JUDGMENT : S.N. Prasad, J. This writ petition is against the award passed in Industrial Dispute Case No.37 of 1994 dtd.31.12.2005 passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Bhubaneswar whereby and where under the award has been answered in favour of the workmen. 2. The brief fact of the case of the petitioner, State of Orissa is that the award was passed by the Industrial Tribunal on 21.11.1997 arising out of reference made by the Government in exercise of power conferred upon them by Sec.12(5) read with Section 10(1) of the Industrial Dispute Act 1947. The petitioner – State of Orissa had filed writ petition before this court being O.J.C. No.5161 of 1998, while disposing of the writ petition vide order dtd.25.3.2004 this court has set aside the award and remanded back the matter with a direction to re-hear after giving adequate opportunity to the parties and accordingly the award has been passed on 31st December 2005 which is under challenge on the ground that it is contrary to the evidence on record and passed on incorrect appreciation of law. The Tribunal had not taken into consideration the document produced regarding the fact that the workmen were not engaged conditionally for 240 days within 12 calendar months, the workmen were engaged for a specific period and when engagement was temporary in nature and the case clearly covered by Sections 2-(00)(bb) and Sections 2(00) & 25-F will be applicable in the case of opposite parties. The Government Department of Irrigation is not an Industry rather it is part of the sovereign function of the State and as such the provision of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 are not applicable. The averment made by them in the affidavit whereby and where under they have been given declaration that they have performed their duties for 240 days in calendar year before retrenchment cannot be said to be sufficient evidence for the Tribunal to come to the conclusion that the workmen had in fact worked for 240 days. 3. While on the other had the case of opposite party – workmen is that they had been engaged as N.M.Rs. and D.L.Rs. employees by the petitioner Management under different irrigation programmes which includes construction and maintenance of irrigation channels, maintenance and watch and ward of river embankment during flood time, etc. 3. While on the other had the case of opposite party – workmen is that they had been engaged as N.M.Rs. and D.L.Rs. employees by the petitioner Management under different irrigation programmes which includes construction and maintenance of irrigation channels, maintenance and watch and ward of river embankment during flood time, etc. and for such work there is regular engagement of N.M.R. and D.L.R. employees by the petitioner but they have illegally been retrenched which led them to raise an objection, on failure the dispute has been referred before the Industrial Tribunal for its adjudication being reference case No.37 of 1994. They have submitted that there is no infirmity in the award, rather the Tribunal after going through the various evidence adduced by the management as well as the workmen has came to a conscious finding that they have worked for 240 days and thereby after appreciating the fact that the provision of Section 25(b) has been violated, hence the award has been passed answering the reference in favour of the workmen. 4. Heard the learned counsels for the parties and perused the documents available on record. After appreciating the rival submission of the parties it is evident that the workmen who had been engaged as N.M.R./D.L.R. in order to perform the work under the Irrigation Department of the State Government and when retrenched they have raised a dispute and the appropriate Government has made a reference by referring the same before learned Tribunal as to “Whether the action of the Executive Engineer, Balasore, Irrigation Division, Balasore in retrenching the following workmen from the date mentioned against each is legal and/or justified? If not to what relief they are entitled?” Name Designation Date of Retrenchment 1. Sri Gopinath Rana N.M.R. 14.8.1989 2. Sri Sachindra Prasad Das N.M.R. 23.5.1989 3. Sri Brundaban Bhanja N.M.R. 31.7.1989 4. Sri Raghunath Puhan D.L.R. 31.7.1989 5. Sri Dibakar Das N.M.R. 14.8.1989 5. If not to what relief they are entitled?” Name Designation Date of Retrenchment 1. Sri Gopinath Rana N.M.R. 14.8.1989 2. Sri Sachindra Prasad Das N.M.R. 23.5.1989 3. Sri Brundaban Bhanja N.M.R. 31.7.1989 4. Sri Raghunath Puhan D.L.R. 31.7.1989 5. Sri Dibakar Das N.M.R. 14.8.1989 5. After the reference having been made the Industrial Tribunal has passed the award on 21.11.1997 in Industrial Dispute Case No.37 of 1994 but the same was challenged by the petitioner – management before this court vide O.J.C. No.5161 of 1998 and while disposing of the writ petition the award passed by the Tribunal dtd.21.11.1997 has been set aside, the matter has been remitted before the Tribunal to adjudicate the issue afresh and in view thereof the matter has been heard de novo and the award has been passed on 31st December, 2005 which is impugned in this writ petition. After going through the award the Tribunal has framed three issues:- (i) Whether the reference is maintainable ? (ii) Whether the action of the Executive Engineer, Balasore Irrigation Division, Balasore in retrenching the following workmen from the dates mentioned against each is legal and/or justified ? (iii) If not, to what relief they are entitled ? Name Designation Date of Retrenchment 1. Sri Gopinath Rana N.M.R. 14.8.1989 2. Sri Sachindra Prasad Das N.M.R. 23.5.1989 3. Sri Brundaban Bhanja N.M.R. 31.7.1989 4. Sri Raghunath Puhan D.L.R. 31.7.1989 5. Sri Dibakar Das N.M.R. 14.8.1989 It transpires from the award that the workmen got examined themselves, the management examined the Jr. Engineers of the Irrigation Department, Soro and Khaira Sub-Division of Markona Section and produced documentary evidence marked as Exhibits-A to C and C/1. From perusal of these exhibits the Tribunal has came to a conscious finding that the workmen were working in a construction of a canal, certainly a time-bound project within the scope of section 25-FFF(2) of the Industrial Dispute Act. Their disengagement at a proximate time from the two groups is suggestive of the closure of the work site. The statute is very clear and specific that if the construction work of the canal was completed within period of two years the same will come under Section 25-FFF(2) of the Industrial Dispute Act for disentitlement of compensation under clause (b) of Section 25-F of the Industrial Dispute Act. The statute is very clear and specific that if the construction work of the canal was completed within period of two years the same will come under Section 25-FFF(2) of the Industrial Dispute Act for disentitlement of compensation under clause (b) of Section 25-F of the Industrial Dispute Act. It further transpires that on going through the Exhibits-A, B, C & C/1, certain workmen witness nos.1, 2, 4 and 5 have worked for more than one year under the management unfettered with the temporary breaks in their job engagement. The workmen witness no.1 Gopinath Rana, Workmen witness no.2, Dibakar Das, workmen witness no.4, Raghunath Puhan and workmen witness no.5 Brundaban Bhanja are to be governed by the provision of Section 25-FFF of the I.D. Act and are entitled to wages not exceeding their average pay for three months. Unfortunately workmen witness no.3 Sachindraprasad Das not having completed the span of continuous service of one year is not entitled to any compensation. And the said award has been questioned by the petitioner management before this court under writ jurisdiction by filing writ petition being O.J.C. no.5161 of 1998 and on the basis of direction passed by this court the order has been passed afresh by the Tribunal. Learned Tribunal while answering issue no.4 as to whether workmen have completed 240 days of continuous service or not has appreciated the rival submission of the parties and came to conclusion that five workmen have performed their work for 240 days with the management. This finding has been given after going through Exhibits-A, B, C and C/1 which supports the contention of the workmen that they have rendered their services for the management. The management has failed to produce any measurement book, admittedly available with it or the voucher of wages in respect of the workmen in order to make the position clear. The management has also not produced any document as to what was the nature of appointment of the workmen. After taking into consideration the approach of the management who has not produced the relevant document in order to adjudicate the issue in a proper manner, hence adverse inference has been drawn against the management – petitioner and accordingly the issue no.4 has been answered in favour of the workmen. After taking into consideration the approach of the management who has not produced the relevant document in order to adjudicate the issue in a proper manner, hence adverse inference has been drawn against the management – petitioner and accordingly the issue no.4 has been answered in favour of the workmen. The Tribunal after answering issue no.4 has also answered issue nos.2 and 3 holding therein that there is violation of Section 25(F) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947. The contention raised by the petitioner – State of Orissa that merely on the basis of averment made by the opposite party – workmen the award has been passed and as such the same is not sustainable but we are not inclined to accept this submission for the reason that admittedly the workmen – opposite party are the workmen working under the management – State of Orissa. It is also not in dispute that the workmen have performed their duties for construction work having been initiated by State of Orissa through its Irrigation Department. The only question is to be examined by the Tribunal as to whether the workmen have performed their duties for continuous period of 240 days as provided U/s.25(b) making them entitled to get the benefit of protection of Section 25-F of the Act 1947. The further admitted fact in this case is that the workmen have been paid their wages as prescribed by the Government and as such there is no dispute about the fact that the wages must have been paid on the basis of muster roll and after going through the attendance register, but these two documents which were vital for consideration of continuity of service of the workmen has not been produced by the State of Orissa being the management which ultimately goes to show that a vital document has been suppressed from the Tribunal and it is settled that withholding documents from Court is fraud. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in the case of S. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. Vrs. Jagannath (dead) by L.Rs. and others, AIR 1994 SC 853 . Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in the case of S. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. Vrs. Jagannath (dead) by L.Rs. and others, AIR 1994 SC 853 . It is also not in dispute regarding the settled proposition that if certain document is not being produced by the party before the court, the adverse inference is to be drawn and accordingly adopting this settled proposition of law adverse inference has been drawn by the Tribunal after considering the fact that the workmen have performed their duties and only in order to deprive them from their legitimate claim so that they may not come within the purview of definition of continuous service as provided U/s.25(b) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 the document has not been produced by the State of Orissa, the petitioner herein before the Tribunal, hence the Tribunal has answered the reference in favour of the workmen. 6. Now the question which has been raised by the petitioner while assailing the award is that merely on the basis of an affidavit the award has been passed, but this argument is not available as because the petitioner has been provided with opportunity to rebut the statement of the workmen, but intentionally they have not produced the relevant document, hence they cannot take this plea before the writ court. The Tribunal has given its finding on the basis of the fact that the management has not rebutted the specific stand taken by the workmen either by way of oral evidence or by documentary evidence and it is very difficult for the daily rated employee to have access to the documents like muster roll, etc. in connection with his service; and he deposed this before Tribunal, the burden of proof shifts upon the employer to prove that he did not complete 240 days of service in the requisite period to constitute continuous service; reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Director, Fisheries Terminal Division vrs. Bhikubhai Meghajibhai Chavda reported in AIR 2010 SC 1236 , wherein their Lordships at para-15 has been held, which is being quoted herein below:- “Para-15. Applying the principles laid down in the above case by this Court, the evidence produced by the appellants has not been consistent. Bhikubhai Meghajibhai Chavda reported in AIR 2010 SC 1236 , wherein their Lordships at para-15 has been held, which is being quoted herein below:- “Para-15. Applying the principles laid down in the above case by this Court, the evidence produced by the appellants has not been consistent. The appellants claim that the respondent did not work for 240 days. The respondent was a workman hired on a daily wage basis. So it is obvious, as this Court pointed out in the above case that he would have difficulty in having access to all the official documents, muster rolls etc. in connection with his service. He has come forward and deposed, so in our opinion the burden of proof shifts to the employer/appellants to prove that he did not complete 240 days of service in the requisite period to constitute continuous service. ” But we find that no such steps were taken by the management to disprove this fact in spite of full contest in the case, hence the Tribunal has come to finding that the workman has performed his duty regularly for period of 240 days which is the requirement for getting protection under Section 25-F of the I.D. Act, 1947 as contemplated under Section 25-B of the I.D. Act, 1947. 7. Now the question with respect to review of the order passed by the Tribunal sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the same has been dealt with by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob Vrs. K. S. Radhakrishnan and others, AIR 1964 SC 477 wherein it paragraph 7 their Lordships have been pleaded to hold as follows:- “7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals; these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdictions. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals; these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdictions. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of tact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the. Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was' insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised.” The proposition laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob (supra) still holds good and in this respect reference may be made to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of M/s.Pepsico India Holding Pvt. Ltd. Vrs. Krishna Kant Pandey, (2015) 4 SCC 270 wherein their Lordships while discussing the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the matter of showing interference with the finding of the Tribunal has been pleased to hold after placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao Vrs. Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447 as follows: “17. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of his Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarta where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and reappreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J. as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at p. 1301 of the report as follows: (SCC p. 864, para 7) “The special civil application preferred by the appellant was admittedly an application under Article 227 and it is, therefore, material only to consider the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the High Court under that article. Did the High Court have jurisdiction in an application under Article 227 to disturb the findings of fact reached by the District Court? It is well settled by the decision of this Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath that the ... Did the High Court have jurisdiction in an application under Article 227 to disturb the findings of fact reached by the District Court? It is well settled by the decision of this Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath that the ... power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways v. Sukumar Mukherjee to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bose v. Commr. of Hills Division and it was pointed out by Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the court in that case: It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” There is no dispute about the settled proposition that this court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot act as a court of appeal to defer the finding given by the Tribunal or any authority judicial or quasi-judicial based upon cogent evidence and the materials placed before it and further in our considered view there is no mistake apparent on the face of the record. After taking into consideration the facts as discussed herein above and on the basis of the fact by which the award has been passed by the Tribunal, in our considered view there is no need to make any interference in the same. Accordingly the writ petition fails and it is dismissed.