JUDGMENT : V.K. Bist, J. Prayers in the writ petition are as follows: “(i) Issue a writ, order or direction to set aside the impugned award dated 14.11.2011 passed by learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Haridwar in Adjudication Case No.425 of 2009 (old no.188/2007) Annexure no.1 to the writ petition. (ii) Issue a writ, order or direction to set aside the order dated 24.08.2007 passed by the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Garhwal Region, Dehradun in C.P. Case no.183/2005, referring the matter to the Labour Court, (Annexure no.6 to the writ petition).” 2. The State Government referred the following question to the Labour Court for adjudication: “Whether the termination of the above noted Workman by the Employers was justified or/and legal. If not, the Workman is entitled to get what relief/benefits.” 3. The case put up by the workman before the Labour Court was that he was employed as a daily wager by the employer on 01.02.1983 and he worked upto 30.09.1987. Thereafter, on 01.10.1987, the employer stopped him from working and did not permit him to attend duties. There was no enquiry pending against him. He had worked for more than 240 days in a calendar year and the employer has not followed the provisions of Section 6(N) of the Act and Rule 42 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Rules, 1957. 4. On the other hand, the case of the employer/petitioner is that the workman was engaged on casual basis on the ground of exigency. After 1987, the workman resigned from the service. It was further the case of the petitioner that the department is not an Industry and it is not covered under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. 5. The learned Labour Court accepted the version of the workman that employer deliberately avoided to file copies of muster rolls from 01.02.1983 to 30.09.1987 and drew adverse inference against the employer. The Labour Court observed that no documentary evidence has been filed by the employer and held that the workman has worked for more than 240 days in a year. The Labour Court answered the question in positive and directed to treat the workman in service. 6. I have learned Standing Counsel for the State and have gone through the writ petition and its annexure. 7. In this case, I find that there is delay of about five years. Therefore, first of all, I am dealing the question of delay. 8. 6. I have learned Standing Counsel for the State and have gone through the writ petition and its annexure. 7. In this case, I find that there is delay of about five years. Therefore, first of all, I am dealing the question of delay. 8. In State of Jammu and Kashmir v. R.K. Zalpuri, AIR 2016 SC 3006, Hon’ble Apex Court has held that State claims are not be adjudicated unless non-interference would cause grave injustice. Paragraphs 26, 27 and 28 of the judgment are reproduced below: “26. In the case at hand, the employee was dismissed from service in the year 1999, but he chose not to avail any departmental remedy. He woke up from his slumber to knock at the doors of the High Court after a lapse of five years. The staleness of the claim remained stale and it could not have been allowed to rise like a phoenix by the writ court. 27. The grievance agitated by the respondent did not deserve to be addressed on merits, for doctrine of delay and laches had already visited his claim like the chill of death which does not spare anyone even the one who fosters the idea and nurtures the attitude that he can sleep to avoid death and eventually proclaim “Deo gratias” – “thanks to God”. 28. Another aspect needs to be stated. A writ Court while deciding a writ petition is required to remain alive to the nature of the claim and the unexplained delay on the part of the writ petitioner. Stale claims are not be adjudicated unless non-interference would cause grave injustice. The present case, need less to emphasise, did not justify adjudication. It deserved to be thrown overboard at the very threshold, for the writ petitioner had accepted the order of dismissal for half a decade and cultivated the feeling that he could freeze time and forever remain in the realm of constant present. 9. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649 , has summarized principles applicable to an application for condonation of delay and has also issued guidelines in paragraphs 21 and 22, which are reproduced hereunder:- “21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: 21.1. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: 21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non- pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. 21.2. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation. 21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. 21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. 21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. 21.11. 21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. 21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. 21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. 22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are:- 22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a half hazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. 22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. 22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. 22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non- serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a non-challant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.” 10. In the instant case, the petitioner neither complied with the Award nor availed any remedy against the same for long time. Now, after a period of 5 years, they have approached this Court. There is long delay of five years in filing the writ petition. Delay is not properly explained. Reasons for delay is given in paragraphs 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the writ petition, which is as under:- “16. Now, after a period of 5 years, they have approached this Court. There is long delay of five years in filing the writ petition. Delay is not properly explained. Reasons for delay is given in paragraphs 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the writ petition, which is as under:- “16. That the impugned award dated 14.11.2011 was published on Notice Board on 25.02.2012 and dispatched from the office of learned labour court, Haridwar through letter no.313-15/Labour court, Haridwar, dated 29.02.2012 to the Maneri Bhali, Tunnel Construction Division-2 (stage II) Shaktipuram, Chinyalisaur, Uttarakashi, whereas the said division was disbanded in the year 2009 after the completion of project (II stage) and all the records were transferred to the office of Executive Engineer, Maneri Bhali, Construction Division-1, Joshiyada, Uttarakashi, presently known as Establishment Division, Uttarkashi. Copy of the said letter from the office of Labour court dated 29.02.2012 is marked as Annexure NO.7 to the writ petition. 17. That vide letter dated 2.4.2012 of the Executive Engineer, Maneri Bhali, Construction Division-1 Joshiyada, Uttarkashi, guidelines were sought from the District Government counsel who vide its letter dated 15.4.2012 submitted the opinion. In this connection a copy of the opinion dated 15.04.2012 is being annexed and marked as Annexure No.8 to this writ petition. 18. That pursuant to that the Executive Engineer, Maneri Bhali, Division-1, Joshiyada vide his letter dated 25.04.2012 referred the matter to the higher authorities to secure permission from the Government to file the writ petition challenging the impugned award. Copy of the said letter is annexed and marked as Annexure no.9 to this writ petition. 19. That vide letter dated 20.05.2016 from the Law Department permission was accorded to file the instant writ petition challenging the impugned award. Copy of the letter dated 20.05.2016 is annexed and marked as Annexure No.10 to this writ petition. 20. That thereafter the Chief In-charge and Head of the Department (Legal-Cell) Irrigation Department, Uttarakhand sent a letter dated 01.06.2016 accompanied by the permission letter dated 20.5.2015 to do needful in the run up to the filing of the writ petition, which was received in the office of the Executive Engineer on 06.06.2016. Copy of the said letter dated 0.06.2016 is annexed and marked as Annexure No.11 to the writ petition. The above ground cannot at all be said to be a valid ground. Copy of the said letter dated 0.06.2016 is annexed and marked as Annexure No.11 to the writ petition. The above ground cannot at all be said to be a valid ground. Award was passed by the Labour Court on 14.11.2011 and the same was published on 25.2.2012. The petitioner has not mentioned anything as upto four years, between the period 25.04.2012 and 20.5.2016, the date when the department sent the matter to higher authorities to secure permission from the Government and the date when permission was accorded by the Government, respectively, where the matter was pending. In such circumstances, it is not possible for the Court to ignore huge delay of 5 years. When such petition is filed after a delay, the petitioner is supposed to give each day’s details viz. when the copy of the Award/judgment was received, when the same was sent to the petitioner/department, what further action was taken, what was the reason for delay, etc. Delay, whether it is short or long, must be explained in proper manner. Petitioner is duty bound to explain the reasons for delay. In this case, delay is not short but it is inordinate delay of five years, which is not sufficiently explained. Petitioner slept over the matter for five years. It is not a case where liberal view can be taken for ignoring long delay. It is also not a case where dismissal of the writ petition on the ground of delay would cause grave injustice to the petitioner. 11. Consequently, the writ petition is dismissed on the ground of laches.