JUDGMENT : S.N. Prasad, J. This writ petition has been filed assailing the award passed in I.D. Case No. 101 of 2000 dated 17.08.2005 whereby and where under the reference has been authorised in favour of the opposite party-workman. 2. Case of the petitioner-State in brief is that the opposite party-workman has never been allowed to continue in service regularly for the period of 240 days and as such he cannot allowed to get protection under Section 25-F of the I.D. Act, 1947 but the Tribunal without appreciating this aspect of the matter has answered the reference by treating the workman in service continuously for a period of 240 days and came to conclusion that the provision of Section 25-F of the I.D. Act, 1947 has not been followed. 3. The case of the workman is that he having been engaged as N.M.R. under the office of Executive Engineer, P.W.D. (R & B) Division, Puri and joined his service on 14.10.1992 and continue to work under the said management till the date of termination i.e., 15.01.1998, hence he has continued to discharge his duty under the Management-petitioner continuously for period of 240 days, hence he is entitled to get protection under Section 25-F of the I.D. Act, 1947 but before retrenching/terminating, the mandatory provision as contemplated under Section 25-F of the I.D. Act, 1947 has not been followed which resulted into raising a dispute before the appropriate Government who on failure of conciliation has made a reference, referred it before the Tribunal within its jurisdiction to adjudicate and accordingly the Tribunal had adjudicated the dispute after going into all aspects of the matter answered the reference in favour of the workman. 4. Opposite party-workman has contended that the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may not interfere under its extra ordinary jurisdiction to reverse the fact finding given by the Tribunal after appreciating the rival submission based upon oral as well as documentary evidence. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents on record. 5. The award has been passed answering the reference which is being reproduced as follows:- “Whether the action of the Executive Engineer, Puri P.W.D. (R&B) Divisin, Puri by terminating the services of Sri Kalandi Ch. Mall, Room Attendant with effect from 15.01.1998 is legal and/or justified ? If not, what relief Sri Mall is entitled to ?” 6. 5. The award has been passed answering the reference which is being reproduced as follows:- “Whether the action of the Executive Engineer, Puri P.W.D. (R&B) Divisin, Puri by terminating the services of Sri Kalandi Ch. Mall, Room Attendant with effect from 15.01.1998 is legal and/or justified ? If not, what relief Sri Mall is entitled to ?” 6. Case of the petitioner-State is that the opposite party-workman has never been allowed to discharge duty continuously for period of 240 days, as such there was no requirement to follow the mandatory provision as contemplated under Section 25-F of the I.D. Act, 1947. 7. While on the other hand the case of opposite party-workman is that he having joined his service as N.M.R. w.e.f. 14.10.1992 continued regularly till 15.01.1998, hence he has completed regular service for more than 240 days as provided under Section 25-F of the I.D. Act, 1947 and therefore he is entitled to get protection under Section 25-F of the I.D. Act, 1947, but before dispensing with the service, the Management-petitioner has not followed the statutory provision as contemplated under Section 25-F of the I.D. Act, 1947, hence the Labour Court has passed the award after appreciating all aspects of the matter. 8. In order to appreciate the rival submission, the award passed by the Tribunal has been perused and from its perusal, it appears that the Tribunal has framed two issues i.e., as follows:- (i) Whether the action of the Executive Engineer, Puri P.W.D. (R & B) Division, Puri by terminating the service of Sri Kalandi Charan Mall, Room Attendant w.e.f. 15.01.1998 is legal and/or justified ? (ii) If not, what relief Sri Mall is entitled to ? The workman in order to substantiate his claim has been examined as W.W.1 and has relied upon the Xerox copies of the documents such as, measurement book for the period from 14.10.1992 to 31.01.1994 and the certificates issued in his favour which has been marked as Exts 1 to 2/b respectively. 9. While, on the other hand, the Management-petitioner has neither examined any witness nor relied upon any document in support of its case. 10. The Tribunal after going through the oral evidence and the arguments and the documentary evidence marked as Ext.1 to 2/b has come to conscious finding that the petitioner has performed his duty from 14.10.1992 to 15.01.1998. 11. While, on the other hand, the Management-petitioner has neither examined any witness nor relied upon any document in support of its case. 10. The Tribunal after going through the oral evidence and the arguments and the documentary evidence marked as Ext.1 to 2/b has come to conscious finding that the petitioner has performed his duty from 14.10.1992 to 15.01.1998. 11. The Tribunal has given its finding on the basis of the fact that the Management has not rebutted the specific stand taken by the workman either by way of oral evidence or by the documentary evidence and as such the Labour Court has passed the award believing on the version of the workman since not rebutted by the State-the petitioner. 12. There is no dispute about the settled proposition that it is very difficult for daily rated employees to have access to the documents like muster roll etc. in connection with his service; and he deposed this before Tribunal, the burden of proof shifts upon the employer to prove that he did not complete 240 days of service in the requisite period to constitute continuous service; reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Director, Fisheries Terminal Division Vs. Bhikubhai Meghajibhai Chavda reported in AIR 2010 SC 1236 , wherein their Lordships at para-15 has been held, which is being quoted herein below:- “Para-15. Applying the principles laid down in the above case by this Court, the evidence produced by the appellants has not been consistent. The appellants claim that the respondent did not work for 240 days. The respondent was a workman hired on a daily wage basis. So it is obvious, as this Court pointed out in the above case that he would have difficulty in having access to all the official documents, muster rolls etc. in connection with his service. The appellants claim that the respondent did not work for 240 days. The respondent was a workman hired on a daily wage basis. So it is obvious, as this Court pointed out in the above case that he would have difficulty in having access to all the official documents, muster rolls etc. in connection with his service. He has come forward and deposed, so in our opinion the burden of proof shifts to the employer/appellants to prove that he did not complete 240 days of service in the requisite period to constitute continuous service.” But we find that no such steps were taken by the management to disprove this fact in spite of full contest in the case, hence the Tribunal has come to finding that the workman has performed his duty regularly for period of 240 days which is the requirement for getting protection under Section 25-F of the I.D. Act, 1947 as contemplated under Section 25-B of the I.D. Act, 1947. 13. The Tribunal after coming to this conclusion has answered the reference in favour of the workman for reinstatement in service however in compensation towards back wages a lump sum amount of Rs.5,000/- has been awarded. After going through the finding given by the Tribunal, we are of conscious view that the finding is based upon documentary evidences produced by the workman which has not been rebutted by the petitioner-State. 14. It is settled that Section 25-F of the I.D. Act, 1947 is mandatorily to be followed as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Bombay and others Vs. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha and others, reported in AIR 1960 SC 610 wherein at paragraph 6 their Lordships have been pleased to hold that on a plain reading of Section 25-F(b) it is clear that the requirement prescribed by it is a condition precedent for the retrenchment of the workman. The section provides that no workman shall be retrenched until the condition in question has been satisfied…………. Having regard to the fact that the words used in plain and unambiguous it seems to us that the Court of Appeal was right in holding that section 25-I covered cases of recovery of monies other than those specified in section 25-F (b)…… Therefore we see no substance in the argument that the Court of Appeal has misconstrued Section 25-F(b). Having regard to the fact that the words used in plain and unambiguous it seems to us that the Court of Appeal was right in holding that section 25-I covered cases of recovery of monies other than those specified in section 25-F (b)…… Therefore we see no substance in the argument that the Court of Appeal has misconstrued Section 25-F(b). That being so, failure to comply with the said provision renders the impugned orders invalid and inoperative. Reference in this regard may also be made to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Gammon India Limited Vs. Niranjan Das reported in (1984) 1 SCC 509 (para 2 to 4). 15. Since, there is violation of provision of Section 25-F of the I.D. Act, 1947 which has been taken into consideration by the Tribunal after going through the rival submission, evidence and documents and as such it cannot be said that the finding given by the Industrial Tribunal is perverse rather we are of the conscious view that the Tribunal has adjudicated the issue on the basis of material produced before him. 16. It is settled that this Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can judicially review the finding given by the Tribunal, if the finding is perverse but nothing has been brought on record to suggest that the finding given by the Tribunal is perverse. Hence, there is no reason to interfere with the finding given by the Tribunal. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court by its Full Bench in the case of Syed Yakoob Vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan and others reported in AIR 1964 SC 477 wherein at paragraph-7 their Lordships have been pleased to hold as follows:- “7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals; these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdictions. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals; these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdictions. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of tact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the. Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was' insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised.” We have also perused the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Swaran Singh and another Vs. State of Punjab and others reported in (1976) 2 SCC 868 , their Lordships discussing the power of writ court under Article 226 for issuance of writ of Certiorari has been pleased to hold at para-12 and 13, that certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from Appellate jurisdiction. The writ jurisdiction can extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice. In regard to finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evident which is legally inadmissible or has refused to admit admissible evidence or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law, a pure error of fact, however grave, cannot be corrected by a writ. In another judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Heinz India Private Limited and another Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others reported in (2012) 5 SCC 443 , their Lordships has been pleased to hold at para-66 and 67, which is being quoted herein below:- “66. In another judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Heinz India Private Limited and another Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others reported in (2012) 5 SCC 443 , their Lordships has been pleased to hold at para-66 and 67, which is being quoted herein below:- “66. That the Court dealing with the exercise of power of judicial review does not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or executive or their agents as to matters within the province of either, and that the court does not supplant “the feel of the expert” by its own review, is also fairly well settled by the decisions of this Court. In all such cases judicial examination is confined to finding out whether the findings of fact have a reasonable on evidence and whether such findings are consistent with the laws of the land. 67. In Dharangadhra Chemical Works Ltd. Vs. State of Saurashtra reported in AIR 1957 SC 264 , this Court held that decision of a tribunal on a question of fact which it has jurisdiction to determine is not liable to be questioned in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution unless it is shown to be totally unsupported by any evidence. In the case of Thansingh Nathmal reported in AIR 1964 SC 1419 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold that the High Court does not generally determine questions which require an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce for which the writ is claimed.” In another judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Jasmer Singh Vs. State of Haryana and another reported in (2015) 4 SCC 458 , their Lordships at para-20 has been pleased to hold which is being reproduced herein below:- “20. State of Haryana and another reported in (2015) 4 SCC 458 , their Lordships at para-20 has been pleased to hold which is being reproduced herein below:- “20. In view of the aforesaid statement of law the setting aside of the award by the learned Single Judge which is affirmed by the Division Bench is vitiated in law as the same is contrary to the judgments of this Curt referred to supra, upon which the learned counsel for the appellant has rightly place reliance in support of the correctness of the finding recorded by the Labour Court on the various issues, particularly the finding of fact that the workman has worked for more than 240 days in a calendar year and termination order is void ab initio in law for non-compliance with Sections 25-F clauses (a) and (b), 25-G and 25-H of the Act, therefore, the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court has rightly set aside the order of termination of services of the workman and awarded the order of reinstatement with continuity of service and full back wages.” Yet in another judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of M/s. Pepsico India Holding Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Krishna Kant Pandey, (2015) 4 SCC 270 wherein their Lordships while discussing the scope of Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in the matter of showing interference with the finding of the Tribunal has been pleased to hold after placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao Vs. Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447 as follows:- “17. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of his Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarta where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and reappreciating. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and reappreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J. as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at p. 1301 of the report as follows: (SCC p. 864, para 7) “The special civil application preferred by the appellant was admittedly an application under Article 227 and it is, therefore, material only to consider the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the High Court under that article. Did the High Court have jurisdiction in an application under Article 227 to disturb the findings of fact reached by the District Court? It is well settled by the decision of this Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath that the ... power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways v. Sukumar Mukherjee to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bose v. Commr. of Hills Division and it was pointed out by Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the court in that case: It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” Thus, it is evident that the proposition laid down in the case of Syed Yakoob (supra) still holds good. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” Thus, it is evident that the proposition laid down in the case of Syed Yakoob (supra) still holds good. Thus it is settled proposition that under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the power of interference is limited only to see that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority, however under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of record and hence if there is no mistake apparent on the face of record, the High Court cannot act as a court of Appeal by appreciating the evidence to substitute the views, but after appreciating rival submission of the parties and on examination of finding given in Award by the Labour Court, we find no mistake apparent on the face of record rather the finding given by the Tribunal is based upon cogent evidence and also the Award is under limits of authority. Hence, we decline to exercise the power conferred under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India to reverse the fact finding given in Award on the basis of the reasons discussed above. In the result, writ petition fails and accordingly it is dismissed.