JUDGMENT Ram Surat Ram (Maurya), J. 1. Heard Sri M.A. Khan, Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Mohiuddin, for the petitioner and Sri U.S. Sahai and Sri N. K. Seth, for the contesting respondents-3 and 4. 2. The writ petition has been filed against the orders of Naib-Tahsildar dated 07.04.2005 and 10.10.2005 and Additional Collector dated 28.02.2006, in mutation proceeding under U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 3. The dispute between the parties is in respect of plot 491 (area 19 biswa, 16 biswansi, 6 kachwansi) of village Farrukhabad Chillawan, pargana Bijnore, district Lucknow, of which, admittedly, Raghubeer Prasad was last recorded tenure holder, who died on 09.04.1985. It is alleged that Smt. Shanti Devi (respondent-5) filed an application (registered as Case No. 56/287/94) under Section 34 of the Act, for mutation of her name over the land in dispute, on the basis of unregistered will dated 02.09.1984, allegedly executed by Raghubeer Prasad, in her favour. Naib Tahsildar allowed the mutation application, by order dated 02.12.1994. 4. Smt. Shanti Devi, thereafter, executed a sale deed dated 17.12.1996 of the land in dispute in favour of Ibrahim Khan (the petitioner). Then, the petitioner filed an application (registered as Case No. 381/252/97) under Section 34 of the Act, for mutation of his name over the land in dispute, on the basis of sale deed dated 17.12.1996, which was allowed by Naib-Tahsildar by order dated 02.01.1999. 5. Upendra Kumar Verma and Surendra Kumar Verma (respondents-3 and 4) (hereinafter referred to as the respondents) filed separate applications under Section 201 of the Act, on 07.05.2004 before Naib-Tahsildar, for recalling, orders dated 02.12.1994 and 02.01.1999 and rehearing aforementioned mutation cases, claiming that they were sons of Raghubeer Prasad and are his only heirs and alleged will set up by Smt. Shanti Devi was forged and fabricated document. Naib-Tahsildar gave opportunity to the parties to file their objection, evidence. Notice was served upon Smt. Shanti Devi through publication but she did not appear. The petitioner contested the applications and filed his documentary evidence and examined Ibrahim Khan and Shyam Lal as witnesses. The respondents filed various documents and examined Bharat Singh and Ram Nath as witnesses. Naib-Tahsildar heard oral arguments of the parties on 21.12.2004 and permitted then to file written arguments also. They also filed written arguments. Naib-Tahisldar, by impugned order dated 07.04.2005, recalled the orders dated 02.12.1994 and 02.01.1999. The respondents filed various documents and examined Bharat Singh and Ram Nath as witnesses. Naib-Tahsildar heard oral arguments of the parties on 21.12.2004 and permitted then to file written arguments also. They also filed written arguments. Naib-Tahisldar, by impugned order dated 07.04.2005, recalled the orders dated 02.12.1994 and 02.01.1999. He further found that Smt. Shanti Devi or the petitioner did not file alleged will dated 02.09.1984 either before passing of the order dated 02.12.1994 or thereafter nor examined attesting witness of that will. Smt. Shanti Devi (respondent-5) belonged to another caste and did not belong to the family of Raghubeer Prasad as such alleged will dated 02.09.1984 was surrounded with suspicious circumstances, in as much as Raghubeer Prasad had two sons and his wife and there was no reason for him to execute will in favour of an out sider. Order dated 02.12.1994, passed on the basis of alleged will dated 02.09.1984, was liable to be set aside. The respondents specifically alleged that Smt. Shanti Devi was a fake and impostor lady. These allegations have not been denied as such it shall be deemed to be admitted. Various efforts made by the Court to effect service on Smt. Shanti Devi failed. Smt. Shanti Devi had no right over the land in dispute as such she had no right to sell it and sale deed dated 17.12.1996 executed by her was void. The order dated 02.01.1999 passed in Case No. 381/252/97 on its basis was also liable to be set aside. From evidence on record, it was proved that Raghubeer Prasad, recorded tenure holder died on 09.04.1985 and his wife Smt. Leela Devi died on 18.03.2002, the respondents were their sons and only heirs under Section 171 of U.P. Act No.1 of 1951. On these findings, he recalled orders dated 02.12.1994 and 02.01.1999 and dismissed mutation applications of Smt. Shanti Devi and the petitioner and directed for mutation of the names of the respondents. 6. The petitioner filed an application dated 17.05.2005 for recall of order dated 07.04.2005. Naib-Tahsildar by order dated 10.10.2005 rejected the recall application. The petitioner filed a revision (registered as Revision No. 18 of 2005-06) against the aforesaid order. The revision was heard by Additional Collector, who by order dated 28.02.2006 dismissed the revision. Hence this writ petition has been filed. 7. Naib-Tahsildar by order dated 10.10.2005 rejected the recall application. The petitioner filed a revision (registered as Revision No. 18 of 2005-06) against the aforesaid order. The revision was heard by Additional Collector, who by order dated 28.02.2006 dismissed the revision. Hence this writ petition has been filed. 7. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that order dated 07.04.2005 was an exparte order but recall application filed by the petitioner was illegally dismissed by Naib-Tahsildar, on irrelevant consideration that sale deed dated 17.12.1996 was in respect of land lying within limit of tahsil Mohan Lal Ganj although limits of sadar tahsil Lucknow and Mohan Lal Ganj were subsequently changed. At the time of filing mutation application by Smt. Shanti Devi and the petitioner, land in dispute was within jurisdiction of tahsil Mohan Lal Ganj and at the time of deciding recall applications it came within jurisdiction of sadar tahsil Lucknow as such respondent-2 had jurisdiction to decide it. The respondents earlier appeared in mutation Case No. 381/252/97 and filed their objection on 24.09.1998, their recall applications filed on 07.05.2004 was not maintainable. The applications were highly time barred and there was no cause for condoning inordinate delay. The applications were liable to be rejected on the ground of limitation and maintainabilty. In any case, order dated 02.12.1994 and 02.01.1999 were passed after due proclamation being issued/served and not liable to be recalled. The petitioner is a bonafide transferee for valuable consideration, without notice, as the name of Smt. Shanti Devi was already mutated over the land in dispute by order dated 02.12.1994. His right was liable to be protected. Smt. Shanti Devi had already parted with the land in dispute as such she did not come forward to contest recall application in collusion of the respondents. Naib-Tahsildar has no jurisdiction to adjudicate validity of the sale deed, it has been illegally not only declared as void but also set aside. The orders of the Courts below are illegal and liable to be set aside. 8. He relied upon the judgement of Board of Revenue, UP in Ranjeet Chaubey Vs. Jahangeer Khan, 1966 RD 423 , in which it has been held that mutation proceeding are of a summary in nature and revenue courts are not expected to look the question of title. The possession of a trespasser has to be ignored. 8. He relied upon the judgement of Board of Revenue, UP in Ranjeet Chaubey Vs. Jahangeer Khan, 1966 RD 423 , in which it has been held that mutation proceeding are of a summary in nature and revenue courts are not expected to look the question of title. The possession of a trespasser has to be ignored. The possession can either be de facto or actual in the strict sense of the word or it can be de jure. In the sense that the word 'de jure' recital in the sale deed by the vendor delivering possession of the property in dispute to the vendee is adequate for purposes of ordering mutation in revenue papers. A larger Bench judgement of Board of Revenue in Dassiyan Vs. Smt. Sukhan, 1977 RD page 211 in which it has been held that possession for the purposes of Section 34/40 of the Act decided on the basis of actual or constructive possession based on lawful succession or transfer. The concept of so-called remote heir in possession ousting a preferential heir is not warranted by the law. Judgment of this Court in Puran Singh Vs. Board of Revenue, UP, Allahabad and others, 2004 (96) RD 98 in which it has been held that the Board of Revenue while deciding the revision arising out of mutation proceeding has no jurisdiction to decide the title. A judgment of this Court in Writ C No. 54589 of 2007 (Prabhu Dayal and others Vs. Board of Revenue and others ) decided on 2.3.2012 in which it has been held that revenue court has no jurisdiction to cancel the sale deed and a judgment of this Court in Committee of Management, Gangadin Ram Kumar Inter Collage, Ramgarh Barwan, Distt. Jaunpur Vs. Deputy Director of Education, Vth Region, Varanasi and others 2006 (24) LCD 1328 , in which relying upon the judgement of Supreme Court in Dhirajlal Girdharilal Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 271 , it has been held that it is well established that when a court of fact acts on material, partly relevant and partly irrelevant, it is impossible to say to what extent the mind of the court was affected by the irrelevant material used by it in arriving at its finding. 9. 9. In reply to the aforesaid arguments, the counsel for the respondents submitted that land in dispute was jointly purchased by Bishambhar Dayal Verma and Raghubeer Prasad Verma through sale deed dated 01.07.1968. Bishambhar Dayal Verma died on 31.01.1971 issueless. Thereafter, Smt. Shanti Srivastava widow of Suraj Narain Lal Srivastava, who was niece of Bishambhar Dayal Verma produced a Will dated 18.10.1970 allegedly executed by Bishambhar Dayal Verma in her favour for registration under Section 40 of the Registration Act 1908. Chief Sub - Registrar Lucknow, after hearing the parties by order dated 2.7.1970 disbelieved the execution of the Will and refused registration. Thereafter Raghubeer Prasad Verma filed a suit registered as Regular Civil Suit No. 39 of 1971 for permanent injunction restraining Ram Krishna Mishra and Smt. Shanti Srivastava from interfering in his possession over the land in dispute. The suit was decreed in terms of compromise by order dated 12.1.1980 by civil court at Lucknow. A part of the property was let out to Health Department, State of UP through lease deed dated 10.10.1968 in which Sliver Jubilee Health Care School was being run by State of UP. Raghubeer Prasad Verma filed a suit registered as Suit No. 84/84 for ejectment of Silver Jubilee Health Care School, Horticulture Department, State of UP. During pendency of the suit Raghubeer Prasad Verma died and the respondents as well as Smt. Lila Verma were substituted as his heirs. Subsequently, the suit was decreed on 12.12.2000. In the meantime, another Will has been fabricated which was allegedly executed by Raghubeer Prasad Verma on 2.9.1984 in favour of Smt. Shanti Devi (respondent-5) who is an imposter lady and on its basis an application for mutation i.e. Case No. 56/287/1994 was filed which was allowed without due proclamation by order dated 2.12.1994. The petitioner allegedly obtained a sale deed dated 17.12.1996 from Smt. Shanti Devi and also filed an application for mutation i.e. Case No. 381/252/1997. In this case a fake objection dated 22.9.1998 was filed in the name of Smt. Lila Verma, mother of the respondents along with respondents. Thereafter Naib Tehsildar allowed the mutation application by order dated 2.1.1999. On coming to know about the orders dated 2.12.1994 and 2.1.1999, the respondents filed an application under Section 201 of the Act on 7.5.2004 for recall of the aforesaid orders. In the application, the petitioner appeared and filed his objection. Thereafter Naib Tehsildar allowed the mutation application by order dated 2.1.1999. On coming to know about the orders dated 2.12.1994 and 2.1.1999, the respondents filed an application under Section 201 of the Act on 7.5.2004 for recall of the aforesaid orders. In the application, the petitioner appeared and filed his objection. The oral arguments of both the parties were heard on 21.12.2004 by Naib Tehsildar and the parties were given opportunity to file written arguments also. Thereafter, written arguments were also filed and the case was decided by order dated 7.4.2005. The recall application was filed on false allegations and was not maintainable as such it has been rejected by the order dated 10.10.2005 and revision filed by the petitioner has also been dismissed by order dated 28.2.2006. In the writ petition, the petitioner has initially not supplied the full address of Smt. Shanti Devi. On the application of the respondents the full address has been supplied and notices have been issued on the address so supplied by the petitioner. Thereafter Smt. Shanti Devi filed her affidavit in this writ petition denying of filing any mutation application as well as execution of sale deed in favour of the petitioner by her. Thus it has been fully proved that the alleged Will dated 2.9.1984 was forged and fabricated paper and on its basis some imposter filed mutation application i.e. Case No. 56/287/94 and secured the order dated 2.12.1994. The sale deed dated 17.12.1996 has also been executed by some imposter. Accordingly, the Naib Tehsildar has rightly held that it is a void document. The Naib Tehsildar in fact cancelled the order declaring the document as void, which was well within his jurisdiction. The counsel for the respondents relied upon the judgment of Supreme Court Prem Singh Vs. Birbal, 2006 (5) SCC 353 in which it has been held that a void document is not required to be cancelled and can be ignored by any authority. He further relied upon the decisions of this Court in Jaipal (minor) Vs. Board of Revenue, UP , 1956 ALJ page 807, (D.B.), Vinod Kumar Rajbhar Vs. State of UP & others, 2012 (115) RD 408 , Ajay Pal Vs. Board of Revenue, UP at Lucknow, 2012 (115) RD 59, Km. Reena Vs. Board of Revenue U.P. & others, 2012 (3) LCD 2393 and Nareesh Sharma Vs. Board of Revenue, UP , 1956 ALJ page 807, (D.B.), Vinod Kumar Rajbhar Vs. State of UP & others, 2012 (115) RD 408 , Ajay Pal Vs. Board of Revenue, UP at Lucknow, 2012 (115) RD 59, Km. Reena Vs. Board of Revenue U.P. & others, 2012 (3) LCD 2393 and Nareesh Sharma Vs. Board of Revenue, 2011 (113) RD 82 in which it has been held that writ petition arising out of mutation proceeding is not maintainable. He submits that writ petition is not maintainable and liable to be dismissed. 10. I have considered the arguments of the counsel for the parties and examined the records. 11. So far as the mutation proceeding is concerned, it is proceeding under Section 34 of UP Land Revenue Act 1901. The relevant part of Section 34 and Section 40 are quoted below : - Section 34. Report of succession or transfer of possession .- (1) Every person obtaining possession of any land by succession or transfer (other than a succession or transfer which has already been recorded under Section 33 A ) , shall report such succession or transfer to the Tehsildar of the Tehsil in which the land is situate. Section 40. Settlement of disputes as to entries in annual register. -(1) All disputes regarding entries in the annual register shall be decided on the basis of possession. (2) If in the course of inquiry into a dispute under this section the Tehsildar is unable to satisfy himself as to which party is in possession, he shall ascertain by summary inquiry who is the person best entitled to the property and shall put such person in possession. Thus the dispute relating to mutation is required to be decided on the basis of possession and under Section 40 (2) if the Tehsildar is unable to satisfy himself as to which party is in possession, he shall ascertain by summary inquiry who is the person best entitled to the property and shall put such person in possession. Thus a combined reading of two Sections makes it clear that the possession which is relevant in deciding the proceeding under Section 34 amounts to be lawful possession. In the proceeding under Section 34 a rank trespasser is not entitled for mutation of his name. 12. Supreme Court in Narayan Laxman Patil Vs. Thus a combined reading of two Sections makes it clear that the possession which is relevant in deciding the proceeding under Section 34 amounts to be lawful possession. In the proceeding under Section 34 a rank trespasser is not entitled for mutation of his name. 12. Supreme Court in Narayan Laxman Patil Vs. M/s Gala Construction Company Pvt. Ltd. And others, 2016 (130) RD 159 (SC) held as follows : - "18. It is thus clear that to exercise the right under Section 148 read with Sections 149 and 150 of the Code for entering one's name in the Record of Rights, the applicant has to be a holder, occupant, owner, mortgagee or tenant. Such a right is also available to a person acquiring interest in the property by succession, survivorship, inheritance, partition, purchase mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise. We fully approve the view taken by the Bombay High Court in the aforesaid decision. The appellant claimed that he along with others is in possession of the suit land for the last 15-20 years and, therefore, his claim was required to be entered in the "Other Rights" column. This contention has been rejected by the Sub Divisional Officer as well as by the Deputy Collector (Appeals) but confirmed by the Additional Commissioner. Merely a holder or occupant does not meet the requirements of law for exercising such a right. Section 2 (12) of the Code, as reproduced hereinabove, makes it clear that to be a "land holder" or "holder of land" means to be lawfully in possession of land, whether such possession is actual or not and as per Section 2(23) "occupant" means a holder in actual possession of unalienated land. It was, therefore, necessary for the appellant to prove that his possession was lawful or he had come in possession by a conveyance / title or any other instrument like receipt etc. to which the respondent No. 1 was a party or at its instance. It is also not the case of the appellant that he has perfected his title over the land in question by way of adverse possession." 13. Similar view was taken by a large Bench of Board of Revenue, UP in Dassiyan Vs. Smt. Sukhan, (supra). to which the respondent No. 1 was a party or at its instance. It is also not the case of the appellant that he has perfected his title over the land in question by way of adverse possession." 13. Similar view was taken by a large Bench of Board of Revenue, UP in Dassiyan Vs. Smt. Sukhan, (supra). Thus while deciding the possession of a person is lawful or not, it is well within the jurisdiction of Tehsildar to examine the title of the parties according to the provisions of Section 40 (2) as to whether the person was entitled to the property or not. In view of judgment of Supreme Court contrary view of High Court is not liable to be accepted. 14. So far as the arguments that Naib Tehsildar has no jurisdiction to adjudicate validity of a document, which is within exclusive jurisdiction of civil court, is concerned, for deciding as to "who is the person best entitled to the property", Naib Tehsildar is fully justified to ascertain title of the parties incidently under Section 40(2) of the Act. Every court and authority discharging judicial or quasi-judicial function is required to give reason for his judgement. Supreme Court in Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496 , held as follows: - (a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. (b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. (c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. (d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. (e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. (f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies. (g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts. (h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. (g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts. (h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. (i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system. (j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. (k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. (l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or "rubber-stamp reasons" is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process. (m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision-making not only makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence, which provides that. "adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions". (o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of "due process". 15. The Tehsildar in this case found that the Will dated 2.9.1984 was not produced either before passing the order dated 2.12.1994 by Smt. Shanti Devi or before passing the order dated 7.5.2004 by the petitioner nor any of the attesting witness of the Will has been examined. 15. The Tehsildar in this case found that the Will dated 2.9.1984 was not produced either before passing the order dated 2.12.1994 by Smt. Shanti Devi or before passing the order dated 7.5.2004 by the petitioner nor any of the attesting witness of the Will has been examined. Thus the order of mutation dated 2.12.1994, secured on its basis, is unauthorised and illegal order and on its basis neither Smt. Shanti Devi obtained any title over the land in dispute nor she had any right to execute the sale deed dated 17.12.1996 in favour of the petitioner and the sale deed is void. Accordingly he set aside the the order dated 2.12.1994 based upon Will dated 2.9.1984 as well as order dated 2.1.1999 based upon sale deed dated 17.12.1996. The argument that Naib Tehsildar has cancelled / set aside the Will /sale deed is misconceived. In fact the mutation orders dated 2.12.1994 and 2.1.1999 were set aside and not the deed. As held by Supreme Court in Prem Singh Vs. Birbal (supra), if the document is void then it is void ab initio and has no legal effect and any authority / person is entitled to ignore it. The execution of Will date 2.9.1984 was not proved according to the provisions of Section 68 of the Evidence Act 1872 as such it is neither admissible in evidence nor any order can be passed on its basis. The order of mutation dated 2.12.1994 and sale deed dated 17.12.1996 are void ab initio and have been rightly ignored by Naib Tehsildar. 16. So far as the argument that order dated 5.7.2004 was ex parte is concerned, in the light of controversy raised by the petitioner, the Standing Counsel was directed to file counter affidavit. The counter affidavit has been filed by Naib Tehsildar Bijnor annexing a copy of the order sheet of recall applications from which it is proved that arguments of the parties were heard on 21.12.2004. Thereafter the petitioner filed a revision i.e. Revision No. 34 of 2004-05 which was dismissed and the parties were directed to appear before Naib Tehsildar on 17.3.2005. The petitioner did not appear before Naib Tehsildar and the case was decided by order dated 7.4.2005. The petitioner himself challenged the order dated 11.3.2005, therefore, after dismissal of his revision there was no justification for him not to appear before Naib Tehsildar. The petitioner did not appear before Naib Tehsildar and the case was decided by order dated 7.4.2005. The petitioner himself challenged the order dated 11.3.2005, therefore, after dismissal of his revision there was no justification for him not to appear before Naib Tehsildar. Although, he was directed to appear before Naib Tehsildar on 17.3.2005. In any case arguments were already herd on 21.12.2004.Thus the order rejecting the recall application dated 10.10.2005 and the order dismissing the revision dated 28.2.2006 do not suffer from any illegality. 17. The argument that the respondents appeared and filed their objection on 22.9.1998 as such recall application filed by them on 7.5.2004 was not maintainable is concerned, the respondents have stated that they did not appear before Naib Tehsildar prior to 7.5.2004 and alleged objection dated 22.9.1998 was filed through some impostor. This statement has been believed by Naib Tehsildar. It is not proper for this Court to re-appreciate the evidence and record a contrary finding in this regard. 18. With the aforesaid observation, the writ petition has no merit and it is dismissed.