JUDGMENT K.S. Jhaveri, J. 1. Both these appeals are directed against the judgment and order of acquittal dated 19.12.1995 passed by learned Extra Assistant Sessions Judge, Mahesana, in Sessions Case No. 56 of 1995. By the impugned judgment, accused No. 1 was acquitted of the charges of offence punishable under Sections 307, 337, 323, 504, 506 (2) read with Section 114 of IPC. Accused No. 2 was also acquitted from the charge of offence punishable under Sections 307, 337, 504, 506 (2) read with Section 114 of IPC and Section 135 (1) of the Bombay Police Act. However, accused No. 2 was convicted for offence punishable under Section 323 of IPC and ordered to undergo simple imprisonment for three months and to pay fine of Rs. 500/- and, in default of payment of fine, further imprisonment of 30 days was imposed. 2. The facts in brief giving rise to the filing of present appeal are as under: "2.1 On 30.9.1993 at about 5.30 in the evening, both the accused, out of old enmity got together at Village-Chitrodipura, Nr. Mahadev Temple, with an intention to commit murder of the complainant and his aide, accused No. 2 stopped the scooter of Mavjibhai while he was passing from Village-Chitrodipura. At that time, accused No. 1 attacked Mavjibhai with Kodali, while accused No. 2 threw bricks at him. Since Mavjibhai started shouting, people gathered, however, the accused persons threatened to kill him and his family members. The motive for the incident is stated to be an old dispute with regard to land. With these allegations, a complaint was filed against the accused persons. 2.2 Thereafter, investigation was carried out and the accused persons came to be arrested. Investigation was carried out and the accused persons came to be arrested. At the end of investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the accused before the Magistrate Court. Since the offence was exclusively triable by the Court of sessions, the case was committed to Sessions Court and, ultimately, trial was initiated and charge came to be framed. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 2.3 In order to bring home the charges against the accused persons, prosecution has examined following witnesses. Sr. No. Name Exhibit 1 Dr. Dhirajkumar Jivanlal. 23 2 Somabhai Ganeshbhai Chaudhary. 31 3 Mavjibhai Ganeshbhai Chaudhary, injured. 33 4 Ambalal Harilal Pandya. 34 5 Naranbhai Gangaram, PSO. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 2.3 In order to bring home the charges against the accused persons, prosecution has examined following witnesses. Sr. No. Name Exhibit 1 Dr. Dhirajkumar Jivanlal. 23 2 Somabhai Ganeshbhai Chaudhary. 31 3 Mavjibhai Ganeshbhai Chaudhary, injured. 33 4 Ambalal Harilal Pandya. 34 5 Naranbhai Gangaram, PSO. 45 6 Jivaji Surji, Head Constable. 46 7 Arjunsing Devising Chauhan, IO. 47 2.4 The prosecution has also produced following documents in support of its case:-- Sr. No. Description Exhibit 1 Medical Case papers of injured Mavjibhai Chaudhary. 24 2 Report of radiologist. 26 3 X-ray plates. 27 to 30 4 Complaint. 32 5 Report by Primary Health Center to Mehsana City Police Station. 6 Panchnama of scene of offence. 37 7 Yadi for dying declaration. 38 8 Panchnama of blood stained clothes. 39 9 Report by FSL. 40 10 Report of serologist. 11 Panchnama of weapons. 2.5 Thereafter, after filing of closing purshis by the prosecution, further statements of the accused persons under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 were recorded. The accused denied the case of the prosecution and submitted that a false case is filed against them." 3. At the conclusion of trial and after appreciating the oral as well as documentary evidence, the learned Judge vide impugned Judgment, acquitted the respondents from the charges levelled against them, except for the charge of offence under Section 323 of IPC for which accused No. 2 is convicted. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said judgment and order of acquittal dated 19.12.1995 passed by learned Extra Assistant Sessions Judge, Mehsana, in Sessions Case No. 56 of 1995, the appellant-State has preferred the present appeals before this Court. 4. Ms. C.M. Shah, learned APP appearing for the State has taken us through the evidence and contended that the trial Court has committed an error in acquitting the accused, as aforesaid, inspite of voluminous evidence against them and contended that the trial Court ought not to have acquitted the accused. She submitted that the trial Court has committed an error in not believing the evidence of doctors, who have supported the case of the prosecution. She also submitted that even the prosecution witnesses have supported the case of the prosecution and there was no reason to dis-believe their versions. She submitted that the trial Court has committed an error in not believing the evidence of doctors, who have supported the case of the prosecution. She also submitted that even the prosecution witnesses have supported the case of the prosecution and there was no reason to dis-believe their versions. She also submitted that even the medical evidence supports the case of the prosecution. She submitted that as per the evidence of Dr. Dhirajkumar Jivanlal, PW-1, five injuries were caused to the victim. She submitted that these injuries were caused on head, face and abdomen of the injured. She also submitted that there was fracture on the right side jaw. It is also opined that injury No. 4 was possible by use of sharp edged weapon. She, therefore, submitted that the accused should have been convicted at least for the offence punishable under Section 325 or 326 of IPC. She has also taken us through the evidence of PW-4, Ambalal Harilal Pandya, who has supported the case of the prosecution. She, therefore, prays that these appeals may be allowed by setting aside the impugned judgment acquitting the accused persons. 5. On the other hand, Mr. Kashyap Jani, learned counsel for the respondents-accused has contended that the trial Court has rightly appreciated the evidence on record and acquitted the accused persons of the aforesaid charges levelled against them. It is also submitted that so far as acquittal appeals are concerned, the law is well settled and by taking us through the impugned judgment, he submitted that this Court may not interfere with the impugned judgment and the appeal may be dismissed. In the alternative, it is submitted that even if this Court finds the accused guilty of offence under Section 325 or 326 of IPC, in view of the fact that more than 22 years have passed since the incident occurred, this Court may show some leniency towards the accused. It is further submitted that accused is also ready to pay some compensation to the complainant. In this regard, he pressed into service the decision of the Apex Court in "Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad v. State of Maharashtra", (2013) 6 SCC 770 and decision of this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1552 of 2004, and submitted that as held therein, sub-section (3) of section 357 of Cr.P.C. empowers the Court to award compensation. 6. In this regard, he pressed into service the decision of the Apex Court in "Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad v. State of Maharashtra", (2013) 6 SCC 770 and decision of this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1552 of 2004, and submitted that as held therein, sub-section (3) of section 357 of Cr.P.C. empowers the Court to award compensation. 6. We have heard learned APP appearing for the appellant-State as well as learned advocate for the respondents. We have also gone through the oral as well as documentary evidence on record. So far as Criminal Appeal No. 237 of 1996 is concerned, from the evidence on record, it is clear that blood of "O" group was found on the clothes of the victim, while there was no blood stains on the weapon used by accused No. 1. Not only that the independent witness Mr. Pandya has also not stated that accused No. 1 was present at the time of offence. Therefore, the trial Court has rightly relied upon the evidence of this witness and acquitted accused No. 1 of the charges levelled against him. It has also come on record that though independent witnesses were available, they were not examined by the prosecution. Therefore, it cannot be said that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against accused No. 1. In our view, there is no substantial piece of evidence to prove that accused No. 1 has committed the offence alleged against him. Therefore, the trial Court has rightly acquitted accused No. 1 of the charges levelled against him. In view of this and considering various decisions of Honourable Apex Court, when two views are possible, this Court should not interfere with the order of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. It is also required to be noted that the principles which would govern and regulate the hearing of appeal by this Court, against an order of acquittal passed by the trial Court, have been very succinctly explained by the Apex Court in a catena of decisions. In the case of M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani v. State of Kerala & Anr., (2006) 6 S.C.C. 39 , the Apex Court has narrated the powers of High Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. In para 54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under: "54. In the case of M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani v. State of Kerala & Anr., (2006) 6 S.C.C. 39 , the Apex Court has narrated the powers of High Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. In para 54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under: "54. In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Even while exercising an appellate power against a judgment of acquittal, the High Court should have borne in mind the well-settled principles of law that where two view are possible, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the Court below." 6.1 Further, in the case of Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 S.C.C. 415 , the Apex Court laid down the following principles; "42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: [1] An appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. [2] The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. [3] Various expressions, such as, substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes, etc. are not intended to curtain extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of flourishes of language to emphasis the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. [4] An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. [5] If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court." 6.2 Thus, it is a settled principle that while exercising appellate power, even if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. 6.3 Even in the case of State of Goa V. Sanjay Thakran & Another, (2007) 3 S.C.C. 75, the Apex Court has reiterated the powers of the High Court in such cases. In para 16 of the said decision, the Court has observed as under:-- "16. From the aforesaid decisions, it is apparent that while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the appellate Court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the appellate Court, in such circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether any of the accused is connected with the commission of the crime he is charged with." 6.4 Similar principle has been laid down by the Apex Court in the cases of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Veer Singh & Ors, 2007 A.I.R. S.C.W. 5553 and in Girja Prasad (Dead) by L.Rs. v. State of M.P. reported in 2007 A.I.R. S.C.W. 5589. Thus, the powers, which this Court may exercise against an order of acquittal are well settled. 6.5 In the case of Luna Ram v. Bhupat Singh and Ors, (2009) SCC 749, the Apex Court in paras-10 and 11 has held as under:-- "10. The High Court has noted that the prosecution version was not clearly believable. Some of the so called eye witnesses stated that the deceased died because his ankle was twisted by an accused. Others said that he was strangulated. It was the case of the prosecution that the injured witnesses were thrown out of the bus. The doctor who conducted the postmortem and examined the witnesses had categorically stated that it was not possible that somebody would throw a person out of the bus when it was in running condition. 11. Considering the parameters of appeal against the judgment of acquittal, we are not inclined to interfere in this appeal. The view of the High Court cannot be termed to be perverse and is a possible view on the evidence." 6.6 Even in a recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mookkiah and Anr. v. State, rep. by the Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu, AIR 2013 SC 321 , the Apex Court in para 4 has held as under:-- "4. It is not in dispute that the trial Court, on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence led in by the prosecution and defence, acquitted the accused in respect of the charges leveled against them. On appeal by the State, the High Court, by impugned order, reversed the said decision and convicted the accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC and awarded RI for life. Since counsel for the appellants very much emphasized that the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in upsetting the order of acquittal into conviction, let us analyze the scope and power of the High Court in an appeal filed against the order of acquittal. Since counsel for the appellants very much emphasized that the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in upsetting the order of acquittal into conviction, let us analyze the scope and power of the High Court in an appeal filed against the order of acquittal. This Court in a series of decisions has repeatedly laid down that as the first appellate court the High Court, even while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, was also entitled, and obliged as well, to scan through and if need be re-appreciate the entire evidence, though while choosing to interfere only the court should find an absolute assurance of the guilt on the basis of the evidence on record and not merely because the High Court could take one more possible or a different view only. Except the above, where the matter of the extent and depth of consideration of the appeal is concerned, no distinctions or differences in approach are envisaged in dealing with an appeal as such merely because one was against conviction or the other against an acquittal. [Vide State of Rajasthan v. Sohan Lal and Others, (2004) 5 SCC 573 ]" 6.7 It is also a settled legal position that in acquittal appeal, the appellate Court is not required to rewrite the judgment or to give fresh reasonings, when the reasons assigned by the Court below are found to be just and proper. Such principle is laid down by the Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy, AIR 1981, SC 1417, wherein it is held as under:-- "...This Court has observed in Girija Nandini Devi V. Bigendra Nandini Choudhary (1967) 1 SCR 93 : ( AIR 1967 SC 1124 ) that it is not the duty of the Appellate Court on the evidence to repeat the narration of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the trial Court expression of general agreement with the reasons given by the Court the decision of which is under appeal, will ordinarily suffice." 7. Thus, in case the appellate Court agrees with the reasons and the opinion given by the lower Court, then the discussion of evidence is not necessary. Thus, in case the appellate Court agrees with the reasons and the opinion given by the lower Court, then the discussion of evidence is not necessary. Moreover, learned APP is not in a position to show any evidence on record so as to take a contrary view in the matter or to conclude that the approach of the Court below is vitiated by some manifest illegality or that the decision is perverse or that the Court below has ignored material evidence while acquitting accused No. 1. Hence, we are of the considered opinion that the Court below has not committed any error in acquitting accused No. 1 of the charge levelled against him. We are in complete agreement with the reasonings given by and the findings arrived at by the Court below in the impugned judgment and, therefore, find no reasons to entertain Criminal Appeal No. 237 of 1996. 8. So far as Criminal Appeal No. 238 of 1996, which is preferred against acquittal of accused No. 2 from some of the charges, as aforesaid, is concerned, we find that medical evidence supports the case of the prosecution. As per the evidence of Dr. Dhirajkumar Jivanlal, PW-1, five injuries were caused to the victim. These injuries were caused on head, face and abdomen of the injured. Not only that there was fracture on the right side jaw of the injured. This injury can be said to be "grievous hurt" as per Section 320 of IPC, which reads as under:-- "320. Grievous hurt.--The following kinds of hurt only are designated as "grievous":-- First.--Emasculation. Secondly.--Permanent privation of the sight of either eye. Thirdly.--Permanent privation of the hearing of either ear. Fourthly.--Privation of any member or joint. Fifthly.--Destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member or joint. Sixthly.--Permanent disfiguration of the head or face. Seventhly.--Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth. Eighthly.--Any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the space of twenty days in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits." 9. From the evidence of Dr. Dhirajkumar Jivanlal, PW-1, it is clear that, except injury No. 4, other injuries can be caused by bricks. It has proved by the prosecution that accused No. 2 had attacked the injured with bricks. From the evidence of Dr. Dhirajkumar Jivanlal, PW-1, it is clear that, except injury No. 4, other injuries can be caused by bricks. It has proved by the prosecution that accused No. 2 had attacked the injured with bricks. Therefore, this injury, due to which fracture is caused, can be attributed to accused No. 2 and, therefore, accused No. 2 is held guilty for the offence under Section 325 of IPC. However, looking to the fact that the incident in question is of 1993, more than 22 years have passed, and considering the principles enunciated in the case of Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad (supra), and decision of this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1552 of 2004, accused No. 2 is directed to deposit a sum of Rs. 15,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Thousand only) with the Sessions Court within three months towards compensation to be paid to the complainant or his legal heirs, in lieu of the sentence of imprisonment imposed by this Court, as per the final order, failing which he shall surrender before the jail authorities forthwith to undergo the period of sentence imposed by this Court. Accordingly, this appeal is required to be partly allowed. 10. For the foregoing reasons, Criminal Appeal No. 237 of 1996 is dismissed. The impugned judgment and order dated 19.12.1995 passed by learned Extra Assistant Sessions Judge, Mehsana, in Sessions Case No. 56 of 1995 acquitting accused No. 1 is hereby confirmed. 11. Criminal Appeal No. 238 of 1996 is partly allowed. So far as accused No. 2 is concerned, the impugned judgment and order dated 19.12.1995 passed by learned Extra Assistant Sessions Judge, Mahesana, in Sessions Case No. 56 of 1995 is modified and accused No. 2 is also convicted for the offence punishable under Section 325 of IPC and ordered to undergo one year's rigorous imprisonment. However, looking to the fact that the incident in question is of 1993, more than 22 years have passed, and considering the principles enunciated in the case of Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad (supra), accused No. 2 is directed to deposit a sum of Rs. 15,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Thousand only) with the Sessions Court within three months towards compensation to be paid to the complainant or his legal heirs, in lieu of the sentence imposed by this Court, failing which he shall surrender before the jail authorities forthwith to undergo the period of sentence imposed by this Court. 15,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Thousand only) with the Sessions Court within three months towards compensation to be paid to the complainant or his legal heirs, in lieu of the sentence imposed by this Court, failing which he shall surrender before the jail authorities forthwith to undergo the period of sentence imposed by this Court. Upon deposit of Rs. 15,000/- by accused No. 2 towards compensation, as aforesaid, the same shall be paid to the complainant or his legal heirs, by issuing an account payee cheque, after due verification. This order is passed looking to the special circumstances of the case. Therefore, this should not be treated as precedent. 12. Bail bond, if any, of the accused stands cancelled. Registry to return the R&P to the concerned trial Court forthwith.