JUDGMENT : U.C. Dhyani, J. By means of the present writ petitions, the petitioners seek following reliefs, among others: “(A) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the order dated 19.10.2012 passed by Estate Officer, Meerut Cantt. in Case No. Estate/PPE/UA/11/2011 (Annexure No. 5 to the petition). (B) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the Judgment & Order dated 07.08.2015 passed by 4th Additional District Judge, Dehradun in PP Appeal No. 168 of 2012 (Annexure No. 8 to the petition). (C) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondent authorities not to demolish the shop of the petitioner and not to evict him from his shop.” (2) Since the factual matrix of the aforesaid writ petitions is the same, therefore, they are being decided together by this common judgment and order for the sake of brevity and convenience. (3) Writ Petition no. 2401 (M/S) of 2015 will be the leading case. These are the writ petitions relating to the U.P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. (4) It is the submission of learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners that no evidence has been led by the parties, as is evident from Annexure–9, which are certified copies of the order-sheet of the proceedings before the Estate Officer. The following is the extract of show cause notice given to the petitioner of Writ Petition no. 2401 (M/S) of 2015. Similar show cause notices were given to the other petitioners also: “The Officiating Commandant President’s Bodyguard complaint that Shri Harish S/o Sh. Kishan Lal has made unauthorised construction in Revenue Survey no. 1 to 187 classified as B-3 land in Dehradun and has raised unauthorized construction thereon. The said property is leased to the President’s Bodyguard (PBG) belongs to Government of India, Ministry of Defence and has been placed under the management of DEO, Meerut Circle, Meerut Cantt. So prima facie it appears to be an encroachment on a Public Premises and the construction thereon appears to illegal made on the said Public Premise. Hence, a notice under Sub-section (2) Section 5-A of the Public Premises (Eviction of unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 be issued to Sh. Harish S/o Sh. So prima facie it appears to be an encroachment on a Public Premises and the construction thereon appears to illegal made on the said Public Premise. Hence, a notice under Sub-section (2) Section 5-A of the Public Premises (Eviction of unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 be issued to Sh. Harish S/o Sh. Kishan Lal Shop-3, Rajpur Road, Near Purani Chungi, Dehradun requiring him to demolish the unauthorized construction before 07.07.2011 or to show cause why the building should not be removed.” (5) Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners drew the attention of this Court towards sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 to the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Rules 1971, which has also been reproduced herein for convenience: “5………………………… (2) The estate officer shall record the summary of the evidence tendered before him. The summary of such evidence and any relevant documents filed before him shall form part of the records of the proceedings.” The Rule therefore says that the Estate Officer shall record the summary of the evidence tendered before him. The summary of such evidence and any relevant documents filed before him shall form part of the records of the proceedings, which is going before him. (6) It is also the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners that the Estate Officer was adjudicating important civil rights, not only between the petitioner and respondent no. 2, but also with respondent no. 3, which is a statutory corporation claiming the same to be its property. The property in question is being claimed by respondent no. 3, who says that the said property was leased out to respondent no. 2. (7) Although, the show cause notices given to the petitioners are admitted to them, but, according to learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, the documents filed in support of the same, which were relied in the impugned order, were not received by the petitioners. Learned counsel for respondent nos. 1 and 2 submitted that these documents were part of complaint filed before the Estate Officer. (8) The Grounds of appeal taken by the appellant (petitioner Harish Kumar herein) in P.P. Appeal no. 268 of 2012, and other appellants in their separate P.P. appeals, before the learned lower appellate court are exactly identical. Learned counsel for respondent nos. 1 and 2 submitted that these documents were part of complaint filed before the Estate Officer. (8) The Grounds of appeal taken by the appellant (petitioner Harish Kumar herein) in P.P. Appeal no. 268 of 2012, and other appellants in their separate P.P. appeals, before the learned lower appellate court are exactly identical. The same are reproduced here-in-below for convenience: That the order impugned was passed without affording opportunity of hearing and adducing evidence to the appellant and was fixed for hearing and the order impugned was passed only on the statements and on the basis of documents of the respondent. That appellant/his parokar used to remain regularly present on the dates fixed in the case but he has not been afforded any opportunity to adduce documentary and oral evidence and to argue his case and the entire proceeding was done in a cursory manner. That in the situation of not adducing oral evidence by the respondent, it was essential and in the interest of justice that the appellant/opposite party should be given opportunity to file cross objection/evidence. That the order impugned was passed on behalf of the respondent without adducing any evidence or proving any documentary evidence. No due care has been taken in respect of the answer presented by the appellant. That the respondent in any case has to prove his case by producing documentary evidence and adducing evidence which was not done by him, and no inference can be drawn on said alleged documents. (9) Vide orders of different dates, learned 4th Additional District Judge, Dehradun dismissed separate P.P. Appeals filed by the appellants (petitioners herein), affirming the order dated 19.10.2012 passed by the Estate Officer. Hence, present writ petitions. (10) The petitioners owe their allegiance to Nagar Nigam and submit that the shops, which are being occupied by them, are on lease from the Nagar Nigam/respondent no. 3. Respondent no. 3 has issued rent receipt to the petitioners in respect of the shops in question. (11) Reliance has been placed upon a decision rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in State of U.P. and Another vs. Zia Khan, 1998 (8) SCC 483 . Paras 2 & 3 are important in the present context and the same are being reproduced herein below for convenience: “2. (11) Reliance has been placed upon a decision rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in State of U.P. and Another vs. Zia Khan, 1998 (8) SCC 483 . Paras 2 & 3 are important in the present context and the same are being reproduced herein below for convenience: “2. The respondent, Zia Khan, was undeniably in possession of a small parcel of land admeasuring 11 bighas and 2 biswas described as “grove”. He was sought to be evicted there from by employing the U.P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972. When the orders went against him, he filed a civil suit for declaration of his title as becoming the Sirdar of the land in dispute. His plaint was rejected on the principles of Section 10 of the Act putting a bar for continuation of the suit. His first appeal failed. The High Court however came to his rescue in second appeal in upsetting the orders of the courts below and effecting a remand for the trial of the suit on merit. This has been questioned herein by the State. 3. It cannot be disputed that the question of title cannot be decided under the U.P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972 and the decision on the subject had either to be made by the revenue court or the civil court, as the case may be. Here, the High Court has asserted that principle in coming to the rescue of the respondent. Having gone through the judgment of the High Court carefully, we find no ground to differ from the view taken. The order of the High Court must therefore sustain. The appeal is consequentially dismissed. No costs.” (12) Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners reiterated that once title dispute was raised, the Estate Officer should not have decided the matter and further, the matter ought to have been decided on the basis of evidence and relevant documents, although summarily. (13) In order to buttress the arguments, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners further relied upon para 49 of a decision rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in New India Assurance Company Ltd. vs. Nusli Neville Wadia & another, (2008) 3 SCC 279 . The said para reads as below: “Section 5 of the 1971 Act, on a plain reading, would place the entire onus upon a notice. The said para reads as below: “Section 5 of the 1971 Act, on a plain reading, would place the entire onus upon a notice. It, in no uncertain terms, states that once a notice under Section 4 of the said Act is issued by the Estate Officer on formation of his opinion as envisaged therein it is for the notice not only to show cause in respect thereof but also adduce evidence and make oral submissions in support of his case. Literal meaning in a situation of this nature would lead to a conclusion that the landlord is not required to adduce any evidence at all nor is it required even to make any oral submissions. Such a literal construction would lead to an anomalous situation because the landlord may not be heard at all. It may not even be permitted to adduce any evidence in rebuttal to the one adduced by the notice nor it would be permitted to advance any argument. This is contemplated in law. When a landlord files an application, it in a given situation must be able to lead evidence either at the first instance or after the evidence is led by the notice to establish its case and/ or in rebuttal to the evidence led by the notice”. (14) Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent nos. 1 & 2 would submit that the respondent no. 3 has not filed any appeal against the order of the Estate Officer and, therefore, they are barred by the principle of estoppel to assert their claim over the shop in question. (15) Hon’ble Apex Court in paras no. 20, 21, 22 and 23 of the judgment rendered in M. Nagabhushana vs State of Karnataka and others, (2011) 3 SCC 408 , has observed as under: 20. This Court in AIMO case explained in clear terms that principle behind the doctrine of res judicata is to prevent an abuse of the process of court. 20, 21, 22 and 23 of the judgment rendered in M. Nagabhushana vs State of Karnataka and others, (2011) 3 SCC 408 , has observed as under: 20. This Court in AIMO case explained in clear terms that principle behind the doctrine of res judicata is to prevent an abuse of the process of court. In explaining the said principle the Bench in AIMO case relied on the following formulation of Somervell, L.J. in Greenhalgh v. Mallard (All ER p. 257 H): (AIMO case, SCC p. 700, para 39) “39………’I think that on the authorities to which I will refer it would be accurate to say that res judicata for this purpose is not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide, but that it covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject-matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them.’” The Bench in AIMO case also noted that the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Greenhalgh was approved by this Court in State of U.P. v. Nawab Hussain, SCC at p. 809, para 4. 21. Following all these principles a Constitution Bench of this Court in Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers’ Assn. V. State of Maharashtra laid down the following principles : (SCC p. 741, para 35) “35…….. an adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to the actual matter determined but as to every other matter which the parties might and ought to have litigated and have had decided as incidental to or essentially connected with subject-matter of the litigation and every matter coming into the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect of the matters of claim and defence. Thus, the principle of constructive res judicata underlying Explanation IV of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure was applied to writ case. We, accordingly hold that the writ case is fit to be dismissed on the ground of res judicata.” 22. In view of such authoritative pronouncement of the Constitution Bench of this Court, there can be no doubt that the principles of constructive res judicata, as explained in Explanation IV to Section 11 CPC, are also applicable to writ petitions. 23. We, accordingly hold that the writ case is fit to be dismissed on the ground of res judicata.” 22. In view of such authoritative pronouncement of the Constitution Bench of this Court, there can be no doubt that the principles of constructive res judicata, as explained in Explanation IV to Section 11 CPC, are also applicable to writ petitions. 23. Thus, the attempt to re-argue the case which has been finally decided by the court of last resort is a clear abuse of process of the court, regardless of the principles of res judicata, as has been held by this Court in K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi. In SCC para 44 of the Report, this principle has been very lucidly discussed by this Court and the relevant portions whereof are extracted below: (SCC p. 592) “44. One of the examples cited as an abuse of the process of the court is relitigation. It is an abuse of the process of the court and contrary to justice and public policy for a party to relitigate the same issue which has already been tried and decided earlier against him. The reagitation may or may not be barred as res judicata.” (16) Further, learned counsel for the respondent nos. 1 & 2 read over paras 17 & 18 of the Appellate Court’s judgment in the open Court to suggest that the shops in question is the property of President Bodyguard. The same are reproduced here-in-below: “17. So far as the ownership of the property in question is concerned, viz., whether the land belongs to President Bodyguard or the Municipality, on such subject merely letter dated 30.12.1998 written by S.D.M., Dehradun addressed to the District Magistrate, Dehradun and copy of the letter dated 04.03.1997, written by the District Magistrate, Dehradun was filed by the Municipal Corporation on the record; both the documents are just letters and not the certificates and the administrative correspondence does not come in the category of the evidence. So far as Annexure 1, document no. 41 presented by the Municipality is concerned, in column 2 of said document, the name of the village in respect of which the property belongs, bodyguard and toll barrier is indicated, meaning thereby, that the property in question belongs to Bodyguard Estate and over which the toll barrier of the Municipality was installed. 18. 41 presented by the Municipality is concerned, in column 2 of said document, the name of the village in respect of which the property belongs, bodyguard and toll barrier is indicated, meaning thereby, that the property in question belongs to Bodyguard Estate and over which the toll barrier of the Municipality was installed. 18. So far as the question of evidence adduce by the President Bodyguard is concerned, they have filed – document no. 3, cite plan of the property in question 4, revenue plan 5, copy of register of Army land, map of the land of President Bodyguard 21 and certificate of Tehsildar 22 on record. In all these documents, the property is said to have been of President Bodyguard. Tehsildar, Dehradun has also stated that the land belongs to Army department. In this way, the documents which were filed by the President Bodyguard before the Estate Officer, in all those documents, the land in question is said to have been of the President Bodyguard. Tehsildar, Dehradun has also issued certificate in favour of President Bodyguard stating therein that the land belongs to it.” (17) Learned counsel for the respondent nos. 1 and 2, therefore, argued that there is no occasion to interfere with the judgment rendered by the Lower Appellate Court. (18) Learned counsel for the respondent nos. 1 & 2 placed reliance upon the register of Nazul of Doon Municipality, which was produced by the Nagar Nigam before the Estate Officer that the village, in which the property has been shown, belongs to Bodyguard Toll Barrier. (19) Learned counsel for the respondent nos. 1 & 2 also submits that there are concurrent findings of the Estate Officer as well as Lower Appellate Court and, therefore, there is no occasion to disbelieve their version. (20) It is also submitted on behalf of respondent nos. 1 & 2 that once the notice has been issued by respondent nos. 1 & 2 to the notice petitioners, the entire burden is on the notice to show that they are not unauthorized occupants. (21) Learned counsel for the respondent nos. 1 & 2 drew the attention of this Court towards Section 4 of the Act which has also been reproduced herein for convenience: “4. 1 & 2 to the notice petitioners, the entire burden is on the notice to show that they are not unauthorized occupants. (21) Learned counsel for the respondent nos. 1 & 2 drew the attention of this Court towards Section 4 of the Act which has also been reproduced herein for convenience: “4. Issue of notice to show cause against order of eviction – (1) If the estate officer has information that any person is in unauthorized occupation of any public premises and that he should be evicted, the estate officer shall issue in the manner hereinafter provided a notice in writing within seven working days from the date of receipt of the information regarding the unauthorized occupation calling upon the person concerned to show cause why an order of eviction should not be made. [(1A) If the estate officer knows or has reasons to believe that any person is in unauthorsed occupation of the public premises, then, without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (1), he shall forthwith issue a notice in writing calling upon the person concerned to show cause why an order of eviction should not be made.] [(IB) Any delay in issuing a notice referred to hi sub-sections (1) and (1A) shall not vitiate the proceedings under this Act.] (2) The notice shall – (a) specify the grounds on which the order of eviction is proposed to be made; and [(b) require all persons concerned, that is to say, all persons who are, or may be, in occupation of, or claim interest in, the public premises, - (i) to show cause, if any, against the proposed order on or before such date as is specified in the notice, being a date not [later than] seven days from the date of issue thereof; and (ii) to appear before the estate officer on the date specified in the notice along with the evidence which they intend to produce in support of the cause shown, and also for personal hearing, if such hearing is desired.] (3) The estate officer shall cause the notice to be served by having it affixed on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the public premises, and in such other manner as may be prescribed, whereupon the notice shall be deemed to have been duly given to all persons concerned. (22) It will also be apposite to read Form ‘A’ appended to Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 as below: [FORM A Form of notice under sub-section (1) and clause (b) (ii) of sub-section (2) of section 4 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 To Shri/Smt./Km……….. Whereas, I, the undersigned, am of opinion, on the grounds specified below that you are in unauthorized occupation of the Public Premises mentioned in the Schedule below and that you should be evicted from the said premises: Grounds Now, therefore, in pursuance of sub-section (1) of section 4 of the Act, I hereby call upon you to show cause on or before the*………………why such an order of eviction should not be made. And in pursuance of clause (b) (ii) of sub-section (2) of section 4, I also call upon you to appear before me in person or through a duty authorize representative capable to answer all material questions connected with the matter along the evidence which you intend to produce in support of the case shown, on …………….at…………….for personal hearing. In case, you fail to appear on the said date and time, the case will be decided ex parte. Schedule Date …. Signature and seal of the Estate Officer] ………. The date should be a date later than 7 days from the date of issue of this notice. (23) Learned counsel for the respondent nos. 1 & 2 also submitted that the complaint filed by the respondent no. 2 consisted of four documents, namely, Military Land Register, Revenue Plan, Site Plan showing unauthorized construction and Report dated 20.05.2011 of Sub Major B.P. Singh, Assistant Garrison Engineer (B/R-I). Demarcation report of the President Bodyguard dated 19.11.2009 was also filed. The complaint was sent to Estate Officer, who therefore, issued notice under Section 4 of the Act. (24) Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that on 16.08.2012, reply notice was filed by the petitioners along with letter of S.D.M. and receipt of Nagar Nigam. Learned counsel for the respondent nos. 1 & 2, on the other hand, submitted that Nagar Nigam has not filed any appeal against the eviction order and therefore eviction order has attained finality. Therefore, the petitioners have no locus to challenge the eviction order. Learned counsel for the respondent nos. 1 & 2, on the other hand, submitted that Nagar Nigam has not filed any appeal against the eviction order and therefore eviction order has attained finality. Therefore, the petitioners have no locus to challenge the eviction order. (25) Learned counsel for the petitioners also submitted that no document has been proved before the Estate Officer, even in a summary manner. The petitioners are in possession of the shops in questions. The petitioners filed preliminary objections for impleadment of Nagar Nigam. Notice was given to Nagar Nigam and the same has also been impleaded on the proceedings before the Estate Officer. They have also filed the objection. (26) Learned counsel for the petitioners, on the other hand, submitted that the case has been decided without there being any material on record. (27) Mr. Siddhartha Singh, learned counsel also appearing for respondent nos. 1 & 2 submitted that these proceedings are purely summary proceedings, in which the Estate Officer has only to record the summary evidence, which includes the relevant documents, filed before him. (28) The decision of State of U.P. and another vs Zia Khan, 1998 (8) SCC 483 does not help the petitioners, inasmuch as the Nagar Nigam has not filed any appeal against the order of the Estate Officer and, therefore, they are barred by principle of constructive res judicata to assert their claim over the shops in question. In other words, the Nagar Nigam, by not filing any appeal against the order of the Estate Officer, has acquiesced that they are not the owners of the shops, being occupied by the petitioners as their tenants. Further, there are concurrent findings of the Estate Officer as well as the Lower Appellate Court and, therefore, the said findings could be assailed by the petitioners, by way of filing present writ petitions only on the ground of perversity. But having carefully scrutinized two judgments reported by the authority and court below, this Court could not find any perversity in the orders which are subject matter of challenge in the present writ petitions. (29) ….What is the meaning of the word ‘perverse’? But having carefully scrutinized two judgments reported by the authority and court below, this Court could not find any perversity in the orders which are subject matter of challenge in the present writ petitions. (29) ….What is the meaning of the word ‘perverse’? It has been observed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gaya Din vs Hanuman Prasad, (2001) 1 SCC 501 that the findings are perverse when they are not supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or where they suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity. Again, Hon’ble Apex Court in Kailasho Devi Burman vs C.I.T., (1996) 7 SCC 613 has held that a conclusion is perverse only if it is such that no person, duly instructed could, upon the record before him, have reasonably come to it. According to Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in Parrys (Cal) Employees’ Union vs M/s Parry and Co., AIR 1966 Cal 31 , ‘perverse finding’ means a finding which is not only against the evidence itself. According to Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in M/s Narayanagowde vs Smt. Girijamma and another, AIR 1977 KAR 58 , all order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is perverse order…. Now the petitioners are invoking the writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, which in fact, is a revisional jurisdiction. Since the petitioners failed to show any perversity and jurisdictional error or illegality or miscarriage of justice thus the writ petitions are devoid of merit and are liable to be dismissed in view of the dictum of Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation V. Dilbahara Singh, 2014 (9) SCC, 78. It is also submitted that the petitioners have totally failed to show any perversity, illegality and jurisdictional error in the order passed by the learned appellate authority. Since the petitioners have failed to show any perversity and miscarriage of justice occasioned to him the writ petitions are liable to be dismiss with cost…. (30) It has been held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. vs Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78 , that the extent, scope, ambit and meaning of the terms “legality or propriety”; “regularity, correctness, legality or propriety”; and “legality, regularity or propriety” which are used in the three Rent Control Acts under consideration need determination. (30) It has been held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. vs Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78 , that the extent, scope, ambit and meaning of the terms “legality or propriety”; “regularity, correctness, legality or propriety”; and “legality, regularity or propriety” which are used in the three Rent Control Acts under consideration need determination. The ordinary meaning of the word “legality” is lawfulness. It refers to strict adherence to law, prescription, or doctrine; the quality of being legal. The term “propriety” means fitness; appropriateness, aptitude; suitability; appropriateness to the circumstances or condition conformity with requirement; rules or principle, rightness, correctness, justness, accuracy. The terms “correctness” and “propriety” ordinarily convey the same meaning, that is, something which is legal and proper. In its ordinary meaning and substance, “correctness” is compounded of “legality” and “propriety” with reference to an order ordinarily relates to the procedure being followed in accord with the principles of natural justice and fair play. (31) Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners laboured hard to argue that the burden on the petitioners will shift only when the respondent nos. 1 and 2 are able to show that the shops in the tenancy of the petitioners are in the ownership of the President Bodyguard Estate. Learned Senior Counsel has also emphasized with vehemence, by bringing on record the copy of the order sheet of the proceedings before the Estate Officer, to indicate that no evidence was offered by respondent nos. 1 and 2 to show that the petitioners are the unauthorized occupants in the property of respondent nos. 1 and 2 and they are not the tenants of Nagar Nigam. (32) By way of filing application under Section 4 of the U.P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 and a complaint dated 30.05.2011 received from the office of President Body Guard, Rashtrapati Bhawan, New Delhi, respondent nos.1 and 2 set the ball rolling by filing certain documents to show that the petitioners are not the tenants of the Nagar Nigam, but are unauthorised occupants in the property of respondent nos. 1 and 2. In support of such contention, respondent nos. 1 and 2 have filed an extract from MLR, extract from revenue plan, site plan showing the unauthorized construction by encroaching on defence land and report dated 20.05.2011 of Sub. Major B.P. Singh, Assistant Garrison Engineer (B/R-I), Military Engineer Service, Dehradun. 1 and 2. In support of such contention, respondent nos. 1 and 2 have filed an extract from MLR, extract from revenue plan, site plan showing the unauthorized construction by encroaching on defence land and report dated 20.05.2011 of Sub. Major B.P. Singh, Assistant Garrison Engineer (B/R-I), Military Engineer Service, Dehradun. The respondent nos. 1 and 2 have, therefore, done their job, by setting the ball rolling that the petitioners are un-authorized occupants over the property of respondent nos. 1 and 2. The petitioners, on the other hand, have failed to negotiate such a contention of respondent nos. 1 and 2, by filing any evidence. It has already been stated above that Nagar Nigam has left the petitioners in lurch by not filing the appeal against the order of the Estate Officer. Even if during the course of proceedings, respondent nos. 1 and 2 have not filed any documents, nevertheless, the fact remains that such documents were already filed by them along with the complaint addressed to the Estate Officer. The Estate Officer as well as the learned Lower Appellate Court has appreciated the evidence appropriately in accordance with Sub Rule (2) of Rule 5 of Rules of 1971. The initial burden has been discharged by respondent no. 1 by enclosing the documents with the complaint addressed to the Estate Officer that the petitioners are the unauthorised occupants in their property, which the petitioners have failed to negotiate satisfactorily during the course of proceedings. The petitioners have although shifted the burden to Nagar Nigam by stating in writing that they are the tenants of Nagar Nigam, but such a plea was not accepted by the Estate Officer. (33) The Estate Officer has not finally accepted the plea that the petitioners are the tenants of the Nagar Nigam, even after making Nagar Nigam a party and hearing them. It is being said at the cost of repetition that the Nagar Nigam has not filed any appeal against the order of the Estate Officer. The burden of proof in such cases is different from other Enactments. Here the respondent nos. 1 and 2 were supposed to show, prima facie, that the petitioners are the unauthorised occupants over their property, which they have done. In order to discharge their burden, the petitioners took a plea that they are the tenants of Nagar Nigam, which plea was not accepted by the Estate Officer. Here the respondent nos. 1 and 2 were supposed to show, prima facie, that the petitioners are the unauthorised occupants over their property, which they have done. In order to discharge their burden, the petitioners took a plea that they are the tenants of Nagar Nigam, which plea was not accepted by the Estate Officer. No appeal has been filed against the same. The Nagar Nigam is, therefore, barred by reiterating further that the petitioners are their tenants. (34) There is no jurisdictional error committed by the Estate Officer and the Lower Appellate Court, which may warrant interference in the concurrent findings of two authorities below. (35) All the writ petitions, therefore, fail and are dismissed.