ORDER 1. They are heard. 2. The petitioner association is claiming to be an association of occupants and lessee of the Electronic Complex, Pardeshipura, Indore. They are aggrieved by the imposition of property tax upon them and also against the recovery and demand of the same from them. 3. The main contention of the petitioner is that since the land on which the construction stands has been allotted to them by the State Government on lease and since the ownership of the land allotted to them vests in the State Government the land is exempted from the imposition of property tax under section 136 of the Municipal Corporation Act, 1956. It is also submitted that the said land has no ownership rights and has been transferred to them by virtue of the lease deed and thus, the State Government being the owner of the land in question, no property tax can been recovered from them by the answering respondents. 4. This issue has been raised in the case of M/s. Sairetred Ward Industrial Area Sehore v. The State of M.P., in Writ Petition No.12481/2014 before the Principal Seat at Jabalpur. 5. The Division Bench by order dated 28.8.2015 disposed of the petition by passing the following order :- “These petitions take exception to the demand notice issued by the respondent Municipal Council,calling upon the respective petitioner to pay property tax. 2. According to the petitioners, the subject land is owned by and vested in the State Government. That fact is indisputable. If it is so, no property tax is payable in respect of such a property, in view of the mandate in 4 section 127A read with sections 147 and 148 of the M.P. Municipalities Act, 1961. 3. The stand of the Municipal Council, on the other hand, is that open (vacant) plot was given on 99 years lease to the concerned petitioners. That amounts to transfer of property in favour of the petitioner, hence not covered by the excepted category mentioned in section 127A of the Act. Further, after allotment of open plot to the concerned petitioners, they have constructed industrial shade thereon; which obviously is of the ownership of the petitioners. Concept of dual ownership of property is well established. In that, the land may belong to another person and the structure constructed thereon may be owned and occupied by the lessee or licensee. 4. Further, after allotment of open plot to the concerned petitioners, they have constructed industrial shade thereon; which obviously is of the ownership of the petitioners. Concept of dual ownership of property is well established. In that, the land may belong to another person and the structure constructed thereon may be owned and occupied by the lessee or licensee. 4. Counsel for the respondents further submit that the matters in issue will have to be resolved in statutory appeal available to the petitioners, as factual aspects (which may be disputed) cannot be decided in writ jurisdiction. Reliance has been placed on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of S. Goyanka Lime and Chemicals, Katni v. Nagar Panchayat, Katni [ 2011 (2) MPLJ 219 ], to buttress this submission. 5. Having considered the rival submissions, we may first address the preliminary objection about the maintainability of writ petition, in the light of statutory remedy of appeal available to the concerned petitioners. Indeed, the writ Court should be loath to entertain in writ petition, if efficacious statutory remedy of appeal is available and moreso when the factual matrix is contested. However, if the grievance is about the impugned action being without jurisdiction and can be established on indisputable facts, there is no reason why the High Court cannot examine such grievance, notwithstanding the statutory remedy of appeal. 6. Keeping this in mind, we may now proceed to examine the grievance of the petitioners. Their argument proceeds on the assumption that since the building constructed is on the land owned by and vesting in the State Government, even the building is also exempted from the liability to pay property tax, within the meaning of section 127A of the Act. This argument, in our opinion, is untenable. Inasmuch as, section 127-A postulates that the property tax to be levied under sub-section (1) of section 127-A, shall not be leviable in respect of “building and land” owned by or vesting in the State Government. On a bare reading of this provision,it is amply clear that the land as well as building occupied by private person must be owned by and vested in the State Government. From the lease-deed, which is appended to the writ petition,in particular the schedule thereunder, it appears that no building was given on lease. On a bare reading of this provision,it is amply clear that the land as well as building occupied by private person must be owned by and vested in the State Government. From the lease-deed, which is appended to the writ petition,in particular the schedule thereunder, it appears that no building was given on lease. Building has been constructed on the vacant plot given by the State Government to the lessee (the petitioners). The petitioners on their own and at their costs, have constructed the building or industrial shades. It is nowhere stated muchless expressly, in the writ petitions, that the building presently occupied by the concerned petitioner is also owned by and is vested in the State Government. Assuming that in a given case, such position can be established, that will be a matter, which can be answered by the appellate Authority,being a fact finding Authority. In our opinion, therefore, the respondents may be right in pointing out the exposition in the case of S.Goyanka Lime and Chemicals, katni, (supra), that the petitioners be relegated before the appellate Authority. 7. Counsel for the petitioners, however, submits that the demand raised towards property tax by the Municipal Council, is without jurisdiction also because it is in respect of the land owned by and vesting in the State Government, in the guise of demand in respect of building occupied by the petitioner. As aforesaid, that question can also be resolved in the appeal proceedings, if substantiated by the concerned petitioners. Indeed,if the property tax is in respect of land, which is owned by and vesting in the State Government, the fact that the same is given on lease, will not make it amenable to property tax, as is evident from section 127-A of the Act. 8. As aforesaid, if the petitioner “fails to establish”that the structure occupied by the concerned petitioner is owned by and vested in the State Government, the argument that such property is not amenable to property tax, will be unavailable. In other words, only such petitioner, who is able to substantiate the fact that even the building occupied by him, is owned by and vested in the State Government, would be exempted from payment of property tax in respect of such building by virtue of the exemption provided under section 127-A of the Act and not otherwise. 9. In other words, only such petitioner, who is able to substantiate the fact that even the building occupied by him, is owned by and vested in the State Government, would be exempted from payment of property tax in respect of such building by virtue of the exemption provided under section 127-A of the Act and not otherwise. 9. Besides this, nothing more is required to be said in the present petitions; nor we are inclined to examine the factual aspects, which in our opinion, must be examined by the appellate Authority. 10. We may, however, observe that if the petitioners resort to remedy of statutory appeal within 30 days from today, the appeal so filed will have to be decided on merits and not to be thrown out at the threshold on the ground of being barred by limitation. Inasmuch as, it is because of the preliminary objection taken by the respondents counsel, we are relegating the petitioners before the appellate authority and the respondents, therefore, cannot be permitted to argue to the contrary before the appellate authority. 11. The appellate authority must examine the concerned appeal expeditiously in accordance with law. All questions relevant for deciding appeal are kept open. 12. Petitions are disposed of accordingly.” 6. As the appeal is provided under section 184 of the Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, we on terms of Para-10 of the order passed in the case of M/s. Sairetred Ward Industrial Area Sehore v. The State of M.P., in Writ Petition No.12481/2014 disposed of the writ petition by directing the petitioner to avail the remedy of appeal provided under section 184 of the Municipal Corporation Act, 1956. The appellate authority shall examine the concerned appeal expeditiously in accordance with law. All questions relevant for deciding the appeal are kept open. 7. With the aforesaid, Writ Petition No.1970/2016 is disposed of. Prashant Upadhyay for petitioner; Amol Shrivastava for respondents No.2 and 3.