dilating on the inherent powers conferred on the High Court under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. while relying on two English decisions, the Supreme Court held: "147. We do not, therefore, think it necessary in the present case to extensively deal with the import and intendment of the powers under Sections 397, 401 and 482 of the Code. 13. Further, dilating on the inherent powers conferred on the High Court under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. while relying on two English decisions, the Supreme Court held: "147. Most of the decisions of the English cases laid down the dictum that only in cases where there is substantial amount of delay or potential abuse of process or vexatious prosecution or the proceedings are tainted with malice etc. alone the Court can step in by exercise of the inherent power. 148. The Privy Council in Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, examined the question of the inherent power of the High Court in interfering with the statutory investigation of the police and laid down the following dictum: "Just as it is essential that every one accused of a crime should have free access to a Court of justice so that he may be duly acquitted if found not guilty of the offence with which he is charged, so it is of the utmost importance that the judiciary should not interfere with the police in matters which are within their province and into which the law imposes upon them the duty of enquiry. In India as has been shown there is a statutory right on the part of the police to investigate the circumstances of an alleged cognizable crime without requiring any authority from the judicial authorities, and it would, as their Lordships think, be an unfortunate result if it should be held possible to interfere with those statutory rights by an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary not overlapping and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function, always, of course, subject to the right of the Court to intervene in an appropriate case when moved under Section 491 Criminal Procedure Code, to give directions in the nature of habeas corpus. In such a case as the present, however, the Court's functions begin when a charge is preferred [24] before it and not until then. In such a case as the present, however, the Court's functions begin when a charge is preferred [24] before it and not until then. It has sometimes been thought that Section 561-A has given increased powers to the Court which it did not possess before that section was enacted. But this is not so. The section gives no new powers, it only provides that those which the Court already inherently possess shall be preserved and is inserted, as their Lordships think, lest it should be considered that the only powers possessed by the Court are those expressly conferred by the Criminal Procedure Code, and that no inherent power had survived the passing of that Act. No doubt, if no cognizable offence is disclosed, and still more if no offence of any kind is disclosed, the police would have no authority to undertake an investigation." 149. Lord Denning in R. v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, has observed thus: "Although the chief officers of police are answerable to the law, there are many fields in which they have a discretion with which the law will not interfere. For instance, it is for the Commissioner of Police or the chief constable, as the case may be, to decide in any particular case whether enquiries should be pursued, or whether an arrest should be made or a prosecution brought. It must be for him to decide on the disposition of his force and the concentration of his resources on any particular crime or area. No court can or should give him direction on such a matter." 14. Therefore, substantially, most of the arguments advanced on behalf of learned counsel for petitioners are falling short of the requirements envisaged by law and are also not satisfying the guidelines enunciated in authoritative judicial pronouncements for exercising inherent powers in these matters. 15. The contention of learned counsel for petitioners that the impugned FIR is based on same set of facts and situation that were made basis for first FIR, is specious. My this view is also fortified by a judgment of Supreme Court in Shiv Shanker Singh v. State of Bihar [ (2012) 1 SCC 130 ], wherein Supreme Court observed that there is no bar to entertain a second complaint on same facts under exceptional circumstances. My this view is also fortified by a judgment of Supreme Court in Shiv Shanker Singh v. State of Bihar [ (2012) 1 SCC 130 ], wherein Supreme Court observed that there is no bar to entertain a second complaint on same facts under exceptional circumstances. Thus, in totality, challenge thrown to impugned FIR by the petitioners wholesomely on this unsubstantiated plea about bar of registration of second FIR is bereft of any merit. 16. One cannot brush aside a primordial fact that whether an accused/individual had been 'guilty mind' (mens rea) or not, can only be ascertained based on proper available materials on record during the investigation or trial of a given case. Viewed in that perspective, inherent powers of a Court of Law cannot be pressed into service. 17. Also, this Court aptly points out the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Central Bureau of Investigation v. Maninder Singh [ 2016 (1) SCC 389 ]. The relevant portion thereof is as follows: "17. The inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. should be sparingly used. Only when the Court comes to the conclusion that there would be manifest injustice or there would be abuse of the process of the Court if such power is not exercised, the Court would quash the proceedings. In economic offences the Court must not only keep in view that money has been paid to the bank which has been defrauded but also the society at large. It is not a case of simple assault or a theft of a trivial amount; but the offence with which we are concerned was well planned and was committed with a deliberate design with an eye on personal profit regardless of consequence to the society at large. To quash the proceeding merely on the ground that the accused has settled the amount with the bank would be a misplaced sympathy. If the prosecution against the economic offenders are not allowed to continue, the entire community is aggrieved. 18. To quash the proceeding merely on the ground that the accused has settled the amount with the bank would be a misplaced sympathy. If the prosecution against the economic offenders are not allowed to continue, the entire community is aggrieved. 18. In the recent decision in Vikram Anantrai Doshi [State of Maharashtra V. Vikram Anantrai Doshi ( 2014 (15) SCC 29 )], this Court distinguished Nikhil Merchant case [Nikhil Merchant V. CBI ( 2008 (9) SCC 677 : 2008 (3) SCC (Cri) 858)] and Narendra Lai Jain case [CBI V. Narendra Lal Jain ( 2014 (5) SCC 364 : 2014 (2) SCC (Cri) 579)] where the compromise was a part of the decree of the court and by which the parties withdrew all allegations against each other. After referring to various case laws under subject in Vikram Anantrai Doshi case, this Court observed that cheating bank exposits fiscal impurity and such financial fraud is an offence against the society at large, in para 26, this Court held as under: (Vikram Anantrai Doshi case, SCC P. 42) 26. Be it stated, that availing of money from a nationalised bank in the manner, as alleged by the investigating agency, vividly exposits fiscal impurity and, in a way, financial fraud. The modus operandi as narrated in the charge-sheet cannot be put in the compartment of an individual or personal wrong. It is a social wrong and it has immense societal impact. It is an accepted principle of handling of finance that whenever there is manipulation and cleverly conceived contrivance to avail of these kind of benefits it cannot be regarded as a case having overwhelmingly and predominantly of civil character. The ultimate victim is the collective. It creates a hazard in the financial interest of the society. The gravity of the offence creates a dent in the economic spine of the nation. The cleverness which has been skillfully contrived, if the allegations are true, has a serious consequence. A crime of this nature, in our view, would definitely fall in the category of offences which travel far ahead of personal or private wrong. It has the potentiality to usher in economic crisis. The cleverness which has been skillfully contrived, if the allegations are true, has a serious consequence. A crime of this nature, in our view, would definitely fall in the category of offences which travel far ahead of personal or private wrong. It has the potentiality to usher in economic crisis. Its implications have its own seriousness, for it creates a concavity in the solemnity that is expected in financial transactions it is not such a case where one can pay the amount and obtain a 'no dues certificate' and enjoy the benefit of quashing of the criminal proceedings on the hypostasis that nothing more remains to be done. The collective interest of which the Court is the guardian cannot be a silent or a mute spectator to allow the proceedings to be withdrawn, or for that matter yield to the ingenuous dexterity of the accused persons to invoke the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution or under Section 482 of the Code and quash the proceeding. It is not legally permissible. The Court is expected to be on guard to these kinds of adroit moves. The High Court, we humble remind, should have dealt with the matter keeping in mind that in these kinds of litigations the accused when perceives a tiny gleam of success, readily invokes the inherent jurisdiction for quashing of the criminal proceeding. The Court's principal duty, at that juncture, should be to scan the entire facts to find out the thrust of allegations and the crux of the settlement. It is the experience of the Judge that comes to his aid and the said experience should be used with care, caution, circumspection and courageous prudence. As we find in the case at hand, the learned Single Judge has not taken pains to scrutinise the entire conspectus of facts in proper perspective and quashed the criminal proceeding. The said quashment neither helps to secure the ends of justice nor does it prevent the abuse of the process of the Court nor can it be also said that as there is a settlement no evidence will come on record and there will be remote chance of conviction. Such a finding in our view would be difficult to record. The said quashment neither helps to secure the ends of justice nor does it prevent the abuse of the process of the Court nor can it be also said that as there is a settlement no evidence will come on record and there will be remote chance of conviction. Such a finding in our view would be difficult to record. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the social interest would be on peril and the prosecuting agency, in these circumstances, cannot be treated as an alien to the whole case. Ergo, we have no other option but to hold that the order of the High Court [Vikram Anantrai Doshi V. State of Maharashtra (Criminal Application No. 2239 of 2009, order dated 22.04.2010 (Bom)] is wholly indefensible." 18. In view of foregoing reasons and also, this Court taking note of the fact that SIT has already been constituted in the matter, it is just and prudent for petitioners to take part in course of investigation of the case. Looking at from any angle, the petition on hand sans merits. In the result, the Petition under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. on hand is dismissed. Interim direction, if any, shall stand vacated.