JUDGMENT : I.P. MUKERJI, J. 1. The petitioners are husband and wife. They are originally from Bihar. They are presently residing in a block of flats on Prince Anwar Shah Road, Kolkata. 2. On 27th November, 2012 they purchased an area measuring about 28,000 sq.ft. on the first and second floors of Fortune Plaza in Benachity, Durgapur for using it for commercial purposes. They applied for mutation to the Durgapur Municipal Corporation. On 25th February, 2015 the Corporation demanded Rs.16,60,500/- as ‘transfer fee’. 3. It seems that on 20th June, 2013 the Mayor-in-Council of the Corporation took a resolution to charge mutation fee ad valorem on property in the following manner: “8. **** (a) Where deed value is between Rs. 1,00,000/- to Rs.1,20,000/- fee was assessed at 1% of the deed value. (b) Where deed value is between Rs. 12,00,001/- to Rs.36,00,000/- fee assessed as 1.5% of the deed value. (c) Where deed value is between Rs. 36,00,000/- and above fee assessed as 2% of the deed value. 4. The aforesaid demand is based on this resolution. 5. This demand is challenged by the writ petitioners. They say that the Corporation has no authority to demand this kind of an exorbitant fee. 6. The decision in this writ will depend on determination of certain very important questions of law raised by the parties. 7. Article 265 of the Constitution of India enacts that no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law. The Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India contains three lists, I, II and III described as the Union List, the State List and the Concurrent List respectively. Entry-5 of the State List confers powers upon the State legislature to make legislation with regard to local government including a Municipal Corporation, etc. This is to be read with Entry-49 which relates to taxes on land and buildings. Entry-66 relates to the power of the legislature of impose fees in respect of any matter mentioned in the State List. It follows that if any fee on the transfer of a property is to be collected by the Corporation it has to have the sanction of the State legislature. The legislature may impose fees by a legislation or delegate its power to the Corporation or any other authority. Mr. It follows that if any fee on the transfer of a property is to be collected by the Corporation it has to have the sanction of the State legislature. The legislature may impose fees by a legislation or delegate its power to the Corporation or any other authority. Mr. Bose for the respondents, very usefully draws this court’s attention to Article 243W and 243X of the Constitution which empower the legislature of a State to pass enabling legislation to make a municipality function and to authorize it to levy collect and appropriate taxes and fees. 8. Section 127 of the West Bengal Municipal Corporation Act, 2006 grants power to the Corporation to alter the “assessment list” on a change of ownership. Under Section 131 (5) of the said Act, on transfer of the property or death of the person primarily responsible for payment of tax, the fact is to be recorded by the Corporation on payment of such fee as may be prescribed by regulations. Section 362 (3) of the said Act lays down that regulations are not valid unless approved by the State Government. 9. No such regulation could be produced by Mr. Bose. 10. The authorities on the subject have to be looked into. 11. In Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority v. Sharad kumar Jayanti Kumar Pasawalla and Others reported in AIR 1992 SC 2038 , cited by Mr. Chakraborty, a levy or development fee could be charged by the State Government under Section 119 of a Town and Planning Act in Gujarat only by virtue of regulations made by the Development Authority. Mr. Justice G.N Ray pronounced the following dictum. 6. *** 12. It appears to us that in a fiscal matter it will not be proper to hold that even in the absence of express provision, a delegated authority can impose tax or fee. In our view, such power of imposition of tax and/or fee by delegated authority must be very specific and there is no scope of implied authority for imposition of such tax or fee. It appears to us that the that the delegated authority must act strictly within the parameters of the authority delegated to it under the Act and it will not be proper to bring the theory of implied intent or the concept of incidental and ancillary power in the matter of exercise of fiscal power. 7. *** 13. It appears to us that the that the delegated authority must act strictly within the parameters of the authority delegated to it under the Act and it will not be proper to bring the theory of implied intent or the concept of incidental and ancillary power in the matter of exercise of fiscal power. 7. *** 13. It has been consistently held by this Court that whenever there is compulsory exaction of any money, there should be specific provision for the same and there is no room for intendment. Nothing is to be read and nothing is to be implied and one should look fairly to the language used.” 14. Calcutta Municipal Corporation and other v. Shrey Mercantile (P) Ltd. and Others reported in (2005) 4 SCC 245 also cited by Mr. Chakraborty, related to fees on ad valorem basis imposed by Kolkata Municipal Corporation, by regulation. Under Section 183(5) of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 the Corporation was given the power to charge fees for mutation. Mr. Justice Kapadia opined that imposition of fees on an ad valorem basis amounted to taxation and that by the said Act the Corporation could make regulations for charging fees only. The court held that taxes were pecuniary burden imposed upon a person to meet the cost of discharging governmental functions whereas fees were charged as consideration for certain services rendered to a particular person. The latter had co relation with the service rendered. The raising of revenue under the taxing power was a tax whereas raising it for “regulation and control” in exercise of the police power of the State was fee. 15. I will read some paragraphs of this judgment: “14. According to "Words & Phrases", Permanent Edition, Vol. 41 Page 230, a charge or fee, if levied for the purpose of raising revenue under the taxing power is a "tax". Similarly, imposition of fees for the primary purpose of "regulation and control" may be classified as fees as it is in the exercise of "police power", but if revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, then the imposition is a "tax". Similarly, imposition of fees for the primary purpose of "regulation and control" may be classified as fees as it is in the exercise of "police power", but if revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, then the imposition is a "tax". A tax is an enforced contribution expected pursuant to a legislative authority for purpose of raising revenue to be used for public or governmental purposes and not as payment for a special privilege or service rendered by a public officer, in which case it is a "fee". Generally speaking "taxes" are burdens of a pecuniary nature imposed for defraying the cost of governmental functions, whereas charges are "fees" where they are imposed upon a person to defray the cost of particular services rendered to his account. 16. Therefore, the main difference between "a fee" and "a tax" is on account of the source of power. Although "police power" is not mentioned in the Constitution, we may rely upon it as a concept to bring out the difference between "a fee" and "a tax". The power to tax must be distinguished from an exercise of the police power. The "police power" is different from the "taxing power" in its essential principles. The power to regulate, control and prohibit with the main object of giving some special benefit to a specific class or group of persons is in the exercise of police power and the charge levied on that class to defray the costs of providing benefit to such a class is "a fee". Therefore, in the afore stated judgment in Kesoram's case, it has been held that where regulation is the primary purpose, its power is referable to the "police power". If the primary purpose in imposing the charge is to regulate, the charge is not a tax even if it produces revenue for the government. But where the government intends to raise revenue as the primary object, the imposition is a tax. In the case of Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of U.P. it has been held that regulation is a necessary concomitant of the police power of the State and that though the doctrine of police power is an American doctrine, the power to regulate is a part of the sovereign power of the State, exercisable by the competent legislature. In the case of Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of U.P. it has been held that regulation is a necessary concomitant of the police power of the State and that though the doctrine of police power is an American doctrine, the power to regulate is a part of the sovereign power of the State, exercisable by the competent legislature. However, as held in Kesoram's case (supra), in the garb of regulation, any fee or levy which has no connection with the cost or expense of administering the regulation cannot be imposed and only such levy can be justified which can be treated as a part of regulatory measure. To that extent, the State's power to regulate as an expression of the sovereign power has its limitations. It is not plenary as in the case of the power of taxation. 18. The Constitution of India postulates either a tax or a fee. However, the use of the expression "tax" or "fee" in a statute is not decisive; as on a proper construction thereof and having regard to its scope and purport "fee" may also be held to be a tax. 21. A distinction must furthermore be borne in mind as regards the sovereign power of the State as understood in India and the doctrine of police power as prevailing in the United States of America. In some jurisdictions a distinction may exist between a police power and a power to tax but as in the Constitution of India, the word "tax" is defined, it has to be interpreted accordingly.” 16. The impugned demand made by respondent-corporation upon the writ petitioner for Rs. 16,60,500/- is ex facie on the basis of valuation of the petitioner’s property. Hence, the demand is ad valorem in nature. It goes without saying that such an imposition amounts to a tax. The Corporation has no authority to impose a tax. 17. In the absence of regulations, no fee could be demanded by the Corporation. 18. Let us assume the Corporation could impose fees. The fee demanded from the writ petitioner is disproportionate to the work which the Corporation has to do for mutation. It has to do the same work for mutating a property worth Rs. 100 as it has to do for a property worth several crores. 18. Let us assume the Corporation could impose fees. The fee demanded from the writ petitioner is disproportionate to the work which the Corporation has to do for mutation. It has to do the same work for mutating a property worth Rs. 100 as it has to do for a property worth several crores. Therefore, this amount of Rs.16 lakhs based on valuation of the property and bearing no correlation to the service rendered by the Corporation is in the nature of taxes and could not have been claimed as fee by the respondent-corporation, even if they were authorized to impose fees. 19. For all these reasons, this writ application succeeds. The impugned letter of demand dated 25th February 2015 is set aside. The resolution of the 274th meeting of the Mayor-in-Council respondent no.1 dated 20th June, 2013 further to which this imposition was made is also set aside and quashed. The Respondent-Corporation will effect mutation of the writ petitioners’ above property, in, accordance with law, within two months of communication of this order. 20. This writ application is allowed. 21. Urgent certified photocopy of this Judgment and order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance with all requisite formalities.