JUDGMENT : D.P. CHOUDHURY, J. Challenge has been made to the order dated 18.5.2012 passed by the learned Odisha Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack Bench, Cuttack (hereinafter called ‘the Tribunal’) in O.A. No. 805(C) of 2011 in not granting pensionary benefit under the Orissa Pension Rules, 1992 (hereinafter called ‘the Rules’). 2. The backdrop of the case of the petitioner is that the petitioner is an advocate since 1973. In 1990 he was appointed as an Asst. Public Prosecutor under the Law Officers Rules, 1971 (hereinafter called ‘the Rules, 1971’). Moreover, he was also appointed as Asst. Public Prosecutor in 1995 and worked as such under the aforesaid Rules. Orissa State Prosecution Rules, 1997 came into force on 7.3.1998 (hereinafter called ‘the Rules, 1997’). Accordingly, the petitioner was duly appointed as direct candidate to the post of Public Prosecutor and joined his duty on 13.7.2001. 3. According to the petitioner he was appointed to the post of Public Prosecutor at the age of 50 years and he got superannuation in the year 2001, but unfortunately due to want of 10 years of qualifying service, he was deprived of getting the pension. 4. Under Rule 47(2)(a) of the Rules of the Rules the Government servant shall be entitled to receive full pension after completion of 33 years of qualifying service, but under Rule 47(2)(b) of the Rules only after 10 years he is entitled to receive pension proportionately. The petitioner while retired has only got 7 years, 10 months and 25 days of service in his credit. By virtue of Rule-32, 1/4th of his qualifying service has been added it became 9 years, 10 months and 15 days and as such, falls short of 45 days of qualifying service. But if the practice of petitioner as advocate is taken into consideration definitely he would complete 10 years of required experience to claim pension. Besides, if the services of Asst. Public Prosecutor for the year 1990 and 1995 are included, he is entitled to service of more than 10 years. 5. It is also stated that the petitioner due to shortage of 45 days of qualifying service is deprived of getting pension and in such case the State Government in Finance Department is to come to rescue to count his qualifying service beyond 10 years by relaxing provisions under Rule 114 of the Rules in view of his hardship and to award proportionate pension. Claiming such benefit the petitioner filed the Original Application before the Tribunal and the Tribunal after hearing failed to consider his case accordingly, the petitioner being aggrieved by the direction of the Tribunal preferred the present writ application on the ground that 9 years, 10 months and 15 days should be counted as 10 years and accordingly the tribunal ought to have given direction to the opp. Parties to release the pensionary benefit to the petitioner instead of directing the op. parties to consider the case of the petitioner. 6. Opp. Parties 1 to 3 filed counter affidavit stating that the petitioner is not entitled to the pension although he has worked for 9 years, 10 months and 15 days inasmuch as 10 years is required as qualifying service under the Rules. The contesting opp. Parties admitted that the petitioner was Asst. Public Prosecutor in the year 1990 and 1995 under Rules, 1971. It is stated that Rule-32 of the Rules prescribes three alternatives to add certain period of qualifying service of Government servant and the period which is least has to be applied for extension of qualifying service to receive pension. Those alternatives are as follows:- (a) a period not exceeding one-fourth of the length of service or; (b) the actual period by which age at the time of recruitment exceeds thirty two years or; (c) a period of five years whichever is least. 7. According to the opp. Parties, the petitioner had served for 7 years, 9 months and 25 days as Government Officer and retired on 31.7.2009. It is stated that in view of the aforesaid provision the petitioner is lawfully entitled only 1/4th period of his service as qualifying service to which it be added to the length of his service, on fair calculation of his qualifying service become 9 years, 10 months and 15 days giving short of 45 days to complete 10 years of service so as to get his pension under Rule-42(2)(b) of the Rules. However, under one time relaxation as per the Rules, the Government may relax, but the stipulation of 10 years as appears in Rule-32 of the Rules cannot be reduced to below 10 years which is minimum service required to get proportionate pension. However, under one time relaxation as per the Rules, the Government may relax, but the stipulation of 10 years as appears in Rule-32 of the Rules cannot be reduced to below 10 years which is minimum service required to get proportionate pension. It is also revealed from the counter affidavit that Sri K.C. Pattnaik, a special Public Prosecutor has got 10 years of qualifying service, for which he could be get pension, but his case cannot be compared with the case of the petitioner because Sri Pattnaik had come to claim during his career, whereas the present petitioner filed the request after his superannuation. So, he supports the order of the Tribunal, but prayed to dismiss the writ petition. 8. The main point for consideration is whether the petitioner is entitled to 10 years of qualifying service to get pension? DISCUSSION: 9. It is the admitted fact that the petitioner after 15 years of legal practice had joined the post of Public Prosecutor under Rules, 1997. Before emerging of Rules, 1997, Rule 1971 was working in 1990 and 1995 when the petitioner had served as Asst. Public Prosecutor in some Courts. It is also the admitted fact that the petitioner was duly selected at the age of 50 years and worked up to 2001 when he was superannuated. For better clarification Rule-47(2)(a) and (b) of the Pension Rules is quoted below:- “47. Amount of pension-The amount of pension that may be granted shall be determined by the length of completed six monthly periods of service rendered by the retired Government servant. (2)(a) In the case of a Government servant retiring in accordance with the provisions of the these rules after completing qualifying service of not less than thirty-three years, the amount of pension shall be calculated at 50 percent of the emoluments last drawn preceding to retirement. (2)(a) In the case of a Government servant retiring in accordance with the provisions of the these rules after completing qualifying service of not less than thirty-three years, the amount of pension shall be calculated at 50 percent of the emoluments last drawn preceding to retirement. (b) In the case of a Government servant retiring in accordance with the provisions of these rules before completing qualifying service of thirty-three years, but after completing qualifying service of ten years, the amount of pension shall be proportionate to the amount of pension admissible under Clause (1) and in no case amount of pension shall be less than the minimum amount of pension admissible.” From the aforesaid provision it is clear that for full pension 33 years of qualifying service is necessary, but in the event of retirement after completion of 10 years before completion of 33 years the amount of pension would be made available in proportionate subject to minimum amount of pension admissible. 10. Rule-32 of the Rules enshrines that in exceptional circumstances the qualifying service can be enhanced to certain extent. Sub-Rule (1) of Rule-32 is placed below for better appreciation: “32. Additional to qualifying service in exceptional circumstances-(1) The State Government may, in exceptional circumstances as noted hereunder add to the service of a Government servant for qualifying superannuation pension only not exceeding onefourth of the length of his service or the actual period by which his age at the time of recruitment exceeds thirty-two years or a period of five years whichever is least; (a) the service or post for which post-graduate research or specialist qualification or experience in scientific, technological or professional filed is essential; and (b) to which candidates of more than thirty-two years of age are normally recruited; Provided that this concession shall not be admissible to a Government servant unless his actual qualifying service at the time he quits Government service is not less than ten years.” From the aforesaid provision it is clear that either 1/4th of the service rendered by the petitioner or actual period by which his age at the time of recruitment above 32 years or a period of 5 years whichever is least will be added as qualifying service. In the instant case minimum of service period was added as two years plus some months, but still the minimum pension period falls short of 45 days. 11. In the instant case minimum of service period was added as two years plus some months, but still the minimum pension period falls short of 45 days. 11. It is the admitted fact that the petitioner was appointed as Public Prosecutor having 20 years of experience in the Bar as legal practitioner. Not only this, but also he has experience as Asst. Public Prosecutor in 1990 and 1995. When after rendering the service to people a Public Prosecutor goes without pension because of technicality, the same can be construed as hardship for the petitioner being deprived receiving minimum pension. Rule-114 of the Rules is quoted below:- “114. Power to relax-Where the Governor is satisfied that the operation of any of the provisions of these Rules causes undue hardship in any particular case, he may, by order, for reasons to be recorded in writing, dispense with or relax the requirements of the said provision to such extent and subject to such conditions as he may consider necessary for dealing with the case in a just and equitable manner; Provided that no such order of relaxation shall be made except with the prior consultation of the Finance Department.” 12. In the case of Sterling General Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Planters Airways Pvt. Ltd.; AIR 1975 SC 415 Their Lordships have observed as follows:- “10. The English courts originally took a very strict and narrow view of the words "undue hardship". In Steamship Co. of 1912 etc. v. Indlo-American Grain Co. (1958) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 341 Lord Parkar, C.J. said : "It has been said, over and over again by this Court, that there must be very special circumstances for extending the time. Of course, if a valid claim is barred, there is hardship, but that is not what is provided for by the clause, and before this Court can extend the time they must be satisfied that the hardship amounts in the particular case to undue hardship...........” In Watney, Comba, Raid & Co. v. E. Al. Dower & Co. Ltd. (1956) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 129 at p.131 Lord Goddard, C.J. said : "I desire to say in the clearest possible terms that the mere fact that the claimant is barred cannot be held to be an undue hardship, which is what the section requires to be found by the court before it extends the time. Dower & Co. Ltd. (1956) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 129 at p.131 Lord Goddard, C.J. said : "I desire to say in the clearest possible terms that the mere fact that the claimant is barred cannot be held to be an undue hardship, which is what the section requires to be found by the court before it extends the time. The section does not mean that this Court can take out of the contract the provision which will bar the claim if it is not pursued in time. They have no power to do that. The only thing they have power to do is to extend the time if undue hardship is caused. One can visualize certain cases of undue hardship." 11. In F. E. Hookway & Co. Ltd. v. H. W. H. Hopper & Co.(1950) 2 ALL ER 842 where the buyers made an application for extension of time under S. 16(6) of the English Act of 1934, Denning, L.J. observed that the extent of delay is a relevant circumstance to be considered, that if the delay is not on account of the fault of the buyer, it would no doubt, be an undue hardship on him to hold the clause against him but, if the delay is his own fault, the hardship may not be undue as it may be a hardship which it is due and proper that he should bear. He further said that another relevant circumstance was whether there was evidence of any loss on any sub-contracts and claims by sub-buyers or any complaints by them and if there was evidence of such loss or claims, then the court would take a lenient view of the delay and hold that, notwithstanding it, there was undue hardship on the buyer. 12. In Stanhope Steamship Co. Ltd. v. British Phosphate Commissioners (1956) 2, Llyod’s Rep, Singleton. J., in delivering the judgment said: "What, then, is the meaning of "undue hardship"? "Undue", it is said by Mr. McCrindle, means something which is not merited by the conduct of the claimant. That may be right. If the result of claimant's being perhaps a day late is so oppressive, so burdensome, as to be altogether out of proportion to the fault, I am inclined to think that one may well say that there is undue hardship. Both the amount at stake and the reasons for the delay are material considerations." 13. That may be right. If the result of claimant's being perhaps a day late is so oppressive, so burdensome, as to be altogether out of proportion to the fault, I am inclined to think that one may well say that there is undue hardship. Both the amount at stake and the reasons for the delay are material considerations." 13. In Librarian Shipping etc. v. A King & Sons (1967) 1, ALL ER 934 the facts were these. A vessel was let on a voyage charter party in Centrocon from containing an arbitration clause under which any claim had to be made in writing and the claimant's arbitrator had to be appointed within three months of final discharge. A fire occurred on board the vessel during loading. Both the owners and the charterers had claims against each other. The time limit was to expire on June 26, 1966. The parties were negotiating and, after considerable correspondence, a meeting between both parties was arranged for June 27, 1966 with a view to settlement. The meeting did not result in a settlement. The charterers first realised that time had expired when the owners sought an extension of it by consent, nine days after the expiry. The charterers had not contributed to the delay on the part of the owners in relation to the arbitration clause. The charterers did not consent to the time being extended. The owners applied under s. 27 of the Arbitration Act, 1950, for an extension of time on the ground that "undue hardship" would otherwise be caused to them. Their claim amounted to about £33.000. The master granted an extension of time, but on appeal the judge refused it. On further appeal the court by a majority said that if the time were not extended undue hardship would be caused to the owners since they would be deprived of what might be a valid claim for £ 33,000 by a delay of only a few days due to excusable inadvertence, that the charterers would not in any way be prejudiced by time being extended and so the court would exercise the discretion conferred by s. 27 of the Arbitration Act, 1950, and would extend the time. In the course of his judgment Lord Denning, M. R. observed that in the past the courts had been inclined to emphasize the word "undue" and to say that if a man does not read the contract and is a day or two late, it is a "hardship": but it is not an "undue hardship", because, it is his own fault but that the interpretation was narrow. He said that these time-limit clauses used to operate most unjustly on claimants for, they found their claim barred by some oversight and it was to avoid that injustice the legislature intervened so as to enable the courts to extend the time whenever "in the circumstances of the case undue hardship would otherwise be caused". He also said that the word "undue" in the context simply means excessive hardship greater than the circumstances warrant and that even if a claimant has been at fault himself, it is an undue hardship on him if the consequences are out of proportion to his fault. He further stated that even if a claimant makes a mistake which is excusable, and is in consequence a few days out of time, then if there is no prejudice to the other side, it would be altogether too harsh to deprive him of all chance for ever of coming and making his claim and that is all the more so, if the mistake is contributed or shared by the other side. He, then observed: "It was said that this was a matter for the Judge's discretion. True enough. We have, however, said time and again that we will interfere with a Judge's discretion if satisfied that the discretion was wrongly exercised. In any case the judge was not exercising an unfettered discretion. He felt himself fettered by the trend of the authorities to give the words "undue hardship" a narrow meaning. I think that we should reverse that trend and give the words their ordinary meaning, as Parliament intended. It would be "undue hardship" on the owners to hold them barred by the clause." In the same case, Salmon, L.J. said that the arbitration clause put it out of the power of the court to grant any relief to a claimant who had allowed a few days to run beyond the period specified in the clause even although the delay could have caused no conceivable harm to the other side. He said that it would be hard and unjust if a man with a perfectly good claim for thousands of pounds worth of damage for breach of contract inadvertently allowed a day or two to go by was deprived of the right to be compensated for the loss which he had suffered, even though the other party had not been in any way affected by the delay and might perhaps have been guilty of a deliberate breach of contract and that it was to remedy this hardship and injustice that the legislature intervened to alter the Law. He further said "This enactment was a beneficent reform, liberalising the law in an admittedly narrow sector of the commercial field. I have heard it said that when people have spent their lives in chains and the shackles are eventually struck off, they cannot believe that their claims are no longer there. They still feel bound by the shackles to which they have so long been accustomed. To my mind, that factor may explain the court's approach in some of the cases to the problem with which we are now faced. He then summed up his conclusion as follows: "In considering this question the court must take all the relevant circumstances of the case into account; the degree of blameworthiness of the claimants in failing to appoint an arbitrator within the time; the amount at stake, the length of the delay; whether the claimants have been misled, whether through some circumstances beyond their control it was impossible for them to appoint an arbitrator in time. In the last two circumstances which I have mentioned, which do not arise here, it is obvious that normally the power would be exercised; but those are not the only circumstances and they are not, to my mind, necessary circumstances for the exercise of the power to extend time. I do not intend to catalogue the circumstances to be taken into account, but one very important circumstance is whether there is any possibility of the other side having been prejudiced by the delay. Of course, if there is such a possibility, it might be said that it is no undue hardship on the owners to refuse an extension of time because, if the hardship is lifted from their shoulders, some hardship will fall on the shoulders of the charterers, and after all, the delay is the owners' fault. Of course, if there is such a possibility, it might be said that it is no undue hardship on the owners to refuse an extension of time because, if the hardship is lifted from their shoulders, some hardship will fall on the shoulders of the charterers, and after all, the delay is the owners' fault. 14. Therefore, we will have to take a liberal view of the meaning of the words "undue hardship." "Undue" must mean something which is not merited by the conduct of the claimant, or is very much disproportionate to it. 15. Keeping in view these principles, it has to be seen whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, there was reasonable and sufficient ground for not preferring the claim to arbitration within the time specified in clause 12 of the policy and whether there would be "undue hardship" to the respondent if time is not extended.” 13. In the aforesaid decision the English Courts as well as the Hon’ble Apex Court have been pleased to observe that ‘undue’ means which is not merited, but hardship where the person is so burdensome or onerous to meet such merit. Therefore, the liberal view of the meaning of word ‘undue hardship’ has to be taken and it will depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. It is reported in AIR 1994 SC 923 ; S. Vasudeva v. State of Karnataka and others at page 943 where Their Lordships observed as follows:- “Under Indian conditions the expression "undue hardship" is normally related to economic hardship. That is why from time to time many holders of lands in excess of the ceiling limit, while claiming exemption under clause (b) put forth their bad economic condition and indebtedness to claim exemption along with permission to sell such excess lands…….” Xx xxxxxxxx “22. In view of our conclusion as above, it is not necessary to go into the further question, viz., if the State Government has such power, in which circumstances it can be exercised and whether financial hardship such as the indebtedness of the land-holder is sufficient to warrant such exemption or not and with respect to which date such indebtedness is to be assessed and in what manner, and whether in the present case, the said aspects of the indebtedness were investigated or properly investigated or not. For this very reason, we also do not propose to go into the other question regarding the mala fides on the part of the authorities while granting permission to the firm to sell the land to the builders in question.” With due respect to the aforesaid decision, we are of the view that in the above cited decision the Urban Land (Ceiling Regulation) Act was analyzed with regard to Section 20(1)(b) of the said Act. In the said decision the factual matrix are that the land holder claims to retain the excess land on the ground of ‘undue hardship’. There the Hon’ble Apex Court interpreted ‘undue hardship’ purportedly that undue hardship must be read while evaluating the object of the statute. If ‘undue hardship’ in a statute like Urban Land (Ceiling Regulation) Act, 1976 is obstructed by showing the financial difficulty or indebtedness of the land holder, then the purpose of the Act will not be fulfilled. But at the same time Their Lordships have clearly observed that ‘undue hardship’ is a ground for exemption of retaining excess land so as to meet the debts incurred or fetch money by sale of same. So, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that ‘undue hardship’ relates to financial liability, but it must be read with the object and reason of the statute in which it occurs to construe liberally. So the word ‘undue hardship’ is to be interpreted by taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of each case and there is no straight jacket formulae to construe the ‘undue hardship’. 14. Now adverting to the present case. Under Rule 114 of the Rules the power lies with His Excellency the Governor to relax any provision with prior consultation of the Finance Department. Here the fact and circumstances of the case are clear that only for 45 days short from 10 years the petitioner is deprived of receiving pension under Rule 47(2)(b) of the Rules. But it must be remembered that the petitioner was appointed at the age of 50 years and the fact that he was working in1990 and 1995 as Asst. Public Prosecutor. Not only this, but also 20 years of the legal practice of the petitioner must be taken into consideration to relax Rule 47(2)(b) of the Rules so as to award pension to the petitioner. Public Prosecutor. Not only this, but also 20 years of the legal practice of the petitioner must be taken into consideration to relax Rule 47(2)(b) of the Rules so as to award pension to the petitioner. The object of this Rule is to award pension to the employees of the State Government and if at all for the technicalities the provisions are not relaxed, that will not subserve justice with proper perspective. If the petitioner would not be allowed to relax the provisions of the Rules, he will go without any pension being received and there would be financial hardship for him to carry on day to day affair. On the other hand the person who has worked for an organization should not be deprived of getting pension on mere shortage of 45 days. It is apt to cite the decision reported in State of Punjab and another Vs. Brijeshwar Singh Chahal and another: (2016) 6 SCC 1 where Their Lordships observed as follows:- “49. The question is what should be the mechanism for such consideration. There are in that regard two major aspects that need to be kept in mind. 49.1 The first is the need for assessment and requirement of the State Governments having regard to the workload in different courts. As noticed earlier, appointments appear to have been made without any realistic assessment of the need for State counsel at different levels. Absence of a proper assessment of the requirement for State counsel leads to situations that have been adversely commented upon by the CAG in his report to which we have made a reference in the earlier part of this judgment. The problem gets compounded by those in power adding to the strength of government advocates not because they are required but because such appointments serve the object of appeasement or private benevolence shown to those who qualify for the same. The CAG has in that view rightly observed that there ought to be a proper assessment of the need before such appointments are made. 49.2. The second aspect is about the process of selection and assessment of merit of the candidates by a credible process. This process can be primarily left to the State Government who can appoint a Committee of officers to carry out the same. 49.2. The second aspect is about the process of selection and assessment of merit of the candidates by a credible process. This process can be primarily left to the State Government who can appoint a Committee of officers to carry out the same. It will be useful if the Committee of officers has the Secretary to Government, Law Department, who is generally a judicial officer on deputation with the Government as its Member-Secretary. The Committee can even invite applications from eligible candidates for different positions. The conditions of eligibility for appointment can be left to the Government or the Committee depending upon the nature and the extent of work which the appointees may be effected to handle. The process and selection of appointment would be fair and reasonable, transparent and credible if the Government or the Committee as the case may be also stipulates the norms for assessment of merit and suitability. 50. The third stage of the process of selection and appointment shall in the absence of any statutory provisions regulating such appointments involve consultation with the District & Sessions Judge if the appointment is at the district level and the High Court if the appointment is for cases conducted before the High Court. It would, in our opinion, be appropriate and in keeping with the demands of transparency, objectivity and fairness if after assessment and finalization of the selection process a panel is sent to the Chief Justice of the High Court concerned for his views on the subject. The Chief Justice could constitute a Committee of Judges to review the names recommended for appointment and offer his views in regard to professional competence and suitability of candidates for such appointments. Appointments made after such a consultative process would inspire confidence and prevent any arbitrariness. The same procedure could be followed where candidates are granted extension in their terms of appointment in which case the Committee appointed by the Government and that constituted by the Chief Justice could also look into the performance of the candidates during the period they have worked as State Counsel”. 15. With due respect to the said decision, it is made clear that the appointment of the Government Counsel including the Public Prosecutor should be fair, transparent and rigorous so that the objectivity of the prosecution system of State would be more achieved. 15. With due respect to the said decision, it is made clear that the appointment of the Government Counsel including the Public Prosecutor should be fair, transparent and rigorous so that the objectivity of the prosecution system of State would be more achieved. On the other hand, the service condition of the Prosecutor or the Government Counsel as the case may be should be more alluring so that the meritorious and intelligent people would apply and in a fair manner their selection could be made. If a Prosecutor after entering to the Government service at the age of 35 years or above will have no retiral benefits, then competent Advocates will not apply for selection so as to allow the selection process to be more fair and transparent. In order to attract the meritorious and competent candidates to the post of Assistant Public Prosecutor, Additional Public Prosecutor, Public Prosecutor, Government Pleader or Additional Government Pleader as the case may be, the rules governing their recruitment and service condition must be attractive and comfortable so that they will defend the State in proper befitting manner. In the OSPS Rules there is direct recruitment to the cadre of Prosecutors after the age of 35 years or 45 years as the case may be but there is no any Pension Scheme so as to attract such service for the competent persons who are esteemed very high in the society and their role also is equally important in justice delivery system. Keeping in mind of the importance of the job, we hope and trust that State Government should take steps to amend the OSPS Rule so as to keep the pensionary provisions in the Rule so that the prosecutors will not face problem because of their short span of service in the cadre. At the same time, we also request the State Government to consider if the age of superannuation of the Public Prosecutors is raised to 65 years so that the term of minimum 10 years to get minimum pension would not arise and the Prosecutors when getting more experience could be able to deliver excellent service by participating in the justice delivery system. It is, of course, the State Government to consider such matters seriously keeping in view that the Advocates are entering to the prosecution service as a professional person like doctors whose age has been also increased to 65 years because of their profession. We do not mean to compare service conditions of each cadre but keeping in mind of the professional efficiency and requirement of the State for better improvement in the justice delivery system, the Prosecutors role should be equally magnified. Of course, as long as the OSPS Rule has not been amended, the Odisha Pension Rules would apply but the relaxation under Rule 114 should be liberal keeping in mind the importance of the service of Government Counsel or the Prosecutor as enumerated by Hon’ble Apex Court and the years of legal profession they have already rendered before coming into service. 16. Relevant portions of the impugned order are as follows:- “5. Heard learned standing counsel. He bases his case on the counter and submits that even if Rule32 of the OCS (Pension) Rules, 1992 is applied, the applicant will not be eligible for pension as he does not complete the prescribed minimum ten years qualifying service for being eligible for pension as he falls short of such ten years qualifying service by 45 days. He also submits that Rule 114 of the OCS (Pension) Rules, 1992 is an exceptional clause to be applied in cases which result in undue hardship and in case of the applicant no such undue hardship of the applicant has been brought on record. As regards reappointment of Special Public Prosecutor. Vigilance, Learned standing counsel has no instructions. 6. After hearing both parties, it is apparent that as per Rule 32 and Rule-114 and Rule 47 the applicant cannot be entitled to pension as he has not completed the prescribed ten years of minimum qualifying service and no undue hardship is apparent. However, the Government i.e., Respondent no.1, is at liberty to make such provision for pension by reducing the period of the minimum qualifying service for allowing such pension to members of the Orissa State Prosecution Service created in 1997 to ensure high level of integrity and competence among such personnel who are recruited after a rigorous screening process by the OPSC after a number of years of practice at the bar. Such decisions, if any be taken within a period of six months from the date of filing of this case.” 17. In terms of our observation in the above paragraphs there is ‘undue hardship’ on the part of the petitioner for which there is necessity to exercise the power under Rule 114 of the Rules to relax Rule 47(2)(b) of the Rules. On the other hand the Tribunal failed to understand real import of Rule-114 of the Rules. The Tribunal has only suggested that the service of the Public Prosecutor being in high esteem, the year of service to receive minimum pension should be reduced is meaningless unless the petitioner is awarded justice accordingly. We are, therefore, of the view that it is a fit case where considering the ‘undue hardship’ the case of the petitioner should be resolved by relaxing the provisions of the Rules as per Rule-114 of the Rules. The point for consideration is disposed of accordingly. CONCLUSION: 18. From the foregoing discussions we are of the view that Rule-47(2)(b) of the Rules entitling the pensioner to receive pension if he works for 10 years be relaxed in the present facts and circumstances of the case where the past experience of the petitioner as Asst. Public Prosecutor and legal practitioner should be added to fill up the gap of 45 days short of 10 years required to get minimum pension. We, therefore, direct the State Government to place the matter before His Excellency the Governor for consideration of relaxation of Rule-47(2)(b) as per Rule-114 of the Rules. We hope and trust that the concerned authorities would consider the undue hardship for compliance of the provisions of the aforesaid Rules, particularly Rule-47(2)(b) of the Rules and direct the Finance Department to opine accordingly when consultation would be made by His Excellency, the Governor with the Finance Department. The exercise should be made within a period of four weeks from today. The order of the Tribunal is liable to be quashed and we do so. The writ application is disposed of accordingly.