JUDGMENT : Jyotirmay Bhattacharya, J. 1. This First Appeal is directed against an order being No. 12 dated 14th March, 2016 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) 2nd Court at Barasat in Title Suit No. 1306 of 2015 at the instance of the plaintiff/appellant. 2. By the impugned order, the plaint filed by the plaintiff praying for declaration, injunction and for recovery of money on account of damages and interest was rejected by the learned Trial Judge under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure as the learned Trial Judge was of the view that the present suit is barred under Section 102 of the West Bengal Cooperative Societies Act, 2006. 3. In connection with the said appeal, three interlocutory applications were filed by the appellant. 4. Since the fate of those interlocutory applications are dependant upon the fate of this appeal, we have decided to decide the appeal itself on merit, before dealing with the interlocutory applications filed in connection with this appeal. 5. Let us now consider as to how far the learned Trial Judge was justified in passing the impugned order in the facts of the present case. 6. It is well-settled principle of law that while considering an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court is required to consider the pleadings made out in the plaint itself and the annexures thereto for ascertaining as to whether the plaint is liable to be rejected on any of the grounds as mentioned therein. While considering an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the code of Civil Procedure, the Court cannot consider any other document and/or material beyond the pleadings made out in the plaint and/or annexures thereto. As such, we restrict ourselves to the pleadings of the plaintiff and/or annexures thereto for ascertaining as to whether the plaint is liable to be rejected as it is barred under the provision contained in Section 102 of the West Bengal Cooperative Societies Act, 2006 or not. 7. In this regard, we have considered the pleadings of the plaintiff made out in the plaint meticulously. On reading the plaint, we find that the plaintiff filed the suit challenging wrongful termination of the building contract entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant No.1. 7. In this regard, we have considered the pleadings of the plaintiff made out in the plaint meticulously. On reading the plaint, we find that the plaintiff filed the suit challenging wrongful termination of the building contract entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant No.1. The defendant No.1 is a Cooperative Housing Society Limited registered under the Cooperative Societies Act, 1983 and is deemed to have been registered as per the West Bengal Cooperative Societies Act, 2006 in terms of Section 6(2) of the said Act. By the said agreement the plaintiff was engaged by the defendant No.1 to construct a G+4 building on the suit land. Pursuant to the said agreement the plaintiff claims to have raised construction upto plinth level. The plaintiff further claims that some additional construction above plinth area was also constructed by him, on the basis of the work order issued by the defendant No.1 in pursuance of the said agreement entered into between the parties. Subsequently, the said agreement and/or the work order was cancelled by the defendant No.1 and the plaintiff was prevented by the defendant No.1 and the other anti-social hooligans like the defendant No.2 from raising further construction on the said premises and, as a result, the plaintiff is unable to raise further construction therein though he collected huge building materials for raising further construction in the suit property. In these set of facts the plaintiff filed the said suit seeking the following reliefs: A. A decree of declaration that the agreement dated 17-11-2014 including the work order and/or the estimation of the project is a valid agreement and the same is still subsisting in the eye of law and binding upon the parties to the said agreement. B. A decree of declaration that the letter dated 9.05.2015 issued by the defendant no.1 is illegal, ultra vires, bad-in-law and without jurisdiction. C. A decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendants and its men, agents servants and associates from misappropriating the articles, belongings and other building materials of the plaintiff, details of which is described in the Schedule – “B” herein below and also from creating any sort of disturbance and/or hindrance in the peaceful constructional work by the plaintiff and its men, agents and masonries in the suit premises, more-fully described in the Schedule – “A” of the plaint. D. A Decree for a sum of Rs.33,20,972/- (Rupees Thirty three Lacs Twenty Thousand Nine Hundred Seventy Two) only along with an interest @ 18% p.a. for the period of presentation of the letter dated 13.06.2015 (Annexure – “I”) and till institution of the instant suit in terms of the accounts mentioned in the letter dated 13.06.2015. E. A Decree for further interest @ 24% p.a. from the date of institution of the instant suit till realization of the claim amount stated in the letter dated 13.06.2015 (Annexure- “I”). F. A decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendants and their men, agents, servants and associates from raising any construction work over the properties either by itself or though any other in the suit premises more-fully and particularly mentioned in the Schedule – “A” herein below. G. All costs with Advocate’s fees. H. Appointment of Receiver. I. Attachment. J. Leave under Order 2 Rule 2 to sue for damages separately. K. Any other relief or reliefs the plaintiff may be entitled to in law on in equity. 8. The learned Trial Judge held that since a dispute has arisen with regard to the business of the Cooperative Society, between the Cooperative Society and the plaintiff having transaction with it, the instant suit is not maintainable as dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant No.1 can only be resolved by the registrar in accordance with the provision contained in Section 102 of the West Bengal Cooperative Societies Act, 2006 and the Civil Court’s Jurisdiction to decide such dispute is barred under Section102(4)of the said Act. 9. According to the learned Trial Judge dispute of such nature between the cooperative society and the plaintiff having transaction with it concerning the business of the cooperative society cannot be triable by the Civil Court in view of the bar created under Section 102(4) of the said Act. 10. Reading the provisions contained in Section 102 of the said Act, Mr. Roy Chowdhury, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, tried to impress upon us that every dispute of any nature between a cooperative society and a person having transaction with it, is not triable by the Registrar and the Civil Court’s jurisdiction to try any dispute between a cooperative society and a person having transaction with it which is unconnected with the management, or business or affairs of a Cooperative Society, is not barred. He thus, contended that it is only those disputes concerning the management or business or affairs of a Cooperative Society other than dispute relating to election in a Cooperative Society as and when such election is conducted by the Cooperative Election Commission and disciplinary action taken by the Cooperative Society against its paid employees regarding the terms and conditions of service shall be filed before the Registrar for settlement, if such dispute arises between any person and the Cooperative Society as contemplated under Clause (a) to (d) of Section 102(1) of the said Act. 11. By referring to the said provision of the said Act, Mr. Roy Chowdhury, learned Senior Counsel, further contended that this is too early a stage where the Court can form an opinion as to whether the dispute involved in the present suit is a dispute concerning the management or business or affair of a Cooperative Society between the said cooperative society and the plaintiff having transaction with it. According to Mr. Roy Chowdhury, in the absence of the rules and bye laws of the cooperative society, no one can ascertain the purpose for which the Cooperative Society was established and unless the purpose for which the Cooperative Society was established is ascertained, it cannot be decided as to whether the dispute complained of relates to the management or business or affairs of the Cooperative Society. Reading the plaint as well as the annexures thereto Mr. Roy Chowdhury pointed out that neither the rules nor the bye laws is annexed to the plaint. The object for which the said Cooperative Society was formed is also not mentioned in the plaint. He, thus, contended that at this stage, the learned Trial Court ought not to have considered the maintainability of the suit before the Civil Court and rejected the plaint due to bar imposed on the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain any dispute between a Cooperative Society and the plaintiff having transaction with it, as at this stage it is impossible for the Court to come to a definite conclusion that the dispute referred to in the plaint concerns, the management and/or business and/or affair of the Cooperative Society in the absence of the Rules and bye laws of the cooperative society. 12. Mr. 12. Mr. Roy Chowdhury, further contended that even assuming that when a part of the claim of the plaintiff is barred under any law but remaining part of the plaintiff’s claim is not barred, in such circumstances, the Court cannot reject the plaint as a whole. To substantiate such contention, he has read the plaint as a whole and pointed out to us that apart from the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff against the defendant No.1, the plaintiff has also claimed relief against the defendant No.2 by way of injunction. Since the provision under Section 102 of the said Act is not attracted to resolve the dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant No.2, according to Mr. Roy Chowdhury, the dispute raised by the plaintiff against the defendant No.2 and the reliefs claimed against him in the suit, cannot be held to be barred under Section 102 of the said Act. 13. He, thus, contended that since part of the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant No. 2, at least, cannot be held to be barred under Section 102 of the said Act, the learned Trial Judge, according to him, ought not to have rejected the plaint as a whole, under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He thus, invited us to interfere with the impugned order and send the suit back to the learned Trial Court for consideration on merit. He, however, fairly submitted that even if the defendants’ application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure is rejected, still then the maintainability of the said suit can again be considered by the learned Trial Court, if occasion so arises after filing of written statement subject to satisfaction of the conditions contained in Order 14 Rule 2, sub-Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. 14. Mr. Saha, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the defendant/respondent, refuted such submission of Mr. Roy Chowdhury by contending that the dispute which is raised by the plaintiff in the plaint squarely comes within the ambit of Section 102 of the West Bengal Cooperative Societies Act, 2006, as the dispute complained of concerns the business and affairs of the Cooperative Society between the Cooperative Society and the plaintiff having transaction with it. He however, did not join any issue with Mr. He however, did not join any issue with Mr. Roy Chowdhury, with regard to the scope and ambit of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He also contended that while considering the prayer for rejection of the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court will have to restrict its consideration with reference to the pleadings of the plaintiff made out in the plaint and/or annexures annexed to the plaint. He thus, restricted his submission to support the impugned order by referring to the pleadings of the plaint. Firstly he drew our attention to the cause title of the plaint to show as to how the defendant No.1 was described in the cause title of the plaint. The defendant No. 1 was described as a registered Housing Cooperative Society. He admitted that the rules and/or bye laws are not annexed to the plaint. He further admitted that ordinarily the Court in the absence of the rules and/or bye laws of the Cooperative Society cannot come to a definite conclusion as to the purpose for which the said Cooperative Society was formed and further as to the exact nature of the business which the said Cooperative Society normally transacts, but the object for which the said Cooperative Society was formed and the nature of its primary business can well be ascertained with reference to the definition of a Housing Cooperative Society as defined in Section 4(36) of the West Bengal Cooperative Societies Act, 2006. Section 4 (36) of the said Act provides that Housing Cooperative Society means a Cooperative Society, the primary object of which is to provide to its members with dwelling houses or flats or with finance for purchase of land for construction of dwelling houses and maintenance of common services in connection therewith and includes a federation of such Cooperative Societies. By referring to the said provision of the said Act, Mr. Saha submitted that primary object for formation of the Housing Cooperative Society is to provide to its members with dwelling houses or flats or with finance for purchase of land for construction of dwelling houses and maintenance of common services in connection therewith and includes a federation of such Cooperative Societies. 15. Saha submitted that primary object for formation of the Housing Cooperative Society is to provide to its members with dwelling houses or flats or with finance for purchase of land for construction of dwelling houses and maintenance of common services in connection therewith and includes a federation of such Cooperative Societies. 15. He further contended that the rules and bye laws of any Cooperative Society cannot provide any object which is inconsistent with the primary object of the Housing Cooperative Society. Looking at the definition of the said Housing Cooperative Society Mr. Saha contended that even in the absence of bye laws, the primary object for which the Cooperative Society was formed, can be ascertained with reference to the provision contained in Section 4 (36) of the said Act. 16. He also relied upon the provision contained in Section 4(25) of the said Act which defines dispute. The said provision says that dispute means any matter capable of being subject of civil litigation and includes claim in respect of any sum payable to or by a Cooperative Society. 17. By referring to those provisions of the said Act Mr. Saha contended that even in the absence of the rules and bye laws of the cooperative society, the nature of the dispute between the parties can be well-ascertained from the pleadings made out in the plaint and reading the plaint itself, the Court can decide as to whether the bar for maintaining civil suit before the Civil Court, imposed under Section 102 of the said Act is attracted or not. 18. Mr. Saha has also referred to a Special Bench decision of this Hon’ble Court in the case of Anjan Choudhury Vs. 18. Mr. Saha has also referred to a Special Bench decision of this Hon’ble Court in the case of Anjan Choudhury Vs. Anandaneer Cooperative Registered Housing Society, reported in AIR 1990 Calcutta 380, wherein the Special Bench of this Court after considering identical provision under the old Act held that when a dispute is raised between a Cooperative Housing Society and its vendor for purchasing a plot of land on the basis of a written agreement between the Cooperative Society and its vendor arising out of the plaintiff’s claim for enforcement of the contract when the Cooperative Society fails to obtain a conveyance from the seller is a dispute directly concerns the business and relates to affairs of the said Housing Cooperative Society and, therefore, such a dispute is a dispute within the meaning of the dispute under Section 86(1) of the Old Act and Section 95(1) of the new Act. It was also held therein that such dispute arises between a Cooperative Society and its seller being a person having transaction with it, can only be resolved by the registrar under the said Act and not by the Civil Court. The Special Bench of this Court, thus, held that the learned Trial Court was wrong in entertaining the suit and in holding that it had jurisdiction and the plaint was not liable to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 19. Relying upon the said Special Bench Decision of this Court Mr. Saha contended that the dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant No.1 is barred as the dispute concerns the business and affairs of the Housing Cooperative Society. 20. By reading the plaint as a whole, Mr. Saha contended that though it is true that the plaintiff has claimed relief by way of injunction against the defendant No.2 but such relief was not claimed against the defendant No.2 independent of the cause of action pleaded by the plaintiff against the defendant No.1. By referring to the pleadings of the plaint, he pointed out that the plaintiff simply stated in the plaint that the defendant No.1 by taking the help of local hooligans like the defendant No.2 and in collusion with him was preventing the plaintiff from executing the work in terms of the agreement and/or the work order issued in favour of the plaintiff by the defendant No.1. He thus, contended that the defendant No.2 is nothing but an agent of the defendant No.1 and the plaint does not disclose any independent cause of action against the defendant No.2 for which separate relief may be claimed against him, even if the cause of action pleaded by the plaintiff against the defendant No.1 is dissected from the cause of action pleaded by the plaintiff against the defendant No.2. He thus, contended that since there is no independent cause of action against the defendant No.2, no relief can be granted to the plaintiff against the defendant No.2 in the said suit. He thus, supported the impugned order by submitting that the learned Trial Court rightly held that the suit is barred under Section 102 of the West Bengal Cooperative Societies Act, 2006. He thus, prayed for dismissal of this appeal. 21. Let us now consider the contentions of the learned Counsel of the respective parties in the facts of the instant case for ascertaining as to whether the bar contained in Section 102 of the said Act is attracted in the present case or not. We have read the plaint as a whole. We find that the plaintiff itself described the defendant No.1 as a Registered Housing Cooperative Society. Since the Rules and bye laws were not annexed to the plaint, it is rightly pointed out by Mr. Roy Chowdhury, that the nature of the business which the Housing Cooperative Society transacts cannot be fully ascertained by the Court at this stage, but still then we cannot be oblivious about the provision contained in Section 4(36) of the said Act which provides that Housing Cooperative Society means a Cooperative Society, the primary object of which is to provide to its members with dwelling houses or flats or with finance for purchase of land for construction of dwelling houses and maintenance of common services in connection therewith and includes a federation of such Cooperative Societies. When the Act provides as to what is the primary object for which a Housing Cooperative Society can be formed, we have no hesitation to hold that a Housing Cooperative Society cannot be formed dehors the provision of law. In our view the Housing Cooperative Societies Act can only be formed provided its primary object is in conformity with the primary object as mentioned in Section 4 (36) of the said Act. In our view the Housing Cooperative Societies Act can only be formed provided its primary object is in conformity with the primary object as mentioned in Section 4 (36) of the said Act. It is no doubt true that apart from the primary object, the Cooperative Society may have other ancillary and/or incidental businesses as per the Rules and/or bye laws framed by it in conformity with the said Act. Thus, by referring to Section 4 (36) of the said Act, we have no hesitation to hold that the primary object for which the Housing Cooperative Society was formed was to provide to its members with dwelling houses and/or flats and for fulfillment of the said object the said Cooperative Society entered into an agreement with the plaintiff authorizing it to raise construction of G+4 storied building on the suit property so that after such building is constructed the flats can be allotted to its members. We, thus, can very well ascertain the primary business and/or affairs of the defendant No.1 being Housing Cooperative Society with reference to the provision contained in Section 4(36) of the said Act. 22. When a dispute arises between the said Cooperative Society and the plaintiff following termination of the contract and/or the cancellation of the work order relating to construction of the said G+4 building on the suit property, we hold that the dispute certainly concerns the business of the said Cooperative Society and it relates to the affairs of the Cooperative Society. This conclusion, we arrive at, by relying upon the special Bench decision of this Court in the case of Anjan Choudhury Vs. Anandaneer Co-operative Registered Housing Society, reported in AIR 1990 Calcutta 380, wherein it was held that even the dispute between a Cooperative Society and its seller arising out of enforcement of a contract for sale, when the Cooperative Society failed to obtain a conveyance from its seller, is a dispute which is referable to the Registrar of the Cooperative Society for its resolution and not before the Civil Court by virtue of the provision of Section 86 of the old Act and Section 95 of the new Act. As a matter of fact, the provision contained in Section 95 of the West Bengal Cooperative Societies Act, 1973 is pari materia with the provision contained in Section 102 of the West Bengal Cooperative Societies Act, 2006. As a matter of fact, the provision contained in Section 95 of the West Bengal Cooperative Societies Act, 1973 is pari materia with the provision contained in Section 102 of the West Bengal Cooperative Societies Act, 2006. As such we have no hesitation to hold that the dispute between the plaintiff and the Cooperative Society concerns the business of the said Cooperative Society and it relates to the affairs of the said Cooperative Society and such dispute is a dispute within the meaning of the dispute under Section 4(25) of the West Bengal Cooperative Societies Act, 2006 which is capable of resolution by the Registrar as per the provision of Section 102 of the said Act. In our view, the suit is barred before the Civil Court as per the provision of Section 102 (4) of the said Act. 23. Let us now consider the other contention of Mr. Roy Chowdhury as to whether the plaint as a whole can be rejected when part of the plaintiff’s claim can be adjudicated upon by the Civil Court. To ascertain the substance of such contention we have read the pleading made out by the plaintiff in the plaint as a whole. On reading the plaint as a whole we find that though the plaintiff has claimed injunction against both the defendants in the said suit but the plaintiff has not pleaded any independent cause of action for seeking such relief against the defendant No.2. As a matter of fact, the defendant No.2 was described as a hooligans agent of the plaintiff in the plaint. When the defendant No.2 was described as an agent of the defendant No.1, we hold that no relief can be claimed against the defendant No.2 independently on the basis of the cause of action pleaded in the plaint. Thus even if the cause of action pleaded by the plaintiff against the defendant No.1 is dissected from the cause of action pleaded by the plaintiff against the defendant No.2 still then we hold that the learned Trial Judge did not commit any illegality in rejecting the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the facts of the present case as the plaintiff has no independent cause of action against the defendant No.2. 24. The appeal thus stands dismissed. 24. The appeal thus stands dismissed. In view of dismissal of this appeal, no order need be passed on the other three applications filed by the appellant. These three applications are thus, deemed to be dismissed. 25. We, thus, affirm the impugned order passed by the learned Trial Judge and dismiss this appeal. 26. Since we have dismissed this appeal. We hold that no further order need be passed on the interlocutory applications filed by the plaintiff/appellant in this appeal. 27. Thus, interlocutory applications are deemed to be disposed of. 28. All pending applications are, thus, disposed of. 29. Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties as expeditiously as possibly.