JUDGMENT : Mr. P.K. Lohra, J. These three writ petitions involve common question of law, therefore, all are heard together and disposed of by this common order. 2. Petitioners in all these three writ petitions are elected Ward Members of Municipal Board/Council, Nokha. Respondents - election petitioners feeling aggrieved by their election as Ward Members laid three separate election petitions to question their election under Section 31 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009 (for short 'the Act of 2009) on different grounds before the District Judge, Bikaner (for short 'the learned Election Tribunal'). The learned Election Tribunal while exercising power Section 10 of the Rajasthan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1950 (for short 'the Ordinance of 1950) transferred all the three election petitions to the Court of Additional District Judge No. 2 Bikaner. This sort of situation promoted all the three petitioners to question the jurisdiction of Additional District Judge No. 2 Bikaner as Election Tribunal and on their behalf, applications under Order 7, Rule 10 read with Section 151 CPC were submitted for returning the election petitions for their presentation before the District Judge, Bikaner. 3. The applications submitted by the petitioners were replied by the respondent-returned candidates by resisting the prayer but in the alternative it was also pleaded that they do not have any objection for hearing of the election petitions by either of the Court/Election Tribunal i.e. by Additional District Judge No. 2 or District Judge, Bikaner. 4. After hearing the rival submissions, learned Additional District Judge No. 2 by the order impugned in all the writ petitions of the even date i.e. 18.01.2016 rejected the applications of the petitioners. The learned Additional District Judge No.2 in the order impugned observed that under the Act of 2009, there is no legal embargo for this Court to hear and decide the election petitions and as such it is not desirable to return the election petitions for their presentation before the District Judge, Bikaner. 5. The crucial question which has cropped up in all these writ petitions is : Whether a District Judge while acting as Election Tribunal under Section 31 of the Act of 2009 can transfer an election petition to the Court of Additional District Judge by treating it an Election Tribunal. 6. 5. The crucial question which has cropped up in all these writ petitions is : Whether a District Judge while acting as Election Tribunal under Section 31 of the Act of 2009 can transfer an election petition to the Court of Additional District Judge by treating it an Election Tribunal. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners submit that under Chapter-IXA of the Constitution which was inserted by Constitution (Seventy Forth Amendment) Act, 1992, an affirmative attempt was made to strengthen the system of municipal bodies in the urban areas. Learned counsel would contend that idea is to place local-self Government in urban areas on a sound and effective footing. Placing reliance on Article 243ZG of the Constitution, learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that bar to interference by courts in electoral matters pre-supposes that election matters are to be sorted out by a local forum envisaged under the statute and not by any civil court. In substance, learned counsel for the petitioners have urged that only District Judge within whose territorial jurisdiction municipal area is situated can adjudicate an election dispute and jurisdiction of any other court including its subordinate court is forbidden. Laying emphasis on Section 31 of the Act of 2009, learned counsel for the petitioners have vehemently argued that legislature in its wisdom has conferred jurisdiction on the District Judge having territorial jurisdiction over the municipal area requires strict construction as per Section 3(7) of the General Clauses Act so as not to include Additional District Judge subordinate to it. Harping on the recital "question" under Section 31 of the Act of 2009, learned counsel for the petitioners submit that term "question" means that election petition is to be adjudicated by the District Judge having territorial jurisdiction over the concerned municipal area only. Learned counsel for the petitioners have contended that under the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 initially there was no provision for transferring an election petition to the Additional District Judge and the term "Additional District Judge" was introduced only in the year 1994. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that after promulgation of the Act of 2009 by virtue of Section 344, the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 stands repealed and, therefore, learned Additional District Judge ought to have examined the matter in that background. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that after promulgation of the Act of 2009 by virtue of Section 344, the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 stands repealed and, therefore, learned Additional District Judge ought to have examined the matter in that background. Learned counsel for the petitioners would urge that legislative intent is clear from a bare reading of Section 31 of the Act of 2009 inasmuch as there is no mention that election petition can be adjudicated by a court other than District Court concerned. In substance, submission of learned counsel for the petitioners is that while hearing an election petition under Section 31 of the Act of 2009 District Judge acts as persona designata. Learned counsel for the petitioners, therefore, submit that impugned order is per se vulnerable. In support of their various contentions, learned counsels for the petitioners have placed reliance on following judgments :- (1) Keshri Prasad v. Bodhraj, 1951 RLW 102. (2) Keshav Dev v. Radhey Shyam, 1964 RLW 1 (3) Badri Prasad & Anr. v. ADJ, Dholpur & Ors., 1972 WLN (Raj.) 180. (4) Shri Banwari Dass v. Shri Sumer Chand & Ors., 1974(4) SCO 817 (5) Moti Ram v. Mali Ram, 1978 WLN 587 (6) Prem Raj v. Bhanwar Lal & Ors., 1996(2) WLC (Raj.) 394 (7) Jeevan Bano v. Smt. Asha Arora & Ors., 1997(3) WLC (Raj.) 111 (8) Smt. Indira v. Prabha, 1998(1) WLC (Raj.) 81 (9) Smt. Rajeshwari v. Kamla Motda, S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 9408/2015 (10) Smt. Ladu Kanwar v. District Judge, 2016(1) WLC (Raj.) UC 391 (11) Nanhoo Mal & Ors. v. Hira Mal & Ors., 1976(3) SCC 211 (12) J&K Housing Board & Anr. v. Kunwar Sanjay Krishan Kaul & Ors. , 2011(10) SCC 714 (13) Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khubchand Baghel & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1099 (14) RR. Nayak v. Union of India, AIR 1972 SC 554 (15) Dilbagh Rai Jerry v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1974 SC 130 (1) (16) Narpat Karan v. The District Judge, Balotra, 1984 RLW 667 (17) Chand Kanwar v. Anoop Kanwar & Anr. , S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 12317/2015, decided on 29.10.2015. 7. Per contra, learned Senior Advocate Mr. Rajesh Joshi submits that District Judge includes Additional District Judge and, therefore, an Additional District Judge can very well exercise powers of an Election Tribunal under Section 31 of the Act of 2009. , S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 12317/2015, decided on 29.10.2015. 7. Per contra, learned Senior Advocate Mr. Rajesh Joshi submits that District Judge includes Additional District Judge and, therefore, an Additional District Judge can very well exercise powers of an Election Tribunal under Section 31 of the Act of 2009. Learned counsel would contend that in substance, there is no error much less an error apparent on the face of record in the impugned order in all the writ petitions warranting interference by this Court in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. 8. Mr. Vikas Balia, learned counsel for the respondent submits that on harmonious and meaningful construction of Article 233 and 234 of the Constitution makes it abundantly clear that District Judge includes Additional District Judge and its posting as well as promotion under the State is required to be made by the Governor of State in consultation with the High Court exercising jurisdiction to such State. Learned counsel, therefore, contends that the distinction sought to be drawn by the petitioners between District Judge and Additional District Judge is merely hypothetical which cannot be countenanced on the anvil of Article 233 and 234 of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel further submits that Section 10 of the Civil Court Ordinance further clarifies the position inasmuch as it clearly envisages that besides District Judge, Additional Judges can be appointed by the State Government upon recommendation of the High Court to discharge any of the functions of a District Judge which the District Judge may assign to him and in discharge of those functions, he shall exercise the same powers as the District Judge. Placing heavy reliance on Section 10 of the Rajasthan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1950 (for short 'the Ordinance of 1950'), Mr. Balia would contend that there is hardly any reason to make a distinction between District Judge and Additional District Judge so far as its powers and functions are concerned. Learned counsel would contend that in view of clear position of law, no interference with the impugned orders in all these writ petitions is warranted. Lastly, Mr. Balia has strenuously urged that contention of the petitioner that District Judge while hearing an election petition under the Act of 2009 acts as persona designata is an ambitious plea inasmuch as the same is not desirable from the legislative intent. Lastly, Mr. Balia has strenuously urged that contention of the petitioner that District Judge while hearing an election petition under the Act of 2009 acts as persona designata is an ambitious plea inasmuch as the same is not desirable from the legislative intent. In support of their various contentions, learned counsels for the respondents have placed reliance on following judgments : (1) Pushpa Devi v. Radheyshyam, AIR 1972 (Raj.) 260 (2) Smt. Veena Lodha v. Narendra Mai Lodha, AIR 1977 (Raj.) 134 (3) Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker, 1995(5) SCC 5 . (4) S.B.P & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. & Anr., 2006(1) WLC (SC) Civil 1 : 2005(8) SCC 618 (5) S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6872/2006 : Sheojilal v. District Judge, Bundi & Ors., decided on 20.11.2007 at Jaipur Bench of Rajasthan High Court (6) Central Talkies Ltd. Kanpur v. Dwarka Prasad, AIR 1961 SC 606 . 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the impugned order and materials available on record. 10. Before adverting to address the question which is bone of contention in all these matters, it is worthwhile to refer to the legal provisions governing the election dispute. The relevant Section 31 of the Act of 2009 reads as under :- "31. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the impugned order and materials available on record. 10. Before adverting to address the question which is bone of contention in all these matters, it is worthwhile to refer to the legal provisions governing the election dispute. The relevant Section 31 of the Act of 2009 reads as under :- "31. Election petition : (1) The election of any person as a member of a Municipality may be questioned by an election petition filed within one month from the date of election before the District Judge having territorial jurisdiction over the municipal area on one or more of the following grounds, namely :- (a) that on the date of election a returned candidate was not qualified, or was disqualified, to be chosen to fill the seat under this Act, or (b) that any corrupt practise specified in section 29 has been committed by a returned candidate or his election agent or by any other person, with the consent of a returned candidate or his election agent, or (c) that any nomination has been improperly rejected, or (d) that the result of the election, in so far as it concerns a returned candidate has been materially affected- (i) by the improper acceptance of any nomination, or (ii) by any corrupt practise committed in the interest of the returned candidate by a person other than that candidate or his election agent or a person acting with the consent of such candidate or election agent, or (iii) by the improper reception, refusal or rejection of any vote or the reception of any vote which is void, or (iv) by any non-compliance with the provisions of this Act or of any rules or orders made thereunder, or (e) that in fact the petitioner or some other candidate received a majority of the valid votes, or (f) that, but for the votes obtained by the returned candidate by corrupt practices, the petitioner or some other candidate would have obtained a majority of the valid votes. (2) In hearing the election petition, the District Judge shall follow such procedure and exercise such powers as may be prescribed." 11. The above-quoted Section 31 of the Act of 2009 postulates jurisdiction on a District Judge having territorial jurisdiction over the municipal area to decide an election petition wherein election of any person as member of municipality is questioned. (2) In hearing the election petition, the District Judge shall follow such procedure and exercise such powers as may be prescribed." 11. The above-quoted Section 31 of the Act of 2009 postulates jurisdiction on a District Judge having territorial jurisdiction over the municipal area to decide an election petition wherein election of any person as member of municipality is questioned. Persistent effort by the learned counsel for the petitioners to bring home their vociferous contention that District Judge alone is empowered to adjudicate an election petition concerning election of any person as member of municipality is essentially edificed on the word used by : the legislature. Therefore, in terms of their version an Additional District Judge is having no jurisdiction to adjudicate an election petition under Section 31 of the Act of 2009. That apart, their arguments are also influenced by the fact that there is no provision for transfer of an election petition by the District Judge to an Additional District Judge. Per se, the contention appears to be quite alluring but in the considered opinion of this Court, the same cannot be examined/scrutinized in isolation to the provisions contained under Section 44 of the Act of 2009. Under Section 44 of the Act of 2009, determination of validity of election of Chairperson or Vice Chairperson of a Municipality is envisaged. The proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 44, and Explanation makes it amply clear that a District Judge, may for the reasons to be recorded in writing, transfer an election petition for hearing and disposal to a Judge subordinate to him. The relevant proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 44 and Explanation reads as under :- "44. Determination of validity of election of Chairperson or Vice-Chairperson : (1) The election of Chairperson or Vice-Chairperson under section 43 shall not be called in question except by an election petition presented to the District Judge having territorial jurisdiction, over the municipal area: Provided that where an election petition is presented as aforesaid to a District Judge, he may, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, transfer the same for hearing and disposal to a Judge subordinate to him. Explanation : The District Judge or any other Judge to whom an election petition is or transferred and by whom it is heard in accordance with the provisions of this section is hereinafter referred to as the Judge." 12. Explanation : The District Judge or any other Judge to whom an election petition is or transferred and by whom it is heard in accordance with the provisions of this section is hereinafter referred to as the Judge." 12. In that background, the contention of the petitioners that District Judge is having no power to transfer an election petition falls flat. As a matter of fact, such inconsistency or dichotomy in the legislative intent is inconceivable that an election petition questioning the validity of election of Chairperson or Vice Chairperson can be transferred by the District Judge to any subordinate Judge but not that of an election petition questioning the election of any person as member of the municipality. A harmonious construction of Sections 31, 32 & 44 obviously emerges out a clear picture that legislature has conferred power of transfer of an election petition on the District Judge having territorial jurisdiction over the municipal area to a Judge subordinate to him. 13. Now, I propose to deal with legal precedents on which learned counsel for the petitioners have placed reliance in the backdrop of facts of these matters. In Keshri Prasad (supra), the issue involved was whether District Judge acting under Section 22 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1946 (for short 'the Act of 1946') is a Court subordinate to High Court within meaning of Section 115 CPC. The Court after examining the matter held that order passed by a District Judge under Section 22 of the Act of 1946 is not revisable under Section 115 CPC. The finding of learned Single Judge that District Judge while acting under Section 22 of the Act of 1946 as a persona designata is not acceptable in view of subsequent authoritative pronouncement of Supreme Court in the case of Central Talkies Ltd. Kanpur v. Dwarka Prasad, AIR 1961 SC 606 . 14. In Keshav Dev (supra), the issue involved was transferring an election petition from one Munsif to another Munsif or from one Munsif to another Civil Judge by the District Judge and, therefore, while interpreting Rule 78 & 83 of the Panchayat and Nyay Panchayats Election Rules, 1960, Division Bench has held that District Judge is not empowered to transfer the election petition. The said decision is not available in the present matters, therefore, the judgment is clearly distinguishable. 15. The said decision is not available in the present matters, therefore, the judgment is clearly distinguishable. 15. In Badri Prasad (supra), a learned Single Judge of this Court has taken a view that revision petition under Section 17 of the Rajasthan Relief of Agricultural Indebtedness Act, 1957 (for short 'the Act of 1957') can be heard and adjudicated by the District Judge only and Additional District Judge is not competent to exercise power of revision. In a subsequent judgment in case of Modilal & Anr. v. LRs. of Chatraram and Ors., 2003(1) CDR 892, this Court has held that under Section 17 of the Act of 1957 the District Judge exercises its power in the court of law and not merely as a persona designata and, therefore, Additional District Judge is fully competent to discharge the same functions. Earlier also, in a judgment on the issue reported in 1977 WLN 367, Court has held that Additional District Judge can discharge any of the functions of a District Judge and, therefore, there was no defect of jurisdiction. The Court in this behalf also placed reliance on Section 10 of the Rajasthan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1950. As such, the aforesaid judgment is also clearly distinguishable. 16. In Shri Banwari Dass (supra), Supreme Court has not dealt with power of transfer of an election petition but has simply stressed for strict construction of election statutes. There remains no quarrel that strict construction of election statutes is warranted and, therefore, ratio decidendi of this judgment too cannot render any assistance to the cause of the petitioner. 17. Moti Ram's case (supra) is yet another judgment wherein Court has held that a Munsif trying election petition is not subordinate to the High Court and, therefore, any order passed by it, is not amenable to revisional jurisdictional of this Court under Section 115 CPC. As such, this judgment is also not of any assistance to the petitioner. 18. Prem Raj's case (supra) is a judgment which was rendered by learned Single Judge while construing Section 40 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959. In that case, District Judge returned the election petition for its presentation before Civil Judge de hors the mandate of law and, therefore, the Court held that order is illegal and without jurisdiction. The facts position in the present case are quite different and, therefore, judgment is clearly distinguishable. 19. In that case, District Judge returned the election petition for its presentation before Civil Judge de hors the mandate of law and, therefore, the Court held that order is illegal and without jurisdiction. The facts position in the present case are quite different and, therefore, judgment is clearly distinguishable. 19. Similarly, Smt. Jeevan Bano's judgment (supra) is a case relating to Section 40 of the Act of 1959 and, therefore, it cannot render any assistance to the petitioner. 20. Judgments in Smt. Indira, Smt. Rajeshwari and Smt. Ladu Kanwar (supra) are related with elections of Panchayati Raj Institutions wherein the court had the occasion to examine powers of the District Judge to transfer an election petition under Section 43 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (for short 'the Act of 1994') and Rule 80 of the Rules of 1994 and, therefore, these judgments cannot render any assistance to the petitioner. As a matter of fact, Section 43 of the Act of 1994 envisages transfer of election petition Civil Judge (Senior Division) subordinate to District Judge, it is apposite to observe here that Section 44 of the Act of 2009 confers powers on the District Judge to transfer an election petition of a Chairperson or Vice Chairperson of a Municipality to any Judge subordinate to it and, therefore, it is rather difficult to comprehend that power to transfer an election petition conferred on the District Judge has been circumscribed by the legislature. 21. Judgment in Nanhoo Mal (supra) is relating to Municipal Election wherein Supreme Court has mandated for compliance with statutory procedure and in that background held that for setting aside a Municipal Election, exclusively jurisdiction vests in the District Judge and High Court's power under Article 226 for setting aside election cannot be countenanced. As such, this judgment too is clearly distinguishable and cannot come to the rescue of the petitioner. 22. In J&K Housing Board (supra), Supreme Court has reiterated the principle that when any statutory provision provides for a particular manner for taking a particular act, the said thing must be done in prescribed manner founded on maxim 'Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius.' The legal proposition so enunciated by Supreme Court is trite and is acceptable without any demur. However, I am afraid, in such situation is available in the instant petitions. Therefore, this judgment too cannot render assistance to the petitioners. 23. However, I am afraid, in such situation is available in the instant petitions. Therefore, this judgment too cannot render assistance to the petitioners. 23. In Vidyacharan Shukla (supra) Constitution Bench of Supreme Court per majority has dilated on different period of limitation for an appeal under the Representation of the People Act and Limitation Act, 1908 and concluded that Limitation Act being Special Act shall govern the period of limitation in appeals. The Court held :- "Even so, it is contended that under section 116-A(2) of the Act the High Court, though it has the same powers, jurisdiction and authority of an appellate court governed by the Code of Civil Procedure, is not empowered to follow the procedure prescribed under the Code in respect of receiving the appeals. This argument is contrary to the express terms of sub-section (2) of Section 116-A of the Act. Under that sub-section, “The High Court shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, have the same powers, jurisdiction and authority and follow the same procedure, with respect to an appeal under this Chapter as if the appeal were an appeal from an original decree passed by a civil court situated within the local limits of its civil appellate jurisdiction." Under the second part of sub-s (2) of section 116-A of the Act, a fiction is created, namely, that though a right of appeal is conferred by section 116-A(1) of the Act, the appeal thereunder to the purpose of sub-section (2) will be deemed to be an appeal from an original decree passed by a civil court situated within the local limits of its civil appellate jurisdiction. The first part of the sub-section describes the purposes for which the fiction is invoked, namely, the exercise of the powers, jurisdiction and authority and the following of the procedure with respect to such an appeal. The powers, jurisdiction and authority take into the powers, jurisdiction and authority exercisable by an appellate tribunal in regard to various matters prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure. What does the word 'procedure' mean ? The procedure must necessarily be the procedure governing such - an appeal. It means, inter alia, the manner of receiving an appeal in the court, the preparation of records of the appeal, the posting of the appeal and the manner of its disposal. What does the word 'procedure' mean ? The procedure must necessarily be the procedure governing such - an appeal. It means, inter alia, the manner of receiving an appeal in the court, the preparation of records of the appeal, the posting of the appeal and the manner of its disposal. We find it impossible to exclude from the word 'procedure' the filing and receiving of an appeal in the court. If that part was excluded, how could the appeal be received in the High Court? The answer given is that the Government might make rules under Section 169(1) of the Act. When Section 168(2) confers a statutory power on the High Court to follow the procedure prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure, we cannot invoke the general power of the Central Government to make rules under section 169(1) of the Act. If so, the procedure prescribed by O. XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure, along with the other relevant provisions of the said Code, equally applies to an appeal filed under section 116-A(2) of the Act. The result is that under section 116-A(2) of the Act, the appeal by fiction, is equated with an appeal filed under the Code of Civil Procedure in the matter of not only the exercise of the powers, jurisdiction ad authority but also in the matter of procedure to be followed from the date of receipt of the appeal to its final disposal. For the aforesaid reasons I hold that the special law, namely, the Act, prescribes a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the First Schedule to the Limitation Act within the meaning of art. 29(2) of the Limitation Act. If so, section 12 of the Limitation Act is attracted, and the 1st respondent was entitled to exclude the time taken by him for obtaining the copy of the order." 24. The legal proposition that vis-a-vis General Law, Special Law is to be prevail cannot be doubted but law is required to be applied in the backdrop of facts and circumstances of an individual case and ratio decidendi of a judgment cannot be applied in abstract sense alien to the facts of the case. 25. P.R. Nayak (supra) is a case relating to civil servant wherein Supreme Court has interpreted Rule 3(1) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969. 25. P.R. Nayak (supra) is a case relating to civil servant wherein Supreme Court has interpreted Rule 3(1) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969. The analogy of subordinate legislation governing the provisions of disciplinary action against the civil servant is having no nexus whatsoever with the law relating to elections and, therefore, it cannot render any assistance to the petitioner. 26. In Dilbagh Rai Jerry (supra), Supreme Court has interpreted first proviso to Section 15(2) of Payment of Wages Act, 1936 vis-a-vis a claim for deduction of wages of an employee for construing starting point of limitation and the Court held, - "From a reading of Section 15, it is clear that the legislature has deliberately used, first, in sub-section (2), and then in sub-section (3) the expressions "deduction of wages" and "delay in payment of wages" as two distinct concepts. Terminus a quo (i) in the proviso expressly relates to the deduction of wages, while (ii) is referable to the delayed wages. If both these termini were always relatable to the same point of time, then there would be no point in mentioning terminus a quo (i), and Legislature could have simply said that limitation for a claim under Section 15(2) would always start from the date on which the wages "fall due" or "accrue" as has been done under Article 102 of the Limitation Act which applies only to suits for recovery of wages. The very fact that two distinct starting points of limitation referable to two distinct concepts, have been stated in the proviso, shows that the Legislature had visualised that the date of deduction of wages and the due date of delayed wages, may not always coincide. Conjunction "or" which in the context means "either" and the phrases "as the case may be" at the end of the Proviso are cliching-indicia of this interpretation. They are not mere surplusages and must be given their full effect. The Legislature is not supposed to indulge in tautology; and when it uses analogous words or phrases in the alternative, each may be presumed to convey a separate and distinct meaning, the choice of which may involve the rejection of the other. They are not mere surplusages and must be given their full effect. The Legislature is not supposed to indulge in tautology; and when it uses analogous words or phrases in the alternative, each may be presumed to convey a separate and distinct meaning, the choice of which may involve the rejection of the other. To hold that the two expressions 'wages deducted', and 'wages delayed', though used in the alternative, carry the same meaning, and in the Proviso are always referable to one and the same point of time, would be contrary to this primary canon of interpretation." 27. There remains no quarrel that while construing a provision, legislative intent is to be gathered from the words or phrases used therein and not to construe the same for drawing some other meaning. But, I am afraid, this analogy cannot be applied in case of District Judge and an Additional District Judge, therefore, this judgment too cannot render any help to the petitioners. 28. Judgments in Narpat Karan and Chand Kanwar (supra) are also not throwing any light on the lis involved in the present matter and consequently cannot render any assistance to the petitioner. 29. Before switching on to examine the legal precedents on which respondents have placed reliance, it would be worthwhile to dilate conceptually on the true meaning of District Judge in the constitutional background. Chapter VI of the Constitution under the caption 'SUBORDINATE COURTS' prescribes appointment of District Judges and other allied subjects. Under article 233 and 234 of the Constitution, the term 'District Judge' is used and for the expression 'District Judge' in this Chapter, Article 236(a) with the heading 'Interpretation' postulates as under :- "(a) the expression 'district judge' includes judge of a city civil court, additional district judge, joint district judge, assistant district judge, chief judge of a small cause court, chief presidency magistrate, additional chief presidency magistrate, sessions judge, additional sessions judge and assistant sessions judge;" 30. Likewise, Section 10 of the Ordinance of 1950 also envisages that Additional District Judge shall exercise the same powers as the District Judge. Section 10 of the Ordinance of 1950 reads as under "10. Additional Judges. Likewise, Section 10 of the Ordinance of 1950 also envisages that Additional District Judge shall exercise the same powers as the District Judge. Section 10 of the Ordinance of 1950 reads as under "10. Additional Judges. - (1) When the business pending before any District Judge or District Judges so requires for its speedy disposal, the State Government may, upon the recommendation of the High Court sanction the appointment of such number of Additional Judges for the Court or Courts of such District Judge or District Judges, as may be necessary. (2) The provisions of Section 9 shall apply also to the appointment, posting and promotion of, and filling up of vacancies among Additional Judges. (3) Any Additional Judge so appointed shall discharge any of the functions of a District Judge which the District Judge may assign to him, and in the discharge of those functions, he shall exercise the same powers as the District Judge." 31. Therefore, taking into account the exhaustive definition of District Judge under Article 236 of the Constitution of India and Section 10 of the Ordinance of 1950, it is rather difficult to comprehend that powers conferred on a District Judge to adjudicate an election dispute of any person as a Member of Municipality, cannot be adjudicated by an Additional District Judge. It is also noteworthy that Section 44 of the Act of 2009 empowers a District Judge to transfer an election petition to a Judge subordinate to him. In that background, if the impugned order is examined then it would ipso facto reveal that learned District Judge has exercised its powers to transfer the election petitions under Section 10 of the Ordinance of 1950. As observed supra, the power is otherwise available upon harmonious construction of Sections 31, 32 and 44 of the Act of 2009. Once the District Judge has exercised its powers to transfer a election petition under Section 10 of the Ordinance of 1950 it presupposes that power has been exercised bona fide to facilitate speedy disposal of the election petition. 32. In this view of the matter, the contention of the petitioner that the District Judge has not recorded reasons before transferring the election petition is per se not tenable. 32. In this view of the matter, the contention of the petitioner that the District Judge has not recorded reasons before transferring the election petition is per se not tenable. As a matter of fact, the District Judge while appreciating the lis involved in the matters has taken a just decision to transfer the election petition to Additional District Judge enjoying the same powers and jurisdiction. The election disputes requires speedy disposal is also clearly discernible from Sub-rule (11) of Rule 4 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Election Petition Rules, 2009. Sub-rule (11) of Rule 4 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Election Petition Rules, 2009 reads as under :- "(11) Every election petition shall be tried as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made to conclude the hearing within six months from the date of the service of the copy of the petition under sub-rule (1)." 33. Therefore, upon perusal of the impugned orders, it is rather difficult to fathom that as per legislative intent, District Judge has not recorded reasons. The legal position as emerged out from the above discussion also clears the decks for dissuading the Court to hold that impugned orders passed by the Additional District Judge No. 2 Bikaner rejecting application under Order 7, Rule 10 CPC are vulnerable. 34. In Pushpa Devi (supra), learned Single Judge of this Court had the occasion to examine powers of District Judge to transfer a case to the Additional District Judge under Section 10(3) of the Ordinance of 1950. The Court held : "11. The next question is whether the District Judge could have assigned this case to the Additional District Judge, Dholpur who is an Additional Judge in the Court of the District Judge for the district. According to Section 10 of the Rajasthan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1950, if the business before any District Judge so requires for its speedy disposal, the State Government may, on the recommendation of the High Court, sanction the appointment of such number of Additional Judges for the Court or Courts of such District Judge or District Judges as may be necessary. Sub-section (3) of that section lays down that any Additional Judge so appointed shall discharge any of the functions of a District Judge which the District Judge may assign to him and in the discharge of those functions he shall exercise the same powers as the District Judge. Sub-section (3) of that section lays down that any Additional Judge so appointed shall discharge any of the functions of a District Judge which the District Judge may assign to him and in the discharge of those functions he shall exercise the same powers as the District Judge. Sub-section (3) thus empowers the District Judge to assign any of his functions to any Additional Judge and the latter shall then exercise the same powers as the District Judge. This sub-section, therefore, empowers the District Judge to transfer a case under the Act to the Additional District Judge and the latter would be exercising the same powers as the District Judge. There is, therefore, no substance in the first contention of the learned counsel." 35. In Central Talkies Ltd. (supra) Supreme Court while interpreting Section 3 of U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 made endeavour to define the term 'persona designata' and declined to accept the contention that District Magistrate mentioned in Section 10 of the Act is a persona designata. The Court held :- "The argument that the District Magistrate was a persona designata cannot be accepted. Under the definition of District Magistrate', the special authorisation by the District Magistrate had the effect of creating officers exercising the powers of a District Magistrate under the Eviction Act. To that extent, those officers would, on authorisation, be equated to the District Magistrate. A persona designata is "a person who is pointed out or described as an individual, as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of a class, or as filling a particular character." (See Osborn's Concise Law Dictionary, 4th Edn., p. 253). In the words of Schwabe, C.J., In Parthasaradhi Naidu v. Koteswara Rao, ILR 47 Mad. 369 : (AIR 1924 Mad. 461) (FB), personae designatae are "persons selected to act in their private capacity and not in their capacity as Judges." The same consideration applies also to a well-known officer like the District Magistrate named by virtue of his office, and whose powers the Additional District Magistrate can also exercise and who can create other officers equal to himself for the purposes of the Eviction Act. The decision of Sapru, J., in the Allahabad case, with respect, was erroneous." 36. The language employed under Section 3 of the U.P. Act is pari materia to Section 31 of the Act of 2009. The decision of Sapru, J., in the Allahabad case, with respect, was erroneous." 36. The language employed under Section 3 of the U.P. Act is pari materia to Section 31 of the Act of 2009. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that while hearing an election petition under Section 31 of the Act of 2009 District Judge acts as a persona designata is not acceptable being an ambitious plea. 37. The concept of persona designata is founded on Latin Maxim 'Designatio unius est exclusio alterius, et expressum facit cessare taciturn' i.e. specifying of one is exclusion of another, and that which is expressed makes that which is understood to cease.' 38. In Mukri Gopalan (supra), Supreme Court re-visited the meaning of persona designata and while reiterating the ratio of Central Talkies Ltd., Kanpuar (supra) held :- "As noted earlier the appellate authority, namely the District Judge. Thallassery has taken the view that since he is a persona designata he cannot resort to Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay in filing appeal before him. So far as this reasoning of the appellate authority is concerned Mr. Nariman, learned counsel for respondent fairly stated that he does not support this reasoning and it is not his say that the appellate authority exercising powers under Section 18 of the Rent Act is a persona designata. In our view the said fair stand taken by learned counsel for respondent is fully justified. It is now well settled that an authority can be styled to be persona designata if powers are conferred on a named person or authority and such powers cannot be exercised by anyone else. The scheme of the Act to which we have referred earlier contra indicates such appellate authority to be a persona designata. It is clear that the appellate authority constituted under Section 18(1) has to decide lis between parties in a judicial manner and subject to the revision of its order, the decision would remain final between the parties. Such an authority is constituted by designation as the District Judge of the district having jurisdiction over the area over which the said Act has been extended. Such an authority is constituted by designation as the District Judge of the district having jurisdiction over the area over which the said Act has been extended. It becomes obvious that even though the District Judge concerned might retire or get transferred or may otherwise cease to hold the office of the District Judge his successor in office can pick up the thread of the proceedings from the stage where it was left by his predecessor and can function as an appellate authority under Section 18. If the District Judge was constituted as an appellate authority being a persona designata or as a named person being the appellate authority as assumed in the present case, such a consequence, on the scheme of the Act would not follow. In this connection, it is useful to refer to a decision of this court in the case of Central Talkies Ltd., Kanpur v. Dwarka Prasad ( AIR 1961 SC 606 ). In that case Hidayatullah, J. speaking for the court had to consider whether Additional District Magistrate empowered under Section 10(2) of Criminal Procedure Code to exercise powers of District Magistrate was a persona designata. Repelling the contention that he was a persona designata the learned Judge made the following pertinent observations : "A persona designata is a "a person who is pointed out or described as an individual as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of a class, or as filing a particular character." (See Osborn's Concise Law Dictionary, 4th Edn., p. 253). In the words of Schwabe, C.J. in Parthasaradhi Naidu v. Koteswara Rao, ILR 47 Mad. 369 : (AIR 1924 Mad. 561) (FB), personae designatae are "persons selected to act in their private capacity and not in their capacity as Judges." The same consideration applies also to a well known officer like the District Magistrate named by virtue of his office, and whose powers the Additional District Magistrate can also exercise and who can create other officers equal to himself for the purposes of the Eviction Act. The decision of Sapru, J. in the Allahabad case, with respect, was erroneous." Applying the said test to the facts of the present case it becomes obvious that appellate authorities as constituted under Section 18 of the Rent Act being the District Judges they constituted a class and cannot be considered to be persona designata. The decision of Sapru, J. in the Allahabad case, with respect, was erroneous." Applying the said test to the facts of the present case it becomes obvious that appellate authorities as constituted under Section 18 of the Rent Act being the District Judges they constituted a class and cannot be considered to be persona designata. It is true that in this connection, the majority decision of the High Court in Jokkim Fernandez v. Amina Kunhi Umma also took a contrary view. But the said view also does not stand scrutiny in the light of the statutory scheme regarding constitution of appellate authority under the Act and the powers conferred on and the decisions rendered by it." 39. In SBP & Co. (supra), seven-judges Bench of Supreme Court reiterated the same principle for defining persona designata. The Court held : "13. It is common ground that the Act has adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. But at the same time, it has made some departures from the model law. Section 11 is in the place of Articles 11 of the Model Law. The Model Law provides for the making of a request under Article 11 to "the court or other authority specified in Article 6 to make the necessary measure." The words in Section 11 of the Act, are the Chief Justice or the person or institution designated by him." The fact that instead of the court, the powers are conferred on the Chief Justice, has to be appreciated in the context of the statute "Court" is defined in the Act to be the principal civil court of original jurisdiction of the district and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction. The principal civil court of original jurisdiction is normally the District Court. The High Courts in India exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction are not too many. So in most of the States the court concerned would be the District Court. Obviously, the Parliament did not want to confer the power on the District Court, to entertain a request for appointing an arbitrator or for constituting an arbitral tribunal under Section 11 of the Act. It has to be noted that under Section 9 of the Act, the District Court or the High Court exercising original jurisdiction, has the power to make interim orders prior to, during or even post arbitration. It has to be noted that under Section 9 of the Act, the District Court or the High Court exercising original jurisdiction, has the power to make interim orders prior to, during or even post arbitration. It has also the power to entertain a challenge to the award that may ultimately be made. The framers of the statute must certainly be taken to have been conscious of the definition of "court" in the Act. It is easily possible to contemplate that they did not want the power under Section 11 to be conferred on the District Court or the High Court exercising original jurisdiction. The intention apparently was to confer the power on the highest judicial authority in the State and in the country, on Chief Justices of High Courts and on the Chief Justice of India. Such a provision is necessarily intended to add the greatest credibility to the arbitral process. The argument that the power thus conferred on the Chief Justice could not even be delegated to any other Judge of the High Court or of the Supreme Court, stands negatived only because of the power given to designate another. The intention of the legislature appears to be clear that it wanted to ensure that the power under Section 11 (6) of the Act was exercised by the highest judicial authority in the State or in the country concerned. This is to ensure the utmost authority to the process of constituting the Arbitral Tribunal. 14. Normally, when a power is conferred on the highest judicial authority who normally performs judicial functions and is the head of the judiciary of the State or of the country, it is difficult to assume that the power is conferred on the Chief Justice as persona designata. Under Section 11 (6), the Chief Justice is given a power to designate another to perform the functions under the provision. That power has generally been designated to a Judge of the High Court or of the Supreme Court respectively. Persona designata, according to Black's Law Dictionary, means "A person considered as an individual rather than as a member of a class". When the power is conferred on the Chief Justices of the High Courts, the power is conferred on a class and not considering that person as an individual. Persona designata, according to Black's Law Dictionary, means "A person considered as an individual rather than as a member of a class". When the power is conferred on the Chief Justices of the High Courts, the power is conferred on a class and not considering that person as an individual. In the Central Talkies Ltd., Kanpur v. Dwarka Prasad ( 1961(3) SCR 495 ) while considering the status in which the power was to be exercised by the District Magistrate under the United Provinces (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, this Court held : "a persona designata is "a person who is pointed out or described as an individual, as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of a class, or as filling a particular character." (See Osborn's Concise Law Dictionary, 4th Edition, p. 253). In the words of Schwabe, C.J., in Parthasaradhi Naidu v. Koteswara Rao, I.L.R. 47 Mad. 369 FB.] personae designatae are, "persons selected to act in their private capacity and not in their capacity as Judges." The same consideration applies also to a well-known officer like the District Magistrate named by virtue of his office, and whose powers the Additional District Magistrate can also exercise and who can create other officers equal to himself for the purpose of the Eviction Act." In Mukri Gopalan v. Chappllat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker [ 1995(5) SCC 5 ] this Court after quoting the above passage from the Central Talkies Ltd., Kanpur v. Dwarka Prasad, applied the test to come to the conclusion that when Section 18 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 constituted the District Judge as an Appellate Authority under that Act, it was a case where the authority was being conferred on District Judges who constituted a class and, therefore, the Appellate Authority could not be considered to be persona designata. What can be gathered from P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Advanced Law Lexicon, 3rd Edition, 2005, is that 'persona designata' is a person selected to act in his private capacity and not in his capacity as a judge. He is a person pointed out or described as an individual as opposed to a person as ascertained as a member of a class or as filling a particular character. He is a person pointed out or described as an individual as opposed to a person as ascertained as a member of a class or as filling a particular character. It is also seen that one of the tests to be applied is to see whether the person concerned could exercise the power only so long as he holds office or could exercise the power even subsequently. Obviously, on ceasing to be a Chief Justice, the person referred to in Section 11 (6) of the Act could not exercise the power. Thus, it is clear that the power is conferred on the Chief Justice under Section 11(6) of the Act not as persona designata." In Smt. Veena Lodha (supra) ratio decidendi of Smt. Pushpa Devi is again reiterated. 40. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that District Judge while hearing an election petition under Section 31 of the Act of 2009 acts as persona designata cannot be accepted. Thus, this plea of the petitioner is hereby rejected. 41. Even otherwise, all these petitions are filed by invoking supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution and, therefore, the Court is required to exercise such jurisdiction with utmost care and circumspection. There is apparently no reason to interfere with the impugned orders as the same have not resulted in miscarriage of justice. It is also evident that learned court below has not passed the orders in dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of law. The supervisory jurisdiction of this Court is confined only to see whether an inferior court or tribunal has proceeded within its parameters and not to correct an error apparent on the face of record, much less of an error of law. 42. The upshot of above discussion is that I find no error in the impugned orders and consequently all these writ petitions fail and are hereby dismissed. 43. A copy of this order be placed in all the connected aforesaid files.