JUDGMENT Dr. B.R. SARANGI, J.- All the above writ petitions having similar cause of action, have been heard together and are disposed of by this common judgment. For better appreciation, the fact of W.P.(C) No.11117/2015 has been taken into consideration for judgment of all the matters. 2.The petitioner has filed this application seeking for the following reliefs: (i)Direct the opposite party to confirm the petitioner by discontinuing the probation and declaring him confirmed with effect from 27.02.2006. (ii)Direct the opposite party to disburse all financial and service benefits which are attached to the post to which the petitioner has been appointed w.e.f. 27.02.2004. (iii)Direct the opposite party to disburse all financial and service benefits handed at Para 10 and Annexure-6 of this Writ Application w.e.f. 27.02.2004. 3.The petitioner was appointed as Data entry Operator on 26.02.2004 pursuant to advertisement issued on 20.12.2002 vide Annexure-1 by following the procedure of selection by conducting written examination, interview and on proper verification of the certificates. The appointment order under Annexure-2 dated 02.04.2004 indicates that the petitioner was appointed in regular scale of pay of Rs.3050-75-3950-80-4590 with usual D.A. and other allowances as admissible from time to time with effect from the date he joins in his post pursuant to which the petitioner joined the post and discharged his duty against the said post. The advertisement as well as the appointment order indicates that he is entitled to get usual service and financial benefits attached to the post as prescribed by rules and regulations. On the allegation of corruption in purchase of computers and illegal appointments made in the Odisha Legislative Assembly, the State Government appointed Hon’ble Justice C.R. Pal, retired Judge of Orissa High Court as Commission of inquiry under the Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952 to enquire into the following matters and submit his report. (i)The alleged violation of the Recruitment procedure and the illegal and unfair practice adopted in giving appointments and showing favouritism and nepotism by misuse of official position. (ii)Alleged corruption committed in purchase of Computers for the Legislative assembly. (iii)The role, if any, of any authority organization/individual in causing violation of the procedure in making the above alleged appointment and purchase; and (iv)Any other matter connected with or incidental thereto as the Commission may consider appropriate including any suggestions in relation to the above matters. (ii)Alleged corruption committed in purchase of Computers for the Legislative assembly. (iii)The role, if any, of any authority organization/individual in causing violation of the procedure in making the above alleged appointment and purchase; and (iv)Any other matter connected with or incidental thereto as the Commission may consider appropriate including any suggestions in relation to the above matters. The appointment of Commission of Inquiry was challenged by the Speaker of the 12th Orissa Legislative Assembly in W.P. (C) No.905/2007 and this Court vide judgment dated 30.09.2008 passed the following order; “20. In view of the facts and circumstances mentioned above, this Court is of the opinion that since the State Government has no jurisdiction to take any action in the affairs of the State Legislative Assembly and in sub-Section (4) of Section 3 of the Commission of Inquiry Act, it has been provided that the report of the Commission is to be laid before the Legislature of the State together with the memorandum of action taken thereon which is not feasible to be complied with and also the affairs of the State Assembly or its Secretariat have not been enumerated in List II or List III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution and the State Government has not been conferred with the residuary power as has been conferred to the Central Government under Entry 97 of List II, the appointment of the Commission under the Commissions of Inquiry Act in the instant case beyond the jurisdiction of the State Government. We do not mean here that if in the opinion of the Legislature, some wrong has been done, the same should not be enquired into. 21.In the result, the petition is allowed, the impugned notification dated 15th September, 2004 appointing the Commission with retrospective effect, i.e,, with effect from 22nd July, 2004 is held illegal and is accordingly quashed. However, we cannot debar the Legislature to take appropriate action in accordance with law. The Legislature has full jurisdiction to pass resolution and also entrust the enquiry or investigation to any one in their discretion in accordance with law. There shall be no order as to cost. “ The said judgment of this Court has been challenged by the State of Orissa before the apex Court which was registered a PC No.6537/2009 converted into Civil Appeal No.1986 of 2014 which is still pending for consideration. There shall be no order as to cost. “ The said judgment of this Court has been challenged by the State of Orissa before the apex Court which was registered a PC No.6537/2009 converted into Civil Appeal No.1986 of 2014 which is still pending for consideration. During the pendency of the aforesaid Civil Appeal before the apex Court with regard to the legality and propriety of the appointment of Commission of Inquiry and his report, the petitioner has not been paid the financial benefit admissible to the post in terms of appointment under Annexure-2. Hence this application. 4.Mr. R.K. Rath, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the petitioner having been duly selected by proper recruitment process and there being no allegation of any kind against him and his appointment having been made against the sanctioned post, he is entitled to get all the consequential benefits in terms of his appointment under Annexure-2.Though in the meantime 11 years have elapsed, he has not been extended all the benefits attached to his post. It is urged that the petitioner is entitled to get the following service and financial benefits: (i)Service book has not been opened till date. (ii)Annual increment have not been given. (iii)GPF account has not been created for GPF amount as being reduced. (iv)House Rent allowance have not been released, (v)Benefits regards sanction of all types of leave has not been given. (vi)The benefit of revised scale of pay has not been extended under the ORSP Rules, 2008. (vii)No promotion has been given to the petitioner. (viii)The benefit of revised Assured Career Progression (RACP) Scheme has also not been extended even though he has become eligible for it. (ix)None of the increments attached to the post have been given to the petitioner. (x)The benefit of up-gradation since 2009 of scale of pay attached to the post of data entry operator has also not been given to the petitioner because of which persons junior to the petitioner and who have joined after the petitioner are getting higher scale of pay than the petitioner. (xi)The petitioner has been deprived of promotional opportunities to the next post i.e. Assistant Programmer. (xii)In fact the petitioner without any reason is being continued on probation basis. Non-grant of such benefits have caused serious prejudice to the petitioner. (xi)The petitioner has been deprived of promotional opportunities to the next post i.e. Assistant Programmer. (xii)In fact the petitioner without any reason is being continued on probation basis. Non-grant of such benefits have caused serious prejudice to the petitioner. It is further urged that on the plea of pendency of the Civil Appeal before the apex Court which has been filed against the order passed by this Court, the benefits admissible to the petitioner have not been extended. It is urged that the pendency of the said Civil Appeal has no nexus with the benefits claimed by the petitioner in terms of the appointment order under Annexure-2. Non-extension of all the service and financial benefits attached to his post in terms of the order of appointment under Annexure-2 is arbitrary and unreasonable and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is further urged that similarly situated persons, who are juniors to the petitioner, have been extended all the service and financial benefits. 5.Mr. M.K. Verma, learned Counsel for the opposite party refers to paragraphs 4 to 8 of the preliminary counter affidavit which state as follows : “4. That it is further submitted that after his appointment during 12th Assembly period there was allegations of violation of Recruitment Procedure and unfair practice adopted in giving appointments and showing nepotism and favouritism. On the strength of such allegation, the State Government appointed Justice Sri C.R. Pal Commission of Inquiry to inquire into the above allegations vide Parliamentary Affairs Department Notification No.6178/PAD., dated 15.09.2004. 5. That the appointment of Justice Sri C.R. Pal Commission was challenged by Shri Sarat Kumar Kar, Ex-Speaker before the Hon’ble High Court of Orissa in W.P. (C) No.905 of 2007.The Hon’ble Court of Justice Sri I.M. Quddusi and Justice Sri A.K. P:arichha after hearing the matter at length disposed of the writ petition on 30.09.2008 by holding the appointment of Justice Sri C.R.Pal Commission to be illegal and quashed the said notification dated 15th September, 2004. 6.That it is pertinent to mention here that the State Government has preferred on S.L.P. (Civil) No.6537 of 2009 against the order of the Hon’ble High Court passed on 30.09.2008 in the aforesaid Writ Petition and the Hon’ble Apex Court has admitted the S.L.P. and it is pending adjudication. 7.That when the matter stood thus, the Odisha Legislative Assembly Secretariat sought for clarification from the Law Department, Govt. 7.That when the matter stood thus, the Odisha Legislative Assembly Secretariat sought for clarification from the Law Department, Govt. of Odisha as to whether services of the persons appointed during the 12th. Assembly period can be regularized and other service benefits can be allowed. The Law Department offered their views on 24.12.2010 which is annexed by the petitioner in the writ petition as Annexure-5. 8.That in view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the present deponent is unable to regularize the service of the petitioner and release the service benefits to the petitioner. 6.On the basis of the facts pleaded above, it appears that the benefit admissible to the petitioner has not been extended due to pendency of S.L.P. (Civil) No.6537 of 2009 which has been filed by the State of Orissa against the order dated 30.09.2008 passed by this Court in W.P. (C) No.905/2007 by which this Court quashed the notification dated 15.09.2004 holding that the appointment of Commission of inquiry is illegal. Essentially the notification was issued to appoint Hon’ble Justice C.R. Pal, retired Judge of Orissa High Court as Commission of Inquiry which was under challenge before this Court in the aforesaid W.P.(C) No.905/2007.The Commission of Inquiry was appointed to cause an inquiry into the allegation of violation of Recruitment Procedure and unfair practice adopted in giving appointment and showing nepotism and favouritism by misusing official position along with allegation of corruption in purchase of computers. But, the said notification in Annexure-4 dated 15.09.2004 having been quashed by this Court, the same is subject matter of Civil Appeal before the apex Court for consideration. Therefore, the apex Court is in seisin over the matter with regard to the legality and propriety of the judgment dated 30.9.2008 passed by this Court in W.P. (C) No.905/2007 quashing Annexure-4 appointing Hon’ble Justice C.R. Pal as Commission of Inquiry to cause an inquiry into the allegation of violation of Recruitment Procedure and unfair practice adopted in giving appointments and corruption in purchase of computers. In the event the apex Court holds that the judgment passed by this Court is not correct, then the report submitted by the Commission of Inquiry will be taken into consideration. If for any reason the apex Court upholds the judgment of thisw Court then the order quashing the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry vide notification dated 15.09.2004 shall stand confirmed. If for any reason the apex Court upholds the judgment of thisw Court then the order quashing the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry vide notification dated 15.09.2004 shall stand confirmed. In any case, any order passed by the apex Court may not prejudice the petitioner as appointment of the petitioner has not been challenged by any of the parties either before this Court or before the apex Court. As none has assailed the selection of the petitioner who is really “person aggrieved” before any forum, non-extension of the benefits admissible to the petitioner in terms of the appointment order under Annexure-2 amounts to violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. As the juniors to the petitioner have been extended such benefits, the petitioner has been discriminated. 7.In Kathi Raning Rawat v .State of Saurashtra, AIR 1952 SC 123 and Video Electronics Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Punjab, AIR 1990 SC 820 , the apex Court held that “Discrimination” means an unjust, an unfair action in favour of one and against another. It involves an element of intentional and purposeful differentiation and further an element of unfavourable bais; an unfair classification. Discrimination under Article 14 of the Constitution must be conscious and not accidental discrimination that arises from oversight which the State is ready to rectify. 8.In Narmada Bachao Andolan (III) v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2011 SC 1989 , the apex Court has explained the phrase “discrimination”. 9.In Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation v. Subhash Sindhi Co-operative Housing Society Jaipur, AIR 2013 SC 1226 , the apex Court has also explained the scope of discrimination. 10.Mr. R.K. Rath, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner further urged that pay and wages are ‘property’. No one can be deprived of the same except by authority of law. ‘Law’ means law as enacted by State Legislature or Parliament or by a statutory rule enacted under a Statute .to substantiate his contention, reliance has been placed on Madan Mohan Pathak, v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 803 , wherein the apex Court was examining the validity of the Life Insurance Corporation (Modification of Settlement) Act of 1976. The settlement had created a right to bonus in favour of the Class III and Class IV employees of the Corporation and the Act adversely interfered with that settlement. The settlement had created a right to bonus in favour of the Class III and Class IV employees of the Corporation and the Act adversely interfered with that settlement. The question for consideration of the seven-Judge Bench was whether bonus payable under the settlement was ‘property’ within the meaning of Art. 31 (2) and whether stopping payment of bonus amounted to compulsory acquisition of property without payment of compensation. The Court ultimately held that bonus was property and the legislation was bad. In paragraph-30 at page 814, the apex Court held as follows : “It is clear from the scheme of fundamental embodied in Part III of the Constitution that the guarantee of the right to property is contained in Article 19 (1) (f) and Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 31. It stands to reason that ‘property’ cannot have one meaning in Article 19 (1) (f), another in Article 31 Clause (1) and still another in Article 31 Clause (2), ‘Property’ must have the same connotation in all the three Articles and since these are constitutional provisions intended to secure a fundamental right, they must receive the widest interpretation and must be held to refer to property of every kind.” At p. 360 (of SCR) : (at p.821 of AIR) of the Reports, the Court again stated that every form of property, tangible or intangible, including debts and chooses in action constituted property. In this group of cases before us the executive grant or the contract created interest in the petitioners and there is no room to doubt that by such process in favour of the petitioners property right had been created. Similar view has also been taken in M/s. Vij Resins Pvt. Ltd. and another v. State of Jammu & Kashmir and others, AIR 1989 SC 1629 . 11.In Jilubhal Nanbhai Khachar etc. etc. v. State of Gujarat and another, AIR 1995 SC 142 , the validity of the provisions contained in Section 2 of Bombay Land Revenue Code and Land Tenure Abolition Laws (Gujarat Amendment) Act, (8 of 1982) was under consideration. While considering such provision, the apex Court held that right to property under Article 300A is not a basic feature or structure of the Constitution. It is only a constitutional right. While considering such provision, the apex Court held that right to property under Article 300A is not a basic feature or structure of the Constitution. It is only a constitutional right. The Amendment Act having had the protective umbrella of Ninth Schedule habitant under Article 31B, its validity is immune from attack by operation of Article 31A with heading “Right to Property” with marginal note reads thus” ‘“Art. 300A. Persons not to be deprived of property, save by authority of law:;- No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law” which is restoration of Art. 31 (1) of the Constitution.”- 12.Referring to the case of State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose, AIR 1954 SC 92 , the apex Court held that the word ‘deprived’ in Clause (1) of Art. 31 cannot be narrowly construed. The apex Court held that Clause (1) and (2) of Art. 31 dealt with the topic of ‘eminent domain’, the expression ‘taken possession of or ‘acquired’ according to Clause (2) have the same meaning which the word ‘deprived’ used in Clause (1). In other words, both the clauses are concerned with the deprivation of the property, taking possession of or acquired used in clause (2) is referable to deprivation of the property in Clause (1).the word “law” used in Article 300 A must be an Act of Parliament or of State Legislature, a rule or statutory order having force of law. The deprivation of the property shall be only by authority of law, be it an Act of Parliament or State Legislature, but not by executive fiat or an order. Deprivation of property is acquisition or requisition or taken possession of for a public purpose. 13.In M/s. Bisambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan etc. etc. V. State of U.P., AIR 1982 SC 33 wherein in paragraph-41 the apex Court held that the State Government cannot while taking recourse to the executive power of the State under Art. 162, deprive a person of his property. Such power can be exercised only by authority of law and not by a mere executive fiat or order. etc. V. State of U.P., AIR 1982 SC 33 wherein in paragraph-41 the apex Court held that the State Government cannot while taking recourse to the executive power of the State under Art. 162, deprive a person of his property. Such power can be exercised only by authority of law and not by a mere executive fiat or order. It is, therefore, necessarily subject to Art. 300A.Eminent domain, therefore, is a right inherent in every sovereign state to expropriate private property for public purpose without its owner’s consent which inheres in Art. 300A and it would be exercised by the authority of law and not by executive fiat or order. In view of the aforesaid provision the question then is what is the meaning of the word ‘property’ used in Art.300A and whether it is amenable to eminent domain. The word ‘property’ connotes everything which is subject of ownership, corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intangible, visible or invisible, real or personal everything that has an exchangeable value or which goes to make up wealth or estate or status. Property, therefore, within the constitutional protection, denotes group of rights inhering citizen’s relation to physical thing, as right to posses, use and dispose of it in accordance with law. Therefore, the word “property” used in Article 300A must be understood in the context in which the sovereign power of eminent domain is exercised by the State and expropriated the property. Therefore, Art. 300A gets attracted to an acquisition or taking possession of private property, by necessary implication for public purpose, in accordance with law made by the Parliament or of a State Legislature, a rule of statutory order having force of law. Consequently, there is no deprivation without any sanction of law. Deprivation by any other mode is not acquisition or taking possession under Art. 300A in other words, if there is no law, there is no deprivation. 14.The apex Court in Hindustan Times and others v. State of U.P. and another, AIR 2003 SC 250 taking into consideration Sudhir Chandra Sarkar v.Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd., AIR SC 1064 : (1984) 3 SCR 325 held that the pension and gratuity are well-known measures of social security. Therefore, the employer cannot have an absolute discretion not to pay any gratuity even when it is earned. Ltd., AIR SC 1064 : (1984) 3 SCR 325 held that the pension and gratuity are well-known measures of social security. Therefore, the employer cannot have an absolute discretion not to pay any gratuity even when it is earned. The apex Court held that deprivation of the benefit of right to property can be inevitable in accordance with law. The expression “Law” within the meaning of Article 300A would mean a Parliamentary Act or an Act of the State Legislature or a statutory order having the force of law. Therefore, the authority taking recourse to the executive power of the State under Article 162 cannot deprive a person of his property. Such power can be exercised only by authority of law and not by a mere executive fiat or order. Article 162, as is clear from the opening words, is subject to other provisions of the Constitution. It is therefore, necessary subject to Article 300 A. The word “Law” in the context of Article 300 A must mean an Act of Parliament or of a State Legislature, a rule, or a statutory order, having the force of law, that is positive or state made law. Therefore, it can be safely held that non-grant of pay in terms of appointment letter is in violation of Article 300 A of the Constitution of India, which is a constitutional right. The petitioner can only be deprived of such benefit by law enacted by State Legislature or Parliament or by Statutory Rules enacted under the Statute. Nothing has been placed before this Court that benefit admissible to the petitioner pursuant to the terms of appointment has been deprived of pursuant to law made by the State Legislature, Parliament or by Statutory Rules enacted under the Statute. Only contention raised is that by virtue of the notification, a commission of enquiry was appointed, which on being assailed has been set aside by this Court and the said decision has been challenged before the apex Court and is pending for consideration. that ipso facto cannot disentitle the petitioner to enjoy the pay fixed in terms appointment. As it is a ‘property’, the petitioner cannot be deprived of the same except by authority of law. 15.Mr.R.K.Rath, further argued that every employee is entitled to scale of pay attached to the post. that ipso facto cannot disentitle the petitioner to enjoy the pay fixed in terms appointment. As it is a ‘property’, the petitioner cannot be deprived of the same except by authority of law. 15.Mr.R.K.Rath, further argued that every employee is entitled to scale of pay attached to the post. To substantiate his contention, he has relied upon the judgment of the apex Court in Smt. P.Grover v. State of Haryana and another, AIR 1983 SC 1060 , wherein pay in promotional post has been denied to the petitioner. The apex Court held that the petitioner is entitled to be paid the salary of a District Education Officer from the date she was promoted to the post until she retired from service. Similarly in Rama Narain Yadav v. State of Haryana and others, AIR 1993 SC 1170 , the petitioner in the said case was discharging the duty of Deputy Secretary and he was deprived of getting his salary on the scale admissible to the said post. The apex Court held that since the petitioner was discharging the duty, he is entitled to get the scale admissible to the post. 16.In Selva Raj v. Lt. Governor of Island, Port Blair and others, AIR 1999 SC 838 , the appellant had worked in the higher post though temporarily and in an officiating capacity, his salary was to be drawn during the time against the post of Secretary (Scouts) and the said scale of pay was admissible to the appellant even though he was in officiating capacity not in regular promote applying the principle of quantum merit. Since the appellant only worked by holding the post, he is entitled to get such benefit. In view of such position, it is made clear that since the petitioners in the aforesaid cases have been appointed pursuant to the appointment order issued by the opposite party in the scale of pay admissible to the post, they cannot be deprived of getting such benefit merely on the ground of pendency of Civil appeal before the apex Court wherein the validity of notification issued for appointment of a commission of inquiry by the State Government is under challenge. In that view of the matter, this Court is of the view that the petitioners are entitled to get scale of pay admissible to the post as they have been validly appointed and deprivation thereof on a flimsy ground is not permissible. 17.Applying the said law laid down by the apex Court to the present case, if the persons juniors to the petitioner have been extended the regular scale of pay and the petitioner has not been extended such benefit, though working in similar situation with similar nature of post with same scale of pay, non-extension of the benefits as due admissible at par with the juniors amounts to discrimination. The ‘pay’ and ‘wages’ being the property the same cannot be denied by the executive fiat, as the petitioners are protected by ‘law’. Therefore, applying the law laid down by the apex Court mentioned supra, the action of the authority in not extending the benefits to the petitioner in terms of the appointment letter amounts to arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power and quite discriminatory one, therefore violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 18.Consequentially, all the writ petitions are allowed and the opposite parties are directed to extend the benefits admissible to the petitioner in each of the cases in terms of the appointment order under Annexure-2 and work out such benefits within a period of four months from the date of communication of this judgment. Petition allowed.