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Gauhati High Court · body

2016 DIGILAW 612 (GAU)

Subhas Das v. State of Assam & Ors.

2016-07-12

UJJAL BHUYAN

body2016
1. Heard Ms. M. Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. B.J. Talukdar, learned Government advocate, Assam. Also heard Mr. A. Mannaf, learned counsel for respondent No.3. 2. By filing this petition under article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, petitioner seeks quashing of judgment and order dated 24.6.2015 passed by the Juvenile Justice Board, Morigaon holding the juvenile (respondent No.3) as not guilty of committing an offence under sections 304/34, IPC in GR Case No. 15/2014 thereby acquitting him. 3. Case of the petitioner is that he is the father of Dhrubajyoti Das, a minor, who died under unnatural circumstances. He had lodged a first information before the Officer-in-Charge, Dharamtul Police Station on 14.11.2014 inter-alia stating that his son Dhrubajyoti Das was taken by his schoolmate Sri Shekhar Bordoloi (respondent No.3) for birthday celebration at his residence at Quarter No. 132/B situated at Maligaon, Guwahati. When his son did not return back home till evening he contacted his son by mobile phone and came to know that Sri Shekhar Bordoloi would not allow his son to return home on that day. When he called again at 4PM, one lady told him that his son would remain with them on that day. Thereafter, the mobile of his son was found switched off. Informant went to the quarter where he found father of Sri Shekhar Bordoloi, Sri Durga Singh Bordoloi, who told the informant that his son was taken by Shekhar's uncle Sri Gopeswar Bordoloi. Though he gave a mobile phone number, communication through the same could not be made. Informant stated that Sri Gopeswar Bordoloi came to their residence on the next morning at around 9 a.m. and informed that his son was required to be brought from Dharamtul. Informant went to the Dharamtul Police Station and there he learnt that his son had died. Informant alleged that his son was killed and attempt was made to pass off the same as an accident. 4. On receipt of the first information, the same was treated as FIR and on the basis of the same, police case was registered, being Dharamtal PS Case No.6/2014 under sections 120(B)/302, IPC. Subsequently, police submitted charge-sheet against respondent No.3 and others under sections 304/34, IPC on the basis of which GR Case No. 15/2014 was registered. 4. On receipt of the first information, the same was treated as FIR and on the basis of the same, police case was registered, being Dharamtal PS Case No.6/2014 under sections 120(B)/302, IPC. Subsequently, police submitted charge-sheet against respondent No.3 and others under sections 304/34, IPC on the basis of which GR Case No. 15/2014 was registered. Since Sri Shekhar Bordoloi took the plea of juvenility, his case was transferred to the Juvenile Justice Board, Morigaon. 5. The case was enquired into by the Juvenile Justice Board (Board) Prosecution side examined as many as 16 witnesses. Thereafter the juvenile was examined under section 313, Cr.PC. However, on behalf of the juvenile, no evidence was adduced. After hearing the rival submissions and considering the materials on record, the Board passed the judgment and order dated 24.6.2015 holding that prosecution witnesses had failed to implicate the juvenile under sections 304/34 IPC and accordingly granted benefit doubt to the juvenile (respondent No 3). He was, thus, acquitted. 6. Aggrieved, present writ petition has been filed seeking the relief as indicated above. 7. Ms. M. Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously argued that firstly there was poor investigation by the police resulting in filing of defective charge-sheet. Call record details of the victim were no: placed before the Board. Post-mortem report had disclosed the cause of death as axphysia, hypo-volumic shock and circulatory failure as a result of 70% burn injuries with description of burns given. Shockingly post mortem report was not exhibited. The story put out on behalf of the juvenile that the victim along with three other juveniles were sleeping inside a Bhelaghar and when the Bhelaghar caught fire, the other three juveniles managed to save their lives but the deceased could not, is an unbelievable story as none of the surviving juveniles sustained any injury on their person. Finding of the Board that the chain of circumstance was neither completed nor conclusive to hold the juvenile guilty is wholly erroneous. Consequently, acquittal of the juvenile by giving him benefit of doubt is wholly unsustainable in the eye of law and require? interference. Finding of the Board that the chain of circumstance was neither completed nor conclusive to hold the juvenile guilty is wholly erroneous. Consequently, acquittal of the juvenile by giving him benefit of doubt is wholly unsustainable in the eye of law and require? interference. In support of her submissions, learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the following decisions : Sanjeev v. State of Haryana, (2015) 4 SCC 387 Vijay Paul v. State, (2015) 4 SCC 749 She also submits that writ petition filed against order of acquittal passe ; by the Board is maintainable and refers to the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Criminal Revision No.3918 of 2012 (Inder Singh v. State of Haryana) disposed of on 15.1.2014. 8. On the other hand, Mr. Talukdar, learned Government advocate submits that the writ petition itself is misconceived. There cannot be any challenge to a judgment of acquittal passed by the Juvenile Justice Board as there is no such provision under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. Having regard to the object and scheme of the said Act, such a challenge would be impermissible. Moreover from a perusal of the impugned judgment, it is more than evident that the Board did not commit any error or infirmity in acquitting the juvenile. Even applying the standard used in criminal jurisprudence while considering appeal against acquittal, the challenge made to the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. On a query made by the court as to whether the guardian of the victim would be entitled to compensation having regard to the provisions contained in section 357A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.PC), Mr. Talukdar, learned Government advocate in his usual fairness submits that this aspect may require a closer scrutiny of the court. 9. Adopting the submissions made by the learned Government Advocate, Mr. Mannaf, learned counsel for respondent No.3 vehemently argues that his client is innocent and has been rightly acquitted by the Board. No case for interference with the decision of the Board is made out. Writ petition should be dismissed, he submits. 10. Rival submissions made have been considered. 11. In the instant case the incident took place on 14.11.2014. At that point of time, the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 was in force. Therefore, provisions of the aforesaid Act will govern the present case. Writ petition should be dismissed, he submits. 10. Rival submissions made have been considered. 11. In the instant case the incident took place on 14.11.2014. At that point of time, the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 was in force. Therefore, provisions of the aforesaid Act will govern the present case. 12. On due consideration, court is of the view that the following issues arise for adjudication in this case (1) Whether a judgment of acquittal made by the Juvenile Justice Boa rd in respect of a juvenile can be subjected to further challenge having regard to the object, intent and purport of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act, 2000? (2) If the answer to issue No.(1) is in the affirmative, whether the impugned judgment and order dated 24.6.2015 calls for any interference? (3) Independent of the answers to issue Nos.(l) and (2) above, whether the victim or in case of death of victim, the family members, of a juvenile offence would be entitled to victim compensation under section 357A, Cr.PC? Issue No.1 : 13. The question which arises for consideration under this head is whether a challenge can be maintained to an order of acquittal passed by the Juvenile Justice Board having regard to the mandate of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act, 2000, "Juvenile Justice Act," for short hereinafter. 14. Any attempt to answer this question would require an analysis of the relevant provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act. Preamble to this Act says that this is an Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to juveniles in conflict with law and children in need of care and protection, by providing for proper care, protection and treatment by catering tc their developmental needs and by adopting a child friendly approach in the adjudication and disposition of matters in the best interest of children and for their ultimate rehabilitation and for matters connected therewith or incidental there to. The statement of objects and reasons leading to introduction of the Bill preceding enactment of the Juvenile Justice Act indicates that the objective of the Bill was to make the juvenile justice system more appreciative of the developmental needs of the juvenile in comparison to criminal justice system as applicable to adults with a view to minimize the stigma so as to ensure rehabilitation and social re-integration of the delinquent juvenile. Juvenile has been defined to mear a person who has not completed 18 years of age and "juvenile in conflict with law" has been defined to mean a juvenile who is alleged to have committed an offence and has not completed 18 years of age as on the date of commission of such offence. Section 4 provides for constitution of Juvenile Justice Board which shall comprise of a Metropolitian Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class, as the case may be. and two social workers of whom at least one shall be a woman. The Magistrate shall be designated as the Principal Magistrate. The Board shall have the powers conferred by the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 on such a Magistrate. The Juvenile Justice Board shall have the power to deal exclusively with all proceedings relating to juveniles in conflict with law. Section 8 provides for establishment of observation homes for temporary reception of any juvenile in conflict with law during the pendency of any inquiry. On the other hand section 9 provides for establishment of special homes for reception and rehabilitation of juvenile; in conflict with law. Under section 10, if a juvenile in conflict with law 15 apprehended by police, he shall be placed under the charge of Special Juvenile Police Unit or the designated police officer who has to produce the juvenile before the Juvenile Justice Board without any loss of time but within a period of 24 hours of apprehension excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place where the juvenile was apprehended to the Juvenile Justice Board. Proviso to Section 10 makes it abundantly clear that in no case a juvenile in conflict with law shall be placed in a police lockup or lodged in a jail. 15. A reading of section 12 would go to show that where a juvenile accused of committing a bailable or non-bailable offence is brought before a Juvenile Justice Board, ordinarily such person is required to be released on bail with or without surety but in the event he is not released, he can be kept only in an observation home. 16. Sections 14 and 15 deal with inquiry by the Juvenile Justice Board and the order that may be passed regarding a juvenile. 16. Sections 14 and 15 deal with inquiry by the Juvenile Justice Board and the order that may be passed regarding a juvenile. The Juvenile Justice Board shall hold the inquiry in accordance with the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act which should be completed within a period of :our months from the date of commencement which period can be extended in special cases after recording the reasons in writing for such extension. At the end of the inquiry, if the Juvenile Justice Board is satisfied that the juvenile has committed an offence the Board may pass an order allowing the juvenile to go home after advice or admonition following counselling, direct the juvenile to participate in group counselling and similar activities, order the juvenile to perform community service, order the parent of the juvenile or the juvenile himself to pay fine if he is over 14 years of age and earns money, direct the juvenile to be released on probation of good conduct placing him under the care of any parent, guardian or any other person, or placed under :he care of any fit institution for the good behavior and well being of :he juvenile for any period not exceeding 3 years or make an order directing the juvenile to be sent to a special home for a period of 3 years. As per the proviso, this period of 3 years may be reduced by the Juvenile Justice Board for reasons to be recorded if the Board is satisfied that such reduction would be justified having regard to the nature of the offence and circumstances of the case. However, before passing such an order, the Juvenile Justice Board shall obtain the social investigation report on the juvenile from the mentioned authority and consider the findings of such report. 17. Section 16 provides that no juvenile in conflict with law shall be sentenced to death or imprisonment for any term which may extend to imprisonment for life or committed to prison in default of payment of fine or in default of furnishing security. 17. Section 16 provides that no juvenile in conflict with law shall be sentenced to death or imprisonment for any term which may extend to imprisonment for life or committed to prison in default of payment of fine or in default of furnishing security. If it is found that a juvenile who has attained the age of 16 years has committed an offence of serious nature and if the Juvenile Justice Board is satisfied that the conduct and behaviour of the juvenile has been such that it would not be either in his own interest or in the interest of other juveniles residing in a special home to send him to such special home and that none of the other measures provided under the Juvenile Justice Act is suitable or sufficient, the Juvenile Justice Board may order the juvenile in conflict with law to be kept in a place of safety reporting the same for order of the State Government. On receipt on such report, the State Government may make arrangement for protective custody of the juvenile. However, the period of detention so ordered shall not exceed in any case the maximum period provided under section 15, i.e., 3 years. Section 18 prohibits joint proceeding of a juvenile and a person who is not a juvenile. It says that no juvenile shall be charged with or tried for any offence together with a person who is not a juvenile. 18. Section 19 ensures that a juvenile who has committed an offence and has been dealt with under the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, shall not suffer any disqualification attaching to a conviction of an offence. Infact the Juvenile Justice Board is mandated to make an order directing that the relevant record of such conviction should be removed after expiry of the period of appeal or after expiry of a reasonable period. 19. Section 21 forbids disclosure of identity of a juvenile in conflict with law in the media. 20. Chapter IV deals with rehabilitation and social re-integration of the juvenile staying in a children's home or special home. 21. Section 52 deals with appeals. 19. Section 21 forbids disclosure of identity of a juvenile in conflict with law in the media. 20. Chapter IV deals with rehabilitation and social re-integration of the juvenile staying in a children's home or special home. 21. Section 52 deals with appeals. A person aggrieved by an order made by competent authority under the Juvenile Justice Act may within 30 days from the date of such order prefer an appeal to the Court of Session though such appeal may still be entertained beyond 30 days if sufficient cause is shown. However, second appeal from an order of the Court of Session passed in appeal is barred. Sub-section (2) clearly provides that no appeal shall lie from an order of acquittal made by the Juvenile Justice Board in respect of a juvenile alleged to have committed an offence. 22. As per section 53, the High Court may at any time either on its own motion or on an application received in this behalf call for the record of any proceeding in which any competent authority or Court of Session has passed an order for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any such order and may pass such order as it thinks fit. However, the High Court shall not pass an order under section 53 prejudicial to any person without giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard. 23. Section 54 provides that the competent authority while holding any inquiry under the Juvenile Justice Act shall follow such procedure as may be Laid down by the Code of Criminal Procedure for trials in summons cases. In respect of appeals and revisions it also mentions that provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 should be followed as far as practicable. 24. The broad features of the Juvenile Justice Act relating to adjudication of an inquiry in respect of a juvenile in conflict with law have been noticed. Indisputably the Juvenile Justice Act is a beneficial legislation. As is visible from the relevant provisions, essence of the Juvenile Justice Act is restorative and not retribution providing for rehabilitation and reintegration of children in conflict with law into main-stream society. Constitutional validity of the Juvenile Justice Act has been upheld by the Supreme Court in Salil Bali v. Union of India, (2013) 7 SCC 705 . As is visible from the relevant provisions, essence of the Juvenile Justice Act is restorative and not retribution providing for rehabilitation and reintegration of children in conflict with law into main-stream society. Constitutional validity of the Juvenile Justice Act has been upheld by the Supreme Court in Salil Bali v. Union of India, (2013) 7 SCC 705 . It was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Subramaniaii Swamy v. Raju, (2014) 8 SCC 390 , In the course of deliberation in Subramanian Swamy (supra), the Supreme Court noted the differences between the juvenile justice system and the criminal justice system as under : "56. Differences between Juvenile Justice System and Criminal Justice System. 56.1 FIR and charge-sheet in respect of juvenile offenders is filed only in 'serious cases', where adult punishment exceeds 7 years. 56.2 A juvenile in conflict with the law is not "arrested", but "apprehended", and only in case of allegations of a serious crime. 56.3. Once apprehended, the police must immediately place such juvenile under the care of a Welfare Officer, whose duty is to produce the juvenile before the Board. Thus, the police do not retain pre- trial custody over the juvenile. 56.4 Under no circumstances is the juvenile to be detained in a jail or police lock-up, whether before, during or after the Board inquiry. 56.5 Grant of Bail to juveniles in conflict with the law is the Rule. 56.6 The JJ Board conducts a child-friendly "inquiry" and not an adversarial trial. This is not to say that the nature of the inquiry is non-adversarial, since both prosecution and defence submit their cases. Instead, the nature of the proceedings acquires a child-friendly colour 56.7 The emphasis of criminal trials is to record a finding on the guilt or innocence of the accused. In case of established guilt, the prime object of sentencing is to punish a guilty offender. The emphasis of juvenile 'inquiry' is to find the guilt/innocence of the juvenile and to investigate the underlying social or familial causes of the alleged crime. Thus, the aim of juvenile sentencing is to reform and rehabilitate the errant juvenile. 56.8. The adult criminal system does not regulate the activities of the offender once she/he has served the sentence. Since the JJ system seeks to reform and rehabilitate the juvenile, it establishes post-trial avenues for the juvenile to make an honest living. 57. Thus, the aim of juvenile sentencing is to reform and rehabilitate the errant juvenile. 56.8. The adult criminal system does not regulate the activities of the offender once she/he has served the sentence. Since the JJ system seeks to reform and rehabilitate the juvenile, it establishes post-trial avenues for the juvenile to make an honest living. 57. Having Laid bare all that is necessary for a purposive adjudication of the issues that have been raised by the rival camps we may now proceed to examine the same. 58. The Act, as manifestly dear from the Statement of Objects and Reasons has been enacted to give full and complete effect to the country's international obligations arising from India being a signatory to the three separate conventions delineated hereinbefore, namely, the Beijing Rules, the UN Convention and the Havana Rules. Notwithstanding the avowed object of the Act and other such enactments to further the country's international commitments, all of such laws must necessarily have to conform to the requirements of a valid legislation judged in the context of the relevant constitutional provisions and the judicial verdicts rendered from time-to-time. Also, that the Act is a beneficial piece of legislation and must therefore. receive its due interpretation as a legislation belonging to the said category has been Laid down by a Constitution Bench of this court in Pratap Singh v. State of jharkhand and Another. In other words, the Act must be interpreted and understood to advance the cause of the legislation and to confer the benefit? of the provisions thereof to the category of persons for whom the legislation has been made." 25. While the differences are quite discernible, what is important to note is that the Juvenile Justice Board conducts a child friendly enquiry and not an adversial trial as is understood in the criminal justice system The emphasis of the juvenile enquiry is not only to find out the guilt or innocence of the juvenile but also to investigate the underlying social or familial causes of the alleged crime, the objective being to reform and rehabilitate the errant juvenile. 26. 26. That being the position, it is no surprise that though section 52 of the Juvenile Justice Act provides for filing of appeal against any order made by a competent authority as contemplated under section 15 thereof, there is a specific bar of filing appeal against any order of acquittal made by the Juvenile Justice Board in respect of a juvenile alleged to have committed an offence. That leaves the provisions relating to revision a? provided under section 53. Though this Section is quite broadly worded inasmuch as, the High Court has been vested with the power to call for the record of any proceeding, in which, any competent authority or Court of Session has passed an order, either on its own motion or on ar. application filed, to satisfy itself as to the legality or propriety of any such order, and, thereafter to pass such an order as it thinks fit, the on!" limitation being that such order shall not be passed prejudicial to any person without giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard, car such a power be extended to examine an order of acquittal. Section r-provides a clue, inasmuch as, it says that the procedure to be followed in hearing appeals or revision proceedings under the Juvenile Justice Act shall be as far as practicable in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 27. While section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, general provides for the powers of revision vested in the High Court or a Court of Session; Section 401 specifically deals with the High Court's power of revision. Sub-section (3) of section 401 mentions that nothing under section 401 shall be deemed to authorize a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. Thus, there is a bar on the High Court while exercising the power of revision from converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. When the aforesaid provision is extrapolated into the provisions contained in section 53 of the Juvenile Justice Act, it becomes evidently clear that the power of revision vested in the High Court cannot be extended to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. This is perfectly in sync with the overall object of the Juvenile Justice Act. When the aforesaid provision is extrapolated into the provisions contained in section 53 of the Juvenile Justice Act, it becomes evidently clear that the power of revision vested in the High Court cannot be extended to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. This is perfectly in sync with the overall object of the Juvenile Justice Act. Therefore, under the Juvenile Justice Act, there can be no appeal or revision against an order of acquittal. 28. Having held so, can a situation be visualized where an order of acquittal passed by the Juvenile Justice Board, even if palpably erroneous and passed in defiance of logic would remain outside the realm of judicial scrutiny. The Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Inder Singh (supra) while taking the view that revision against an order of acquittal is not permissible, however, observed that the High Court in its supervisory jurisdiction under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India can entertain a petition against such an order. 29. This observation of the Punjab and Haryana High Court appears to reflect the correct legal position. But before dilating on the scope and ambit of interference against an order of acquittal passed by the Juvenile Justice Board under articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, it would be apposite to briefly notice the general limitations even in case of an appeal against acquittal under the criminal justice system. Section 378 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, provides for filing of appeal against acquittal. Over the years through several judicial pronouncements, the contours of appellate jurisdiction in case of appeal against acquittal has been delineated. The principles governing and regulating appeal against order of acquittal as culled out from various judicial pronouncements can be summarized as under : (1) In an appeal against an order of acquittal, the appellate court possesses all the powers which it possesses while hearing an appeal against an order of conviction, (2) The appellate court has the power to reconsider the whole issue, reappraise the evidence and come to its own conclusion if the findings of the trial court are against the weight of the evidence on record. (3) Before reversing the finding of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider each ground on which order of acquittal was based and record its own reasons for not accepting those grounds and not subscribing to the view expressed by the trial court. (4) While reversing the finding of acquittal, the appellate court has to keep in view the fact that the presumption of innocence is still available in favour of the accused which would stand further fortified and strengthened by the order of acquittal. (5) If on fresh scrutiny and reappraisal of the evidence on record, the appellate court comes to the conclusion that no other view other than the guilt of the accused can reasonable be taken, then finding of acquittal may be converted to a finding of conviction. However, if another view, can be reasonable taken, then the view which favours the accused should be adopted. (6) The appellate court has also to keep in mind that the trial court had the advantage of assessing the demeanor of witnesses and observing their the conduct in the court. The appellate court has also to keep in mind that even at the belated stage, the accused is entitled to benefit of doubt if a doubt so arises. In such a case, the standard applied should be that of a reasonable person. In addition to the above, the appellate court should bear in mind that i: should not disturb an order of acquittal if it is based on reasonable and plausible grounds. 30. Thus, it is quite evident that even in case of an appeal against acquittal as provided under the Cr.PC, the jurisdiction of the appellate court is circumscribed by several limitations as noticed above. 31. Having regard to the general limitations on the power of the appellate court while deciding an appeal against acquittal under the criminal justice system and having regard to the fact that no such appeal or revision provided under the juvenile justice system, the power of interference by the High Court in an order of acquittal passed by the Board while exercising powers under article 226/227 of the Constitution of India would be very limited. In this connection, a reference maybe made to a Full Bench decision of this court in Slate of Assam v. Moslem Mondal, (2013) 3 GLR 402; (2013 : GLT 809. In this connection, a reference maybe made to a Full Bench decision of this court in Slate of Assam v. Moslem Mondal, (2013) 3 GLR 402; (2013 : GLT 809. In that case amongst various issues, the scope of interference be the High Court exercising power under article 226 of the Constitution of India with an order of the Foreigners' Tribunal came up for consideration On due consideration, the Full Bench held as under : "112. Article 226 of the Constitution confers on the High Court power to issue appropriate writ to any person or authority within its territorial jurisdiction. The Tribunal constituted under the 1946 Act read with the 19tf-Order, as noticed above, is required to discharge the quasi-judicial function The High Court, therefore, has the power under article 226 of the Constitution to issue writ of certiorari quashing the decision of the Tribunal in an appropriate case. The scope of interference with the Tribunal's order, in exercise of the jurisdiction under article 226, however, is limited. The writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as and when the inferior Court or Tribunal acts without Jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it or if such Court or Tribunal acts illegally in exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, or when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard or violates the principles of natural justice. The certiorari jurisdiction of the writ court being supervisory and not appellate Jurisdiction, the court cannot review the findings of facts reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal. There is, however, an exception to the said general proposition, in as much as, the writ of certiorari can be issued and the decision of a Tribunal on a finding of fact can be interfered with, if in recording such a finding the Tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible or has refused to admit admissible evidence or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases such error would amount to an error of law apparent on the face of the record. The other errors of fact, however, grave it may be, cannot be corrected by a writ court. The other errors of fact, however, grave it may be, cannot be corrected by a writ court. As noticed above, the judicial review of the order passed by the inferior Court or the Tribunal, in exercise of the jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution, is limited to correction of errors apparent on the face of the record, which also takes within its fold a case where a statutory authority exercising its discretionary jurisdiction did not take into consideration a relevant fact or renders its decision on wholly irrelevant factors. Hence, the failure of taking into account the relevant facts or consideration of irrelevant factors, which has a bearing on the decision of the inferior court or the Tribunal, can be a ground for interference of the court or Tribunal's decision in exercise of the writ jurisdiction by the High Court. 113. The Apex Court in Sant Lal Gupta v. Modern Coop, Group Housing Society Ltd., (2010) 13 SCC 336 , reiterating the grounds on which a writ of certiorari can be issued, has opined that such a writ can be issued only when there is a failure of justice and cannot be issued merely because it may be legally permissible to do so. It is obligatory on the part of the petitioners to show that a jurisdictional error has been committed by the statutory authority. There must be an error apparent on the face of the record, as the High Court acts merely in a supervisory capacity and not as the appellate authority. An error apparent on the face of the records means an error which strikes one on mere looking and does not need long drawn out process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions. Such error should not require any extraneous matters to show its incorrectness. Such error may include giving reasons that are bad in law or inconsistent, unintelligible or inadequate. It may also include the application of a wrong legal test to the facts found, taking irrelevant consideration into account and failing to take relevant consideration into account, and wrongful admission or exclusion of evidence as well as arriving at a conclusion without any supporting evidence. It may also include the application of a wrong legal test to the facts found, taking irrelevant consideration into account and failing to take relevant consideration into account, and wrongful admission or exclusion of evidence as well as arriving at a conclusion without any supporting evidence. Such a writ can also be issued when there is an error in jurisdiction or authority whose order is to be reviewed has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction or has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him by law." 32. Thus, an order of an inferior Tribunal can be examined by the writ court on very limited grounds as explained by the Full Bench in Moslen: Mondal (supra), which would be further circumscribed when it comes to examining a challenge to an order of acquittal passed by the Board having regard to the statutory bar on appeal and revision under sections 52 and 53 of the Juvenile Justice Act and further having regard to the genera-limitations governing an appeal against acquittal in criminal jurisdiction. 33. Therefore, it can be safely held that while the High Court would have limited jurisdiction to interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the Juvenile Justice Board, even the said power has to be exercised sparingly, having regard to the limited scope of interference. Only in the event of the order of acquittal being vitiated by an error apparent on the face of the record, would the High Court have the jurisdiction to interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the Juvenile Justice Board. 34. Issue No. 1 is answered accordingly. Issue No. 2 : 35. Having answered Issue No. 1 by holding that High Court would have limited jurisdiction under articles 226/227 of the Constitution o: India to interfere with a judgment of acquittal passed by the Juvenile Justice Board, the second issue, i.e., whether the impugned judgment and order dated 24.06.2015 calls for any interference, may now be examined. 36. As already noticed above, the Board examined as many as 1-prosecution witnesses. The juvenile was examined under section 3~L~ Cr.PC. However, no evidence was adduced on behalf of the juvenile After hearing the matter and on due consideration, the Board passed the impugned judgment and order dated 24.6.2015, acquitting the juvenile of the offence alleged by giving benefit of doubt to the juvenile. The juvenile was examined under section 3~L~ Cr.PC. However, no evidence was adduced on behalf of the juvenile After hearing the matter and on due consideration, the Board passed the impugned judgment and order dated 24.6.2015, acquitting the juvenile of the offence alleged by giving benefit of doubt to the juvenile. After appreciating the evidence on record and the provisions of section 3C-IPC, learned Principal Magistrate concluded the enquiry as under : "(26). Section 304 of IPC provided for punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Section 304 of IPC provided that whoever commit culpable homicide not amounting to murder shall be punish with imprisonment for life or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death; or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or with both, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. (27) Scrutiny of above stated prosecution evidence has disclosed that whole case of the prosecution is based on proof by circumstantial evidence as there is no eye witness of murder. Proof by chain or of circumstantial evidence is depended on the following circumstances in the present case : (a) that the circumstances from which the inference of guilt is to be drawn, have been established by unimpeachable evidence beyond a shadow of doubt; (b) that the circumstances are of a determinative tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt of Juvenile of this case; (c) that the circumstances, taken collectively, are incapable of explanation on any reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt sought to be proved against Juvenile; (d) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the Juvenile and must show that in all human probability the act have been done by Juvenile. In the absence of motive, conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence is not justified. In the absence of motive, conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence is not justified. Hence, there is need to establish about the enmity along with the fact that deceased was last seen in the company of the Juvenile or article of Juvenile was recovered from or nearby the place of occurrence or Juvenile was in possession of any incriminating articles. It was not alleged by complainant in the FIR that his had prior enmity withy Juvenile side. Moreover, scrutiny of above stated prosecution evidence has failed disclose any prior enmity between the parties. Interestingly, PW-12, namely, Dipali Das was mother of deceased, disclosed that her son and Juvenile were friends. PW-12 disclosed that Juvenile learnt drummed from her deceased son. PW-12 disclosed that there was no enmity between her deceased son and juvenile. PW-1, namely, Pranjit Tumung, PW-2, namely, Pranab Tumung, PW-3, namely, Biki Manta, PW-4, namely, Mangai Singh Tumung, PW-6, namely, Paiash Pator, PW-7, namely, Prahiad Duri, PW-8, namely, Jimbu Bordoloi, PW-9, namely, Uhpen Ch. Manta and PW-10, namely, Ranu Tarron or PW-14 are independent witnesses. Evidence of all the said witnesses disclosed that they were not eye witnesses. Moreover, PW-1 to PW-10 and PW-14 failed to enlighten this board how the deceased died in fire of Maji or Bhetaghar. On the other hand, none of the prosecution witnesses have stated anything about prior enmity between the parties in their respective evidences. PW-16, IO, disclosed that he filed charge sheet on doubt. If so, mere suspicion of FIR or deposition of parents, i.e. PW-11 and PW-12 making juvenile responsible for the death of deceased are not sufficient proof to implicate any juvenile of this case considering that case is established beyond all reasonable doubt. If, witness who is neither 'wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable' can be relied if corroborated by credible evidence. But, in the present case, prosecution witnesses are not corroborative. Moreover, the motive of the Juvenile in commission of the crime is the considerable aspect; same is not explained in the depositions of the PWs against the Juvenile. Thus, prosecution has explained the genesis of the nature of the offence of murder. Hence, this aspect of cause of circumstances incident of murder is incapable of explanation on any reasonable hypothesis to expose the guilt sought to be proved against Juvenile. Thus, prosecution has explained the genesis of the nature of the offence of murder. Hence, this aspect of cause of circumstances incident of murder is incapable of explanation on any reasonable hypothesis to expose the guilt sought to be proved against Juvenile. Hence, unpredictability of prosecution witnesses would provide the Juvenile with a defence of total absence in the place of occurrence or involvement in the incident or motive. (28) MO disclosed that he conducted post-mortem of D.J. Das and cause of death was asphyxia following hypo-voiumic shock and circulatory failure as a result of about seventy percent burn on whole body. MO disclosed that there was (1) burning of both thighs and both legs except both feet; (2) burning of both upper limbs; (3) burn of hair face; (4) bum of genital region both buttocks. MO disclosed that except these cases, no other reason was stated in his report. Cross-examination of PW-13 disclosed that injury of ext.-3 was like bum injury, PW-15, investigating officer who conducted preliminary investigation disclosed that his investigation could not establish any cause for which juvenile could set the deceased in the fire. PW-15, IO, disclosed in cross-examination that he found during investigation that caused of death by fall on Fire was sudden accident PW-16, 10, disclosed that he had no sufficient evidence to entrust responsibility of setting the Bhelagharh upon Juvenile or others. PW-16, 10, disclosed in cross-examination that people could sleep in Bhelaghar at night as national festival. PW-15 or PW-16, i.e. IO, disclosed in cross-examination that Bhelaghar was secured place before the fire. PW-16, IP, has disclosed in cross-examination that present cases car be termed as accident. Facts necessary to explain or introduce a fact in issue or relevant fact, or which support or rebut an inference suggested by a fact in issue or relevant fact, or which establish the identify of anything or parser whose identity is relevant, or fix the time or place at which any fact in issue or relevant fact happened, or which show the relation of parties by when" any such fact is transacted, are relevant in so far as they are necessary for that purpose. If so, it cannot be presume any act on the part of juvenile ha-caused the death of deceased with the intention of causing death or of causer such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, beyond all reasonable doubt Scrutiny of above stated prosecution evidence has disclosed that prosecutor witnesses have not able to show the role played by Juvenile beyond all reasonable doubt. Hence, there is missing circumstantial link of the case in the premises of corroborations of the prosecution witnesses and same h = -implication in this case. Hence, prosecution has not established that juvenile has done any act with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as i-likely to cause death. Law does not enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lea; evidence of such character which is almost impossible to be lead or at any rate extremely difficult to be led. The duty on the prosecution is to lead such evidence which it is capable of leading, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Accordingly, it appears that the depositions of the prosecution are not found cogent and unimpeachable in nature with the basic alleged prosecution version of the FIR. Hence, it is considered as reasonable that the prosecution side has failed to establish the allegation in appreciable manner. As such, I have failed to inspire by PWs to consider that there is any sufficient implicating evidence against juvenile, so far as their deposition in connection of incident of culpable homicide not amounting to murder by present juvenile, beyond all reasonable doubt. In result, I have failed to inspire by argument on the part of prosecution. As such, in my consideration, there is missing link in the chain of evidence of the prosecution about the role played by juvenile. Hence, it would be not safe to implicate juvenile in this case on the basis of depositions on record which was basically assailed in the cross- examination of PWs. As such, prosecution witness has failed to implicate the juvenile under section 304/34 of IPC and have pushed this Juvenile Justice Board to extend benefit of doubt to juvenile. In the result, I have found no sufficient material to hold the juvenile as guilty under sections 304/34 of the IPC. As such, prosecution witness has failed to implicate the juvenile under section 304/34 of IPC and have pushed this Juvenile Justice Board to extend benefit of doubt to juvenile. In the result, I have found no sufficient material to hold the juvenile as guilty under sections 304/34 of the IPC. Having considered the matter in its entirety in the light of the above discussions, I am of view that the prosecutions has not established its case beyond all reasonable doubts. In the result, the point taken for determination in this case is decided negatively extending the benefit of doubt to the Juvenile under section 304/34 of the IPC." 37. Learned Principal Magistrate on an in depth appreciation of the evidence adduced took the view that the chain of events was not complete so as to come to the one and only conclusion about the guilt of the juvenile. In such circumstances, learned Principal Magistrate granted benefit of doubt to the juvenile. The view taken by the learned Principal Magistrate is a plausible view and cannot be said to be based on no evidence or based on a complete misreading of the evidence on record or in defiance of logic. Having regard to the fact that no appeal or revision against an order of acquittal under the Juvenile Justice Act is permissible and further keeping in mind the object and purport of the Juvenile Justice Act coupled with the extremely limited scope of interference with such an order in a proceeding under articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, this court is unable accept the contention of the petitioner that the decision of the Board is erroneous to the extent that it requires interference by the writ court. Second issue is answered accordingly. Issue No. 3 : 38. Issue No. 3 deals with entitlement of victim of juvenile offence to compensation. Section 15 of the Juvenile Justice Act, as already noticed above, provides for the kind of order(s) that may be passed by the Board on being satisfied after holding enquiry that the juvenile had committed the offence alleged. Section 15(d) mentions that the Board may order the parent of the juvenile or the juvenile himself to pay a fine, if he is over 14 years of age and earns money. Section 15(d) mentions that the Board may order the parent of the juvenile or the juvenile himself to pay a fine, if he is over 14 years of age and earns money. Therefore, section 15(d) will come into play only when the Board is satisfied on enquiry that the juvenile had committed an offence in respect of which the enquiry was held. In other words, if a finding is returned that the juvenile had not committed the offence or the juvenile is granted benefit of doubt, section 15(d) will not be attracted. 39. Section 357, Cr.PC, on the other hand, provides that when a court imposes a sentence of fine or a sentence including a sentence of death of which fine forms a part, the court may when passing the judgment, order the whole or any part of the fine recovered to be paid to the victim Even in a case, where fine does not form part of the sentence, the court may order the accused to pay compensation to the victim. Thus, there are 2 aspects to be noted while considering section 357, Cr.PC. First is that order to pay compensation has to be passed by the court imposing the sentence and secondly, order to pay compensation has to be passed only at the time of sentencing of the accused following conviction. Therefore, in the event, the accused is not convicted, section 357 would not come into play. 40. This now leads to section 357A, Cr.PC, which was inserted by wav of an amendment w.e.f. 31.12.2009. Section 357A(1) mandates every State Government in coordination with the Central Government to prepare a. scheme for providing funds for the purpose of compensation to the victim or his dependents, who have suffered loss or injury as a result of the crime and who require rehabilitation. As per sub-section (2), whenever a recommendation is made by the court for compensation, the District Legal Services Authority (DLSA) or the State Legal Services Authority (SLSA), as the case may be, shall determine the quantum of compensation to be awarded under the scheme prepared by the State Government Sub-section (3) provides that if the trial court at the conclusion of the trial is satisfied that the compensation awarded under section 357 is not adequate or where the case ends in acquittal or discharge and the victim has to be rehabilitated, it may make recommendation for compensation. Under sub-sections (4) and (5), in case where the offender is not traced or identified, but the victim is identified and where no trial takes place, the victim or his dependent may make an application to the State or the District Legal Service r Authority for award of compensation, where after, the said authority after making due enquiry shall award adequate compensation. 41. The aspect of victim compensation under section 357A, Cr.PC, has received the attention of this court as well of the Apex Court [kindly see Jalilur Rahman v. State of Assam, 2012 (1) GLT 238, Suresh v. State of Haryana: (2015) 2 SCC 449, Manohar Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2015) 3 SCC 449 and State of Madhya Pradesh '. Mehtaab, (2015) 5 SCC 197 ]. Besides explaining the scheme, the Apex Court has made it clear that apart from sentence and fine, compensation has to be paid by the accused and if the accused is not in a position to pay fair compensation, Court has to ensure award of compensation by the State, Court should also be alive to the need of interim compensation and it would be obligatory for the court to refer to section 357A, Cr.PC in each case. The Apex Court also held that the victim compensation scheme adopted by the State of Kerala is an ideal one and all the states should try to emulate the same, providing for compensation up to Rs. 5 lakhs in the case of death. In the case of Suresh (supra), the Apex Court held as under : "16. We are of the view that it is the duty of the courts, on taking cognizance of a criminal offence, to ascertain whether there is tangible material to show commission of crime, whether the victim is identifiable and whether the victim, of crime needs immediate financial relief. On being satisfied on an application or on its own motion, the court ought to direct grant of interim compensation, subject to final compensation being determined later. Such duty continues at every stage of a criminal case where compensation ought to be given and has not been given, irrespective of the application by the victim. On being satisfied on an application or on its own motion, the court ought to direct grant of interim compensation, subject to final compensation being determined later. Such duty continues at every stage of a criminal case where compensation ought to be given and has not been given, irrespective of the application by the victim. At the stage of final hearing it is obligatory on the part of the court to advert to the provision and record a finding whether a case for grant of compensation has been made out and, if so, who is entitled to compensation and how much. Award of such compensation can be interim. Gravity of offence and need of victim are some of the guiding factors to be kept in mind, apart from such other factors as may be found relevant in the facts and circumstances of an individual case. 17. We are also of the view that there is need to consider upward revision in the scale for compensation and pending such consideration to adopt the scale notified by the State of Kerala in its scheme, unless the scale awarded by any other State or Union Territory is higher. The States of Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Meghalaya and Telangana are directed to notify their schemes within one month from receipt of a copy of this order. 18. We also direct that a copy of this judgment be forwarded to National Judicial Academy so that all judicial officers in the country can be imparted requisite training to make the provision operative and meaningful." In Jalilur Rahman (supra), a Division Bench of this court observed, thus : "56. There may be cases, where accused person goes unpunished. In such a case also, the question of rendering justice to the victim of the crime comes. There may be various reasons or consequences for which a guilty may go unpunished. Admittedly, in the absence of proof, beyond all reasonable doubt, the court has no other option but to grant acquittal in favour of the accused person. The responsibility of procuring evidence to prove the guilt, beyond all reasonable doubt, is on the Investigating Agency, i.e., the prosecution. There maybe sufficient lacunae/defects in the investigating process resulting acquittal of the accused. 57. The responsibility of procuring evidence to prove the guilt, beyond all reasonable doubt, is on the Investigating Agency, i.e., the prosecution. There maybe sufficient lacunae/defects in the investigating process resulting acquittal of the accused. 57. The acquittal of the accused person is bound to create a feeling of insecurity in the minds of the victims of the crime as well as their dependents or relatives. 58. As defined by section 2(wa), Cr.PC, "victim" means a person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of the act or omission for which the accused person has bee charged and the expression "Victim" includes his or her guardian or legal heir. 63. Section 357A, Cr.PC itself provides that the State Government, in coordination with the Central Government, has to prepare the said scheme for providing fund for the purpose of payment of compensation to the victims, their legal heirs and dependents. This implies that the Central Government also has the responsibility all together for implementation of the provisions prescribed under section 357A, Cr.PC. Thus, it is dear that the rehabilitation of the victim or their dependents and legal representatives, as the case may be, is also a part of criminal justice delivery system. This requirement is independent of punishment or acquittal awarded to the guilty person. Unless the victim or their dependents), in appropriate cases, are suitably compensated or rehabilitated, justice cannot be said to be done. Because the loss, injury and suffering caused to the victim or his/her dependents will continue, with the existence of a feeling of insecurity unless appropriate measure for rehabilitation is taken" 42. There is nothing in section 357A, Cr.PC to show that victims of juvenile offence are excluded from the benefit of the said provision. It is an all encompassing provision dealing with compensation to the victims of crime, be it committed by a juvenile or by a non-juvenile. That being the position, court is of the view that the present case would be covered by sub-section (3) of section 357A, Cr.PC. It is an all encompassing provision dealing with compensation to the victims of crime, be it committed by a juvenile or by a non-juvenile. That being the position, court is of the view that the present case would be covered by sub-section (3) of section 357A, Cr.PC. Since the enquiry has ended in the acquittal of the juvenile, which finding has been affirmed by this court, it would be appropriate that a recommendation is made to the Assam State Legal Services Authority (ASLSA) for payment of compensation to the guardian of the victim as per the scheme prepared by the State Government and having regard to the law declared by the Supreme Court. It is accordingly made. Member Secretary, Assam State Legal Services Authority (ASLSA) shall do the needful in this regard. Petitioner or any family member of the deceased shall appear before the Member Secretary, Assam State Legal Services Authority (ASLSA), along with a copy of this judgment within 30 days from today, where after, the Member Secretary shall do the needful within 30 days, thereafter. 43. Issue No. 3 is answered accordingly. 44. Having regard to the above, writ petition would stand disposed of in the above terms. No cost(s).