JUDGMENT : 1. The captioned writ petitions are intrinsically connected and therefore they are disposed of together. The subject matter of the writ petitions is mainly concerning the judgment of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Ernakulam in M.V.A.A. No. 42 of 2011 dated 18.08.2011, by which the Tribunal has directed to grant regular permit to the 6th respondent in W.P.(C) No. 25418 of 2015, subject to settlement of timings. Facts discernible from W.P.(C) No. 25418 of 2015 are recited hereunder for the purpose of disposal of the writ petitions. 2. Petitioner is a permit holder operating on the route Pullu-Thrissur-Thriprayar, with a settled set of timings and a valid permit, evident from Ext.P1. It is contended that, the judgment of the Appellate Tribunal in Appeal No.42 of 2011, directing grant of regular permit, overlaps the notified route and therefore the challenge even though belated is inevitable. Based on Ext.P2 judgment of the Tribunal, 2nd respondent granted permit to the 6th respondent as per Ext.P3 dated 02.02.2012. It is the contention of the petitioner that, the decision was made by the Regional Transport Authority at a time when the law regarding this issue was not declared by this Court. It is urged that, vide the judgment in 'KSRTC, Tvm. v. Regional Transport Authority, Kollam and others' [2013 (2) KHC 278], it was held that: “Merely because a private operator has to traverse on the line of a notified route for 5 kms or for 1.5 kms only is no ground to dispense with the mandate of law. Such an overlapping also cannot be sustained on the ground that it relates to a small town. If such a view of law as propounded by the Full Bench is to be accepted, it is difficult to be applied where a notified route passes through bigger towns where involvement is of 10 to 20 kms within that town. The reasoning of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal to justify the alleged excess overlapping as an inevitable intersection to have access to the town cannot be sustained in view of the categoric pronouncement of the Supreme Court.” 3. Therefore, it is the contention of the petitioner that, the 6th respondent having known about this judicial pronouncement, was keeping silence all the way and it is now understood that 6th respondent is prevailing upon the Secretary of the 2nd respondent for issuance of granted regular permit. Therefore, it is the contention of the petitioner that, the 6th respondent having known about this judicial pronouncement, was keeping silence all the way and it is now understood that 6th respondent is prevailing upon the Secretary of the 2nd respondent for issuance of granted regular permit. According to the petitioner, the permit cannot be issued in view of the judgment in 'KSRTC Tvm. v. RTA, Kollam' (supra). It is also contended that, Ext.P2 judgment rendered by the Tribunal is illegal and therefore liable to be quashed. It is in this backdrop, the above writ petition is filed. 4. W.P.(C) No.37854 of 2015 is also filed challenging the judgment of the Tribunal as well as the consequential order passed by the 2nd respondent granting regular permit to the 3rd respondent [6th respondent in other writ petition]. Contentions are almost similar. However, it is contended by the petitioner therein that, petitioner came to know about the order impugned as per Ext.P1 timing conference proposed to be held on 15.12.2015. Therefore, it is the contention of the petitioner that, there is no delay on the part of the petitioner to challenge Ext.P2 judgment rendered by the Appellate Tribunal. 5. W.P.(C) No.12102 of 2016 is filed by the party respondent in the other two writ petitions, who is the beneficiary of Ext.P2 judgment, seeking direction to the 1st respondent Secretary, R.T.A., Thrissur to issue temporary permit to the petitioner on the route Thriprayar-Thrissur with respect to stage carriage bearing registration No.KL-08/AC- 8686 with the settled set of timings pending, issuance of regular permit, on the basis of Ext.P4 application. 6. When W.P.(C) No.25418 of 2015 was admitted to the files of this Court on 19.08.2015, the issue of permit to the party respondent pursuant to Ext.P3 grant was directed to be kept in abeyance for a period of three weeks , which was being successively extended. However, on 10.12.2015, the interim order granted was modified and directed the 3rd respondent Secretary to settle the timings of the vehicle of the party respondent in the meeting scheduled on 15.12.2015. However, it was directed that the permit shall not be issued without further orders from this Court. 7. However, on 10.12.2015, the interim order granted was modified and directed the 3rd respondent Secretary to settle the timings of the vehicle of the party respondent in the meeting scheduled on 15.12.2015. However, it was directed that the permit shall not be issued without further orders from this Court. 7. The thrust of the contention advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners is that, Ext.P2 judgment of the Tribunal is in violation of Ext.P5 notification dated 14.07.2009, whereby overlapping is permitted only to the extent of 5% or 5 kms. of the total route length, and therefore admittedly, the route length as per the grant of permit to the party respondent is exceeding the permissible limit. That apart, it is contended that, the finding of the Tribunal that the overlapping is mere inevitable intersection and not an objectionable overlapping, is not legally sustainable in view of the law laid down in the judgment in 'KSRTC Tvm. v. RTA, Kollam' (supra), wherein this Court held that no permit can be granted to operate on a notified route or a portion thereof if the scheme prohibits such operation by a private operator and the only exception is where a private operator has to intersect a notified route. That apart, it is also held that, an intersection of a notified route does not amount to traversing or overlapping the notified route because the prohibition imposed, applies to the whole or part of the route on the same line only. It was held in paragraph 6 of the judgment as follows: “6. No permit can be granted to operate on a notified route or a portion thereof if the Scheme prohibits such operation by a private operator and the only exception is where a private operator has to intersect a notified route. An intersection of a notified route does not amount to traversing or overlapping the notified route because the prohibition imposed applies to the whole or part of the route on the same line only. An intersection cuts across the notified route and does not permit traversing the same line of travel on a notified route as held in Karnataka S.R.T.C v. Ashrafulla Khan, 2002 KHC 1150 : 2002 (2) SCC 560 : AIR 2002 SC 629 . An intersection cuts across the notified route and does not permit traversing the same line of travel on a notified route as held in Karnataka S.R.T.C v. Ashrafulla Khan, 2002 KHC 1150 : 2002 (2) SCC 560 : AIR 2002 SC 629 . It has been held therein as follows: “In other words, if the vehicle is to ply on the same line of travel on a notified route, it is an overlapping and if a non-notified route cuts across a notified route for its onward journey, it is an intersection. The expression “intersection” has been employed by this Court only to provide facility to a private operator operating on a non-notified route to continue an onward journey if it cuts across a notified route. It appears that this exception was carried out only to avoid hardships to the travelling public; otherwise a Scheme which is for total exclusion of private operation was held to be untouchable.” The Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision has followed the Constitution Bench decision in Adarsh Travels Bus Service v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1985 KHC 749 : 1985 (4) SCC 557 : AIR 1986 SC 319 which takes note of the earlier divergent views on the point.” 8. Therefore, it is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners in the first among the two writ petitions that, consequent to the pronouncement of law in the above referred case, Ext.P2 judgment of the Tribunal cannot be sustained, and consequentially Ext.P3 grant by the 2nd respondent cannot also be sustained. Learned counsel has also invited my attention to a Larger Bench judgment of this Court in 'Ratheesh v. Regional Transport Authority' [ 2015 (1) KLT 248 (L.B.)], to canvass the proposition that where the grant is in violation of a statutory provision, the right to file revision under Sec.90 of the Motor Vehicles Act or to file writ petition or the writ appeal cannot be denied on the ground of locus standi. Therefore, it is the contention of the petitioners that, Ext.P2 cannot be sustained in view of the authoritative pronouncement made by this Court referred (supra). 9. Therefore, it is the contention of the petitioners that, Ext.P2 cannot be sustained in view of the authoritative pronouncement made by this Court referred (supra). 9. Fourth and fifth respondents, Transport Corporation have filed a statement also supporting the contentions advanced by the petitioners in the two writ petitions and contended that, the judgment of the Tribunal cannot be sustained in view of the excess overlapping approved by the Court in respect of the stage carriage operated by the party respondent. 10. The party respondent has filed a counter affidavit refuting the allegations and statements and claims and demands made by the petitioner. The thrust of the contention is that the judgment of the Tribunal is of the year 2011, whereas, the challenge is only in the year 2015. That apart, it is also contended that, the permit was granted in the year 2012 and the same was also challenged only after three years. That apart, it is contended that, the attempt of the petitioners are to block the issue of regular permit already granted in his favour. It is also urged that, petitioners are only rival operators not entitled to challenge the grant of the permit. The attempt is only with oblique motive, business rivalry and without any bonafides. That apart, it is also contended that, party respondent had filed W.P.(C) No. 20315 of 2015 and secured Ext.R6(a) judgment, whereby the respondent was directed to consider the application filed by the petitioner for issuance of permit on or before 05.10.2015. It is also contended that, it is with due satisfaction of the vehicle of the party respondent that the permit was directed to be issued. It is also contended that, there is no overlapping in excess of the permissible limit. That apart, it is also stated that, after the commencement of Ext.P5 scheme, about 75 permits were granted by the 2nd respondent itself, covering the very same sector as unobjectionable and the petitioner has not cared to challenge any of those proceedings and targeting only the party respondent, absolutely without any bonafides. In order to demonstrate that vehicles are being operated on the very same route with overlapping as that of the party respondent, Exts.R6(c) and R6(d) regular permits issued by the 3rd respondent are produced. 11. In order to demonstrate that vehicles are being operated on the very same route with overlapping as that of the party respondent, Exts.R6(c) and R6(d) regular permits issued by the 3rd respondent are produced. 11. Therefore, it is the contention of the party respondent that he alone cannot be singled out on the basis of the notified scheme. That apart, it is also contended that, petitioners are in no way affected commercially with respect to the settlement of timings and therefore the petitioners have no manner of locus standi to challenge the permit granted to the party respondent. It is also contended that, the sole affected person in terms of Ext.P5 notification is the respondent State Transport Undertaking and the said authority even though a party in Ext.P2 judgment, has not cared to challenge the same. In order to canvass the said proposition, learned counsel has invited my attention to the judgment of the Apex Court in 'Vishundas Hundumal etc. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others' [ AIR 1981 SC 1636 ], wherein the Apex Court has held that certain existing operators are allowed to operate on overlapping portions of notified routes while the petitioners were denied with such facility. That apart, it is held that, while cancelling or curtailing permits of the petitioners, permit holders for routes, parts of which overlapped the notified routes, other permit holders in the same class having stage carriage permits for certain routes parts of which were overlapping with the notified route were treated favourably by neither curtailing nor cancelling of the permits and were permitted to ply their stage carriages by passing over a portion of the notified route, and therefore till such time such overlapping are curtailed by the authorities, petitioners therein were permitted to operate their stage carriages also. 12. Learned counsel has also invited my attention to the judgment of the Apex Court in 'Mithilesh Rani and others v. Regional Transport Authority, Dehradun and others' [1994 KHC 613], wherein in par agraph 14, it was held as follows: “14. x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Another and more important circumstance is that the State Transport Undertaking has not chosen to challenge the grant of permits to the appellants. x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Another and more important circumstance is that the State Transport Undertaking has not chosen to challenge the grant of permits to the appellants. It is only the Respondents 3 and 4 who are operating on a route which partially overlaps the route concerned herein that have chosen to come forward. We are not inclined to entertain the said objection at their instance, more particularly, when a copy of the scheme (s) even has not been filed. This aspect would become relevant if and when the State Transport undertaking objects to the grant of permits to the appellants and the approved scheme or draft scheme, as the case may be, is placed before the Court in support of the said objection. In the present state of facts, we decline to go into the said question.” 13. That apart, learned counsel has invited my attention to the Division Bench judgment of this Court in W.A.No.62 of 2012 dated 24.01.2012 and specifically to paragraph 8 of the judgment, which read thus: “8. That apart, what we notice is, the appellants have no locus standi to challenge the verdict of the Tribunal as well as the judgment of the learned Single Judge in view of the fact that the most important beneficiary of the route, i.e. K.S.R.T.C having not challenged either the order of the Transport Tribunal or the judgment of the learned Single Judge. For this also, the learned counsel appearing for the 3rd respondent relies upon Mithilesh Rani v. Regional Transport Authority, Dehradun [ AIR 1994 SC 2229 ]. It was held in this case, even if a small portion of overlapping of notified route happens if objections are raised by private operators and not by the State Transport, the beneficiary, such objections cannot be entertained. By referring to this AIR 1994 SC 2229 , a Division Bench of this Court, in an unreported decision in W.A.No.319 of 2005 in the case of Biju Scaria v. Regional Transport Authority held that in the absence of the actual affected or prejudiced party not questioning the order of the Tribunal, there was no justification for the outsider to question who is not at all concerned with the rout in question.” 14. Learned counsel has also invited my attention to paragraph 9 also, to canvass the proposition that the appellants have no locus standi to challenge the order of the Tribunal due to the fact that the most important beneficiary of the route, State Transport Corporation has not challenged the judgment. So also, learned counsel has invited my attention to the judgment of this Court in W.P.(C) No.8031 of 2009 dated 31.03.2009 and specifically to paragraph 3, wherein this Court has held that once the appellate Tribunal has directed grant of permit, all that remains to be done is the ministerial act of granting permit and in the meanwhile, if the route has become objectionable the remedy available is to initiate proceedings under Sec.103 read with Rule 242 of the KMV Rules instead of declining grant of permit. 15. That apart, my attention was drawn to the judgment in W.A.No.319 of 2005 dated 23.03.2006, wherein this Court held that only K.S.R.T.C can object grant of permit in the nationalised route if there is violation of the scheme and held as follows: “They have also not challenged the grant of permit to the third respondent. In the above circumstances, we see no ground to interfere with the judgment of the learned Single Judge”. 16. The judgment in W.P.(C) No.18910 of 2012 dated 10.10.2012 was also pressed into service by the counsel for the party respondent, in which K.S.R.T.C is the petitioner and this Court held as follows: “3. The contention raised by the petitioner in this writ petition is that Ext.P3 order was secured behind the back of the petitioner and was passed by the Tribunal in violation of the principles of natural justice. I have perused the records produced by the parties. The reason stated in Ext.P2 order for rejecting the application has nothing to do with the contentions raised by the petitioner in this writ petition. The record does not show that the petitioner had objected the granting of the application. 4. The learned counsel for the 2nd respondent submits that the petitioner did not raise any objection to the grant of the application for extension. If the KSRT Corporation did not raise any objection, it is natural that the petitioner is not made a party in the appeal preferred before the Tribunal. 5. In such circumstances, the contentions raised in the writ petition is without any merit. If the KSRT Corporation did not raise any objection, it is natural that the petitioner is not made a party in the appeal preferred before the Tribunal. 5. In such circumstances, the contentions raised in the writ petition is without any merit. At the same time, this Court finds that if the petitioner is aggrieved by Ext.P3 order, the remedy open to them is to approach the Authority under Section 103 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 103(2) of the Act reads as follows: “(2) For the purpose of giving effect to the approved scheme in respect of a notified area or notified route, the State Transport Authority or, as the case may be, the Regional Transport Authority concerned may, by order, (a) refuse to entertain any application for the grant or renewal of any other permit or reject any such application as may be pending; (b) cancel any existing permit; (c) modify the terms of any existing permit so as to – i. render the permit ineffective beyond a specified date; ii. reduce the number of vehicles authorised to be used under the permit; iii. curtail the area or route covered by the permit in so far as such permit relates to the notified area or notified route.” In the circumstances, the writ petition is disposed of without prejudice to the right of the petitioner to move the Forum under Section 103 of the Motor Vehicles Act, if so advised.” 17. That apart, the judgment in R.P.No.258 of 2013 in W.P.(C) No.3217 of 2012 dated 11.03.2014 is also brought to my notice, in which also the K.S.R.T.C is the review petitioner. Therein, this Court held that there was no necessity for the STAT to have directed the grant of regular permit and that on a perusal of the impugned order of the STAT as well as the judgment of this Court, it is clear that the review petitioner is not without any remedy at all. Thereupon, it was held that, Sec.103 of the Motor Vehicles Act r/w Rule 242 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules clearly stipulates that it shall be open for the State Transport Undertaking to approach the concerned RTA for cancelling any permit granted which overlaps the scheme covered areas at the time of implementation of the scheme. 18. Thereupon, it was held that, Sec.103 of the Motor Vehicles Act r/w Rule 242 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules clearly stipulates that it shall be open for the State Transport Undertaking to approach the concerned RTA for cancelling any permit granted which overlaps the scheme covered areas at the time of implementation of the scheme. 18. Per contra, learned counsel for the petitioners have invited my attention to the judgment of this Court in R.P.No.671 of 2013 in W.P.(C) No.1755 of 2012 dated 10.12.2013 and canvassed the proposition that, when a law is declared by this Court taking into consideration the batch of cases, necessarily that law has to be applied to all the pending writ petitions. That apart, learned counsel contended that the Larger Bench of this Court in the judgment in 'Ratheesh v. RTA' cited (supra), has held that if there is violation of any statutory provision any operator can seek the remedy in accordance with Sec.90 of the Motor Vehicles Act or by filing writ petition or writ appeal before this Court. 19. So also, learned Standing Counsel for the Corporation has invited my attention to the judgment in 'Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v. Ashrafulla Khan and others' [ (2002) 2 SCC 560 ], wherein it was held that road transport service scheme providing for total exclusion of private operators from notified routes is a law, which has to be protected and preserved in public interest and therefore a permit cannot be granted for a non-notified route which overlaps i.e. traverses or covers the same line of travel as a portion of a notified route. Therefore, it is the contention of the counsel that the judgment of the Tribunal cannot be sustained under law. Further, learned counsel has invited my attention to paragraphs 26, 27 and 28, wherein it was held that merely because a private operator has to traverse on the line of a notified route for 5 km or for 1.5 km only is no ground to dispense with the mandate of law and such an overlapping also cannot be sustained on the ground that it relates to a small town. 20. 20. Having heard learned counsel for the petitioners, learned Government Pleader, learned Standing Counsel for the Transport Corporation and the respective counsel appearing for the party respondent, and on perusal of pleadings and the proposition of law laid down by this Court and the Apex Court in the above cited judgments, the question to be considered is whether any interference with the order passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal in M.V.A.A No.42 of 2011 dated 18.08.2011 is necessitated. So far as the overlapping is concerned, even though party respondent has contended that there is no overlapping as contemplated in the scheme, but it is only an inevitable intersection, cannot be sustained at all in view of the law laid down by this Court in the judgment in 'K.S.R.T.C Tvpm. v. R.T.A, Kollam' cited (supra). In which it was held that an inevitable intersection in the context of overlapping is also taken note of under the scheme and the exemption granted includes the same also. Appreciating the judgment of the Tribunal in that manner, it is evident that direction to grant permit to the party respondent exceeding the notified scheme in question, cannot be sustained. 21. However, learned counsel for the party respondent contended that, the judgment of the Tribunal in question is dated 18.08.2011, in which the Transport Corporation was a party but it did not challenge the order of the Tribunal at any point of time and even now. True, the challenge is made almost four years after the judgment and there is considerable delay on the part of the petitioners in challenging the impugned order. However, petitioner in W.P.(C) No.37854 of 2015 has a case that he came to know of Ext.P2 judgment when a timing conference was scheduled on 15.12.2015 by the 2nd respondent, and therefore there is no delay on the part of the said petitioner to challenge the impugned order of the Tribunal. However, learned counsel for the party respondent contended that, pursuant to the impugned judgment, a consequential order is passed by the 2nd respondent dated 02.02.2012, granting permit to the party respondent and therefore, definitely, that would have been known to the operators and the public generally. 22. However, learned counsel for the party respondent contended that, pursuant to the impugned judgment, a consequential order is passed by the 2nd respondent dated 02.02.2012, granting permit to the party respondent and therefore, definitely, that would have been known to the operators and the public generally. 22. Learned counsel has pressed into service the judgment of the Apex Court in 'Vishundas Hundumal' and 'Mithilesh Rani and others' cited (supra) and contended that, the Apex Court has held that till such time all the operators operating through the notified route are terminated, the petitioner therein also is entitled to continue. Taking cue from the proposition of law made by the Apex Court, learned counsel for the party respondent contended that, several vehicles and stage carriages are operating in the notified route with the same set of intersection overlapping the route. Learned counsel has relied on Exts.R6(c) and R6(d) in W.P.(C) No.25418 of 2015 to contend that same are also operators overlapping the very same notified route and therefore unless and until such operators are interdicted from operating from the route, party respondent is also entitled to enjoy the route. That apart, it is contended that, the State Transport Undertaking is the sole aggrieved person and therefore the said authority having not come forward to challenge the impugned order passed by the Tribunal, the party respondents are not at liberty to do so. To the said contention, the Larger Bench judgment of this Court in 'Ratheesh v. R.T.A' (supra) is pressed into service by the learned counsel for the petitioners which held that, if any statutory provisions are violated, any operator can institute appropriate proceedings so as to undo the illegality. Similar is the consideration of a Division Bench of this Court in 'Jaffer P. v. Usman and others' [2015 KHC 947]. But the judgments of the Apex Court in 'Vishundas Hundumal' and 'Mithilesh Rani and others' stated supra were not subject matter of consideration of the Larger Bench and the said judgments were not brought to the notice of the Court also. 23. That apart, learned counsel for the party respondent has a contention that there is inordinate delay in challenging the impugned judgment passed by the Tribunal and therefore the challenge cannot be sustained legally. True, there is a delay of four years in challenging the impugned order. No doubt, the same is unreasonable delay. 23. That apart, learned counsel for the party respondent has a contention that there is inordinate delay in challenging the impugned judgment passed by the Tribunal and therefore the challenge cannot be sustained legally. True, there is a delay of four years in challenging the impugned order. No doubt, the same is unreasonable delay. Since the petitioners are operators existing in the route, it cannot be finally concluded that petitioners were not aware of Ext.P2 order or subsequent grant of permit to the party respondent by the 2nd respondent. Petitioners in the writ petitions have no case that they are aggrieved due to any time clash consequent to the operation of the stage carriage by the party respondent. In the judgment of the Larger Bench, the question considered was with respect to the locus standi of the rival operators to challenge the grant of permit and this Court held that merely because there is a commercial interest, a rival operator cannot challenge a grant, but however, if there is a time clash or violation of any provisions of a statute, they have locus standi. The question with respect to the operation of other vehicles on the route and its consequences thereto was not considered by the Larger Bench. That question was specifically considered by the Apex Court in 'Vishundas Hundumal' (supra) and held in paragraphs 6 and 7 as follows: “6. Conceding that this was discrimination unconsciously indulged into by inadvertence or oversight on the part of a Governmental agency, by this order we only propose to rectify the same and not reject the whole scheme. Such an approach would be destructive of a wholesome effort towards nationalisation of bus transport which is generally undertaken in public interest. When discrimination is glaring the State cannot take recourse to inadvertence in its action resulting in discrimination. The approach is, what is the impact of State action on the fundamental rights of citizen. In this case denial of equal protection is complained of. And this denial of equal protection flows from State action and has a direct impact on the fundamental rights of the petitioners. We, therefore, propose to take a constructive approach by removing the discrimination by putting the present petitioners in the same class as those who have enjoyed favourable treatment by inadvertence on the part of the Regional Transport Authority. 7. We, therefore, propose to take a constructive approach by removing the discrimination by putting the present petitioners in the same class as those who have enjoyed favourable treatment by inadvertence on the part of the Regional Transport Authority. 7. Accordingly, we hereby direct that the order/conditions in permits curtailing the permits of the petitioners prohibiting them from passing over the overlapping portion of their route with the notified route be quashed and declared to be of no consequence till all the operators including those excluded and similarly situated are similarly treated.” 24. So also, my attention is invited to Sec.103 of the Motor Vehicles Act and Rule 242 of the KMV Rules, wherein power is conferred on the statutory authority under subsection 2(iii) to curtail the area or route covered by the permit in so far as such permit relates to the notified area or notified route. That apart, by virtue of Rule 242 of the KMV Rules, the State or Regional Transport Authority is vested with powers to cancel the existing permits after providing an opportunity of hearing to the respective operator. By making reference to the judgment of the Apex Court in 'Vishundas Hundumal' (supra) a Division Bench of this Court held that the respondent Transport Corporation is vested with powers under the Act and the Rules to curtail the permit in the notified route. 25. Taking into account the aforementioned factual circumstances and reckoning the legal situations, I am of the considered opinion that, even if Ext.P2 impugned judgment and the consequential grant of permit to the party respondent is against the provisions of the notified scheme, there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioners in challenging the impugned judgment and the grant of permit. Moreover, the State Transport Corporation has not cared to challenge Ext.P2 order even though it was a party to the proceedings. The State has also not cared to challenge the order of the Tribunal. Therefore, I am of the considered opinion that, the party respondent is entitled to get benefit of the judgment of the Apex Court in 'Vishundas Hundumal' and 'Mithilesh Rani and others' (supra) and entitled to enjoy the benefit of Ext.P2 judgment of the Tribunal and consequential Ext.P3 grant of permit dated 02.02.2012, subject to the liberty of the State Transport Undertaking to invoke Sec.103 of the Act and Rule 242 of the KMV Rules. 26. 26. The upshot of the above discussion is that, I do not find any reason to interfere with Ext.P2 impugned judgment of the Tribunal in M.V.A.A. No. 42 of 2011, and the consequential grant of permit made by the 2nd respondent as per its order dated 02.02.2012, but subject to the observations made above. 27. Resultantly, W.P.(C) Nos. 25418 and 37854 of 2015 are dismissed and W.P.(C) No. 12102 of 2016 [filed by the party respondent in the other writ petitions] is allowed, and there will be a direction to consider Ext.P4 application seeking temporary permit within three weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. The interim order passed in W.P. (C) No. 25418 of 2015 on 10.12.2015 with respect to the settlement of timings is confirmed. Needless to say, consequential action in accordance with the findings rendered above shall be taken by the competent among the 2nd and 3rd respondents, in accordance with law, within a reasonable period.